Thompson factors in Kansas

2016Pabst then cited the "Thompson factors" from 1976 and noted that our Court of Appeals had routinely looked to those factors to measure prejudice: "'"'When determining whether prosecutorial misconduct was prejudicial, factors that should be considered include: (1) Is the misconduct so gross and flagrant as to deny the accused a fair trial? (2) Do the remarks show ill will on the prosecutor's part? (3) Is the evidence against the defendant of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have little weight in the minds of the jurors? [Citations 20 omitted.]'"'" Pabst, 26

2000The Thompson factors have been cited several times by the Court of Appeals: “ ‘ “When determining whether prosecutorial misconduct was prejudicial, factors that should be considered include: (1) Is the misconduct so gross and flagrant as to deny the accused a fair trial? (2) Do the remarks show ill will on die prosecutor’s part? (3) Is the evidence against the defendant of such a direct and overwhelming nature diat the misconduct would likely have little weight in die minds of the jurors? [Citations omitted.]” ’ ” Lockhart, 24 Kan.

2025App. 2d 272 , 510 P.3d 1194 (2022).

2021State v. Whitesell, 270 Kan. 259, 294 , 13 P.3d 887 (2000).

2021State v. Whitesell, 270 Kan. 259, 294 , 13 P.3d 887 (2000).

2016Pabst then cited the "Thompson factors" from 1976 and noted that our Court of Appeals had routinely looked to those factors to measure prejudice: "'"'When determining whether prosecutorial misconduct was prejudicial, factors that should be considered include: (1) Is the misconduct so gross and flagrant as to deny the accused a fair trial? (2) Do the remarks show ill will on the prosecutor's part? (3) Is the evidence against the defendant of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have little weight in the minds of the jurors? [Citations 20 omitted.]'"'" Pabst, 26

2011As we discussed in Pabst v. State, 287 Kan. 1 , 192 P.3d 630 (2008), the version of K.S.A. 60-215, specifically its subsection (a), in effect at the time of Thompson’s motion and attempted amendment in district court, did not permit K.S.A. 60-1507 movants to amend their motions as of right.

2011As we discussed in Pabst v. State, 287 Kan. 1 , 192 P.3d 630 (2008), the version of K.S.A. 60-215, specifically its subsection (a), in effect at the time of Thompson’s motion and attempted amendment in district court, did not permit K.S.A. 60-1507 movants to amend their motions as of right.

2009The Thompson factors include: "knowledge of the right to refuse, a clear communication that the driver is free to terminate the encounter or refuse to answer questions, return of the driver's license and other documents, and a physical disengagement before further questioning." 284 Kan. at 810-11, 166 P.3d 1015 .

2009The Thompson factors include: "knowledge of the right to refuse, a clear communication that the driver is free to terminate the encounter or refuse to answer questions, return of the driver's license and other documents, and a physical disengagement before further questioning." 284 Kan. at 810-11, 166 P.3d 1015 .

2007The trial court denied Thompson's motion to suppress, finding that Thompson was not seized at the time he consented to the search of his vehicle and, therefore, his "Fourth Amendment rights do not come into play." On direct appeal in State v. Thompson, 36 Kan.App.2d 252, 260-61 , 138 P.3d 398 (2006), the Court of Appeals panel reversed, holding in part "that Thompson submitted to a claim of lawful authority rather than consented to a voluntary act." We granted the State's petition for review in which the State argues the panel's decision is in "direct conflict" with decisions of the Tenth Circ

2007The trial court denied Thompson's motion to suppress, finding that Thompson was not seized at the time he consented to the search of his vehicle and, therefore, his "Fourth Amendment rights do not come into play." On direct appeal in State v. Thompson, 36 Kan.App.2d 252, 260-61 , 138 P.3d 398 (2006), the Court of Appeals panel reversed, holding in part "that Thompson submitted to a claim of lawful authority rather than consented to a voluntary act." We granted the State's petition for review in which the State argues the panel's decision is in "direct conflict" with decisions of the Tenth Circ

1973In Hospital Co. v. Philippi, 82 Kan. 64 , 107 Pac. 530 , this court considered the question of premature filing and said: “Where the devisee of the will brought the action before the will was probated, and later, when it was probated, filed an amended and supplemental petition, on which the cause of action was tried, the objection that the action was prematurely brought became immaterial.” (Syl. f 3.) An analogous principle is stated in 1 C.

1973In Hospital Co. v. Philippi, 82 Kan. 64 , 107 Pac. 530 , this court considered the question of premature filing and said: “Where the devisee of the will brought the action before the will was probated, and later, when it was probated, filed an amended and supplemental petition, on which the cause of action was tried, the objection that the action was prematurely brought became immaterial.” (Syl. f 3.) An analogous principle is stated in 1 C.