propriety instruction in Texas

2008See, e.g., Pope v. State, 161 S.W.3d 114, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004), aff’d, 207 S.W.3d 352 (2006); Best v. State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 865 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (holding that merely giving a reasonable doubt definition in a jury charge does not constitute reversible error, and the trial court did not err by submitting 14 a jury charge distinguishing reasonable doubt from possible doubt).

2008See, e.g. , Pope v. State, 161 S.W.3d 114, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004), aff’d, 207 S.W.3d 352 (2006); Best v. State , 118 S.W.3d 857, 865 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (holding that merely giving a reasonable doubt definition in a jury charge does not constitute reversible error, and the trial court did not err by submitting a jury charge distinguishing reasonable doubt from possible doubt).

2015See White- documented and information needed to be filled in. side v. Watson, 12 S.W.3d 614, 621-22 (Tex. However, none of the persons making those entries App.--Eastland 2000, pet. denied); [*226] Offshore testified that they provided false information. 7 There Pipelines, Inc. v. Schooley, 984 S.W.2d 654 , 667-68 was also testimony that there were times when the staff (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.). was so busy with resident care that they did not have 5 Appellants also complain that the instruction did not assist the jury, but confused and misled them and improperly shifted th

2003See Whiteside v. Watson, 12 S.W.3d 614, 621-22 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2000, pet. denied); *226 Offshore Pipelines, Inc. v. Schooley, 984 S.W.2d 654, 667-68 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.).

2026The adequacy of a temporary injunction’s description of the reasons for its issuance depends on whether it will: “(1) enable a party against whom the temporary injunction has been issued to understand the basis for the ruling and evaluate the propriety of a challenge to the injunction, and (2) provide an adequate basis for appellate review of the injunction.” Id. at 748 The injunction in this case states that the trial court found “that good cause exists for issuing the temporary injunction, that Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their claims, and that if the temporary injunction is not issu

2023Id. at 748 .

2015See White- documented and information needed to be filled in. side v. Watson, 12 S.W.3d 614, 621-22 (Tex. However, none of the persons making those entries App.--Eastland 2000, pet. denied); [*226] Offshore testified that they provided false information. 7 There Pipelines, Inc. v. Schooley, 984 S.W.2d 654 , 667-68 was also testimony that there were times when the staff (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.). was so busy with resident care that they did not have 5 Appellants also complain that the instruction did not assist the jury, but confused and misled them and improperly shifted th

2003See Whiteside v. Watson, 12 S.W.3d 614, 621-22 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2000, pet. denied); *226 Offshore Pipelines, Inc. v. Schooley, 984 S.W.2d 654, 667-68 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.).

2026Gonzales v. State, 353 S.W.3d 826, 832 (Tex. Crim.

2019Gonzales v. State, 353 S.W.3d 826, 832 (Tex. Crim.

2009See Bunton v. State, 136 S.W.3d 355, 367 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. ref’d) (discussing the propriety of the defense eliciting hearsay from the investigating police officer and the State later seeking to clarify the hearsay evidence).

2009See Bunton v. State , 136 S.W.3d 355, 367 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. ref’d) (discussing the propriety of the defense eliciting hearsay from the investigating police officer and the State later seeking to clarify the hearsay evidence).

2008See, e.g., Pope v. State, 161 S.W.3d 114, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004), aff’d, 207 S.W.3d 352 (2006); Best v. State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 865 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (holding that merely giving a reasonable doubt definition in a jury charge does not constitute reversible error, and the trial court did not err by submitting 14 a jury charge distinguishing reasonable doubt from possible doubt).

2008See, e.g. , Pope v. State, 161 S.W.3d 114, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004), aff’d, 207 S.W.3d 352 (2006); Best v. State , 118 S.W.3d 857, 865 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (holding that merely giving a reasonable doubt definition in a jury charge does not constitute reversible error, and the trial court did not err by submitting a jury charge distinguishing reasonable doubt from possible doubt).

2008See, e.g., Pope v. State, 161 S.W.3d 114, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004), aff’d, 207 S.W.3d 352 (2006); Best v. State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 865 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (holding that merely giving a reasonable doubt definition in a jury charge does not constitute reversible error, and the trial court did not err by submitting 14 a jury charge distinguishing reasonable doubt from possible doubt).

2008See, e.g. , Pope v. State, 161 S.W.3d 114, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004), aff’d, 207 S.W.3d 352 (2006); Best v. State , 118 S.W.3d 857, 865 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (holding that merely giving a reasonable doubt definition in a jury charge does not constitute reversible error, and the trial court did not err by submitting a jury charge distinguishing reasonable doubt from possible doubt).

2005In re K.M.S., 91 S.W.3d 331 (Tex.2002) (courts of appeals are not free to disregard pronouncements from Texas Supreme Court); Lofton v. Texas Brine Corp., 777 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Tex.1989).

2005In re K.M.S. , 91 S.W.3d 331 (Tex. 2002) (courts of appeals are not free to disregard pronouncements from Texas Supreme Court); Lofton v. Texas Brine Corp. , 777 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Tex. 1989).

2003See State v. Gill , 967 S.W.2d 540, 541 (Tex. App.--Austin 1998, pet. ref'd) (order granting new trial will be upheld if correct on any legal theory applicable to case).

2003See State v. Gill, 967 S.W.2d 540, 541 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. ref’d) (order granting new trial will be upheld if correct on any legal theory applicable to case).

2024See Ex parte City of Corpus Christi, 427 S.W.3d 400, 404 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2013, pet. denied) (“Proceeds of bonds voted by the 12 people must be used for the purposes for which they were voted.” (citing Lewis v. City of Fort Worth, 89 S.W.2d 975, 978 (Tex. 1936)); Gallagher Headquarters Ranch Dev., Ltd. v. City of San Antonio, 269 S.W.3d 628 , 633–34 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (recognizing the propriety of the doctrine); Taxpayers for Sensible Priorities v. City of Dallas, 79 S.W.3d 670, 676 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. denied) (“It is e

2024See Ex parte City of Corpus Christi, 427 S.W.3d 400, 404 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2013, pet. denied) (“Proceeds of bonds voted by the 12 people must be used for the purposes for which they were voted.” (citing Lewis v. City of Fort Worth, 89 S.W.2d 975, 978 (Tex. 1936)); Gallagher Headquarters Ranch Dev., Ltd. v. City of San Antonio, 269 S.W.3d 628 , 633–34 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (recognizing the propriety of the doctrine); Taxpayers for Sensible Priorities v. City of Dallas, 79 S.W.3d 670, 676 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. denied) (“It is e

2024See Ex parte City of Corpus Christi, 427 S.W.3d 400, 404 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2013, pet. denied) (“Proceeds of bonds voted by the 12 people must be used for the purposes for which they were voted.” (citing Lewis v. City of Fort Worth, 89 S.W.2d 975, 978 (Tex. 1936)); Gallagher Headquarters Ranch Dev., Ltd. v. City of San Antonio, 269 S.W.3d 628 , 633–34 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (recognizing the propriety of the doctrine); Taxpayers for Sensible Priorities v. City of Dallas, 79 S.W.3d 670, 676 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. denied) (“It is e

2015See In re Office of the Attorney Gen., 257 S.W.3d at 697 ; El Tacaso, Inc. v. Jireh Star, Inc., 356 S.W.3d at 747–48.

2015Airlines, Inc., 281 S.W.3d 215, 220 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied).2 We conclude, based on the unique set of facts underlying this case, that the temporary restraining order adequately enables relator to understand the basis for the ruling and evaluate the propriety of a challenge to an injunction, and provides an adequate basis for appellate review of the injunction.

2014See Moon, 410 S.W.3d at 375 ("[T]here must be some evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that [the appellant] was sufficiently sophisticated and mature for the reasons specified by the court in order to uphold its waiver determination.

2010See Jones v. LaFargue , 758 S.W.2d 320, 324 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Jackson , 610 S.W.2d at 522; see also Tex. R.

2006We hasten to note, however, that none of these cases appears to have involved policies that defined A occurrence @ so as to include A continuous or repeated exposure to conditions. @ The CGL policies currently before us do so, as did the policies at issue in Pilgrim Enterprises, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co. , 24 S.W.3d 488, 496 (Tex. App. C Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).

2006We hasten to note, however, that none of these cases appears to have involved policies that defined “occurrence” so as to include “continuous or repeated exposure to conditions.” The CGL policies currently before us do so, as did the policies at issue in Pilgrim Enterprises, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 24 S.W.2d 488, 496 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).

1997See Soria v. State, 933 S.W.2d 46, 64 (Tex.Crim.