propriety instruction in Wyoming

2024In analyzing the propriety of the instruction in Harley, we applied United States Supreme Court precedent, including Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 , 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2459 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979).

2024In analyzing the propriety of the instruction in Harley, we applied United States Supreme Court precedent, including Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 , 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2459 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979).

2024In Stuebgen v. State, 548 P.2d 870 (Wyo. 1976), this court examined the history of the law of specific intent in analyzing the propriety of an instruction permitting a jury to infer intent in the context of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance.

2024We explained that with general intent crimes “intent may be implied from established facts and the accused may be presumed to do what he does.” Id. at 882 .

2014Moulton, 1 13, 148 P.3d at 42 . [¶ 23] In Moulton, officers entered the defendant's home in Glendo because his wife, an emergency medical technician, contacted a law enforcement dispatcher at 4:80 a.m. on a hand-held radio.

1984Parklane Hosiery Company, Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-327 , 99 S.Ct. 645, 649 , 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979). [2] The propriety of applying the doctrine of mutual collateral estoppel against the United States government was recently affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Stauffer Chemical Company, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 575 , 78 L.Ed.2d ___ (1984).

1984Parklane Hosiery Company, Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-327 , 99 S.Ct. 645, 649 , 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979). [2] The propriety of applying the doctrine of mutual collateral estoppel against the United States government was recently affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Stauffer Chemical Company, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 575 , 78 L.Ed.2d ___ (1984).

1984The propriety of applying the doctrine of mutual collateral estoppel against the United States government was recently affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Stauffer Chemical Company, - U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 575 , 78 L.Ed.2d - (1984).

1984Parklane Hosiery Company, Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-327 , 99 S.Ct. 645, 649 , 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979). [2] The propriety of applying the doctrine of mutual collateral estoppel against the United States government was recently affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Stauffer Chemical Company, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 575 , 78 L.Ed.2d ___ (1984).

1982NOTES [1] See, Haight v. State, Wyo., 654 P.2d 1232 (1982) and Evans v. State, Wyo., 653 P.2d 308 (1982). [2] An officer witness called by counsel for one of the defendants testified that he stopped the car and that all these items were in the vehicle. [3] At the trial, the store was identified as Sa v eway in south Cheyenne. [4] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable caus

1982NOTES [1] See, Haight v. State, Wyo., 654 P.2d 1232 (1982) and Evans v. State, Wyo., 653 P.2d 308 (1982). [2] An officer witness called by counsel for one of the defendants testified that he stopped the car and that all these items were in the vehicle. [3] At the trial, the store was identified as Sa v eway in south Cheyenne. [4] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable caus

1979Oeland v. Neuman Transit Company, Wyo., 367 P.2d 967 (1962); Edwards v. Harris, Wyo., 397 P.2d 87 (1964); Haley v. Dreesen, Wyo., 532 P.2d 399 (1975).

1979Oeland v. Neuman Transit Company, Wyo., 367 P.2d 967 (1962); Edwards v. Harris, Wyo., 397 P.2d 87 (1964); Haley v. Dreesen, Wyo., 532 P.2d 399 (1975).

1979Oeland v. Neuman Transit Company, Wyo., 367 P.2d 967 (1962); Edwards v. Harris, Wyo., 397 P.2d 87 (1964); Haley v. Dreesen, Wyo., 532 P.2d 399 (1975).

1979Oeland v. Neuman Transit Company, Wyo., 367 P.2d 967 (1962); Edwards v. Harris, Wyo., 397 P.2d 87 (1964); Haley v. Dreesen, Wyo., 532 P.2d 399 (1975).

1979Oeland v. Neuman Transit Company, Wyo., 367 P.2d 967 (1962); Edwards v. Harris, Wyo., 397 P.2d 87 (1964); Haley v. Dreesen, Wyo., 532 P.2d 399 (1975).

1979Oeland v. Neuman Transit Company, Wyo., 367 P.2d 967 (1962); Edwards v. Harris, Wyo., 397 P.2d 87 (1964); Haley v. Dreesen, Wyo., 532 P.2d 399 (1975).

1976Connor v. State, Wyo.1975, 537 P.2d 715 .

1976Connor v. State, Wyo. 1975, 537 P.2d 715 .

1975We do not consider it applicable to *110 this case. 1 While this court has not directly decided this question, we did hold in a rape case, Strand v. State, 36 Wyo. 78 , 252 P. 1030, 1033 , that usually questions of the credibility of witnesses should be left to the jury, with the customary instruction on the subject, and that it was not necessary in that case to instruct upon the proposition that the jury should examine the uncorroborated testimony of a prosecutrix with great caution, although it was suggested that the same might be discretionary with the court.

1975We do not consider it applicable to *110 this case. 1 While this court has not directly decided this question, we did hold in a rape case, Strand v. State, 36 Wyo. 78 , 252 P. 1030, 1033 , that usually questions of the credibility of witnesses should be left to the jury, with the customary instruction on the subject, and that it was not necessary in that case to instruct upon the proposition that the jury should examine the uncorroborated testimony of a prosecutrix with great caution, although it was suggested that the same might be discretionary with the court.

1974There can be no question concerning the propriety of the rule stated in Shipton Supply Co. v. Bumbaca, Wyo., 505 P.2d 591, 594 , that circumstantial evidence must exclude other reasonable hypotheses with a fair amount of certainty; but we are reluctant to say that this has not been accomplished here by plaintiff.

1972As said in Hallinan v. United States, 9 Cir., 182 F.2d 880 , 887: “ * * * the word ‘summarily’ does not require hasty determination and * * * the night hours spent by the judge in preparing his summation for his contempt order, delivered on the following morning, are not an improper incident to summary action.” Furthermore, while to this court the temper displayed by the eighteen-year-old defendant toward his father was not such that would have caused serious question as to his sanity, the trial court apparently had doubts in that regard, contacted a psychiatrist, and solicited his opinion; an

1971That case also inferentially approved the giving of an instruction on “unavoidable accident.” We again considered the matter in the recent case of Potts v. Brown, Wyo., 452 P.2d 975, 979 , and although the refusal of the trial court to give the instruction tendered was upheld we indicated the propriety of such an instruction if the circumstances were such as to warrant it.

1960Ibid." Pollard v. Shively, 5 Colo. 309, 313 .

1960Ibid." Pollard v. Shively, 5 Colo. 309, 313 .

1958The legislature by Ch. 68, S.L. of Wyoming, 1909, now incorporated in § 71-401, W.C.S. 1945, changed this rule and "adopted the policy that a water right by direct flow from a stream shall be attached to land." Scherck v. Nichols, 55 Wyo. 4 , 95 P.2d 74, 80 .

1958The legislature by Ch. 68, S.L. of Wyoming, 1909, now incorporated in § 71-401, W.C.S. 1945, changed this rule and "adopted the policy that a water right by direct flow from a stream shall be attached to land." Scherck v. Nichols, 55 Wyo. 4 , 95 P.2d 74, 80 .

1945The propriety of such an instruction was considered by this Court in State v. Eldredge, 45 Wyo. 488 , 21 Pac 2d 545, wherein the Court quoted with approval the text from 8 R.C.L. 220, Sec. 217 as follows: “And so it is asserted by excellent authority that Courts instructing juries in criminal cases should make no attempt to define the expression but should merely follow the language of the statute that ‘where there is a reasonable doubt of the defendant being proven guilty, he is entitled to an acquittal,’ or, if there is no such statute, let the words themselves carry their own definition.” A

1945The propriety of such an instruction was considered by this Court in State v. Eldredge, 45 Wyo. 488 , 21 Pac 2d 545, wherein the Court quoted with approval the text from 8 R.C.L. 220, Sec. 217 as follows: “And so it is asserted by excellent authority that Courts instructing juries in criminal cases should make no attempt to define the expression but should merely follow the language of the statute that ‘where there is a reasonable doubt of the defendant being proven guilty, he is entitled to an acquittal,’ or, if there is no such statute, let the words themselves carry their own definition.” A