propriety instruction in New Jersey

2014Id. at 511-13 , 98 S. Ct. at 833-34 , 54 L.

2014Id. at 511-13 , 98 S. Ct. at 833-34 , 54 L.

2012In two eases — Ronan v. Adely, 182 N.J. 103 , 861 A.2d 822 (2004) and Gubernat v. Deremer, 140 N.J. 120 , 657 A.2d 856 (1995) — the Court authorized application of a presumption in the PPR’s favor in name-change disputes when the child was born out of wedlock.

2012In two eases — Ronan v. Adely, 182 N.J. 103 , 861 A.2d 822 (2004) and Gubernat v. Deremer, 140 N.J. 120 , 657 A.2d 856 (1995) — the Court authorized application of a presumption in the PPR’s favor in name-change disputes when the child was born out of wedlock.

2012In two eases — Ronan v. Adely, 182 N.J. 103 , 861 A.2d 822 (2004) and Gubernat v. Deremer, 140 N.J. 120 , 657 A.2d 856 (1995) — the Court authorized application of a presumption in the PPR’s favor in name-change disputes when the child was born out of wedlock.

2012In two eases — Ronan v. Adely, 182 N.J. 103 , 861 A.2d 822 (2004) and Gubernat v. Deremer, 140 N.J. 120 , 657 A.2d 856 (1995) — the Court authorized application of a presumption in the PPR’s favor in name-change disputes when the child was born out of wedlock.

2007Supra, 15 N.J. at 511-26 , 105 A.2d 545 .

2007Supra, 15 N.J. at 511-26 , 105 A.2d 545 .

1995See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 690 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 2066 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693, 695 (1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 60-61 , 519 A.2d 336 (1987).

1995See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 690 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 2066 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693, 695 (1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 60-61 , 519 A.2d 336 (1987).

1994See, e.g., Whalen v. State, 492 A.2d 552, 562 (Del.1985) (concluding that instructions that failed clearly to inform jury of effect of non-unanimous option prejudiced defendant); State v. Loyd, 459 So.2d 498, 502-03 (La.1984) (holding that failure to instruct jury at its request about consequences of nonunanimity was reversible error); Commonwealth v. Baker, 511 Pa. 1 , 511 A.2d 777 , 789 n.8 (1986) (noting potential for defense counsel to request special instruction to deadlocked jury informing them of option of non-unanimous verdict); State v. Jeffries, 105 Wash.2d 398 , 717 P.2d 722, 736 (u

1994See, e.g., Whalen v. State, 492 A.2d 552, 562 (Del.1985) (concluding that instructions that failed clearly to inform jury of effect of non-unanimous option prejudiced defendant); State v. Loyd, 459 So.2d 498, 502-03 (La.1984) (holding that failure to instruct jury at its request about consequences of nonunanimity was reversible error); Commonwealth v. Baker, 511 Pa. 1 , 511 A.2d 777 , 789 n.8 (1986) (noting potential for defense counsel to request special instruction to deadlocked jury informing them of option of non-unanimous verdict); State v. Jeffries, 105 Wash.2d 398 , 717 P.2d 722, 736 (u

1994See, e.g., Whalen v. State, 492 A.2d 552, 562 (Del.1985) (concluding that instructions that failed clearly to inform jury of effect of non-unanimous option prejudiced defendant); State v. Loyd, 459 So.2d 498, 502-03 (La.1984) (holding that failure to instruct jury at its request about consequences of nonunanimity was reversible error); Commonwealth v. Baker, 511 Pa. 1 , 511 A.2d 777 , 789 n.8 (1986) (noting potential for defense counsel to request special instruction to deadlocked jury informing them of option of non-unanimous verdict); State v. Jeffries, 105 Wash.2d 398 , 717 P.2d 722, 736 (u

1994See, e.g., Whalen v. State, 492 A. 2d 552, 562 (Del. 1985) (concluding that instructions that failed clearly to inform jury of effect of non-unanimous option prejudiced defendant); State v. Loyd, 459 So. 2d 498, 502-03 (La. 1984) (holding that failure to instruct jury at its request about consequences of nonunanimity was reversible error); Commonwealth v. Baker, 511 Pa. 1 , 511 A. 2d 777 , 789 n. 8 (1986) (noting potential for defense counsel to request special instruction to deadlocked jury informing them of option of non-unanimous verdict); State v. Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d 398 , 717 P. 2d 722

1994See, e.g., Whalen v. State, 492 A.2d 552, 562 (Del.1985) (concluding that instructions that failed clearly to inform jury of effect of non-unanimous option prejudiced defendant); State v. Loyd, 459 So.2d 498, 502-03 (La.1984) (holding that failure to instruct jury at its request about consequences of nonunanimity was reversible error); Commonwealth v. Baker, 511 Pa. 1 , 511 A.2d 777 , 789 n.8 (1986) (noting potential for defense counsel to request special instruction to deadlocked jury informing them of option of non-unanimous verdict); State v. Jeffries, 105 Wash.2d 398 , 717 P.2d 722, 736 (u

1994See, e.g., Whalen v. State, 492 A. 2d 552, 562 (Del. 1985) (concluding that instructions that failed clearly to inform jury of effect of non-unanimous option prejudiced defendant); State v. Loyd, 459 So. 2d 498, 502-03 (La. 1984) (holding that failure to instruct jury at its request about consequences of nonunanimity was reversible error); Commonwealth v. Baker, 511 Pa. 1 , 511 A. 2d 777 , 789 n. 8 (1986) (noting potential for defense counsel to request special instruction to deadlocked jury informing them of option of non-unanimous verdict); State v. Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d 398 , 717 P. 2d 722

1991In Williams, supra, 113 N.J. at 412 , 550 A. 2d 1172 , we expressed "serious reservations concerning the propriety of an instruction * * * that * * * effectively tells a juror what answers during the death qualification process lead to automatic excusal and what responses avoid excusal." In that case the court instructed the jury as follows: *90 In short, your views about a death penalty disqualify you only if they cause you to vote automatically one way or the other without regard to the evidence or my instructions as to whether defendant is guilty or as to whether a death penalty is to be im

1991In Williams, supra, 113 N.J. at 412 , 550 A. 2d 1172 , we expressed "serious reservations concerning the propriety of an instruction * * * that * * * effectively tells a juror what answers during the death qualification process lead to automatic excusal and what responses avoid excusal." In that case the court instructed the jury as follows: *90 In short, your views about a death penalty disqualify you only if they cause you to vote automatically one way or the other without regard to the evidence or my instructions as to whether defendant is guilty or as to whether a death penalty is to be im

1987We found that a general instruction on the tax exemption for damage awards is proper because it “imposes no new burden on the jury and there is nothing speculative about it.” Id. at 489 (quoting McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 364 U.S. 870 , 81 S.Ct. 115 , 5 L.Ed.2d 93 (1960)).

1987We found that a general instruction on the tax exemption for damage awards is proper because it "imposes no new burden on the jury and there is nothing speculative about it." Id. at 489 (quoting McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F. 2d 34, 39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 , 81 S.Ct. 115 , 5 L.Ed. 2d 93 (1960)).

1987We found that a general instruction on the tax exemption for damage awards is proper because it “imposes no new burden on the jury and there is nothing speculative about it.” Id. at 489 (quoting McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 364 U.S. 870 , 81 S.Ct. 115 , 5 L.Ed.2d 93 (1960)).

1987We found that a general instruction on the tax exemption for damage awards is proper because it "imposes no new burden on the jury and there is nothing speculative about it." Id. at 489 (quoting McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F. 2d 34, 39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 , 81 S.Ct. 115 , 5 L.Ed. 2d 93 (1960)).

1987We found that a general instruction on the tax exemption for damage awards is proper because it “imposes no new burden on the jury and there is nothing speculative about it.” Id. at 489 (quoting McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 364 U.S. 870 , 81 S.Ct. 115 , 5 L.Ed.2d 93 (1960)).

1987We found that a general instruction on the tax exemption for damage awards is proper because it "imposes no new burden on the jury and there is nothing speculative about it." Id. at 489 (quoting McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F. 2d 34, 39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 , 81 S.Ct. 115 , 5 L.Ed. 2d 93 (1960)).

1987We found that a general instruction on the tax exemption for damage awards is proper because it “imposes no new burden on the jury and there is nothing speculative about it.” Id. at 489 (quoting McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 364 U.S. 870 , 81 S.Ct. 115 , 5 L.Ed.2d 93 (1960)).

1987We found that a general instruction on the tax exemption for damage awards is proper because it "imposes no new burden on the jury and there is nothing speculative about it." Id. at 489 (quoting McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F. 2d 34, 39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 , 81 S.Ct. 115 , 5 L.Ed. 2d 93 (1960)).

1980Therefore, the propriety of the defense itself was left open. 52 N.J. at 430-431 .

1979App. 1978) (juror where defendant was charged with indecency with child had witnessed sexual assault on own daughter); Pugh v. State, 376 S. W. 2d 760 (Tex. Cr.

1979App. 1978) (juror where defendant was charged with indecency with child had witnessed sexual assault on own daughter); Pugh v. State, 376 S.W. 2d 760 (Tex. Cr.

1979Many eases, however, have recognized the propriety of a challenge for cause where there is reason to question a juror’s impartiality because of direct or indirect involvement as, or with, the victim of a crime; e. g., Salazar v. State, 562 S. W. 2d 480 (Tex. Cr.

1979Many cases, however, have recognized the propriety of a challenge *76 for cause where there is reason to question a juror's impartiality because of direct or indirect involvement as, or with, the victim of a crime; e.g., Salazar v. State, 562 S.W. 2d 480 (Tex. Cr.

1912In that case we approved as sound the following declaration of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Finn, 108 Mass. 466 : “Guilty knowledge may be found by the jury where the defendant receives the goods under such circumstances as would satisfy a man of ordinary intelligence and caution that they were stolen.” The next assignment challenges the propriety of the instruction of the court upon the significance to be given the fact that the defendant failed to offer himself as a witness on his own behalf.

1912Buttelli v. Electric Company, 30 Vroom 302.

1912It was entirely justified by the decisions of the Court of Errors and Appeals in Parker v. State, 33 Vroom 801 , and State v. Twining, 44 Id. 691.

1884Chancellor Williamson recognized the propriety of this rule-in Clarke v. Johnston, 2 Stock. 287 , and it has not since then been questioned.