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17 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Danielsgreen2 sentences2006This is the objective law of contract interpretation and construction, Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Cook, 386 Md. 468, 496-497 , 872 A.2d 969, 985 (2005); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Daniels, 303 Md. 254, 261 , 492 A.2d 1306, 1310 (1985); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Insurance Commissioner, 293 Md. 409, 420 , 445 A.2d 14, 19 (1982), which we have explained, as follows: “A court construing an agreement under this test must first determine from the language of the agreement itself what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have meant at the time it was effectuated. 2006This is the objective law of contract interpretation and construction, Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Cook, 386 Md. 468, 496-497 , 872 A.2d 969, 985 (2005); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Daniels, 303 Md. 254, 261 , 492 A.2d 1306, 1310 (1985); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Insurance Commissioner, 293 Md. 409, 420 , 445 A.2d 14, 19 (1982), which we have explained, as follows: “A court construing an agreement under this test must first determine from the language of the agreement itself what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have meant at the time it was effectuated. | 4 | 4 |
Baltimore County Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 4 v. Baltimore Countygreen2 sentences2022See id. at 550-51 , 57 A.3d at 435 . 2022See id. at 550-51 , 57 A.3d at 435 . | 2 | 2 |
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Cookgreen2 sentences2009“Maryland follows the objective law of contract interpretation and construction.” Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Cook, 386 Md. 468, 496 , 872 A.2d 969 (2005). *447 “A court construing an agreement under this test must first determine from the language of the agreement itself what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have meant at the time it was effectuated. 2009“Maryland follows the objective law of contract interpretation and construction.” Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Cook, 386 Md. 468, 496 , 872 A.2d 969 (2005). *447 “A court construing an agreement under this test must first determine from the language of the agreement itself what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have meant at the time it was effectuated. | 1 | 2 |
Cure v. Stategreen1 sentence2020In support, the Court cited to Cure v. State, 421 Md. 300, 318, 321 (2011), where the Court adopted the reasoning of a dissent in a “fractured” decision, noting that, “[f]or purposes of stare decisis . . . this is a proposition that garnered the support of four Judges.” It also cited to State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205 , 213 n.6 (1994), where the Court held that the issue whether a crime bore on witness credibility was a matter of law, noting the parties’ agreement with this standard and that four judges, in concurring and dissenting opinions, in a prior opinion had come to that conclusion. | 1 | 1 |
Chertkov v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Chertkov v. State, 335 Md. 161, 163 , 642 A.2d 232, 233 (1994). 8 The Chertkov Court found that the trial court illegally modified the agreement in violation of the preexisting plea agreement. 2013Chertkov v. State, 335 Md. 161, 163 , 642 A.2d 232, 233 (1994). 8 The Chertkov Court found that the trial court illegally modified the agreement in violation of the preexisting plea agreement. | 1 | 1 |
White v. Pines Community Improvement Ass'ngreen2 sentences2009As we stated in White v. Pines Community Improvement Association, Inc., 403 Md. 13, 32 , 939 A.2d 165, 176 (2008), the language of the agreement itself is of foremost importance: *63 “ ‘A court construing an agreement under this test must first determine from the language of the agreement itself what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have meant at the time it was effectuated. 2009As we stated in White v. Pines Community Improvement Association, Inc., 403 Md. 13, 32 , 939 A.2d 165, 176 (2008), the language of the agreement itself is of foremost importance: *63 “ ‘A court construing an agreement under this test must first determine from the language of the agreement itself what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have meant at the time it was effectuated. | 1 | 1 |
Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2009In addition, when the language of the contract is plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction, and a court must presume that the parties meant what they expressed.’ ” (Citations omitted.) The principles of deed construction require, moreover, consideration of “the character of the contract, its purpose, and the facts and circumstances of the parties at the time of execution[.]” Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 355 Md. 110, 123 , 733 A.2d 1055, 1062 (1999) (citations omitted). “[W]e must consider the deed as a whole, viewing its language in light of the facts and circumstances 2009In addition, when the language of the contract is plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction, and a court must presume that the parties meant what they expressed.’ ” (Citations omitted.) The principles of deed construction require, moreover, consideration of “the character of the contract, its purpose, and the facts and circumstances of the parties at the time of execution[.]” Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 355 Md. 110, 123 , 733 A.2d 1055, 1062 (1999) (citations omitted). “[W]e must consider the deed as a whole, viewing its language in light of the facts and circumstances | 1 | 1 |
Aetna Cas. & Sur. v. Ins. Comm'rgreen2 sentences2006This is the objective law of contract interpretation and construction, Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Cook, 386 Md. 468, 496-497 , 872 A.2d 969, 985 (2005); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Daniels, 303 Md. 254, 261 , 492 A.2d 1306, 1310 (1985); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Insurance Commissioner, 293 Md. 409, 420 , 445 A.2d 14, 19 (1982), which we have explained, as follows: “A court construing an agreement under this test must first determine from the language of the agreement itself what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have meant at the time it was effectuated. 2006This is the objective law of contract interpretation and construction, Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Cook, 386 Md. 468, 496-497 , 872 A.2d 969, 985 (2005); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Daniels, 303 Md. 254, 261 , 492 A.2d 1306, 1310 (1985); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Insurance Commissioner, 293 Md. 409, 420 , 445 A.2d 14, 19 (1982), which we have explained, as follows: “A court construing an agreement under this test must first determine from the language of the agreement itself what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have meant at the time it was effectuated. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Giddens
green
1 sentence2020In support, the Court cited to Cure v. State, 421 Md. 300, 318, 321 (2011), where the Court adopted the reasoning of a dissent in a “fractured” decision, noting that, “[f]or purposes of stare decisis . . . this is a proposition that garnered the support of four Judges.” It also cited to State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205 , 213 n.6 (1994), where the Court held that the issue whether a crime bore on witness credibility was a matter of law, noting the parties’ agreement with this standard and that four judges, in concurring and dissenting opinions, in a prior opinion had come to that conclusion. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Falcon
green
1 sentence2020In Falcon, 451 Md. at 171–72, the Court examined the legal propositions set forth in the four separate opinions in a prior case with no majority opinion. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Johnson v. State
green
1 sentence2019The agreement, therefore, induced the plea, secured the finding of guilt, and gave the court the authority to impose sentence.”14 Because of that alleged inducement, he avers that “[t]he relationship between the agreement, conviction, breach and illegal sentence are therefore so intrinsically intertwined that the remedy cannot be limited merely to sentence correction; the error does not affect only the sentence, but infects and vitiates the regularity of the underlying conviction itself.” Hughes also refers us to Johnson v. State, 427 Md. 356 (2012) to support his assertion that [b]ecause the | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Woodson v. Saldana
green
2 sentences2010If Husband retires on reserve status, 18 the numerator is “the number of military reserve retirement points accumulated by the Member during the parties’ marriage.” The parties are in agreement as to this figure and we agree that it is accurate. 19 See Woodson v. Saldana, 165 Md.App. 480, 485-491 , 885 A.2d 907 (2005) (discussing calculation of the marital portion of military reserve retirement benefits). 2010If Husband retires on reserve status, 18 the numerator is “the number of military reserve retirement points accumulated by the Member during the parties’ marriage.” The parties are in agreement as to this figure and we agree that it is accurate. 19 See Woodson v. Saldana, 165 Md.App. 480, 485-491 , 885 A.2d 907 (2005) (discussing calculation of the marital portion of military reserve retirement benefits). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Washington Homes, Inc. v. Interstate Land Development Co.
green
2 sentences2006We are reminded of what the Court said in Washington Homes, 281 Md. at 728 , 382 A.2d 555 : “Repudiation of a contract by one party gives the other party a choice of remedies.” (Emphasis added; citations omitted.) Appellee’s defense of the appeal in Maslow I did not bar his right to oppose appellant’s motion to enforce the Agreement. 2006We are reminded of what the Court said in Washington Homes, 281 Md. at 728 , 382 A.2d 555 : “Repudiation of a contract by one party gives the other party a choice of remedies.” (Emphasis added; citations omitted.) Appellee’s defense of the appeal in Maslow I did not bar his right to oppose appellant’s motion to enforce the Agreement. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Formento v. Encanto Business Park
green
2 sentences2002Agristor Leasing v. Saylor, 803 F.2d 1401 (6th Cir.1986); Moffatt Enters., Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 807 F.2d 1169 (3d Cir.1986) (applying Pennsylvania law); Formento[ v. Encanto Business Park], 154 Ariz. 495 , 744 P.2d 22 ; Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md. 328 , 439 A.2d 534 (1982); Gilliland v. Elmwood Properties, 301 S.C. 295 , 391 S.E.2d 577 (1990). 2002Agristor Leasing v. Saylor, 803 F.2d 1401 (6th Cir.1986); Moffatt Enters., Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 807 F.2d 1169 (3d Cir.1986) (applying Pennsylvania law); Formento[ v. Encanto Business Park], 154 Ariz. 495 , 744 P.2d 22 ; Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md. 328 , 439 A.2d 534 (1982); Gilliland v. Elmwood Properties, 301 S.C. 295 , 391 S.E.2d 577 (1990). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
cluster 478579
green
1 sentence2002Agristor Leasing v. Saylor, 803 F.2d 1401 (6th Cir.1986); Moffatt Enters., Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 807 F.2d 1169 (3d Cir.1986) (applying Pennsylvania law); Formento[ v. Encanto Business Park], 154 Ariz. 495 , 744 P.2d 22 ; Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md. 328 , 439 A.2d 534 (1982); Gilliland v. Elmwood Properties, 301 S.C. 295 , 391 S.E.2d 577 (1990). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
cluster 480740
green
1 sentence2002Agristor Leasing v. Saylor, 803 F.2d 1401 (6th Cir.1986); Moffatt Enters., Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 807 F.2d 1169 (3d Cir.1986) (applying Pennsylvania law); Formento[ v. Encanto Business Park], 154 Ariz. 495 , 744 P.2d 22 ; Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md. 328 , 439 A.2d 534 (1982); Gilliland v. Elmwood Properties, 301 S.C. 295 , 391 S.E.2d 577 (1990). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Gilliland v. Elmwood Properties
green
2 sentences2002Agristor Leasing v. Saylor, 803 F.2d 1401 (6th Cir.1986); Moffatt Enters., Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 807 F.2d 1169 (3d Cir.1986) (applying Pennsylvania law); Formento[ v. Encanto Business Park], 154 Ariz. 495 , 744 P.2d 22 ; Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md. 328 , 439 A.2d 534 (1982); Gilliland v. Elmwood Properties, 301 S.C. 295 , 391 S.E.2d 577 (1990). 2002Agristor Leasing v. Saylor, 803 F.2d 1401 (6th Cir.1986); Moffatt Enters., Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 807 F.2d 1169 (3d Cir.1986) (applying Pennsylvania law); Formento[ v. Encanto Business Park], 154 Ariz. 495 , 744 P.2d 22 ; Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md. 328 , 439 A.2d 534 (1982); Gilliland v. Elmwood Properties, 301 S.C. 295 , 391 S.E.2d 577 (1990). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Keller v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc.
green
1 sentence2002Smith Harvestore Products, Inc., 819 P.2d 69 (Colo.1991): Many other courts have also concluded that the mere presence of a general integration clause in an agreement does not bar a claim for negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney
green
2 sentences2002Agristor Leasing v. Saylor, 803 F.2d 1401 (6th Cir.1986); Moffatt Enters., Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 807 F.2d 1169 (3d Cir.1986) (applying Pennsylvania law); Formento[ v. Encanto Business Park], 154 Ariz. 495 , 744 P.2d 22 ; Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md. 328 , 439 A.2d 534 (1982); Gilliland v. Elmwood Properties, 301 S.C. 295 , 391 S.E.2d 577 (1990). 2002Agristor Leasing v. Saylor, 803 F.2d 1401 (6th Cir.1986); Moffatt Enters., Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 807 F.2d 1169 (3d Cir.1986) (applying Pennsylvania law); Formento[ v. Encanto Business Park], 154 Ariz. 495 , 744 P.2d 22 ; Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md. 328 , 439 A.2d 534 (1982); Gilliland v. Elmwood Properties, 301 S.C. 295 , 391 S.E.2d 577 (1990). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Zouck v. Zouck
green
2 sentences1985He did not challenge the fairness of the amount he agreed to pay nor claim that he was unable to pay it, or that its payment would be a hardship on him.” 204 Md. at 296 , 104 A.2d at 577-78 . 1985He did not challenge the fairness of the amount he agreed to pay nor claim that he was unable to pay it, or that its payment would be a hardship on him.” 204 Md. at 296 , 104 A.2d at 577-78 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Klein v. Whitehead
green
1 sentence1979The court concluded, however, that the issue of monies allegedly due under the Dealer’s Agreement was a defense in the nature of a set-off to the Bank’s action for monies due under the Continuing Dealer’s Floor Plan Agreement, and that: “[w]hen judgment was rendered for the Plaintiff Savings Bank against the Defendant Ziegler for the breach of the ‘Continuing Floor Plan Agreement’ without any allowance for set-off on the basis of the defense of monies due under the Dealer’s Agreement, that defense was adjudicated and obviously denied by the Court.” We had occasion recently to discuss the allie | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Marburg v. Mercantile Building Co.
neutral
1 sentence1977Co., 154 Md. 438 and Goldsmith v. Mfgrs’ Liability I. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.