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8 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2007See 725 ILCS 5/122 — 1(a)(1) (West 2004) (permitting claims of “substantial denial of *** rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois”); People v. Jackson, 205 Ill. 2d 247, 271-72 (2001) (addressing a Witherspoon argument raised in a postconviction petition). 2007See 725 ILCS 5/122 — 1(a)(1) (West 2004) (permitting claims of “substantial denial of *** rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois”); People v. Jackson, 205 Ill. 2d 247, 271-72 (2001) (addressing a Witherspoon argument raised in a postconviction petition). | 2 | 2 |
Morgan v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences1997However, Turner merely holds that "a capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias. * * * Also, a defendant cannot complain of a judge's failure to question the venire on racial prejudice unless the defendant has specifically requested such an inquiry." Significantly, the Court in Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 , 112 S.Ct. 2222 , 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992), in setting out the requirement for a reverse- Witherspoon inquiry, relies largely on the reasoning in Turner and uses muc 1997Ed. 2d 492 , 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992), in setting out the requirement for a revers e-Witherspoon inquiry, relies largely on the reasoning in Turner and uses much the same language. | 1 | 3 |
Griffith v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences1993See People v. Morgan, 112 Ill. 2d at 138 (Witherspoon error applies only to sentencing and does not affect conviction); Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314, 328 , 93 L. 1993See People v. Morgan, 112 Ill. 2d at 138 (Witherspoon error applies only to sentencing and does not affect conviction); Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314, 328 , 93 L. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Morgangreen2 sentences1993See People v. Morgan, 112 Ill. 2d at 138 (Witherspoon error applies only to sentencing and does not affect conviction); Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314, 328 , 93 L. 1993See People v. Morgan, 112 Ill. 2d at 138 (Witherspoon error applies only to sentencing and does not affect conviction); Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314, 328 , 93 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wainwright v. Witt
green
2 sentences1993Ed. 2d 841, 851-52 , 105 S. Ct. 844, 852 .) Accordingly, defendant’s contention that he is entitled to a new trial based on a Witherspoon violation is not supported by fact or law. 1993Ed. 2d 841, 851-52 , 105 S. Ct. 844, 852 .) Accordingly, defendant’s contention that he is entitled to a new trial based on a Witherspoon violation is not supported by fact or law. | 2 | 1985–1993 |
Witherspoon v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1986A Witherspoon issue (Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510 , 20 L. 1986A Witherspoon issue (Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510 , 20 L. | 2 | 1985–1986 |
People v. Brisbon
green
2 sentences1989“As we have held previously, there is no ‘reverse Witherspoon’ rule that requires the trial court to ‘life qualify’ a jury to exclude all jurors who believe that the death penalty should be imposed in every murder case. [Citations.] A defendant, however, is free to question the jurors regarding bias, and it is then for the trial court to decide whether to excuse a juror for cause.” (People v. Brisbon (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 342, 359 , 478 N.E.2d 402 .) Defendant’s conviction must be affirmed on this issue. 1989“As we have held previously, there is no ‘reverse Witherspoon’ rule that requires the trial court to ‘life qualify’ a jury to exclude all jurors who believe that the death penalty should be imposed in every murder case. [Citations.] A defendant, however, is free to question the jurors regarding bias, and it is then for the trial court to decide whether to excuse a juror for cause.” (People v. Brisbon (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 342, 359 , 478 N.E.2d 402 .) Defendant’s conviction must be affirmed on this issue. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
People v. Kubat
green
2 sentences1986Ed. 2d 776 , 88 S. Ct. 1770 ) was raised and decided in Kubat I ( 94 Ill. 2d 437, 498-99 ). 1986A Witherspoon issue ( Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 ) was raised and decided in Kubat I ( 94 Ill.2d 437, 498-99 ). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Gaines
green
2 sentences1985This court in People v. Gaines (1981), 88 Ill.2d 342 , *357 356, perceived this problem: "We think it is appropriate to point out that the distinction drawn in Witherspoon between a venireman's general opposition to the death penalty and his unwillingness to vote for its imposition is a sophisticated one which a prospective juror may not readily grasp. 1985This court in People v. Gaines (1981), 88 Ill.2d 342 , *357 356, perceived this problem: "We think it is appropriate to point out that the distinction drawn in Witherspoon between a venireman's general opposition to the death penalty and his unwillingness to vote for its imposition is a sophisticated one which a prospective juror may not readily grasp. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Adams v. Texas
green
2 sentences1985Ed. 2d 776 , 785 n.21, 88 S. Ct. 1770 , 1777 n.21.) In the most recent articulation of the Witherspoon standard, however, the Supreme Court abandoned that language in favor of the statement, previously made in Adams v. Texas (1980), 448 U.S. 38 , 65 L. 1985Ed. 2d 776 , 785 n.21, 88 S. Ct. 1770 , 1777 n.21.) In the most recent articulation of the Witherspoon standard, however, the Supreme Court abandoned that language in favor of the statement, previously made in Adams v. Texas (1980), 448 U.S. 38 , 65 L. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.