agreement defense in Florida

1989On this basis, Noon v. State, 480 So.2d 668 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) and Campbell v. State, 453 So.2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) specifically held that an agreement for waiver of the mandatory sentence in exchange for cooperation in a non -narcotics case, as here, could not be enforced and that the concomitant plea was vacatable at the defendant’s instance.

1989On this basis, Noon v. State, 480 So.2d 668 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) and Campbell v. State, 453 So.2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) specifically held that an agreement for waiver of the mandatory sentence in exchange for cooperation in a non -narcotics case, as here, could not be enforced and that the concomitant plea was vacatable at the defendant's instance.

1989On this basis, Noon v. State, 480 So.2d 668 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) and Campbell v. State, 453 So.2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) specifically held that an agreement for waiver of the mandatory sentence in exchange for cooperation in a non -narcotics case, as here, could not be enforced and that the concomitant plea was vacatable at the defendant’s instance.

1989On this basis, Noon v. State, 480 So.2d 668 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) and Campbell v. State, 453 So.2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) specifically held that an agreement for waiver of the mandatory sentence in exchange for cooperation in a non -narcotics case, as here, could not be enforced and that the concomitant plea was vacatable at the defendant's instance.

2021The general magistrate relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Barker, 64 So. 3d 1246 (Fla. 2011), in which Justice Pariente, writing for the majority, stated, in dictum, the following general proposition: Absent the marital settlement agreement providing who is or is not to receive the death benefits or specifying the beneficiary, courts should look no further than the named beneficiary on the policy, plan, or account.

1995As the Florida Supreme Court explained in Johnson v. Harrison Hardware and Furniture Co., 119 Fla. 470 , 160 So. 878 , 879 (Fla. 1935): In applying the statute of limitations, where the evidence of liability relied on is partly set forth in writings in the form of letters and the like, but the writings are incomplete in themselves, or are otherwise so indefinite as to necessitate and make unavoidable plaintiffs resort to oral testimony to make complete the showing of any legal liability incurred by the defendant, under the terms of the transaction of which the writings are made a part, such ag

1995Id. at 866 .

1984Florida Farm Bureau contends that this case is closer to that of Paoli v. Shor, 345 So.2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), aff'd, 353 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1977).

1984Florida Farm Bureau contends that this case is closer to that of Paoli v. Shor, 345 So.2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), aff'd, 353 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1977).

1981I note that Dino's trial and appellate counsel did not represent him at the time he gave the statement to Detective Major. [4] Under Swenson v. Stidham, 409 U.S. 224 , 93 S.Ct. 359 , 34 L.Ed.2d 431 (1972); Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43 , 85 S.Ct. 174 , 13 L.Ed.2d 109 (1964); and Jackson v. Denno, supra , Dino would only be entitled to a fair determination of whether his statement was voluntary in light of his claim that it was drug induced, not a new trial.

1981I note that Dino's trial and appellate counsel did not represent him at the time he gave the statement to Detective Major. [4] Under Swenson v. Stidham, 409 U.S. 224 , 93 S.Ct. 359 , 34 L.Ed.2d 431 (1972); Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43 , 85 S.Ct. 174 , 13 L.Ed.2d 109 (1964); and Jackson v. Denno, supra , Dino would only be entitled to a fair determination of whether his statement was voluntary in light of his claim that it was drug induced, not a new trial.

1981I note that Dino's trial and appellate counsel did not represent him at the time he gave the statement to Detective Major. [4] Under Swenson v. Stidham, 409 U.S. 224 , 93 S.Ct. 359 , 34 L.Ed.2d 431 (1972); Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43 , 85 S.Ct. 174 , 13 L.Ed.2d 109 (1964); and Jackson v. Denno, supra , Dino would only be entitled to a fair determination of whether his statement was voluntary in light of his claim that it was drug induced, not a new trial.

1981I note that Dino's trial and appellate counsel did not represent him at the time he gave the statement to Detective Major. [4] Under Swenson v. Stidham, 409 U.S. 224 , 93 S.Ct. 359 , 34 L.Ed.2d 431 (1972); Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43 , 85 S.Ct. 174 , 13 L.Ed.2d 109 (1964); and Jackson v. Denno, supra , Dino would only be entitled to a fair determination of whether his statement was voluntary in light of his claim that it was drug induced, not a new trial.

1980BOOTH, Judge, dissenting: The trial court correctly held that the speedy trial rule was tolled while the agreement for immunity was in effect and that, after the defendant breached the agreement, he could be tried. [1] The case of Davis *710 v. State, 383 So.2d 620 , (Fla. 3d DCA), supports the well-reasoned decision below.

1976"The Court specifically finds that the agreement was signed freely and voluntarily by the parties, that when the wife signed same she had or reasonably should have had a general and approximate knowledge of the character and extent of the husband's property, and, as to the variation in the husband's financial status at the time of the signing of the agreement and the hearing of this cause `the vicissitudes of his fortune in the interval were only that which can be said to have been reasonably contemplated from the nature of his assets', Singer v. Singer, 4th DCA, (1975), 318 So.2d 438 .

1962Corp. (1922), 200 App. Div. 539 , 193 N.Y.S. 838 , where a court had before it a similar contract to the one in the case at bar, designating the city of Havana, Cuba, and its courts as the exclusive forum for the determination of all disputes arising out of an agreement and a waiver of the jurisdiction of the domiciles of the parties to the agreement.

1962Corp. (1922), 200 App. Div. 539 , 193 N.Y.S. 838 , where a court had before it a similar contract to the one in the case at bar, designating the city of Havana, Cuba, and its courts as the exclusive forum for the determination of all disputes arising out of an agreement and a waiver of the jurisdiction of the domiciles of the parties to the agreement.

1941The office of executor or administrator is one exceedingly necessary and useful, and must, in frequent circumstances, be assumed by persons unskilled in legal matters; and to infer from mere silence on the part of the executor or administrator an agreement that the claim was just, and a promise to pay it, would often contradict the real intention, and tend to subject estates of decedents to the payment of unfounded claims.” In the case of Dill v. Stevens, 144 Fla. 307 , 198 So. 811 , and on rehearing, 197 So. 849 , this Court held, in an opinion concurred in by four of the Justices, one of who

1941The office of executor or administrator is one exceedingly necessary and useful, and must, in frequent circumstances, be assumed by persons unskilled in legal matters; and to infer from mere silence on the part of the executor or administrator an agreement that the claim was just, and a promise to pay it, would often contradict the real intention, and tend to subject estates of decedents to the payment of unfounded claims.” In the case of Dill v. Stevens, 144 Fla. 307 , 198 So. 811 , and on rehearing, 197 So. 849 , this Court held, in an opinion concurred in by four of the Justices, one of who

1903While there is conflict in the testimony upon this point, we think that produced by the appellee is sufficient to support a finding that the contract was so modified, and also that the modification of the contract was supported by a valuable consideration so as to bring it within the rule announced in Robinson v. Hyer, 35 Fla. 544 , 17 South.