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10 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Zaragozagreen2 sentences2011But although that would be proper if we were reviewing the propriety of the instruction retrospectively and deciding on appeal whether there had been error, see, e.g., State v. Zaragoza, 221 Ariz. 49, ¶ 15 , 209 P.3d 629, 633 (2009), it would not be appropriate to do so here, before the case is tried. 2011But although that would be proper if we were reviewing the propriety of the instruction retrospectively and deciding on appeal whether there had been error, see, e.g., State v. Zaragoza, 221 Ariz. 49, ¶ 15 , 209 P.3d 629, 633 (2009), it would not be appropriate to do so here, before the case is tried. | 2 | 2 |
Liteky v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015“Within reason, a judge does not display bias or cause prejudice when acting sua sponte to control the courtroom and the trial.” State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 595 , 858 P.2d 1152, 1198 (1993); see also Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556 , 114 S. Ct. at 1157 (“A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even a stern and 4 STATE v. SANCHEZ Decision of the Court short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration” do not establish bias or prejudice.). 2015“Within reason, a judge does not display bias or cause prejudice when acting sua sponte to control the courtroom and the trial.” State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 595 , 858 P.2d 1152, 1198 (1993); see also Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556 , 114 S. Ct. at 1157 (“A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even a stern and 4 STATE v. SANCHEZ Decision of the Court short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration” do not establish bias or prejudice.). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Biblegreen2 sentences2015“Within reason, a judge does not display bias or cause prejudice when acting sua sponte to control the courtroom and the trial.” State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 595 , 858 P.2d 1152, 1198 (1993); see also Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556 , 114 S. Ct. at 1157 (“A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even a stern and 4 STATE v. SANCHEZ Decision of the Court short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration” do not establish bias or prejudice.). 2015“Within reason, a judge does not display bias or cause prejudice when acting sua sponte to control the courtroom and the trial.” State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 595 , 858 P.2d 1152, 1198 (1993); see also Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556 , 114 S. Ct. at 1157 (“A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even a stern and 4 STATE v. SANCHEZ Decision of the Court short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration” do not establish bias or prejudice.). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2009See State v. Jones, 188 Ariz. 388, 392 , 937 P.2d 310, 314 (1997) (“We assume that the legislature accords words their natural and obvious meanings unless otherwise stated.”); In re Manny, 211 Ariz. 301, ¶ 10 , 120 P.3d 1111, 1114 (App.2005) (legislature presumed to intend each word and clause to have meaning); Odle v. Shamrock Dairy of Phoenix, 7 Ariz.App. 515, 518 , 441 P.2d 550, 553 (1968) (“The legislature is presumed to express its meaning as clearly as possible ____”). 2009See State v. Jones, 188 Ariz. 388, 392 , 937 P.2d 310, 314 (1997) (“We assume that the legislature accords words their natural and obvious meanings unless otherwise stated.”); In re Manny, 211 Ariz. 301, ¶ 10 , 120 P.3d 1111, 1114 (App.2005) (legislature presumed to intend each word and clause to have meaning); Odle v. Shamrock Dairy of Phoenix, 7 Ariz.App. 515, 518 , 441 P.2d 550, 553 (1968) (“The legislature is presumed to express its meaning as clearly as possible ____”). | 1 | 1 |
Odle v. Shamrock Dairy of Phoenix, Inc.green2 sentences2009See State v. Jones, 188 Ariz. 388, 392 , 937 P.2d 310, 314 (1997) (“We assume that the legislature accords words their natural and obvious meanings unless otherwise stated.”); In re Manny, 211 Ariz. 301, ¶ 10 , 120 P.3d 1111, 1114 (App.2005) (legislature presumed to intend each word and clause to have meaning); Odle v. Shamrock Dairy of Phoenix, 7 Ariz.App. 515, 518 , 441 P.2d 550, 553 (1968) (“The legislature is presumed to express its meaning as clearly as possible ____”). 2009See State v. Jones, 188 Ariz. 388, 392 , 937 P.2d 310, 314 (1997) (“We assume that the legislature accords words their natural and obvious meanings unless otherwise stated.”); In re Manny, 211 Ariz. 301, ¶ 10 , 120 P.3d 1111, 1114 (App.2005) (legislature presumed to intend each word and clause to have meaning); Odle v. Shamrock Dairy of Phoenix, 7 Ariz.App. 515, 518 , 441 P.2d 550, 553 (1968) (“The legislature is presumed to express its meaning as clearly as possible ____”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lovegreen2 sentences2009State v. Love, 182 Ariz. 324, 326-27 , 897 P.2d 626, 628-29 (1995) (rejecting suggestion that cases should turn on whether engine is running and vehicle is pulled entirely off the road). ¶ 7 In addressing the propriety of the instruction that was given here, we presume the legislature deliberately used the phrase “actual physical control,” intending each word to be given its natural and obvious meaning. 2009State v. Love, 182 Ariz. 324, 326-27 , 897 P.2d 626, 628-29 (1995) (rejecting suggestion that cases should turn on whether engine is running and vehicle is pulled entirely off the road). ¶ 7 In addressing the propriety of the instruction that was given here, we presume the legislature deliberately used the phrase “actual physical control,” intending each word to be given its natural and obvious meaning. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Mannygreen2 sentences2009See State v. Jones, 188 Ariz. 388, 392 , 937 P.2d 310, 314 (1997) (“We assume that the legislature accords words their natural and obvious meanings unless otherwise stated.”); In re Manny, 211 Ariz. 301, ¶ 10 , 120 P.3d 1111, 1114 (App.2005) (legislature presumed to intend each word and clause to have meaning); Odle v. Shamrock Dairy of Phoenix, 7 Ariz.App. 515, 518 , 441 P.2d 550, 553 (1968) (“The legislature is presumed to express its meaning as clearly as possible ____”). 2009See State v. Jones, 188 Ariz. 388, 392 , 937 P.2d 310, 314 (1997) (“We assume that the legislature accords words their natural and obvious meanings unless otherwise stated.”); In re Manny, 211 Ariz. 301, ¶ 10 , 120 P.3d 1111, 1114 (App.2005) (legislature presumed to intend each word and clause to have meaning); Odle v. Shamrock Dairy of Phoenix, 7 Ariz.App. 515, 518 , 441 P.2d 550, 553 (1968) (“The legislature is presumed to express its meaning as clearly as possible ____”). | 1 | 1 |
Evans v. Pickettgreen2 sentences1996Evans v. Pickett, 102 Ariz. 393, 397 , 430 P.2d 413, 417 (1967) (The test of the propriety of an instruction “is whether the jury would be misled as to the proper rule of law.”) Using this approach, we turn to the subject of the mere presence doctrine. 1996Evans v. Pickett, 102 Ariz. 393, 397 , 430 P.2d 413, 417 (1967) (The test of the propriety of an instruction “is whether the jury would be misled as to the proper rule of law.”) Using this approach, we turn to the subject of the mere presence doctrine. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Edgargreen2 sentences1987“A specific objection, timely made, allows the trial judge to consider the propriety of the instruction and cure any error therein before [the instruction is] read to the jury.” State v. Edgar, 126 Ariz. 206, 209 , 613 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1980). 1987“A specific objection, timely made, allows the trial judge to consider the propriety of the instruction and cure any error therein before [the instruction is] read to the jury.” State v. Edgar, 126 Ariz. 206, 209 , 613 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Drake v. State of Arizonagreen2 sentences1980While rule 21.3(c) does not bar raising fundamental error for the first time on appeal, State v. Dippre, 121 Ariz. 596 , 592 P.2d 1252 (1979), we think the error here is not fundamental and does not mandate reversal. *210 II “Any person standing in a confidential or trust relation to another and who by reason thereof comes into possession or control of the latter’s property may embezzle it by fraudulently converting it to a use or purpose other than the one intended.” Drake v. State, 53 Ariz. 93, 97 , 85 P.2d 984, 986 (1939); State v. Gomez, 27 Ariz.App. 248 , 553 P.2d 1233 (1976); A.R.S. § 13 1980While rule 21.3(c) does not bar raising fundamental error for the first time on appeal, State v. Dippre, 121 Ariz. 596 , 592 P.2d 1252 (1979), we think the error here is not fundamental and does not mandate reversal. *210 II “Any person standing in a confidential or trust relation to another and who by reason thereof comes into possession or control of the latter’s property may embezzle it by fraudulently converting it to a use or purpose other than the one intended.” Drake v. State, 53 Ariz. 93, 97 , 85 P.2d 984, 986 (1939); State v. Gomez, 27 Ariz.App. 248 , 553 P.2d 1233 (1976); A.R.S. § 13 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gomez
green
2 sentences1980While rule 21.3(c) does not bar raising fundamental error for the first time on appeal, State v. Dippre, 121 Ariz. 596 , 592 P.2d 1252 (1979), we think the error here is not fundamental and does not mandate reversal. *210 II “Any person standing in a confidential or trust relation to another and who by reason thereof comes into possession or control of the latter’s property may embezzle it by fraudulently converting it to a use or purpose other than the one intended.” Drake v. State, 53 Ariz. 93, 97 , 85 P.2d 984, 986 (1939); State v. Gomez, 27 Ariz.App. 248 , 553 P.2d 1233 (1976); A.R.S. § 13 1980While rule 21.3(c) does not bar raising fundamental error for the first time on appeal, State v. Dippre, 121 Ariz. 596 , 592 P.2d 1252 (1979), we think the error here is not fundamental and does not mandate reversal. *210 II “Any person standing in a confidential or trust relation to another and who by reason thereof comes into possession or control of the latter’s property may embezzle it by fraudulently converting it to a use or purpose other than the one intended.” Drake v. State, 53 Ariz. 93, 97 , 85 P.2d 984, 986 (1939); State v. Gomez, 27 Ariz.App. 248 , 553 P.2d 1233 (1976); A.R.S. § 13 | 1 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Dippre
green
2 sentences1980While rule 21.3(c) does not bar raising fundamental error for the first time on appeal, State v. Dippre, 121 Ariz. 596 , 592 P.2d 1252 (1979), we think the error here is not fundamental and does not mandate reversal. *210 II “Any person standing in a confidential or trust relation to another and who by reason thereof comes into possession or control of the latter’s property may embezzle it by fraudulently converting it to a use or purpose other than the one intended.” Drake v. State, 53 Ariz. 93, 97 , 85 P.2d 984, 986 (1939); State v. Gomez, 27 Ariz.App. 248 , 553 P.2d 1233 (1976); A.R.S. § 13 1980While rule 21.3(c) does not bar raising fundamental error for the first time on appeal, State v. Dippre, 121 Ariz. 596 , 592 P.2d 1252 (1979), we think the error here is not fundamental and does not mandate reversal. *210 II “Any person standing in a confidential or trust relation to another and who by reason thereof comes into possession or control of the latter’s property may embezzle it by fraudulently converting it to a use or purpose other than the one intended.” Drake v. State, 53 Ariz. 93, 97 , 85 P.2d 984, 986 (1939); State v. Gomez, 27 Ariz.App. 248 , 553 P.2d 1233 (1976); A.R.S. § 13 | 1 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Toney
green
2 sentences1980Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 21.3(c); State v. Toney, 113 Ariz. 404 , 555 P.2d 650 (1976). Á specific objection, timely made, allows the trial judge to consider the propriety of the instruction and cure any error, therein before it is read to the jury. 1980Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 21.3(c); State v. Toney, 113 Ariz. 404 , 555 P.2d 650 (1976). Á specific objection, timely made, allows the trial judge to consider the propriety of the instruction and cure any error, therein before it is read to the jury. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Carr
green
2 sentences1973State v. Carr, 108 Ariz. 203 , 495 P.2d 134 (1972); State v. Beard, 107 Ariz. 388 , 489 P.2d 25 (1971); State v. Godsoe, 107 Ariz. 367 , 489 P.2d 4 (1971). 1973State v. Carr, 108 Ariz. 203 , 495 P.2d 134 (1972); State v. Beard, 107 Ariz. 388 , 489 P.2d 25 (1971); State v. Godsoe, 107 Ariz. 367 , 489 P.2d 4 (1971). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
State v. Beard
green
2 sentences1973State v. Carr, 108 Ariz. 203 , 495 P.2d 134 (1972); State v. Beard, 107 Ariz. 388 , 489 P.2d 25 (1971); State v. Godsoe, 107 Ariz. 367 , 489 P.2d 4 (1971). 1973State v. Carr, 108 Ariz. 203 , 495 P.2d 134 (1972); State v. Beard, 107 Ariz. 388 , 489 P.2d 25 (1971); State v. Godsoe, 107 Ariz. 367 , 489 P.2d 4 (1971). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
State v. Godsoe
green
2 sentences1973State v. Carr, 108 Ariz. 203 , 495 P.2d 134 (1972); State v. Beard, 107 Ariz. 388 , 489 P.2d 25 (1971); State v. Godsoe, 107 Ariz. 367 , 489 P.2d 4 (1971). 1973State v. Carr, 108 Ariz. 203 , 495 P.2d 134 (1972); State v. Beard, 107 Ariz. 388 , 489 P.2d 25 (1971); State v. Godsoe, 107 Ariz. 367 , 489 P.2d 4 (1971). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Commonwealth v. Harvard
green
2 sentences1971Both the defense and the prosecution have submitted respectable authority to support their respective positions as to the propriety of such instruction. 1 The defendant relies on cases such as Lewis v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 145 , 337 F.2d 541 (1964), cert. den. 381 U.S. 920 , 85 *606 S.Ct. 1542, 14 L.Ed.2d 440 (1965) ; Henderson v. United States, 261 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Prince, 264 F.2d 850 (3rd Cir. 1959) ; Smith v. State, 396 S.W.2d 876 (Tex.Cr.App.1965); People v. Fortes, 24 A.D.2d 428 , 260 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1965); and Commonwealth v. Harvard, 356 Mass. 452 , 1971Both the defense and the prosecution have submitted respectable authority to support their respective positions as to the propriety of such instruction. 1 The defendant relies on cases such as Lewis v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 145 , 337 F.2d 541 (1964), cert. den. 381 U.S. 920 , 85 *606 S.Ct. 1542, 14 L.Ed.2d 440 (1965) ; Henderson v. United States, 261 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Prince, 264 F.2d 850 (3rd Cir. 1959) ; Smith v. State, 396 S.W.2d 876 (Tex.Cr.App.1965); People v. Fortes, 24 A.D.2d 428 , 260 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1965); and Commonwealth v. Harvard, 356 Mass. 452 , | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Smith v. State
green
1 sentence1971Both the defense and the prosecution have submitted respectable authority to support their respective positions as to the propriety of such instruction. 1 The defendant relies on cases such as Lewis v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 145 , 337 F.2d 541 (1964), cert. den. 381 U.S. 920 , 85 *606 S.Ct. 1542, 14 L.Ed.2d 440 (1965) ; Henderson v. United States, 261 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Prince, 264 F.2d 850 (3rd Cir. 1959) ; Smith v. State, 396 S.W.2d 876 (Tex.Cr.App.1965); People v. Fortes, 24 A.D.2d 428 , 260 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1965); and Commonwealth v. Harvard, 356 Mass. 452 , | 1 | 1971–1971 |
United States v. James William Prince
green
1 sentence1971Both the defense and the prosecution have submitted respectable authority to support their respective positions as to the propriety of such instruction. 1 The defendant relies on cases such as Lewis v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 145 , 337 F.2d 541 (1964), cert. den. 381 U.S. 920 , 85 *606 S.Ct. 1542, 14 L.Ed.2d 440 (1965) ; Henderson v. United States, 261 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Prince, 264 F.2d 850 (3rd Cir. 1959) ; Smith v. State, 396 S.W.2d 876 (Tex.Cr.App.1965); People v. Fortes, 24 A.D.2d 428 , 260 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1965); and Commonwealth v. Harvard, 356 Mass. 452 , | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Leona Henderson v. United States
green
1 sentence1971Both the defense and the prosecution have submitted respectable authority to support their respective positions as to the propriety of such instruction. 1 The defendant relies on cases such as Lewis v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 145 , 337 F.2d 541 (1964), cert. den. 381 U.S. 920 , 85 *606 S.Ct. 1542, 14 L.Ed.2d 440 (1965) ; Henderson v. United States, 261 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Prince, 264 F.2d 850 (3rd Cir. 1959) ; Smith v. State, 396 S.W.2d 876 (Tex.Cr.App.1965); People v. Fortes, 24 A.D.2d 428 , 260 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1965); and Commonwealth v. Harvard, 356 Mass. 452 , | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Joseph E. Lewis v. United States
green
1 sentence1971Both the defense and the prosecution have submitted respectable authority to support their respective positions as to the propriety of such instruction. 1 The defendant relies on cases such as Lewis v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 145 , 337 F.2d 541 (1964), cert. den. 381 U.S. 920 , 85 *606 S.Ct. 1542, 14 L.Ed.2d 440 (1965) ; Henderson v. United States, 261 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Prince, 264 F.2d 850 (3rd Cir. 1959) ; Smith v. State, 396 S.W.2d 876 (Tex.Cr.App.1965); People v. Fortes, 24 A.D.2d 428 , 260 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1965); and Commonwealth v. Harvard, 356 Mass. 452 , | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Lane v. United States
green
1 sentence1971Both the defense and the prosecution have submitted respectable authority to support their respective positions as to the propriety of such instruction. 1 The defendant relies on cases such as Lewis v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 145 , 337 F.2d 541 (1964), cert. den. 381 U.S. 920 , 85 *606 S.Ct. 1542, 14 L.Ed.2d 440 (1965) ; Henderson v. United States, 261 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Prince, 264 F.2d 850 (3rd Cir. 1959) ; Smith v. State, 396 S.W.2d 876 (Tex.Cr.App.1965); People v. Fortes, 24 A.D.2d 428 , 260 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1965); and Commonwealth v. Harvard, 356 Mass. 452 , | 1 | 1971–1971 |
People v. Fortes
neutral
2 sentences1971Both the defense and the prosecution have submitted respectable authority to support their respective positions as to the propriety of such instruction. 1 The defendant relies on cases such as Lewis v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 145 , 337 F.2d 541 (1964), cert. den. 381 U.S. 920 , 85 *606 S.Ct. 1542, 14 L.Ed.2d 440 (1965) ; Henderson v. United States, 261 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Prince, 264 F.2d 850 (3rd Cir. 1959) ; Smith v. State, 396 S.W.2d 876 (Tex.Cr.App.1965); People v. Fortes, 24 A.D.2d 428 , 260 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1965); and Commonwealth v. Harvard, 356 Mass. 452 , 1971Both the defense and the prosecution have submitted respectable authority to support their respective positions as to the propriety of such instruction. 1 The defendant relies on cases such as Lewis v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 145 , 337 F.2d 541 (1964), cert. den. 381 U.S. 920 , 85 *606 S.Ct. 1542, 14 L.Ed.2d 440 (1965) ; Henderson v. United States, 261 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Prince, 264 F.2d 850 (3rd Cir. 1959) ; Smith v. State, 396 S.W.2d 876 (Tex.Cr.App.1965); People v. Fortes, 24 A.D.2d 428 , 260 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1965); and Commonwealth v. Harvard, 356 Mass. 452 , | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Tribolet v. Fowler
green
2 sentences1966This principle is established by the case of Wray v. Superior Court, 82 Ariz. 79 , 308 P.2d 701 (1957), wherein the trial judge declined to enter an order for a change of venue and the Supreme Court concluded its opinion by stating: "It is ordered that a peremptory writ of prohibition issue restraining respondents from further exercising jurisdiction over defendant Wray in said three civil actions other than entering an order transferring said causes * * *." On the other hand, it is appropriate to inquire as to the propriety of the order and the case of Tribolet v. Fowler, 77 Ariz. 59 , 266 P. 1966This principle is established by the case of Wray v. Superior Court, 82 Ariz. 79 , 308 P.2d 701 (1957), wherein the trial judge declined to enter an order for a change of venue and the Supreme Court concluded its opinion by stating: "It is ordered that a peremptory writ of prohibition issue restraining respondents from further exercising jurisdiction over defendant Wray in said three civil actions other than entering an order transferring said causes * * *." On the other hand, it is appropriate to inquire as to the propriety of the order and the case of Tribolet v. Fowler, 77 Ariz. 59 , 266 P. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Wray v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1966This principle is established by the case of Wray v. Superior Court, 82 Ariz. 79 , 308 P.2d 701 (1957), wherein the trial judge declined to enter an order for a change of venue and the Supreme Court concluded its opinion by stating: "It is ordered that a peremptory writ of prohibition issue restraining respondents from further exercising jurisdiction over defendant Wray in said three civil actions other than entering an order transferring said causes * * *." On the other hand, it is appropriate to inquire as to the propriety of the order and the case of Tribolet v. Fowler, 77 Ariz. 59 , 266 P. 1966This principle is established by the case of Wray v. Superior Court, 82 Ariz. 79 , 308 P.2d 701 (1957), wherein the trial judge declined to enter an order for a change of venue and the Supreme Court concluded its opinion by stating: "It is ordered that a peremptory writ of prohibition issue restraining respondents from further exercising jurisdiction over defendant Wray in said three civil actions other than entering an order transferring said causes * * *." On the other hand, it is appropriate to inquire as to the propriety of the order and the case of Tribolet v. Fowler, 77 Ariz. 59 , 266 P. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.