Witherspoon standard in Alabama

1982In accordance with the Witherspoon progeny, the rule in Alabama is that a prospective juror may be excused because of his opposition to capital punishment only if it is "sufficiently [shown] that he [or she] would automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty no matter what the evidence introduced at trial might reveal." Liddell v. State , 287 Ala. 299 , 251 So.2d 601 (1971); Hill v. State , 371 So.2d 60 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978), cert denied, 371 So.2d 64 (Ala. 1979); Bracewell v. State , 407 So.2d 845 (Ala. 1979), on remand, 407 So.2d 848 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979).

1982In accordance with the Witherspoon progeny, the rule in Alabama is that a prospective juror may be excused because of his opposition to capital punishment only if it is "sufficiently [shown] that he [or she] would automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty no matter what the evidence introduced at trial might reveal." Liddell v. State , 287 Ala. 299 , 251 So.2d 601 (1971); Hill v. State , 371 So.2d 60 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978), cert denied, 371 So.2d 64 (Ala. 1979); Bracewell v. State , 407 So.2d 845 (Ala. 1979), on remand, 407 So.2d 848 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979).

1997The Witt standard dispensed with the Witherspoon requirement of "automatic" decisionmaking, and eliminated the requirement that a veniremember's bias be proved with "unmistakable clarity." 469 U.S. at 424 , 105 S.Ct. at 852 . [6] However, Dr. Warner also testified that he found no bullet in the victim's clothing. [7] There is no question that the jury's sentencing was not tainted by a consideration of the appellant's juvenile record: the jury received no evidence of his juvenile record and defense counsel did not argue the existence of this particular mitigating circumstance.

1997The Witt standard dispensed with the Witherspoon requirement of "automatic" decisionmaking, and eliminated the requirement that a veniremember's bias be proved with "unmistakable clarity." 469 U.S. at 424 , 105 S.Ct. at 852 . [6] However, Dr. Warner also testified that he found no bullet in the victim's clothing. [7] There is no question that the jury's sentencing was not tainted by a consideration of the appellant's juvenile record: the jury received no evidence of his juvenile record and defense counsel did not argue the existence of this particular mitigating circumstance.

1990This issue has recently been addressed by the Supreme Court of California in People *849 v. Coleman, 46 Cal.3d 1284C, 46 Cal.3d 749 , 251 Cal.Rptr. 83 , 759 P.2d 1260 (1988). [4] The court stated therein: "Although neither Witherspoon, supra, 391 U.S. 510 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 , nor Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412 , 105 S.Ct. 844 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 , on its face concerns exclusion of a prospective juror for cause due to his or her view favoring the death penalty, we think Witt makes clear that a challenge on the basis of bias meeting the Witherspoon standard is no different from any other c

1990This issue has recently been addressed by the Supreme Court of California in People *849 v. Coleman, 46 Cal.3d 1284C, 46 Cal.3d 749 , 251 Cal.Rptr. 83 , 759 P.2d 1260 (1988). [4] The court stated therein: "Although neither Witherspoon, supra, 391 U.S. 510 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 , nor Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412 , 105 S.Ct. 844 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 , on its face concerns exclusion of a prospective juror for cause due to his or her view favoring the death penalty, we think Witt makes clear that a challenge on the basis of bias meeting the Witherspoon standard is no different from any other c

1984Likewise, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in a recent case involving Witherspoon error, held invalid only the sentence of death; moreover, the court remanded the case with directions that the State choose either "(1) to conduct a new sentence proceeding, in the manner provided by state statute, or (2) to vacate petitioner's sentence and impose a sentence less than death in accordance with state law." Hance v. Zant , 696 F.2d 940 , 957 (11th Cir. 1983).

1984In Rouse , the court, interpreting a capital punishment statute similar to Alabama's, held that "the words `the jury rendering the verdict' . . . were not intended to require the same jury to fix the punishment where the accused pleads guilty or he successfully raises the Witherspoon rule." Id. , at 151.

1984In Rouse , the court, interpreting a capital punishment statute similar to Alabama's, held that "the words `the jury rendering the verdict' . . . were not intended to require the same jury to fix the punishment where the accused pleads guilty or he successfully raises the Witherspoon rule." Id. , at 151.

1984"The holding in Witherspoon is not applicable where the jury recommends a sentence less than the death sentence." Eady v. State , 284 Ala. 327 , 224 So.2d 876 (1969); see, Brinks v. State , 44 Ala. App. 601 , 217 So.2d 813 , cert. denied, 283 Ala. 712 , 217 So.2d 820 (1969); see also, Witherspoon v. Illinois , 391 U.S. 510 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), and Bumper v. North Carolina , 391 U.S. 543 , 88 S.Ct. 1788 , 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968).

1984"The holding in Witherspoon is not applicable where the jury recommends a sentence less than the death sentence." Eady v. State , 284 Ala. 327 , 224 So.2d 876 (1969); see, Brinks v. State , 44 Ala. App. 601 , 217 So.2d 813 , cert. denied, 283 Ala. 712 , 217 So.2d 820 (1969); see also, Witherspoon v. Illinois , 391 U.S. 510 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), and Bumper v. North Carolina , 391 U.S. 543 , 88 S.Ct. 1788 , 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968).

1984The trial court is hereby directed to conduct this new sentencing hearing in a manner *1207 consistent with Beck v. State, 396 So.2d 645 (Ala.1980), and the authorities cited therein.

1984The trial court is hereby directed to conduct this new sentencing hearing in a manner *1207 consistent with Beck v. State, 396 So.2d 645 (Ala.1980), and the authorities cited therein.

1982In accordance with the Witherspoon progeny, the rule in Alabama is that a prospective juror may be excused because of his opposition to capital punishment only if it is “sufficiently [shown] that he [or she] would automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty no matter what the evidence introduced at trial might reveal.” Liddell v. State, 287 Ala. 299 , 251 So.2d 601 (1971); Hill v. State, 371 So.2d 60 (Ala.Cr.App.1978), cert denied, 371 So.2d 64 (Ala.1979); Bracewell v. State, 407 So.2d 845 (Ala.1979), on remand, 407 So.2d 848 (Ala.Cr.App.1979).

1982In accordance with the Witherspoon progeny, the rule in Alabama is that a prospective juror may be excused because of his opposition to capital punishment only if it is "sufficiently [shown] that he [or she] would automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty no matter what the evidence introduced at trial might reveal." Liddell v. State , 287 Ala. 299 , 251 So.2d 601 (1971); Hill v. State , 371 So.2d 60 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978), cert denied, 371 So.2d 64 (Ala. 1979); Bracewell v. State , 407 So.2d 845 (Ala. 1979), on remand, 407 So.2d 848 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979).

1982In accordance with the Witherspoon progeny, the rule in Alabama is that a prospective juror may be excused because of his opposition to capital punishment only if it is “sufficiently [shown] that he [or she] would automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty no matter what the evidence introduced at trial might reveal.” Liddell v. State, 287 Ala. 299 , 251 So.2d 601 (1971); Hill v. State, 371 So.2d 60 (Ala.Cr.App.1978), cert denied, 371 So.2d 64 (Ala.1979); Bracewell v. State, 407 So.2d 845 (Ala.1979), on remand, 407 So.2d 848 (Ala.Cr.App.1979).

1982In accordance with the Witherspoon progeny, the rule in Alabama is that a prospective juror may be excused because of his opposition to capital punishment only if it is "sufficiently [shown] that he [or she] would automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty no matter what the evidence introduced at trial might reveal." Liddell v. State , 287 Ala. 299 , 251 So.2d 601 (1971); Hill v. State , 371 So.2d 60 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978), cert denied, 371 So.2d 64 (Ala. 1979); Bracewell v. State , 407 So.2d 845 (Ala. 1979), on remand, 407 So.2d 848 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979).

1982In accordance with the Witherspoon progeny, the rule in Alabama is that a prospective juror may be excused because of his opposition to capital punishment only if it is “sufficiently [shown] that he [or she] would automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty no matter what the evidence introduced at trial might reveal.” Liddell v. State, 287 Ala. 299 , 251 So.2d 601 (1971); Hill v. State, 371 So.2d 60 (Ala.Cr.App.1978), cert denied, 371 So.2d 64 (Ala.1979); Bracewell v. State, 407 So.2d 845 (Ala.1979), on remand, 407 So.2d 848 (Ala.Cr.App.1979).

1982In accordance with the Witherspoon progeny, the rule in Alabama is that a prospective juror may be excused because of his opposition to capital punishment only if it is "sufficiently [shown] that he [or she] would automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty no matter what the evidence introduced at trial might reveal." Liddell v. State , 287 Ala. 299 , 251 So.2d 601 (1971); Hill v. State , 371 So.2d 60 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978), cert denied, 371 So.2d 64 (Ala. 1979); Bracewell v. State , 407 So.2d 845 (Ala. 1979), on remand, 407 So.2d 848 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979).

1982In accordance with the Witherspoon progeny, the rule in Alabama is that a prospective juror may be excused because of his opposition to capital punishment only if it is “sufficiently [shown] that he [or she] would automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty no matter what the evidence introduced at trial might reveal.” Liddell v. State, 287 Ala. 299 , 251 So.2d 601 (1971); Hill v. State, 371 So.2d 60 (Ala.Cr.App.1978), cert denied, 371 So.2d 64 (Ala.1979); Bracewell v. State, 407 So.2d 845 (Ala.1979), on remand, 407 So.2d 848 (Ala.Cr.App.1979).

1982In accordance with the Witherspoon progeny, the rule in Alabama is that a prospective juror may be excused because of his opposition to capital punishment only if it is "sufficiently [shown] that he [or she] would automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty no matter what the evidence introduced at trial might reveal." Liddell v. State , 287 Ala. 299 , 251 So.2d 601 (1971); Hill v. State , 371 So.2d 60 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978), cert denied, 371 So.2d 64 (Ala. 1979); Bracewell v. State , 407 So.2d 845 (Ala. 1979), on remand, 407 So.2d 848 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979).

1979If the voir dire testimony in a given case indicates that veniremen were excluded on any broader basis than this, the death sentence cannot be carried out...." In 1976 that Court reaffirmed the Witherspoon test in Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 .

1979If the voir dire testimony in a given case indicates that veniremen were excluded on any broader basis than this, the death sentence cannot be carried out...." In 1976 that Court reaffirmed the Witherspoon test in Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 .

1970In Boulden v. Holman, Warden, 394 U.S. 478 , 89 S.Ct. 1138 , 22 L.Ed.2d 433 , the Supreme *Page 438 Court of the United States determined the effect, if any, of the Witherspoon doctrine, supra, on the procedures followed in this state under the provisions of Section 57, Title 30, supra. That court stated as follows: "* * * Eleven veniremen, however, appear to have been excused for cause simply on the basis of their affirmative answers to the question whether, in the statutory language, they had 'a fixed opinion against' capital punishment. * * * Two other veniremen seem to have been excluded m

1970In Boulden v. Holman, Warden, 394 U.S. 478 , 89 S.Ct. 1138 , 22 L.Ed.2d 433 , the Supreme *Page 438 Court of the United States determined the effect, if any, of the Witherspoon doctrine, supra, on the procedures followed in this state under the provisions of Section 57, Title 30, supra. That court stated as follows: "* * * Eleven veniremen, however, appear to have been excused for cause simply on the basis of their affirmative answers to the question whether, in the statutory language, they had 'a fixed opinion against' capital punishment. * * * Two other veniremen seem to have been excluded m

1883That being a prior incumbrance on the land, of Schley’s own creation, it is a breach of the covenants of his deed ; and to the extent that Searcy may have his land charged by that incumbrance, he may set it off, and claim a corresponding rebate from his unpaid purchase-money note, unless, he has estopped himself from making that defense against Wilkinson, the present holder. — Smith v. Pettus, 1 Stew. & Por. 107 ; McLemore v. Mabson, 20 Ala. 137 ; Walton v. Bonham, 24 Ala. 513 ; Kelly v. Allen, 34 Ala. 663, 670 . 70. 3-4.

1883That being a prior incumbrance on the land, of Schley’s own creation, it is a breach of the covenants of his deed ; and to the extent that Searcy may have his land charged by that incumbrance, he may set it off, and claim a corresponding rebate from his unpaid purchase-money note, unless, he has estopped himself from making that defense against Wilkinson, the present holder. — Smith v. Pettus, 1 Stew. & Por. 107 ; McLemore v. Mabson, 20 Ala. 137 ; Walton v. Bonham, 24 Ala. 513 ; Kelly v. Allen, 34 Ala. 663, 670 . 70. 3-4.

1883That being a prior incumbrance on the land, of Schley’s own creation, it is a breach of the covenants of his deed ; and to the extent that Searcy may have his land charged by that incumbrance, he may set it off, and claim a corresponding rebate from his unpaid purchase-money note, unless, he has estopped himself from making that defense against Wilkinson, the present holder. — Smith v. Pettus, 1 Stew. & Por. 107 ; McLemore v. Mabson, 20 Ala. 137 ; Walton v. Bonham, 24 Ala. 513 ; Kelly v. Allen, 34 Ala. 663, 670 . 70. 3-4.