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11 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1960–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Karakas v. Dostgreen1 sentence2016Therefore, we hold that the trial judge committed reversible error in ordering summary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.2(1) on the redemption issue. [Karakas, 67 Mich App at 166-168 (citations omitted).] The Court also concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary disposition for lack of factual merit: We believe plaintiffs’ affidavits in the case at bar raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendants had manifested an intent to not accept tender of payment. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jennesgreen1 sentence1973Ashcroft, named in the information, on the 17th January, 1858, at the Howard House, in the city of Detroit, Wayne county; and the prosecution still insisting that such act has been proven, and that the defendant is liable to be found guilty for such act, that this must be taken to be the offense charged in the information, and is the only one which can be submitted to the jury for their verdict, and that the jury can render their verdict only upon such charge.” People v Jenness, supra, p 310. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Reed
green
2 sentences1986In arguing that the trial judge committed reversible error, defendant relies on the Michigan Supreme Court decision in People v Reed. 1 The Reed Court addressed a trial judge’s refusal to allow a defendant to call the prosecuting attorney as a witness at a hearing held outside the presence of the jury for the express purpose of discovering any evidence suppressed by the prosecutor which could be favorable to the accused pursuant to Brady v Maryland. 2 The Reed Court held that in this situation the trial judge erroneously limited the scope of the Brady hearing, and that once requested, such a h 1986In arguing that the trial judge committed reversible error, defendant relies on the Michigan Supreme Court decision in People v Reed. 1 The Reed Court addressed a trial judge’s refusal to allow a defendant to call the prosecuting attorney as a witness at a hearing held outside the presence of the jury for the express purpose of discovering any evidence suppressed by the prosecutor which could be favorable to the accused pursuant to Brady v Maryland. 2 The Reed Court held that in this situation the trial judge erroneously limited the scope of the Brady hearing, and that once requested, such a h | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Archer v. Burton
green
2 sentences1982We have reviewed plaintiff’s claimed error and find the instruction permissible under our opinion in Archer v Burton, 91 Mich App 57 ; 282 NW2d 833 (1979), lv den 407 Mich 932 (1979). 1982We have reviewed plaintiff’s claimed error and find the instruction permissible under our opinion in Archer v Burton, 91 Mich App 57 ; 282 NW2d 833 (1979), lv den 407 Mich 932 (1979). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
People v. McCoy
green
2 sentences1980No such instruction was requested, but it has been held in People v McCoy, 392 Mich 231, 240 ; 220 NW2d 456 (1974), that it may be reversible error to fail to give such a cautionary instruction even in the absence of a request to charge when the issue is "closely drawn”. 1980No such instruction was requested, but it has been held in People v McCoy, 392 Mich 231, 240 ; 220 NW2d 456 (1974), that it may be reversible error to fail to give such a cautionary instruction even in the absence of a request to charge when the issue is "closely drawn”. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
People v. Hampton
green
2 sentences1977"It is his right to take the stand or he may elect not to do so, as he shall choose, and you are not in any sense to construe that against him.” Defendant’s final allegation is that in view of People v Hampton, 394 Mich 437 ; 231 NW2d 654 (1975), the trial judge committed reversible error. 1977"It is his right to take the stand or he may elect not to do so, as he shall choose, and you are not in any sense to construe that against him.” Defendant’s final allegation is that in view of People v Hampton, 394 Mich 437 ; 231 NW2d 654 (1975), the trial judge committed reversible error. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Carne v. Litchfield
neutral
2 sentences1975Carne v Litchfield, 2 Mich 340 (1852). 1975Carne v Litchfield, 2 Mich 340 (1852). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
People v. Harrington
green
2 sentences1974Defendant cited as authority therefor the cases of People v Harrington, 33 Mich App 548 ; 190 NW2d 343 (1971), and People v Eugene Harris, 43 Mich App *61 531; 204 NW2d 549 (1972). 1974Defendant cited as authority therefor the cases of People v Harrington, 33 Mich App 548 ; 190 NW2d 343 (1971), and People v Eugene Harris, 43 Mich App *61 531; 204 NW2d 549 (1972). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
People v. Eugene Harris
green
1 sentence1974Defendant cited as authority therefor the cases of People v Harrington, 33 Mich App 548 ; 190 NW2d 343 (1971), and People v Eugene Harris, 43 Mich App *61 531; 204 NW2d 549 (1972). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
People v. Farrar
green
1 sentence1973In People v Farrar, 36 Mich App 294 (1971), this Court found that trial judges could admit or exclude prior convictions offered for impeachment purposes within their discretion. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Higdon v. Kelley
green
1 sentence1969Plaintiff claims that because there were inconsistencies in the witness’ testimony at trial and in the deposition, she had a right to use the deposition in examining the witness for these reasons: (a) that she was taken by surprise by the witness’ testimony at the trial and under the authority of Higdon v. Kelley (1954), 339 Mich 209 , she was entitled to use the deposition for the purpose of refreshing the witness’ recollection and of inducing the witness to correct her testimony, and (b) that the witness was a part-time employee of defendants and, therefore, she had a right to use the deposi | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Sedorchuk v. Weeder
green
1 sentence1960In Sedorchuk v. Weeder, 311 Mich 6 , the Court, citing prior decisions, recognized the principle of law that there may be more than 1 proximate cause of an accident and held that the trial judge committed reversible error in referring throughout his charge to' the jury to “the proximate cause.” The Court declared (p 11) that the charge as given “was tantamount to an instruction that, before plaintiff could recover, he must show that defendant’s negligence was ‘the sole’ proximate cause of the accident.” Under the proofs in the instant case the jury may have concluded that the party proceeding | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.