7 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Marnon v. Vaughan Motor Co., Inc.green2 sentences1995See Marnon v. Vaughan Motor Co., Inc., 184 Or 103, 157 , 194 P2d 992 (1948). (“ ‘The new contract supersedes the first to the extent that the two will be unable to stand together.’ ” (quoting 17 C JS, Contracts, 869, § 379)). 11 The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Thompson’s claim of an attorney’s lien to secure payment of his attorney fee prevents the July agreement from covering the “same” subject matter as the earlier fee agreements founders on the facts of the items covered by the July agreement. 1995See Marnon v. Vaughan Motor Co., Inc., 184 Or 103, 157 , 194 P2d 992 (1948). (“ ‘The new contract supersedes the first to the extent that the two will be unable to stand together.’ ” (quoting 17 C JS, Contracts, 869, § 379)). 11 The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Thompson’s claim of an attorney’s lien to secure payment of his attorney fee prevents the July agreement from covering the “same” subject matter as the earlier fee agreements founders on the facts of the items covered by the July agreement. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
May v. Chicago Insurance Company
green
2 sentences2025As we will explain, we conclude that the nondis- paragement clause did not waive Thompson’s right to the procedural protections afforded by the anti-SLAPP statute, and thus the clause itself did not defeat her special motion 10 With respect to Thompson’s alternative ORCP 21 A(1)(h) motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals concluded that Lowes had “adequately alleged causation and damages, and the trial court therefore erred in granting Thompson’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.” Id. at 415 . 32 Lowes v. Thompson to strike.11 Accordingly, we reverse the Court of App 2025As we will explain, we conclude that the nondis- paragement clause did not waive Thompson’s right to the procedural protections afforded by the anti-SLAPP statute, and thus the clause itself did not defeat her special motion 10 With respect to Thompson’s alternative ORCP 21 A(1)(h) motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals concluded that Lowes had “adequately alleged causation and damages, and the trial court therefore erred in granting Thompson’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.” Id. at 415 . 32 Lowes v. Thompson to strike.11 Accordingly, we reverse the Court of App | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Winamaki v. Umpqua Bank
green
2 sentences2024Former ORCP 21 A(8)—renumbered as ORCP 21 A(1)(h), effective January 21, 2022—both before and after renumbering, allows motions to dismiss for “failure to state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a claim[.]” In review- ing a trial court’s decision under ORCP 21 A to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we will “assume the truth of all well-pleaded allegations and all reasonable inferences favorable to plaintiff that may be drawn from those allega- tions.” Winamaki v. Umpqua Bank, 322 Or App 588, 589 , 521 414 Lowes v. Thompson P3d 846 (2022), rev den, 370 Or 828 (2023). 2024Former ORCP 21 A(8)—renumbered as ORCP 21 A(1)(h), effective January 21, 2022—both before and after renumbering, allows motions to dismiss for “failure to state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a claim[.]” In review- ing a trial court’s decision under ORCP 21 A to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we will “assume the truth of all well-pleaded allegations and all reasonable inferences favorable to plaintiff that may be drawn from those allega- tions.” Winamaki v. Umpqua Bank, 322 Or App 588, 589 , 521 414 Lowes v. Thompson P3d 846 (2022), rev den, 370 Or 828 (2023). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Gowans v. Northwestern Pacific Indemnity Co.
green
2 sentences2023Co., 260 Or 618 , 489 P2d 947 (1971), they contend that the “proximate cause” of Thompson’s claim against Final Table was Final Table’s overservice of Sheets, not Sheets’ assault and battery. 2023Co., 260 Or 618 , 489 P2d 947 (1971), they contend that the “proximate cause” of Thompson’s claim against Final Table was Final Table’s overservice of Sheets, not Sheets’ assault and battery. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Final Table, LLC v. Acceptance Casualty Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences2023Cite as 328 Or App 620 (2023) 623 Final Table forwarded a copy of Thompson’s claim to defendant. 2023Cite as 328 Or App 620 (2023) 623 Final Table forwarded a copy of Thompson’s claim to defendant. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
ZRZ Realty Co. v. Beneficial Fire & Casualty Insurance
green
2 sentences2023The duty to defend is separate from the duty to indemnify, ZRZ Realty v. Beneficial Fire and Casualty Ins., 349 Or 117, 150 , 241 P3d 710 (2010), and we begin with the duty to indemnify. 2023The duty to defend is separate from the duty to indemnify, ZRZ Realty v. Beneficial Fire and Casualty Ins., 349 Or 117, 150 , 241 P3d 710 (2010), and we begin with the duty to indemnify. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.