15 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 2004–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Cassill-Skiltongreen2 sentences2017In Cassill-Skilton, a case where an appellant did not receive due process, there was "no record to show the basis of termination, any opportunity for a hearing on the alleged violations, nor any findings to show what evidence the court relied on in finding an agreement violation." 122 Wn. 2007App. 635, 637 , 663 P.2d 120 (1983) (citations omitted); see also State v. Finch, 137 Wn.2d 792, 806 , 975 P.2d 967 (1999) (“a defendant’s right to trial within 60 days is a procedural right which can be waived by defense counsel over defendant’s objection”). ¶18 Relying on Cassill-Skilton, Varnell argues that his right to a termination hearing was a due process right and, therefore, a substantial right. 7 In Cassill-Skilton, we held that the defendant did not receive due process because “there is no record to show the basis of termination, any opportunity for a hearing on the alleged violatio | 3 | 3 |
State v. Finchgreen2 sentences2007A CrR 3.5 hearing is such a procedural matter." State v. Fanger, 34 Wash.App. 635, 637 , 663 P.2d 120 (1983) (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Finch, 137 Wash.2d 792, 806 , 975 P.2d 967 (1999) ("a defendant's right to trial within 60 days is a procedural right which can be waived by defense counsel over defendant's objection"). ¶ 18 Relying on Cassill-Skilton, Varnell argues that his right to a termination hearing was a due process right and, therefore, a substantial right. [7] In Cassill-Skilton, we held that the defendant did not receive due process because "there is no record 2007App. 635, 637 , 663 P.2d 120 (1983) (citations omitted); see also State v. Finch, 137 Wn.2d 792, 806 , 975 P.2d 967 (1999) (“a defendant’s right to trial within 60 days is a procedural right which can be waived by defense counsel over defendant’s objection”). ¶18 Relying on Cassill-Skilton, Varnell argues that his right to a termination hearing was a due process right and, therefore, a substantial right. 7 In Cassill-Skilton, we held that the defendant did not receive due process because “there is no record to show the basis of termination, any opportunity for a hearing on the alleged violatio | 2 | 2 |
State v. Finchgreen2 sentences2007A CrR 3.5 hearing is such a procedural matter." State v. Fanger, 34 Wash.App. 635, 637 , 663 P.2d 120 (1983) (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Finch, 137 Wash.2d 792, 806 , 975 P.2d 967 (1999) ("a defendant's right to trial within 60 days is a procedural right which can be waived by defense counsel over defendant's objection"). ¶ 18 Relying on Cassill-Skilton, Varnell argues that his right to a termination hearing was a due process right and, therefore, a substantial right. [7] In Cassill-Skilton, we held that the defendant did not receive due process because "there is no record 2007App. 635, 637 , 663 P.2d 120 (1983) (citations omitted); see also State v. Finch, 137 Wn.2d 792, 806 , 975 P.2d 967 (1999) (“a defendant’s right to trial within 60 days is a procedural right which can be waived by defense counsel over defendant’s objection”). ¶18 Relying on Cassill-Skilton, Varnell argues that his right to a termination hearing was a due process right and, therefore, a substantial right. 7 In Cassill-Skilton, we held that the defendant did not receive due process because “there is no record to show the basis of termination, any opportunity for a hearing on the alleged violatio | 2 | 2 |
State v. Cassill-Skiltongreen1 sentence2007A CrR 3.5 hearing is such a procedural matter." State v. Fanger, 34 Wash.App. 635, 637 , 663 P.2d 120 (1983) (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Finch, 137 Wash.2d 792, 806 , 975 P.2d 967 (1999) ("a defendant's right to trial within 60 days is a procedural right which can be waived by defense counsel over defendant's objection"). ¶ 18 Relying on Cassill-Skilton, Varnell argues that his right to a termination hearing was a due process right and, therefore, a substantial right. [7] In Cassill-Skilton, we held that the defendant did not receive due process because "there is no record | 1 | 1 |
State v. Marinogreen1 sentence2004Marino held that, “[W]e emphasize, however, that the trial court needs to clearly state the evidence upon which the court relied.” Marino, 100 Wn.2d at 727 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mitchell v. Campbell
green
2 sentences2021Mitchell v. Campbell, 13 P. 190 , 192 16 No. 37400-9-III Umpqua Bank v. Gunzel, III (1886). 2021Mitchell v. Campbell, 13 P. 190 , 192 16 No. 37400-9-III Umpqua Bank v. Gunzel, III (1886). | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America
green
2 sentences2013Id. at 381 . 2013Id. at 381 . | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Fluor Enterprises, Inc. v. WALTER CONST., LTD.
green
2 sentences2011Instead, it contends, it did so to ensure that any appeal of the decision that the Agreement is not a bar to MTCA contribution would be taken before the MTCA allocation process. ¶ 26 The following four elements must be met for a trial court to enter a CR 54(b) final judgment: "`(1) more than one claim for relief or more than one party against whom relief is sought; (2) an express determination that there is no just reason for delay; (3) written findings supporting the determination that there is no just reason for delay; and (4) an express direction for entry of the judgment.'" Fluor Enter., I 2011App. 761, 766-67 , 172 P.3d 368 (2007) (quoting Nelbro Packing Co. v. Baypack Fisheries, LLC, 101 Wn. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Fluor Enterprises, Inc. v. Walter Construction, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2011Instead, it contends, it did so to ensure that any appeal of the decision that the Agreement is not a bar to MTCA contribution would be taken before the MTCA allocation process. ¶ 26 The following four elements must be met for a trial court to enter a CR 54(b) final judgment: "`(1) more than one claim for relief or more than one party against whom relief is sought; (2) an express determination that there is no just reason for delay; (3) written findings supporting the determination that there is no just reason for delay; and (4) an express direction for entry of the judgment.'" Fluor Enter., I 2011Instead, it contends, it did so to ensure that any appeal of the decision that the Agreement is not a bar to MTCA contribution would be taken before the MTCA allocation process. ¶26 The following four elements must be met for a trial court to enter a CR 54(b) final judgment: “ ‘(1) more than one claim for relief or more than one party against whom relief is sought; (2) an express determination that there is no just reason for delay; (3) written findings supporting the determination that there is no just reason for delay; and (4) an express direction for entry of the judgment.’ ” Fluor Enters., | 2 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Fanger
green
2 sentences2007A CrR 3.5 hearing is such a procedural matter." State v. Fanger, 34 Wash.App. 635, 637 , 663 P.2d 120 (1983) (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Finch, 137 Wash.2d 792, 806 , 975 P.2d 967 (1999) ("a defendant's right to trial within 60 days is a procedural right which can be waived by defense counsel over defendant's objection"). ¶ 18 Relying on Cassill-Skilton, Varnell argues that his right to a termination hearing was a due process right and, therefore, a substantial right. [7] In Cassill-Skilton, we held that the defendant did not receive due process because "there is no record 2007App. 635, 637 , 663 P.2d 120 (1983) (citations omitted); see also State v. Finch, 137 Wn.2d 792, 806 , 975 P.2d 967 (1999) (“a defendant’s right to trial within 60 days is a procedural right which can be waived by defense counsel over defendant’s objection”). ¶18 Relying on Cassill-Skilton, Varnell argues that his right to a termination hearing was a due process right and, therefore, a substantial right. 7 In Cassill-Skilton, we held that the defendant did not receive due process because “there is no record to show the basis of termination, any opportunity for a hearing on the alleged violatio | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Willener v. Sweeting
green
1 sentence2025We must first address “whether plaintiffs sufficiently performed under the agreement to claim nonperformance of defendants” and then address “whether the parties’ duties were concurrent conditions or whether plaintiffs were waiting on a condition precedent.” Id. at 394 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Petrich
red
2 sentences2024State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566, 572 , 683 P.2d 173 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d 403, 405-06 , 756 P.2d 105 (1988). 2024State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566, 572 , 683 P.2d 173 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d 403, 405-06 , 756 P.2d 105 (1988). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Kitchen
green
2 sentences2024State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566, 572 , 683 P.2d 173 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d 403, 405-06 , 756 P.2d 105 (1988). 2024State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566, 572 , 683 P.2d 173 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d 403, 405-06 , 756 P.2d 105 (1988). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Condon v. Condon
green
1 sentence2021In Condon v. Condon, 177 Wn.2d 150 (2013), the court addressed whether the trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce a settlement after a stipulated dismissal of claims. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Ish
green
1 sentence2020Ish, 170 Wn.2d at 194 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Knight v. Department of Labor & Industries
green
1 sentence2016This provision is titled "Other agreements affecting instrument."6 It states: Subject to applicable law regarding exclusion of proof of contemporaneous or previous agreements, the obligation of a party to an instrument to pay the instrument may be modified, supplemented, or nullified by a separate agreement of the obligor and a person entitled to enforce the instrument, if the instrument is issued or the obligation is incurred in reliance on the agreement or as part of the same transaction giving rise to the agreement To the extent an obligation is modified, supplemented, or nullified by an ag | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Nelbro Packing Co. v. Baypack Fisheries, L.L.C.
green
1 sentence2011App. 761, 766-67 , 172 P.3d 368 (2007) (quoting Nelbro Packing Co. v. Baypack Fisheries, LLC, 101 Wn. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.