Witherspoon standard in Ohio

2002Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412 ; State v. Moore (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 22 , 27 (stating that the Witherspoon holding was "substantially altered" by Witt ); State v. Rogers (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 174 , 177 (vacated on other grounds, stating that it is "unmistakably clear" that the Witherspoon standard was modified by the holding in Witt ); State v. Wilson (Oct. 12, 1994), Lorain App. No. 92CA5396 (stating that Witt modified Witherspoon ).

2002Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412 ; State v. Moore (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 22 , 27 (stating that the Witherspoon holding was "substantially altered" by Witt ); State v. Rogers (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 174 , 177 (vacated on other grounds, stating that it is "unmistakably clear" that the Witherspoon standard was modified by the holding in Witt ); State v. Wilson (Oct. 12, 1994), Lorain App. No. 92CA5396 (stating that Witt modified Witherspoon ).

2002Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412 ; State v. Moore (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 22 , 27 (stating that the Witherspoon holding was "substantially altered" by Witt ); State v. Rogers (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 174 , 177 (vacated on other grounds, stating that it is "unmistakably clear" that the Witherspoon standard was modified by the holding in Witt ); State v. Wilson (Oct. 12, 1994), Lorain App. No. 92CA5396 (stating that Witt modified Witherspoon ).

2002Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412 ; State v. Moore (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 22 , 27 (stating that the Witherspoon holding was "substantially altered" by Witt ); State v. Rogers (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 174 , 177 (vacated on other grounds, stating that it is "unmistakably clear" that the Witherspoon standard was modified by the holding in Witt ); State v. Wilson (Oct. 12, 1994), Lorain App. No. 92CA5396 (stating that Witt modified Witherspoon ).

2011State v. Beuke (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 29, 38 ; State v. Buell (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 139 .

2011State v. Beuke (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 29, 38 ; State v. Buell (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 139 .

2002Witt , 469 U.S. 412 , citing Adams v. Texas (1980), 448 U.S. 38 , 45 ; State v. Madrigal (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 378 , 391 , citing Rogers , 17 Ohio St.3d at 174 ; State v. Scott (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 92 , 97 (explaining that the Witt test dispenses with the "automatic" decision-making and the unmistakable clarity standards that the Witherspoon test required).

2002Witt , 469 U.S. 412 , citing Adams v. Texas (1980), 448 U.S. 38 , 45 ; State v. Madrigal (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 378 , 391 , citing Rogers , 17 Ohio St.3d at 174 ; State v. Scott (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 92 , 97 (explaining that the Witt test dispenses with the "automatic" decision-making and the unmistakable clarity standards that the Witherspoon test required).

2011Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510, 522-523 .

2011Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510, 522-523 .

2011State v. Beuke (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 29, 38 ; State v. Buell (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 139 .

2011State v. Beuke (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 29, 38 ; State v. Buell (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 139 .

2002Witt , 469 U.S. 412 , citing Adams v. Texas (1980), 448 U.S. 38 , 45 ; State v. Madrigal (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 378 , 391 , citing Rogers , 17 Ohio St.3d at 174 ; State v. Scott (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 92 , 97 (explaining that the Witt test dispenses with the "automatic" decision-making and the unmistakable clarity standards that the Witherspoon test required).

2002Witt , 469 U.S. 412 , citing Adams v. Texas (1980), 448 U.S. 38 , 45 ; State v. Madrigal (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 378 , 391 , citing Rogers , 17 Ohio St.3d at 174 ; State v. Scott (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 92 , 97 (explaining that the Witt test dispenses with the "automatic" decision-making and the unmistakable clarity standards that the Witherspoon test required).

2002Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412 ; State v. Moore (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 22 , 27 (stating that the Witherspoon holding was "substantially altered" by Witt ); State v. Rogers (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 174 , 177 (vacated on other grounds, stating that it is "unmistakably clear" that the Witherspoon standard was modified by the holding in Witt ); State v. Wilson (Oct. 12, 1994), Lorain App. No. 92CA5396 (stating that Witt modified Witherspoon ).

2002Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412 ; State v. Moore (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 22 , 27 (stating that the Witherspoon holding was "substantially altered" by Witt ); State v. Rogers (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 174 , 177 (vacated on other grounds, stating that it is "unmistakably clear" that the Witherspoon standard was modified by the holding in Witt ); State v. Wilson (Oct. 12, 1994), Lorain App. No. 92CA5396 (stating that Witt modified Witherspoon ).

2002Witt , 469 U.S. 412 , citing Adams v. Texas (1980), 448 U.S. 38 , 45 ; State v. Madrigal (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 378 , 391 , citing Rogers , 17 Ohio St.3d at 174 ; State v. Scott (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 92 , 97 (explaining that the Witt test dispenses with the "automatic" decision-making and the unmistakable clarity standards that the Witherspoon test required).

2002Witt , 469 U.S. 412 , citing Adams v. Texas (1980), 448 U.S. 38 , 45 ; State v. Madrigal (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 378 , 391 , citing Rogers , 17 Ohio St.3d at 174 ; State v. Scott (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 92 , 97 (explaining that the Witt test dispenses with the "automatic" decision-making and the unmistakable clarity standards that the Witherspoon test required).

1988Wainwright v. Witt, supra, at 424 , subsequently clarified the Witherspoon standard to be “* * * whether the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath’ [Adams v. Texas (1980), 448 U.S. 38, 45 ].” The Witt standard was thereafter adopted and applied by this court in State v. Rogers (1985), 17 Ohio St. 3d 174, 178-179 , 17 OBR 414, 417-418, 478 N.E. 2d 984, 989-990 , and at paragraph three of the syllabus, vacated on other grounds (1985), 474 U.S. 1002 , and is a basis for challenging prospective

1988Wainwright v. Witt, supra, at 424 , subsequently clarified the Witherspoon standard to be “* * * whether the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath’ [Adams v. Texas (1980), 448 U.S. 38, 45 ].” The Witt standard was thereafter adopted and applied by this court in State v. Rogers (1985), 17 Ohio St. 3d 174, 178-179 , 17 OBR 414, 417-418, 478 N.E. 2d 984, 989-990 , and at paragraph three of the syllabus, vacated on other grounds (1985), 474 U.S. 1002 , and is a basis for challenging prospective

1984However, in State v. Wilson (1972), 30 Ohio St. 2d 199 [ 59 O.O.2d 220 ], syllabus, this court held: “After a venireman has unambiguously stated, on jury voir dire, that he could not vote for the death penalty under any circumstances, a Witherspoon violation cannot be predicated merely upon his ambiguous response to a question of defendant's counsel as to whether there is ‘anything about the nature of this case that would keep you from listening on the question of the death penalty.’ ” The focus of our inquiry must now turn to the voir dire of the four excluded jurors.

1984However, in State v. Wilson (1972), 30 Ohio St. 2d 199 [ 59 O.O.2d 220 ], syllabus, this court held: “After a venireman has unambiguously stated, on jury voir dire, that he could not vote for the death penalty under any circumstances, a Witherspoon violation cannot be predicated merely upon his ambiguous response to a question of defendant's counsel as to whether there is ‘anything about the nature of this case that would keep you from listening on the question of the death penalty.’ ” The focus of our inquiry must now turn to the voir dire of the four excluded jurors.

1972This is the requirement under the Witherspoon doctrine which this court has literally followed in State v. Watson (1971), 28 Ohio St. 2d 15 .

1972This is the requirement under the Witherspoon doctrine which this court has literally followed in State v. Watson (1971), 28 Ohio St. 2d 15 .

1969Finally, in the event it turns out, as now appears, that relief from this death sentence must be ordered, a local federal court will be far better equipped than are we to frame an appropriate decree with due regard to available Alabama procedures.” 394 U. S. at 484 , id. at 439. 16 If a jury recommends mercy, the effect is to moot the application of the Witherspoon principle.

1969Bumper v. North Carolina (1968), 391 U. S. 543 , 20 L.

1969Bumper v. North Carolina (1968), 391 U. S. 543 , 20 L.

1969Any ‘layman # # * [might] say he has scruples if he is somewhat unhappy about death sentences. * * * [Thus] a general question as to the presence of # * * reservations [or scruples] is far from the inquiry which separates those who would never vote for the ultimate penalty from those who would reserve it for the direst cases.’ # * In a very recent ease the Supreme Court of Ohio has clearly implied that the Ohio statute on disqualification (Section 2915.25 (C), Revised Code) has long reflected the Witherspoon doctrine allowing the elimination for cause only that juror whose opinions “ preclude

1969Any ‘layman # # * [might] say he has scruples if he is somewhat unhappy about death sentences. * * * [Thus] a general question as to the presence of # * * reservations [or scruples] is far from the inquiry which separates those who would never vote for the ultimate penalty from those who would reserve it for the direst cases.’ # * In a very recent ease the Supreme Court of Ohio has clearly implied that the Ohio statute on disqualification (Section 2915.25 (C), Revised Code) has long reflected the Witherspoon doctrine allowing the elimination for cause only that juror whose opinions “ preclude