Thompson brief in Alabama

2017Likewise, in Stockman v. Echlin, Inc. , 604 So.2d 393 , 394 (Ala. 1992), this Court did not consider a motion for a judgment on the pleadings to have been converted into a motion for a summary judgment when "the trial court did not indicate whether it considered matters outside the pleadings in making its determination." In Stockman , the trial court held a hearing on the motion, but there was no transcript of the hearing and the record was silent as to whether the trial court had considered affidavits presented by both parties.

2012“This comment by the prosecutor was an argument to the jury concerning the strength of the State’s case, McWhorter v. State, 781 So.2d 257, 321 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), affirmed, Ex parte McWhorter, 781 So.2d 330 (Ala.2000), cert. denied, McWhorter v. Alabama, 532 U.S. 976 , 121 S.Ct. 1612 , 149 L.Ed.2d 476 (2001), and reasonable inferences and conclusions that could be drawn therefrom.

2012“This comment by the prosecutor was an argument to the jury concerning the strength of the State’s case, McWhorter v. State, 781 So.2d 257, 321 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), affirmed, Ex parte McWhorter, 781 So.2d 330 (Ala.2000), cert. denied, McWhorter v. Alabama, 532 U.S. 976 , 121 S.Ct. 1612 , 149 L.Ed.2d 476 (2001), and reasonable inferences and conclusions that could be drawn therefrom.

2012Specifically, he challenges the instruction that in order to acquit Thompson the jury’s doubt “must be an actual doubt, and not a mere guess or surprise; it is not a forced or captious doubt.” (Thompson’s brief, p. 99.) He relies on Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 , 111 S.Ct. 328 , 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), to support this contention.

2012Specifically, he challenges the instruction that in order to acquit Thompson the jury’s doubt “must be an actual doubt, and not a mere guess or surprise; it is not a forced or captious doubt.” (Thompson’s brief, p. 99.) He relies on Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 , 111 S.Ct. 328 , 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), to support this contention.

2012Of themselves, they may not warrant a conviction but they are relevant as evidence and the weight to which they are entitled, it is the province of the jury to determine under proper instructions from the Court.” (R. 3843.) Thompson argues on appeal that this instruction was erroneous because, he says, he relied on the defense of PTSD and the jury should have been informed that it “needed to first consider whether the defendant had other possible motives for behaving as he did after the crime.” (Thompson’s brief, p. 98.) He cites Ex parte Weaver, 678 So.2d 284 (Ala.1996), to support his argume

2012See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008 , 103 S.Ct. 3446 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983) (‘Once the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, ... the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment.’); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 902 , 103 S.Ct. 2733 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (‘sentencing decisions rest on a far-reaching inquiry into countless facts and circumstances and not on the type of proof of particular elemen

2012See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008 , 103 S.Ct. 3446 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983) (‘Once the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, ... the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment.’); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 902 , 103 S.Ct. 2733 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (‘sentencing decisions rest on a far-reaching inquiry into countless facts and circumstances and not on the type of proof of particular elemen

2012“This comment by the prosecutor was an argument to the jury concerning the strength of the State’s case, McWhorter v. State, 781 So.2d 257, 321 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), affirmed, Ex parte McWhorter, 781 So.2d 330 (Ala.2000), cert. denied, McWhorter v. Alabama, 532 U.S. 976 , 121 S.Ct. 1612 , 149 L.Ed.2d 476 (2001), and reasonable inferences and conclusions that could be drawn therefrom.

2011This Court addressed this same issue in Davenport v. State, 968 So.2d 27 (Ala.Crim.App.2005), stating: “The appellant further argues that the trial court erroneously denied her motions for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s case and at the close of all of the evidence because the evidence did not support a conviction for murder.

2011See, e.g., Flowers v. State, 799 So.2d 966 (Ala.Crim.App.2000); Montgomery, supra. Thompson also contends that he is entitled to a new trial because, he says, he was involuntarily absent from trial.

2009P. 4 Accordingly, Thompson failed to show that he was prevented from raising a “nonfrivolous claim”; thus, he failed to show any “actual injury.” Moreover, in Peoples v. State, 531 So.2d 323 (Ala.Crim.App.1988), this Court, quoting the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1072-73 (11th Cir.1986), cited with approval the sanctions a court may legally impose when faced with litigious and prolific pro se litigants: “Courts have an ‘inherent power ... to regulate the activities of abusive liti *125 gants by imposing carefully tailored rest

2002We note that at the time of the proceedings below, the Alabama Supreme Court had not yet released its decision in Ex parte Fountain, 842 So.2d 726 (Ala.2001), affirming in part and reversing in part this Court’s judgment in Fountain v. State, 842 So.2d 719 (Ala.Crim.App.2000).

2002We note that at the time of the proceedings below, the Alabama Supreme Court had not yet released its decision in Ex parte Fountain, 842 So.2d 726 (Ala.2001), affirming in part and reversing in part this Court’s judgment in Fountain v. State, 842 So.2d 719 (Ala.Crim.App.2000).

1994In Greene, 554 So.2d at 381 , our supreme court made the following statements: “After a thorough review of the Estate’s post-judgment motion, we find that the Estate was merely reasserting the same issues that it had previously argued in opposition to Ms. Thompson’s motion for summary judgment; it was not moving for relief from judgment based on newly discovered evidence not discoverable through due diligence in time to prevent judgment from being entered against it.

1991We further note, that in denying the petition for writ of certiorari, our supreme court stated that it did not agree with the reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeals, 562 So.2d at 1365 .

1991In regard to whether the change in the eviden-tiary standard has resulted in a change in the rule that the record must indicate that the arresting officer or any other witness was qualified to state his opinion that the inmate was under the influence of alcohol, Ex parte Hawkins, 475 So.2d at 492 , compare Whitson v. State, 513 So.2d 38 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (wherein the court followed Hawkins even though the evidentiary standard had changed, but was not explicitly recognized by the Whitson court) with Martin v. State, 562 So.2d 294 (Ala.Cr.App.1990) (wherein the court, under the Thompson standard

1991In regard to whether the change in the eviden-tiary standard has resulted in a change in the rule that the record must indicate that the arresting officer or any other witness was qualified to state his opinion that the inmate was under the influence of alcohol, Ex parte Hawkins, 475 So.2d at 492 , compare Whitson v. State, 513 So.2d 38 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (wherein the court followed Hawkins even though the evidentiary standard had changed, but was not explicitly recognized by the Whitson court) with Martin v. State, 562 So.2d 294 (Ala.Cr.App.1990) (wherein the court, under the Thompson standard

1991In regard to whether the change in the eviden-tiary standard has resulted in a change in the rule that the record must indicate that the arresting officer or any other witness was qualified to state his opinion that the inmate was under the influence of alcohol, Ex parte Hawkins, 475 So.2d at 492 , compare Whitson v. State, 513 So.2d 38 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (wherein the court followed Hawkins even though the evidentiary standard had changed, but was not explicitly recognized by the Whitson court) with Martin v. State, 562 So.2d 294 (Ala.Cr.App.1990) (wherein the court, under the Thompson standard

1991In regard to whether the change in the eviden-tiary standard has resulted in a change in the rule that the record must indicate that the arresting officer or any other witness was qualified to state his opinion that the inmate was under the influence of alcohol, Ex parte Hawkins, 475 So.2d at 492 , compare Whitson v. State, 513 So.2d 38 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (wherein the court followed Hawkins even though the evidentiary standard had changed, but was not explicitly recognized by the Whitson court) with Martin v. State, 562 So.2d 294 (Ala.Cr.App.1990) (wherein the court, under the Thompson standard