37 California opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2025 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Fuimaonogreen2 sentences2020(People v. Torres (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1081 , 1084; People v. Hernandez (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 323, 326 .) “If the trial court does not have jurisdiction to rule on a motion to vacate or modify a sentence, an order denying such a motion is nonappealable, and any appeal from such an order must be 3 dismissed. [Citations.]” (People v. Torres, at p. 1084; see People v. Fuimaono (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 132, 135 .) Even if the order were appealable, Thompson’s claim has been forfeited. 2020(People v. Torres (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1081 , 1084; People v. Hernandez (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 323, 326 .) “If the trial court does not have jurisdiction to rule on a motion to vacate or modify a sentence, an order denying such a motion is nonappealable, and any appeal from such an order must be 3 dismissed. [Citations.]” (People v. Torres, at p. 1084; see People v. Fuimaono (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 132, 135 .) Even if the order were appealable, Thompson’s claim has been forfeited. | 2 | 2 |
Samples v. Browngreen2 sentences2014(Alviso v. Sonoma County Sheriff’s Dept. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 198, 202 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 775 ] (Alviso); see Samples v. Brown (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 787, 804 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 216 ] (Samples) [§ 14602.6 not unconstitutionally vague]; Salazar v. Maywood (9th Cir. 2011) 414 Fed.Appx. 73, 74-75 (Salazar) [statute’s notice provisions satisfy due process].) As explained by the Alviso court, “the hearing procedure . . . adequately reconciles the competing interests of the parties: the private interest in avoiding the cost and disruption entailed by impoundment of one’s automobile; the relatively lo 2014(Alviso v. Sonoma County Sheriff’s Dept. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 198, 202 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 775 ] (Alviso); see Samples v. Brown (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 787, 804 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 216 ] (Samples) [§ 14602.6 not unconstitutionally vague]; Salazar v. Maywood (9th Cir. 2011) 414 Fed.Appx. 73, 74-75 (Salazar) [statute’s notice provisions satisfy due process].) As explained by the Alviso court, “the hearing procedure . . . adequately reconciles the competing interests of the parties: the private interest in avoiding the cost and disruption entailed by impoundment of one’s automobile; the relatively lo | 2 | 2 |
Alviso v. Sonoma County Sheriff's Departmentgreen2 sentences2014Accordingly, the impound scheme does not violate due process.” (Alviso, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 214 .) Thompson’s claim that the City is required to provide specific notices in addition to the 48-hour notice required by the statute (see § 14602.6, subd. (b); Veh. 2014Accordingly, the impound scheme does not violate due process.” (Alviso, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 214 .) Thompson’s claim that the City is required to provide specific notices in addition to the 48-hour notice required by the statute (see §§ 14602.6, subd. (b), 22852, subd. (b)) 3 also fails to state a cause of action. | 2 | 2 |
Jorge Miranda Irene Miranda v. City of Cornelius Acme Towing, Inc.green2 sentences2014Appx. at p. 75 ; see Miranda v. City of Cornelius (9th Cir. 2005) 429 F.3d 858, 868 [notice to owners of a vehicle within 48 hours of an impoundment explaining right to request a hearing ensures that any erroneous deprivation of an owner’s vehicle will be slight and satisfies due process concerns].) Thus, contrary to Thompson’s claim, due process does not require that the City set forth the entire language of section 14602.6 in its notice, give the factual basis for the impound, or provide the evidence that the City plans to use at the hearing. 2014Code, §§ 22852, 22650, subd. (a)) are sufficient to comply with due process. ( Alviso, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at pp. 209-214; Smith v. Santa Rosa Police Dept., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 569 ; Miranda v. City of Cornelius, supra, 429 F.3d at p. 868 .) While Thompson would have the City provide more extensive procedures, he does not allege that the ones the City currently provides are inconsistent with section 14602.6 and the *108 implementing regulations, which the courts have held comport with due process. ( Alviso, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at pp. 209-214.) 4 Thompson’s challenge to the City’s | 2 | 2 |
Juan Salazar v. City of Maywoodgreen2 sentences2014(Alviso v. Sonoma County Sheriff’s Dept. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 198, 202 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 775 ] (Alviso); see Samples v. Brown (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 787, 804 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 216 ] (Samples) [§ 14602.6 not unconstitutionally vague]; Salazar v. Maywood (9th Cir. 2011) 414 Fed.Appx. 73, 74-75 (Salazar) [statute’s notice provisions satisfy due process].) As explained by the Alviso court, “the hearing procedure . . . adequately reconciles the competing interests of the parties: the private interest in avoiding the cost and disruption entailed by impoundment of one’s automobile; the relatively lo 2014(Salazar, supra, 414 Fed. | 1 | 2 |
Baral v. Schnittgreen1 sentence2024(Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396 [“When relief is sought based on allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the unprotected activity is disregarded at this stage”].) The parties dispute, however, the extent to which these causes of action rely upon protected activity, and whether it was proper for the trial court to put these protected activity allegations through the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. | 1 | 1 |
In re Trejogreen2 sentences2021(See In re Trejo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 972, 984 (Trejo); In re Williams (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 794, 799-804 (Williams); In re Jenson (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 266, 278-283 (Jenson).) We will briefly summarize the youth program legislation and the relevant cases. 2021(Trejo, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 984 .) After a thorough analysis of the interplay between section 3051 and various sentencing laws, the Trejo court concluded that the Youth Offender Parole Program necessarily supersedes the Thompson requirement, as it does other sentencing requirements not expressly excluded by section 3051. | 1 | 1 |
In re Williamsgreen1 sentence2021(See In re Trejo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 972, 984 (Trejo); In re Williams (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 794, 799-804 (Williams); In re Jenson (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 266, 278-283 (Jenson).) We will briefly summarize the youth program legislation and the relevant cases. | 1 | 1 |
In re Jensongreen1 sentence2021(See In re Trejo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 972, 984 (Trejo); In re Williams (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 794, 799-804 (Williams); In re Jenson (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 266, 278-283 (Jenson).) We will briefly summarize the youth program legislation and the relevant cases. | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Halvonikgreen2 sentences2016Just as we cannot accept Asimos’s claim that the defense of “no license” was a sure loser, we cannot accept as a sure winner Thompson’s claim of entitlement to $311,100. “ ‘Damage to be subject to a proper award must be such as follows the act complained of as a legal certainty . . . : [Citations.]” (Filbin v. Fitzgerald (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 154, 165 [ 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 422 ] (Filbin), quoting Agnew v. Parks (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 756, 768 [ 343 P.2d 118 ].) “Conversely, ‘ “ ‘[t]he mere probability that a certain event would have happened, upon which a claim for damages is predicated, will not 2016Just as we cannot accept Asimos’s claim that the defense of “no license” was a sure loser, we cannot accept as a sure winner Thompson’s claim of entitlement to $311,100. “ ‘Damage to be subject to a proper award must be such as follows the act complained of as a legal certainty . . . : [Citations.]” (Filbin v. Fitzgerald (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 154, 165 [ 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 422 ] (Filbin), quoting Agnew v. Parks (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 756, 768 [ 343 P.2d 118 ].) “Conversely, ‘ “ ‘[t]he mere probability that a certain event would have happened, upon which a claim for damages is predicated, will not | 1 | 1 |
Agnew v. Parksgreen2 sentences2016Just as we cannot accept Asimos’s claim that the defense of “no license” was a sure loser, we cannot accept as a sure winner Thompson’s claim of entitlement to $311,100. “ ‘Damage to be subject to a proper award must be such as follows the act complained of as a legal certainty . . . : [Citations.]” (Filbin v. Fitzgerald (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 154, 165 [ 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 422 ] (Filbin), quoting Agnew v. Parks (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 756, 768 [ 343 P.2d 118 ].) “Conversely, ‘ “ ‘[t]he mere probability that a certain event would have happened, upon which a claim for damages is predicated, will not 2016Just as we cannot accept Asimos’s claim that the defense of “no license” was a sure loser, we cannot accept as a sure winner Thompson’s claim of entitlement to $311,100. “ ‘Damage to be subject to a proper award must be such as follows the act complained of as a legal certainty . . . : [Citations.]” (Filbin v. Fitzgerald (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 154, 165 [ 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 422 ] (Filbin), quoting Agnew v. Parks (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 756, 768 [ 343 P.2d 118 ].) “Conversely, ‘ “ ‘[t]he mere probability that a certain event would have happened, upon which a claim for damages is predicated, will not | 1 | 1 |
Marshak v. Ballesterosgreen2 sentences2016Just as we cannot accept Asimos’s claim that the defense of “no license” was a sure loser, we cannot accept as a sure winner Thompson’s claim of entitlement to $311,100. “ ‘Damage to be subject to a proper award must be such as follows the act complained of as a legal certainty . . . : [Citations.]” (Filbin v. Fitzgerald (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 154, 165 [ 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 422 ] (Filbin), quoting Agnew v. Parks (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 756, 768 [ 343 P.2d 118 ].) “Conversely, ‘ “ ‘[t]he mere probability that a certain event would have happened, upon which a claim for damages is predicated, will not 2016Just as we cannot accept Asimos’s claim that the defense of “no license” was a sure loser, we cannot accept as a sure winner Thompson’s claim of entitlement to $311,100. “ ‘Damage to be subject to a proper award must be such as follows the act complained of as a legal certainty . . . : [Citations.]” (Filbin v. Fitzgerald (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 154, 165 [ 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 422 ] (Filbin), quoting Agnew v. Parks (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 756, 768 [ 343 P.2d 118 ].) “Conversely, ‘ “ ‘[t]he mere probability that a certain event would have happened, upon which a claim for damages is predicated, will not | 1 | 1 |
Filbin v. Fitzgeraldgreen2 sentences2016Just as we cannot accept Asimos’s claim that the defense of “no license” was a sure loser, we cannot accept as a sure winner Thompson’s claim of entitlement to $311,100. “ ‘Damage to be subject to a proper award must be such as follows the act complained of as a legal certainty . . . : [Citations.]” (Filbin v. Fitzgerald (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 154, 165 [ 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 422 ] (Filbin), quoting Agnew v. Parks (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 756, 768 [ 343 P.2d 118 ].) “Conversely, ‘ “ ‘[t]he mere probability that a certain event would have happened, upon which a claim for damages is predicated, will not 2016Just as we cannot accept Asimos’s claim that the defense of “no license” was a sure loser, we cannot accept as a sure winner Thompson’s claim of entitlement to $311,100. “ ‘Damage to be subject to a proper award must be such as follows the act complained of as a legal certainty . . . : [Citations.]” (Filbin v. Fitzgerald (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 154, 165 [ 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 422 ] (Filbin), quoting Agnew v. Parks (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 756, 768 [ 343 P.2d 118 ].) “Conversely, ‘ “ ‘[t]he mere probability that a certain event would have happened, upon which a claim for damages is predicated, will not | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Salvatogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Thompsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Aguilar v. Avis Rent a Car System, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| People Ex Rel. Allstate Insurance v. Weitzmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Ellisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Alcalared | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Greengreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Tassellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Thorntongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Rodriguezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lawlergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Thompson
green
2 sentences1988The objection was to the relevancy of the evidence to an issue in the trial. [4] Although the objection did not specify that, as prior crimes evidence, the theft was inadmissible under Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101, subdivision (b), unless it satisfied the admissibility criteria summarized in Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d 303 , we believe that it was sufficiently specific to encompass a Thompson objection, i.e., that the People were offering evidence of uncharged criminal conduct by the defendant, that defendant had not put in issue any element of the offense or issue necessary to the Peopl 1988The objection was to the relevancy of the evidence to an issue in the trial. 4 Although the objection did not specify that, as prior crimes evidence, the theft was inadmissible under Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101, subdivision (b), unless it satisfied the admissibility criteria summarized in Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d 303 , we believe that it was sufliciently specific to encompass a Thompson objection, i.e., that the People were offering evidence of uncharged criminal conduct by the defendant, that defendant had not put in issue any element of the offense or issue necessary to the People’ | 4 | 1980–1988 |
People v. Hernandez
green
2 sentences2020(People v. Torres (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1081 , 1084; People v. Hernandez (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 323, 326 .) “If the trial court does not have jurisdiction to rule on a motion to vacate or modify a sentence, an order denying such a motion is nonappealable, and any appeal from such an order must be 3 dismissed. [Citations.]” (People v. Torres, at p. 1084; see People v. Fuimaono (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 132, 135 .) Even if the order were appealable, Thompson’s claim has been forfeited. 2020(People v. Torres (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1081 , 1084; People v. Hernandez (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 323, 326 .) “If the trial court does not have jurisdiction to rule on a motion to vacate or modify a sentence, an order denying such a motion is nonappealable, and any appeal from such an order must be 3 dismissed. [Citations.]” (People v. Torres, at p. 1084; see People v. Fuimaono (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 132, 135 .) Even if the order were appealable, Thompson’s claim has been forfeited. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Smith v. Santa Rosa Police Department
green
2 sentences2014Code, §§ 22852; 22650, subd. (a)) are sufficient to comply with due process. ( Alviso, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at pp. 209–214; Smith v. Santa Rosa Police Dept., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 569 ; Miranda v. City of Cornelius, supra, 429 F.3d at p. 868 .) While Thompson would have the City provide more extensive procedures, he does not allege that the ones the City currently provides are inconsistent with section 14602.6 and the implementing regulations, which the courts have held comport with due process. ( Alviso, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at pp. 209–214.)4 Thompson’s challenge to the City’s use o 2014Code, §§ 22852, 22650, subd. (a)) are sufficient to comply with due process. ( Alviso, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at pp. 209-214; Smith v. Santa Rosa Police Dept., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 569 ; Miranda v. City of Cornelius, supra, 429 F.3d at p. 868 .) While Thompson would have the City provide more extensive procedures, he does not allege that the ones the City currently provides are inconsistent with section 14602.6 and the *108 implementing regulations, which the courts have held comport with due process. ( Alviso, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at pp. 209-214.) 4 Thompson’s challenge to the City’s | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Estate of Shinkle
green
2 sentences2004We concluded that Thompson came within the statutory definition of "care custodian," which covers administrators, employees, and support and maintenance staff of public and private facilities and agencies, including "`[t]he office of the long-term care ombudsman.'" ( Shinkle, supra, 97 Cal. App.4th at pp. 1005-1006, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 42 , quoting Welf. & Inst.Code, § 15610.17, subd. (s).) We rejected Thompson's claim that he lost that status when he ceased being Shinkle's ombudsman and began to *19 see her and help her simply as a friend. ( Shinkle, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1005 , 119 Cal.Rpt 2004We concluded that Thompson came within the statutory definition of "care custodian," which covers administrators, employees, and support and maintenance staff of public and private facilities and agencies, including "`[t]he office of the long-term care ombudsman.'" ( Shinkle, supra, 97 Cal. App.4th at pp. 1005-1006, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 42 , quoting Welf. & Inst.Code, § 15610.17, subd. (s).) We rejected Thompson's claim that he lost that status when he ceased being Shinkle's ombudsman and began to *19 see her and help her simply as a friend. ( Shinkle, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1005 , 119 Cal.Rpt | 2 | 2004–2004 |
People v. Cuccia
green
1 sentence2025(Citing People v. Cuccia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 785, 795 .) But contrary to Thompson’s claim, he raised no objection below, and the actions he did take were inadequate to preserve his arguments for appeal. “[T]he forfeiture rule for alleged sentencing errors” is that, “unless a party makes a contemporaneous objection, he or she generally cannot challenge a court’s ruling for the first time on appeal.” (People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 594 .) This is because, “[a]lthough the court is required to impose sentence in a lawful manner, counsel is charged with understanding, advocating, and | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Lafferty v. Wells Fargo Bank
green
1 sentence2025(Briley v. City of West Covina (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 119 , 133; Lafferty v. Wells Fargo Bank (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 545, 571-572 .) For these reasons, we reject Thompson’s challenge to the order granting Ning’s motion to quash. 9 DISPOSITION The April 10, 2024, orders granting Ning’s motion to quash and denying Thompson’s petition to determine a parental relationship are affirmed. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc.
green
1 sentence2025The city now argues that 5 persuaded that Thompson established such alleged conduct via uncontradicted evidence (Sonic, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 466 ), let alone that any conduct by the city deprived her property of all value. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Scott
green
1 sentence2025(Citing People v. Cuccia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 785, 795 .) But contrary to Thompson’s claim, he raised no objection below, and the actions he did take were inadequate to preserve his arguments for appeal. “[T]he forfeiture rule for alleged sentencing errors” is that, “unless a party makes a contemporaneous objection, he or she generally cannot challenge a court’s ruling for the first time on appeal.” (People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 594 .) This is because, “[a]lthough the court is required to impose sentence in a lawful manner, counsel is charged with understanding, advocating, and | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2025(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 .) Therefore, we reject Thompson’s claim of error. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. McCullough
green
1 sentence2025(Citing People v. Cuccia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 785, 795 .) But contrary to Thompson’s claim, he raised no objection below, and the actions he did take were inadequate to preserve his arguments for appeal. “[T]he forfeiture rule for alleged sentencing errors” is that, “unless a party makes a contemporaneous objection, he or she generally cannot challenge a court’s ruling for the first time on appeal.” (People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 594 .) This is because, “[a]lthough the court is required to impose sentence in a lawful manner, counsel is charged with understanding, advocating, and | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co.
green
1 sentence2024(See Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 .) 17 C The trial court erred in granting Thompson’s motion as to Warner’s concealment cause of action. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC v. Evangelism
green
1 sentence2024(See Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 28, 49 .) A The trial court correctly denied Thompson’s motion at step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis with respect to Warner’s causes of action for public nuisance, private nuisance, and negligence. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Anders v. California
green
1 sentence2022To assist the court in its review, and in compliance with Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), counsel has identified the following possible issue that was considered in evaluating the potential merits of this appeal: Did the trial court err in refusing to consider Thompson’s motion as a request for resentencing? | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Gauss v. GAF Corp.
green
1 sentence2021Gauss purported to foreclose use of the Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 procedure to “enforce a settlement agreement signed only by a party’s agent.” (Gauss, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1121 .) But, as we suggested in Provost v. Regents of University of California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1289 (Provost), Gauss does not 3 The Legislature passed amendments to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 which became effective on January 1, 2021, long after the trial court made its ruling on Thompson’s motion to enforce settlement. 4 Amongst other things, the recent amendments added language permit | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Philippine Export & Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. v. Chuidian
green
1 sentence2021Thus, granting the motion would be contrary to the principle that “the evidence normally must enable the Court of Appeal to affirm the judgment, not lead to a reversal.” (Philippine Export & Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. v. Chuidian, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 1090 .) Based on the foregoing, we decline to exercise our discretionary authority to take evidence and make findings of fact. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Provost v. Regents of University of California
green
1 sentence2021Gauss purported to foreclose use of the Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 procedure to “enforce a settlement agreement signed only by a party’s agent.” (Gauss, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1121 .) But, as we suggested in Provost v. Regents of University of California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1289 (Provost), Gauss does not 3 The Legislature passed amendments to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 which became effective on January 1, 2021, long after the trial court made its ruling on Thompson’s motion to enforce settlement. 4 Amongst other things, the recent amendments added language permit | 1 | 2021–2021 |
J.B.B. Investment Partners, Ltd. v. Fair
green
1 sentence2021Investment Partners Ltd. v. Fair (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 974, 984 .) However, in determining whether Thompson’s motion satisfied the statute’s requirements, our review is de novo since the question is one of law. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Warrick v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Thompson green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| In Re Candelario green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Thompson v. Missouri green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Ward green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Strong v. Superior Court neutral | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Magness v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp. green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Moore v. Preventive Medicine Medical Group, Inc. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. Williams green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Wilson red | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Commonwealth v. Simpson green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. Morgison green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Sears green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Harris green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. Phillips green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. Ahmadjian green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Ireland green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| United States v. William Maurice Foster, Jr. And Terry Lee McCready green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| United States v. Clarence E. Braasch green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| United States v. Stephen Hathaway, United States of America v. Howard Baptista green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.