agreement violation in Texas

2025Sacks, P.C. v. Haden, 266 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Tex. 2008) (holding that contract was enforceable because, even though it did not state a total price, it stated the hourly rate and “was therefore sufficiently clear to demonstrate a meeting of the minds[.]”); Penwell v. Barrett, 724 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1987, no writ) (“When an agreement provides a standard to be applied in determining price, the contract is sufficiently definite to be enforceable.”); Katy Int’l., 451 S.W.3d at 85 (agreement that referred to “applicable Securities Commission regulations” was sufficiently definite b

2024CODE § 1271.155(a); see Penwell, 724 S.W.2d at 905 (stating—in case in which parties allegedly agreed in oral contract that purchase price of property would be “that value given the property by an appraiser”—that “[w]hen an agreement provides a standard to be applied in determining price, the contract is sufficiently definite to be enforceable.”).

2013Id. at §§ 7.001, 7.006 (West 2006); see In re Joyner, 196 S.W.3d 883, 889 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. denied).

2013See id. §§ 7.001, 7.006; In re Joyner, 196 S.W.3d 883, 889 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. denied).

2006Cf. Geters , 834 S.W.2d at 50 (statute permitted recovery of "damages" from surety of motor vehicle's bond; court concluded that statute and common meaning of word "damages" did not restrict type of recovery to particular types of damages and concluded that, when legislature has intended such a limitation, it provides the limitation by statute).

2006Cf. Geters, 834 S.W.2d at 50 (statute permitted recovery of “damages” from surety of motor vehicle’s bond; court concluded that statute and common meaning of word “damages” did not restrict type of recovery to particular types of damages and concluded that, when legislature has intended such a limitation, it provides the limitation by statute).

2003In a substantially shorter, but similarly broad, residuary clause, the husband’s retirement benefits were awarded under the divorce decree that incorporated the parties’ agreement when the clause simply covered “all community property not mentioned above.” Jacobs v. Cude, 641 S.W.2d 258, 259 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

2003In a substantially shorter, but similarly broad, residuary clause, the husband's retirement benefits were awarded under the divorce decree that incorporated the parties' agreement when the clause simply covered "all community property not mentioned above." Jacobs v. Cude , 641 S.W.2d 258, 259 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

2018Rather, the non-signatory must “seek to derive a direct benefit” from the agreement such that its claim “depend[s] on the existence of the contract and [would] be unable to stand independently without the contract.” Id. at 527-28 (internal quotations omitted); see, e.g., Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 847-48 (Tex. 2013) (by pursuing a suit based on a trust’s terms and validity, the non-signatory beneficiary was barred by direct benefits estoppel from avoiding a trust’s arbitration provision); In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d at 752-53 , 755- 56 (by suing based on the contract, the plai

2018But the Texas Supreme Court has “found assent by nonsignatories to arbitration provisions when a party has obtained or is seeking substantial benefits under an agreement under the doctrine of direct benefits estoppel.” Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 845–46.

2025Sacks, P.C. v. Haden, 266 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Tex. 2008) (holding that contract was enforceable because, even though it did not state a total price, it stated the hourly rate and “was therefore sufficiently clear to demonstrate a meeting of the minds[.]”); Penwell v. Barrett, 724 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1987, no writ) (“When an agreement provides a standard to be applied in determining price, the contract is sufficiently definite to be enforceable.”); Katy Int’l., 451 S.W.3d at 85 (agreement that referred to “applicable Securities Commission regulations” was sufficiently definite b

2016Sacks, P.C. v. Haden, 266 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Tex. 2008) (holding that, although the parties did not specify an exact total price, their agreement to use hourly rates confirmed that they intended a reasonable price); see also Penwell v. Barrett, 724 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ) (“When an agreement provides a standard to be applied in determining price, the contract is sufficiently definite to be enforceable.”). : ■ We conclude that the 2010 pending-projects clause expressly obligated CTMI to pay Fischer for the value of the projects pending at the end of 2010, and to do so

2011See Freightliner of Knoxville, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Vans, LLC, 484 F.3d 865, 869-70 (6th Cir. 2007) (business relationship between supplier and dealer did not amount to a change in the competitive circumstances of the agreement in violation of statute where the relationship was anticipated by the dealer agreement).

2011See Freightliner of Knoxville, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Vans, LLC, 484 F.3d 865, 869-70 (6th Cir.2007) (business relationship between supplier and dealer did not amount to a change in the competitive circumstances of the agreement in violation of statute where the relationship was anticipated by the dealer agreement).

2009See Tex. Commerce Bank Reagan v. Lebco Constructors, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 68, 76 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (holding that tender of an instruction that misstates the law is not in substantially correct form), overruled on other grounds by Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 530 (Tex. 1998); see also King v. Bank of N.Y., No. 13-07-069-CV, 2008 WL 2764523 , at *6 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi July 17, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that appellant’s proposed instruction was substantively incorrect where appellant failed to include an essentia

2009See Tex. Commerce Bank Reagan v. Lebco Constructors, Inc. , 865 S.W.2d 68, 76 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (holding that tender of an instruction that misstates the law is not in substantially correct form), overruled on other grounds by Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc. , 962 S.W.2d 507, 530 (Tex. 1998); see also King v. Bank of N.Y. , No. 13-07-069-CV, 2008 WL 2764523 , at *6 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi July 17, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that appellant's proposed instruction was substantively incorrect where appellant failed to include an essen

2009See Tex. Commerce Bank Reagan v. Lebco Constructors, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 68, 76 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (holding that tender of an instruction that misstates the law is not in substantially correct form), overruled on other grounds by Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 530 (Tex. 1998); see also King v. Bank of N.Y., No. 13-07-069-CV, 2008 WL 2764523 , at *6 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi July 17, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that appellant’s proposed instruction was substantively incorrect where appellant failed to include an essentia

2009See Tex. Commerce Bank Reagan v. Lebco Constructors, Inc. , 865 S.W.2d 68, 76 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (holding that tender of an instruction that misstates the law is not in substantially correct form), overruled on other grounds by Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc. , 962 S.W.2d 507, 530 (Tex. 1998); see also King v. Bank of N.Y. , No. 13-07-069-CV, 2008 WL 2764523 , at *6 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi July 17, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that appellant's proposed instruction was substantively incorrect where appellant failed to include an essen

2002Co., 915 S.W.2d at 931 (non-signatory’s burden); In re Koch Indus., 49 S.W.3d at 444 (evidence required).

2002Co. , 915 S.W.2d at 931 (non-signatory's burden); In re Koch Indus. , 49 S.W.3d at 444 (evidence required).

2002Co., 915 S.W.2d at 931 (non-signatory’s burden); In re Koch Indus., 49 S.W.3d at 444 (evidence required).

2002Co. , 915 S.W.2d at 931 (non-signatory's burden); In re Koch Indus. , 49 S.W.3d at 444 (evidence required).

2026See Quintero, 654 S.W.2d at 444 (“[O]ur reversal of the judgment of dismissal is without prejudice to the rights of the [defendant] in its attempt to plead and prove an enforceable settlement agreement under the release.”); Burnaman, 240 S.W.2d at 292 (reversing a consent judgment “without prejudice to the right of defendants to plead the agreement in bar of plaintiff’s suit”). 8 OPINION DELIVERED: January 9, 2026 9

2015These are issues to be settled by the jury or the court in a trial of the case. 240 S.W.2d at 292 .

2026“The agreement or instruction need not necessarily involve a quid pro quo; it may be enough for the State to make a ‘conscious decision to obtain the informant’s cooperation’ and for the informant to ‘consciously decide[] to provide that cooperation.’” See Hall v. State, 663 S.W.3d 15 , 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting Rubalcado, 424 S.W.3d at 575-76).

2021The agreement or instruction need not necessarily involve a quid pro quo; it may be enough for the State to make a “conscious decision to obtain the informant’s cooperation” and for the informant to “consciously decide[] to provide that cooperation.” See Rubalcado, 424 S.W.3d at 575–76 (some brackets omitted).

2021Co., 893 S.W.2d 92, 104 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (“The fact that this particular agreement to negotiate in the future includes a term calling for the appellees to put forth a ‘good faith effort’ in the negotiations does not remove the agreement from this rule.

2019Co. , 893 S.W.2d 92 , 104 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) ("The fact that this particular agreement to negotiate in the future includes a term calling for the appellees to put forth a 'good faith effort' in the negotiations does not remove the agreement from this rule.

2018Rather, the non-signatory must “seek to derive a direct benefit” from the agreement such that its claim “depend[s] on the existence of the contract and [would] be unable to stand independently without the contract.” Id. at 527-28 (internal quotations omitted); see, e.g., Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 847-48 (Tex. 2013) (by pursuing a suit based on a trust’s terms and validity, the non-signatory beneficiary was barred by direct benefits estoppel from avoiding a trust’s arbitration provision); In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d at 752-53 , 755- 56 (by suing based on the contract, the plai

2013But we have also found assent by nonsignatories to arbitration provisions when a party has obtained or is *846 seeking substantial benefits under an agreement under the doctrine of direct benefits estoppel. 5 For example, in the case of In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., the de los Santos plaintiffs purchased a mobile home for their daughter and her husband (the Alvarezes, their co-plaintiffs) under a retail installment financing agreement with the seller. 52 S.W.3d 749, 752 (Tex.2001).

2002Because the existence and enforceability of an agreement for immunity must be determined prior to trial, Zani v. State, 701 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Tex.Cr.App. 1985), the State's motion that we abate the appeal and remand the cause to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing is overruled.

1991Turning to the standard established in Zani, 701 S.W.2d 249 , to determine whether an immunity agreement existed, there is no evidence to demonstrate that appellant entered into an immunity agreement with the Liberty County District Attorney’s Office.

2026See Quintero, 654 S.W.2d at 444 (“[O]ur reversal of the judgment of dismissal is without prejudice to the rights of the [defendant] in its attempt to plead and prove an enforceable settlement agreement under the release.”); Burnaman, 240 S.W.2d at 292 (reversing a consent judgment “without prejudice to the right of defendants to plead the agreement in bar of plaintiff’s suit”). 8 OPINION DELIVERED: January 9, 2026 9

2026See Valerus Compression Servs., LP v. Austin, 417 S.W.3d 202 , 210–11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (concluding that later agreement without arbitration clause did not replace earlier agreement with arbitration clause and stating that “[t]he mere presence of venue and merger provisions [in the later agreement] does not invalidate an arbitration agreement when the provisions can be harmonized with the agreement to arbitrate”).

2025Sacks, P.C. v. Haden, 266 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Tex. 2008) (holding that contract was enforceable because, even though it did not state a total price, it stated the hourly rate and “was therefore sufficiently clear to demonstrate a meeting of the minds[.]”); Penwell v. Barrett, 724 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1987, no writ) (“When an agreement provides a standard to be applied in determining price, the contract is sufficiently definite to be enforceable.”); Katy Int’l., 451 S.W.3d at 85 (agreement that referred to “applicable Securities Commission regulations” was sufficiently definite b

2025See generally Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. Crim.

2024See Royston, Rayzor, Vickery, & Williams, LLP v. Lopez, 467 S.W.3d 494 , 499–500 (Tex. 2015). 1 To the extent the scope of the arbitration provision was disputed at the trial court, I note that the arbitration provision provided that “arbitration will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of [Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service (JAMS)]’ Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures.” By this language, the parties incorporated the JAMS rules into their arbitration agreement, and thus the rules are binding, at least absent any conflict between the Company Agreement and the rules

2022Contrary to Lilliman’s assertion, section 1704.001 does not prohibit partnerships from owning or operating bail bond businesses.1 The trial court erred to the extent 1 Moreover, because section 1704.001 does not prohibit partnerships from owning or operating bail bond businesses, Lilliman’s citation to McCreary, 68 S.W.3d at 733 , for the proposition that “an agreement which is in violation of the law also violates public policy, is void and will not be enforced,” is inapplicable in this case. 7 it based summary judgment on this ground.

2022He further argued that “an agreement which is in violation of the law also violates public policy, is void and will not be enforced,” citing McCreary v. Bay Area Bank & Trust, 68 S.W.3d 727, 733 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no writ).

2022A manufacturer of course generally has a right to deal, or refuse to deal, with whomever it likes, as long as it does so independently.”); Theatre Enters., 346 U.S. at 540 (“The crucial question is whether respondents’ conduct toward petitioner stemmed from independent decision or from an agreement, tacit or express.”); In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 396 (3d Cir. 2015) (“An important corollary to the agreement requirement is that § 1 liability cannot be predicated on a defendant’s unilateral actions, no matter its anticompetitive motivations.”); Cap.

2022A manufacturer of course generally has a right to deal, or refuse to deal, with whomever it likes, as long as it does so independently.”); Theatre Enters., 346 U.S. at 540 (“The crucial question is whether respondents’ conduct toward petitioner stemmed from independent decision or from an agreement, tacit or express.”); In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 396 (3d Cir. 2015) (“An important corollary to the agreement requirement is that § 1 liability cannot be predicated on a defendant’s unilateral actions, no matter its anticompetitive motivations.”); Cap.

2021See id.

2020See In re Z.M.R., 562 S.W.3d at 793 ; Lumbis, 65 S.W.3d at 851 ; In re M.B.T., 2016 WL 3896486 , at *3.

2020See In re Z.M.R., 562 S.W.3d at 793 ; Lumbis, 65 S.W.3d at 851 ; In re M.B.T., 2016 WL 3896486 , at *3.