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8 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Boulden v. Holmangreen2 sentences1981See Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 , 89 S.Ct. 1138 , 22 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969), wherein the Supreme Court vacated the death sentence imposed by the jury, where jurors who had a “fixed opinion against” or did not “believe in” capital punishment were excused for cause under an Alabama statute which authorized exclusion of potential jurors in capital cases if the person “has a fixed opinion against capital punishment.” The Court held it entirely possible that such a juror might nevertheless be able to abide by existing law, and conscientiously follow the instructions of the trial judge and consider 1981See Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 , 89 S.Ct. 1138 , 22 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969), wherein the Supreme Court vacated the death sentence imposed by the jury, where jurors who had a “fixed opinion against” or did not “believe in” capital punishment were excused for cause under an Alabama statute which authorized exclusion of potential jurors in capital cases if the person “has a fixed opinion against capital punishment.” The Court held it entirely possible that such a juror might nevertheless be able to abide by existing law, and conscientiously follow the instructions of the trial judge and consider | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Georgiagreen2 sentences1981Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976). 1981Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Harrington
green
2 sentences1989In State v. Harrington, 627 S.W.2d 345 (Tenn.1981) we reversed the sentence of death and remanded for a new sentencing hearing upon our finding that the trial judge had erroenously excluded a single juror for cause in violation of the Witherspoon standard. 1989In State v. Harrington, 627 S.W.2d 345 (Tenn.1981) we reversed the sentence of death and remanded for a new sentencing hearing upon our finding that the trial judge had erroenously excluded a single juror for cause in violation of the Witherspoon standard. | 2 | 1989–2006 |
Wainwright v. Witt
green
2 sentences1998The Witherspoon standard was clarified in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424 , 105 S.Ct. at 852 : That standard is whether the juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” We note that, in addition to dispensing with Witherspoon’s reference to “automatic” decision making, this standard likewise does not require that a juror’s bias be proved with “unmistakable clarity.” The specific question challenged by the appellant was the prosecutor’s inquiry: 8 W e note tha t the appe llant failed to pre s 1998The Witherspoon standard was clarified in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424 , 105 S.Ct. at 852 : That standard is whether the juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” We note that, in addition to dispensing with Witherspoon’s reference to “automatic” decision making, this standard likewise does not require that a juror’s bias be proved with “unmistakable clarity.” The specific question challenged by the appellant was the prosecutor’s inquiry: 8 W e note tha t the appe llant failed to pre s | 2 | 1996–1998 |
Adams v. Texas
green
2 sentences1981In the recent case of Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 , 100 S.Ct. 2521 , 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980), the Supreme Court held violative of the Witherspoon standard a Texas statute which required the disqualification of any juror in a capital case who did not state under oath "that the mandatory penalty of death or life imprisonment will not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.31 (b). 1981In the recent case of Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 , 100 S.Ct. 2521 , 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980), the Supreme Court held violative of the Witherspoon standard a Texas statute which required the disqualification of any juror in a capital case who did not state under oath "that the mandatory penalty of death or life imprisonment will not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.31 (b). | 2 | 1981–1984 |
Witherspoon v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1984Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), and its progeny 2 establish the general *940 proposition “that a juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 , 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526 , 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980). 1984Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), and its progeny 2 establish the general *940 proposition “that a juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 , 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526 , 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Hovey v. Superior Court
red
2 sentences1984He argues that in capital cases individual voir dire is the preferred method and also that group voir dire on the Witherspoon issue makes a jury prone to give the death penalty as found in Hovey v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 28 Cal.3d 1 , 168 Cal.Rptr. 128 , 616 P.2d 1301 (1980). 1984He argues that in capital cases individual voir dire is the preferred method and also that group voir dire on the Witherspoon issue makes a jury prone to give the death penalty as found in Hovey v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 28 Cal.3d 1 , 168 Cal.Rptr. 128 , 616 P.2d 1301 (1980). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Maxwell v. Bishop
green
2 sentences1981See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 , 90 S.Ct. 578 , 26 L.Ed.2d 221 (1970); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 , 89 S.Ct. 1138 , 22 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969). 1981See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 , 90 S.Ct. 578 , 26 L.Ed.2d 221 (1970); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 , 89 S.Ct. 1138 , 22 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Swift v. Commandant
green
2 sentences1981See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 , 90 S.Ct. 578 , 26 L.Ed.2d 221 (1970); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 , 89 S.Ct. 1138 , 22 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969). 1981See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 , 90 S.Ct. 578 , 26 L.Ed.2d 221 (1970); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 , 89 S.Ct. 1138 , 22 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Cardinale v. Henderson
neutral
2 sentences1971In Cardinale v. Henderson, 316 F.Supp. 481 (E.D.La.1970) after finding a Witherspoon violation, the court set aside the death penalty and imposed in its place a sentence of life imprisonment. 1971In Cardinale v. Henderson, 316 F.Supp. 481 (E.D.La.1970) after finding a Witherspoon violation, the court set aside the death penalty and imposed in its place a sentence of life imprisonment. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Ward v. Henderson
neutral
2 sentences1971(The trial jury could choose only death or life imprisonment upon a finding of guilt.) The court said, “the effect of the breach of Witherspoon is to set aside the death penalty and to impose in its place the other sentence which the jury could have imposed following a finding of guilt.” However, in another Louisiana case, Ward v. Henderson, 317 F.Supp. 344 (W.D.La.1970), the court there found a violation of Witherspoon but noted that the U. S. Supreme Court did not specify how such cases would be disposed of. 1971(The trial jury could choose only death or life imprisonment upon a finding of guilt.) The court said, “the effect of the breach of Witherspoon is to set aside the death penalty and to impose in its place the other sentence which the jury could have imposed following a finding of guilt.” However, in another Louisiana case, Ward v. Henderson, 317 F.Supp. 344 (W.D.La.1970), the court there found a violation of Witherspoon but noted that the U. S. Supreme Court did not specify how such cases would be disposed of. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Zimmer v. State
green
2 sentences1971In Zimmer v. State, 206 Kan. 304 , 477 P.2d 971 (1970) the trial court, upon finding a Witherspoon violation upon a post-conviction proceeding, ordered the death sentence set aside and resentenced him to life imprisonment. 1971In Zimmer v. State, 206 Kan. 304 , 477 P.2d 971 (1970) the trial court, upon finding a Witherspoon violation upon a post-conviction proceeding, ordered the death sentence set aside and resentenced him to life imprisonment. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
John Elmer Woodards v. H. J. Cardwell, Warden, Ohio Penitentiary
green
2 sentences1971In Woodards v. Cardwell, 430 F.2d 978 (6th Cir.1970), it was held that a Witherspoon violation did not invalidate the guilty verdict and that only the death sentence imposed by the improperly selected jury could not be executed. 1971In Woodards v. Cardwell, 430 F.2d 978 (6th Cir.1970), it was held that a Witherspoon violation did not invalidate the guilty verdict and that only the death sentence imposed by the improperly selected jury could not be executed. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.