71 California opinions name it 4 courts 1902–2024 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Socol v. Kinggreen2 sentences1979(Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal.2d 202, 212-213 [ 259 P.2d 656 ]; Socol v. King, 36 Cal.2d 342, 345-346 [ 223 P.2d 627 ].)” (Italics added.) In In re Marriage of Frapwell (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 597 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 718 ], a husband changed two separate savings accounts to joint accounts with his wife. 1979(Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal.2d 202, 212-213 [ 259 P.2d 656 ]; Socol v. King, 36 Cal.2d 342, 345-346 [ 223 P.2d 627 ].)” (Italics added.) In In re Marriage of Frapwell (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 597 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 718 ], a husband changed two separate savings accounts to joint accounts with his wife. | 5 | 5 |
Gudelj v. Gudeljgreen2 sentences1979(Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal.2d 202, 212-213 [ 259 P.2d 656 ]; Socol v. King, 36 Cal.2d 342, 345-346 [ 223 P.2d 627 ].)” (Italics added.) In In re Marriage of Frapwell (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 597 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 718 ], a husband changed two separate savings accounts to joint accounts with his wife. 1979(Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal.2d 202, 212-213 [ 259 P.2d 656 ]; Socol v. King, 36 Cal.2d 342, 345-346 [ 223 P.2d 627 ].)” (Italics added.) In In re Marriage of Frapwell (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 597 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 718 ], a husband changed two separate savings accounts to joint accounts with his wife. | 5 | 5 |
Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc.green2 sentences2023Procedural Unconscionability Our Supreme Court has often explained that “[a] procedural unconscionability analysis ‘begins with an inquiry into whether the contract is one of adhesion.’ (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 113 .) An adhesive contract is standardized, generally on a preprinted form, and offered by the party with superior bargaining power ‘on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.’ (Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1245 (Baltazar); see Armendariz, at p. 113.) Arbitration contracts imposed as a condition of employment are typically adhesive (see Armendariz, at pp. 114–1 2019A procedural unconscionability analysis “begins with an inquiry into whether the contract is one of adhesion.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 113 .) An adhesive contract is standardized, generally on a preprinted form, and offered by the party with superior bargaining power “on a take-it-or-leave- it basis.” (Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1245 (Baltazar); see Armendariz, at p. 113.) Arbitration 14 OTO, L.L.C. v. KHO Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. contracts imposed as a condition of employment are typically adhesive (see Armendariz, at pp. 114-115; Serpa v. Ca | 2 | 2 |
Tracer Research Corp. v. National Environmental Services Company, Doing Business as Nesco Lab One Analytical, Inc. Eddy Paterson Albert McCutchangreen2 sentences2015(See Tracer, supra, 42 F.3d at p. 1295 [“an arbitration clause that covers disputes ‘arising under’ an agreement. .. covered only those disputes ‘relating to the interpretation and performance of the contract itself’ ”]; Mediterranean Enterprises, Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp. (9th Cir. 1983) 708 F.2d 1458, 1464 [“when an arbitration clause ‘refers to disputes or controversies “under” or “arising out of’ the contract,’ arbitration is restricted to ‘disputes and controversies relating to the interpretation of the contract and matters of performance’ ”].) Therefore, whether the arbitration provision p 2015(See Tracer, supra, 42 F.3d at 1295 ["an arbitration clause that covers disputes 'arising under' an agreement ... covered only those disputes 'relating to the interpretation and performance of the contract itself' "]; Mediterranean Enterprises, Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp. (9th Cir.1983) 708 F.2d 1458 , 1464 ["when an arbitration clause 'refers to disputes or controversies "under" or "arising out of" the contract,' arbitration is restricted to 'disputes and controversies relating to the interpretation of the contract and matters of performance' "].) Therefore, whether the arbitration provision perm | 2 | 2 |
Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc.green2 sentences2023Procedural Unconscionability Our Supreme Court has often explained that “[a] procedural unconscionability analysis ‘begins with an inquiry into whether the contract is one of adhesion.’ (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 113 .) An adhesive contract is standardized, generally on a preprinted form, and offered by the party with superior bargaining power ‘on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.’ (Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1245 (Baltazar); see Armendariz, at p. 113.) Arbitration contracts imposed as a condition of employment are typically adhesive (see Armendariz, at pp. 114–1 2019A procedural unconscionability analysis “begins with an inquiry into whether the contract is one of adhesion.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 113 .) An adhesive contract is standardized, generally on a preprinted form, and offered by the party with superior bargaining power “on a take-it-or-leave- it basis.” (Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1245 (Baltazar); see Armendariz, at p. 113.) Arbitration 14 OTO, L.L.C. v. KHO Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. contracts imposed as a condition of employment are typically adhesive (see Armendariz, at pp. 114-115; Serpa v. Ca | 1 | 2 |
Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLCred2 sentences2023(Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 360, 384 (Iskanian), overruled in part by Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. – [213 L.Ed.2d at p. 200] [“[A]n arbitration agreement requiring an employee as a condition of employment to give up the right to bring representative PAGA actions in any forum is contrary to public policy” and “unenforceable as a matter of state law”].) Moreover, the court decided that the express terms of the Agreement required that the waiver provision be severed. 2023In Iskanian, our high court held an agreement that required the waiver of “ ‘representative actions’ ” undisputedly “cover[ed] representative actions brought under [PAGA].” (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 378 .) Paragraph 7 expressly precludes the right to bring any representative action in arbitration and court. | 1 | 2 |
Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitalsgreen2 sentences2016(See Desert Outdoor Advertising v. Superior Court (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 866, 872 [“[a] cardinal rule of contract law is that a party’s failure to read a contract, or to carefully read a contract, before signing it is no defense to the contract’s enforcement”]; Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 710 [“one who assents to a contract is bound by its provisions and cannot complain of unfamiliarity with the language of the 2 instrument”].) b. 1985(See, e.g., Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, supra, 17 Cal.3d 699 ; Wilson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1983) 141 Cal. App.3d 891, 894 [ 190 Cal. Rptr. 649 ].) The last two pages of the Agreement, which contain spaces for the signatures of representatives of both sides, are simply attached to Kaiser's standard Medical and Hospital Services Agreement. | 1 | 2 |
Mediterranean Enterprises, Inc. v. Ssangyong Corporationgreen2 sentences2015(See Tracer, supra, 42 F.3d at p. 1295 [“an arbitration clause that covers disputes ‘arising under’ an agreement. .. covered only those disputes ‘relating to the interpretation and performance of the contract itself’ ”]; Mediterranean Enterprises, Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp. (9th Cir. 1983) 708 F.2d 1458, 1464 [“when an arbitration clause ‘refers to disputes or controversies “under” or “arising out of’ the contract,’ arbitration is restricted to ‘disputes and controversies relating to the interpretation of the contract and matters of performance’ ”].) Therefore, whether the arbitration provision p 2015(See Tracer, supra, 42 F.3d at 1295 ["an arbitration clause that covers disputes 'arising under' an agreement ... covered only those disputes 'relating to the interpretation and performance of the contract itself' "]; Mediterranean Enterprises, Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp. (9th Cir.1983) 708 F.2d 1458 , 1464 ["when an arbitration clause 'refers to disputes or controversies "under" or "arising out of" the contract,' arbitration is restricted to 'disputes and controversies relating to the interpretation of the contract and matters of performance' "].) Therefore, whether the arbitration provision perm | 1 | 2 |
Goldman v. KPMG, LLPgreen1 sentence2024(Goldman v. KPMG, LLP (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 209, 220 (Goldman).) In the arbitration context, “if a plaintiff relies on the terms of an agreement to assert his or her claims against a nonsignatory defendant, the plaintiff may be equitably estopped from repudiating the arbitration clause of that very agreement. | 1 | 1 |
Medeiros v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2023(Zembsch, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 161 .) Although petitioner does not assert that arbitration would be too costly or inefficient, it necessarily follows that arbitration of any claim “compelled in the absence of a valid, enforceable arbitration agreement is an unduly time consuming and expensive proposition.” (Medeiros v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1014, fn. 7 .) Writ review “avoid[s] having [the] parties try a case in a forum where they do not belong, only to have to do it all over again in the appropriate forum.” (Ibid.) Having concluded that writ review is appropriate, | 1 | 1 |
Desert Outdoor Advertising v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2016(See Desert Outdoor Advertising v. Superior Court (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 866, 872 [“[a] cardinal rule of contract law is that a party’s failure to read a contract, or to carefully read a contract, before signing it is no defense to the contract’s enforcement”]; Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 710 [“one who assents to a contract is bound by its provisions and cannot complain of unfamiliarity with the language of the 2 instrument”].) b. | 1 | 1 |
Marshall & Co. v. Weiselgreen1 sentence2015(See Marshall & Co. v. Weisel (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 191, 196 [“„A contract is construed most strongly against the party who drafts or supplies it‟”].) 6 based on any breach of the agreement, and plaintiff has not cited anything indicating it did not mean what it clearly stated in paragraph 9(b)(1) of the agreement. | 1 | 1 |
Cruz v. Ayromloogreen1 sentence2014(See Maynard v. BTI Group, Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 984, 992-993 [“ ‘the broad language of the attorney fee clause . . . permitted recovery of attorney fees for breach of contract or any other claim asserted in connection with the lease’ ”]; Cruz v. Ayromloo (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1277 [clause allowing recovery of attorney fees for any claim asserted in connection with the lease encompassed both contract and tort causes of action].) Defendants asserted their novation defense because of a dispute “in connection with” the option agreement, and in particular the integration clause—specif | 1 | 1 |
Maynard v. BTI Group, Inc.green1 sentence2014(See Maynard v. BTI Group, Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 984, 992-993 [“ ‘the broad language of the attorney fee clause . . . permitted recovery of attorney fees for breach of contract or any other claim asserted in connection with the lease’ ”]; Cruz v. Ayromloo (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1277 [clause allowing recovery of attorney fees for any claim asserted in connection with the lease encompassed both contract and tort causes of action].) Defendants asserted their novation defense because of a dispute “in connection with” the option agreement, and in particular the integration clause—specif | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bonillagreen1 sentence2013The Supreme Court held that this was proper, and distinguished Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th 792 , on the basis that the accomplice‟s plea agreement in Bonilla did not contain any provision indicating that the prosecution “had made or would make any preliminary determination that [the accomplice] was being truthful.” (Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 338, fn. 9 .) The court went on to reject the contention that admission of the agreement was error because the provision making the agreement contingent on the accomplice‟s truthfulness at trial would lead the jury to conclude that the prosecutor belie | 1 | 1 |
Chin v. Namvargreen1 sentence2013(See Chin v. Namvar (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 994, 1009 [reviewing court must presume judgment is correct; it is up to appealing party to 19 identifiable ambiguity in the agreement or challenge to the underlying validity of the plea itself for which extrinsic evidence would be helpful (see People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 767 ), any ancillary discussions concerning the effect of the 1999 conviction in the event of an amendment to the relevant law are immaterial. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Puentegreen1 sentence2013(See ibid. [if language in plea is clear and explicit, it governs]; People v. Puente (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1149 [same].) Unless identified in the record and approved by the court, such pre-plea discussions are not part of the bargain. | 1 | 1 |
Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.green1 sentence2013(Ibid.; see Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (9th Cir. 2007) 509 F.3d 978, 991 ; Burnside v. Kiewit Pacific Corp. (9th Cir. 2007) 491 F.3d 1053, 1060 .) Only if the court must “construe” disputed terms of the agreement will the claim be preempted. | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Bachgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Severance v. Knight-Counihan Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angelesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Madison v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| City of Los Angeles v. Colegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Paralift, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Saenz v. Whitewater Voyages, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Hilton v. McNittgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Manchenogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Santobello v. New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Walkergreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Marriage of Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Russell v. Riley & Petersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wilson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitalsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gamer v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Watsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Schindler v. Schindlergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Firlotte v. Jesseegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fox v. Foxgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Flynn v. Flynngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Oto, L. L.C. v. Kho
green
2 sentences2024The pertinent question, then, is whether circumstances of the contract’s formation created such oppression or surprise that closer scrutiny of its overall fairness is required. [Citations.] ‘ “ ‘Oppression occurs where a contract involves lack of negotiation and meaningful choice, surprise where the allegedly unconscionable provision is hidden within a prolix printed form.’ ” ’ ” (OTO, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 126 , original italics.) “ ‘The circumstances relevant to establishing oppression include, but are not limited to (1) the amount of time the party is given to consider the proposed contrac 2023Procedural Unconscionability Our Supreme Court has often explained that “[a] procedural unconscionability analysis ‘begins with an inquiry into whether the contract is one of adhesion.’ (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 113 .) An adhesive contract is standardized, generally on a preprinted form, and offered by the party with superior bargaining power ‘on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.’ (Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1245 (Baltazar); see Armendariz, at p. 113.) Arbitration contracts imposed as a condition of employment are typically adhesive (see Armendariz, at pp. 114–1 | 4 | 2021–2024 |
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc.
green
2 sentences2023Procedural Unconscionability Our Supreme Court has often explained that “[a] procedural unconscionability analysis ‘begins with an inquiry into whether the contract is one of adhesion.’ (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 113 .) An adhesive contract is standardized, generally on a preprinted form, and offered by the party with superior bargaining power ‘on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.’ (Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1245 (Baltazar); see Armendariz, at p. 113.) Arbitration contracts imposed as a condition of employment are typically adhesive (see Armendariz, at pp. 114–1 2019A procedural unconscionability analysis “begins with an inquiry into whether the contract is one of adhesion.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 113 .) An adhesive contract is standardized, generally on a preprinted form, and offered by the party with superior bargaining power “on a take-it-or-leave- it basis.” (Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1245 (Baltazar); see Armendariz, at p. 113.) Arbitration 14 OTO, L.L.C. v. KHO Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. contracts imposed as a condition of employment are typically adhesive (see Armendariz, at pp. 114-115; Serpa v. Ca | 3 | 2002–2023 |
Stephen Morris v. Ernst & Young
green
2 sentences2017The Ninth and Seventh Circuits have held that waivers of classwide 8 Section 7 of the NLRA states that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requirement membership in a labor organization as a condition of empl 2017The Ninth and Seventh Circuits have held that waivers of classwide 8 Section 7 of the NLRA states that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requirement membership in a labor organization as a condition of empl | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Jacob Lewis v. Epic Systems Corporation
green
2 sentences2017Corp. (7th Cir. 2016) 823 F.3d 1147, 1155 ) while other circuit courts have rejected that position and found such waivers of class actions enforceable. 2017Corp. (7th Cir. 2016) 823 F.3d 1147, 1155 ) while other circuit courts have rejected that position and found such waivers of class actions enforceable. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
ZEMBSCH v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2023(Zembsch, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 161 .) Although petitioner does not assert that arbitration would be too costly or inefficient, it necessarily follows that arbitration of any claim “compelled in the absence of a valid, enforceable arbitration agreement is an unduly time consuming and expensive proposition.” (Medeiros v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1014, fn. 7 .) Writ review “avoid[s] having [the] parties try a case in a forum where they do not belong, only to have to do it all over again in the appropriate forum.” (Ibid.) Having concluded that writ review is appropriate, | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna
green
2 sentences2020(Id. at p. 398.) Subsequently, in Buckeye, supra, 546 U.S. 440 , a borrower alleged that a check cashing company charged usurious interest rates, rendering the entire agreement with the check cashing company “illegal and void abinitio.” (Id. at p. 443.) The Supreme Court held “Prima Paint’s rule of 31 severability required that the arbitrator decide the challenge to the arbitration provision contained in the parties’ agreement because the challenge was “to the validity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause . . . .” (Buckeye, at p. 449.) The Supreme Court st 2020(Id. at p. 398.) Subsequently, in Buckeye, supra, 546 U.S. 440 , a borrower alleged that a check cashing company charged usurious interest rates, rendering the entire agreement with the check cashing company “illegal and void abinitio.” (Id. at p. 443.) The Supreme Court held “Prima Paint’s rule of 31 severability required that the arbitrator decide the challenge to the arbitration provision contained in the parties’ agreement because the challenge was “to the validity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause . . . .” (Buckeye, at p. 449.) The Supreme Court st | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Preston v. Ferrer
green
2 sentences2020(Id. at p. 398.) Subsequently, in Buckeye, supra, 546 U.S. 440 , a borrower alleged that a check cashing company charged usurious interest rates, rendering the entire agreement with the check cashing company “illegal and void abinitio.” (Id. at p. 443.) The Supreme Court held “Prima Paint’s rule of 31 severability required that the arbitrator decide the challenge to the arbitration provision contained in the parties’ agreement because the challenge was “to the validity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause . . . .” (Buckeye, at p. 449.) The Supreme Court st 2020(Id. at p. 398.) Subsequently, in Buckeye, supra, 546 U.S. 440 , a borrower alleged that a check cashing company charged usurious interest rates, rendering the entire agreement with the check cashing company “illegal and void abinitio.” (Id. at p. 443.) The Supreme Court held “Prima Paint’s rule of 31 severability required that the arbitrator decide the challenge to the arbitration provision contained in the parties’ agreement because the challenge was “to the validity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause . . . .” (Buckeye, at p. 449.) The Supreme Court st | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Westra v. Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Brokerage Co.
green
2 sentences2019However, an agency or similar relationship between the nonsignatory and one of the parties to the arbitration agreement allows enforcement by the nonsignatory. ( Westra v. Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Brokerage Co., Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 759 , 763-766, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 752 [agent of a signatory party to an arbitration agreement may compel arbitration, even if the agent did not sign the agreement].) Appellants' co-employer relationship and identity of interest with regard to their mutual employees allows them to compel arbitration of an employment dispute. 2019However, an agency or similar relationship between the nonsignatory and one of the parties to the arbitration agreement allows enforcement by the nonsignatory. ( Westra v. Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Brokerage Co., Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 759 , 763-766, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 752 [agent of a signatory party to an arbitration agreement may compel arbitration, even if the agent did not sign the agreement].) Appellants' co-employer relationship and identity of interest with regard to their mutual employees allows them to compel arbitration of an employment dispute. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.
green
1 sentence2018Federal labor law preempts a state-law claim that is either "founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements" or " 'substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.' " ( Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams (1987) 482 U.S. 386 , 394, 107 S.Ct. 2425 , 96 L.Ed.2d 318 .) However, it does not preempt a state-law claim merely because a party raises a defense that requires a court to interpret or apply a collective-bargaining agreement. ( Id . at p. 398, 107 S.Ct. 2425 .) Here, the Employees' claims do not require an analysis of the Agreement; rather, WinCo ha | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams
green
2 sentences2018Federal labor law preempts a state-law claim that is either "founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements" or " 'substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.' " ( Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams (1987) 482 U.S. 386 , 394, 107 S.Ct. 2425 , 96 L.Ed.2d 318 .) However, it does not preempt a state-law claim merely because a party raises a defense that requires a court to interpret or apply a collective-bargaining agreement. ( Id . at p. 398, 107 S.Ct. 2425 .) Here, the Employees' claims do not require an analysis of the Agreement; rather, WinCo ha 2018Federal labor law preempts a state-law claim that is either "founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements" or " 'substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.' " ( Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams (1987) 482 U.S. 386 , 394, 107 S.Ct. 2425 , 96 L.Ed.2d 318 .) However, it does not preempt a state-law claim merely because a party raises a defense that requires a court to interpret or apply a collective-bargaining agreement. ( Id . at p. 398, 107 S.Ct. 2425 .) Here, the Employees' claims do not require an analysis of the Agreement; rather, WinCo ha | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Navarro
green
1 sentence2015(Id. at p. 136, fn. 19.) We also reject Solis’s extensive reliance on Navarro, supra, 40 Cal.4th 668 , for a different conclusion regarding the separation of powers doctrine. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Hasso v. Hapke
green
1 sentence2014Because “contradicted evidence” is still substantial evidence (Hasso, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at 119 ), we decline Massman’s invitation to reweigh the evidence. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Fauber green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| No. 04-57134 green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Shelton green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Turner v. Schultz green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Asdourian v. Araj green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Serrano v. Priest green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Kinney v. United Healthcare Services, Inc. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Martinsville Nylon Employees Council Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board, E.I. Dupont Denemours and Company, Intervenor green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Buchan v. United States Cycling Federation, Inc. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Thompson v. Williams green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| County of Los Angeles v. Faus green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Kiely Corp. v. Gibson green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| cluster 400916 green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Greenfield v. Heublein green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Lomanto v. Bank of America green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Kaneko v. Okuda green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| In Re Marriage of Frapwell green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Holland v. Universal Underwriters Insurance green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Donovan v. Donovan green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| MacHado v. MacHado green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Barba v. Barba green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Benam v. Benam green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Lande v. Southern California Freight Lines green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Gulart v. Azevedo neutral | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.