14 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2026Id. at 594 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e)(2)(B)). ¶ 33 The Court held that this language was unconstitutionally vague, reasoning that “[d]eciding whether the residual clause covers a crime . . . requires a court to picture the kind of conduct that the crime involves in ‘the ordinary case,’ and to judge whether that abstraction presents a serious potential risk of physical injury.” Id. at 596. 2023But those cases are distinguishable. ¶ 20 In Johnson , the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was unconstitutionally vague and therefore void. 576 U.S. at 606 , 135 S.Ct. 2551 . | 3 | 7 |
Vasquez v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2025Id. ¶ 48 Under the residual exception to the hearsay rule, the proponent must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement is supported by “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.” CRE 807; see Vasquez v. People, 173 P.3d 1099, 1106 (Colo. 2007). 2014However, this exception is "to be used only rarely, and in exceptional cireum-stances and applies only when certain exceptional guarantees of trustworthiness exist and when high degrees of probativeness and necessity are present." United States v. Turner, 718 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir.2013) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) 3 A trial court "must make adequate findings on the record before admitting hearsay statements under the residual exception." Vasquez v. People, 173 P.3d 1099, 1106 (Colo.2007). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Fullergreen2 sentences2007Id. 2007In People v. Fuller, we established five prerequisites for admissibility under CRE 804(b)(5) (now CRE 807): [1] [The statement is supported by circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; [2] the statement is offered as evidence of material facts; [3] the statement is more probative on the points for which it is offered than any other evidence which could be reasonably procured; [4] the general purposes of the rules of evidence and the interests of justice are best served by the admission of the statement; and [5] the adverse party had adequate notice in advance of trial of the intention of t | 1 | 2 |
People v. Shellgreen1 sentence2016Johnson appears to have backed away from the position in Flipside, 455 U.S. at 497 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , that .a statute may be declared facially void for vagueness only if it is "impermissibly vague in all its applications." 135 S.Ct. at 2560-61 ("[Allithough statements in some of our opinions could be read to suggest otherwise, our holdings squarely contradict the theory that a vague provision is constitutional merely because there is some conduct that clearly falls within the provision's grasp."); see also Shell, 148 P.3d at 172 (observing that, to succeed on a claim that a law is facially voi | 1 | 1 |
Sykes v. United Statesred2 sentences2015See Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 , 131 S. Ct. 2267 , 180 L.Ed.2d 60 (2011) (holding that a conviction under Indiana's vehicle flight statute is a ''violent felony'' as the ACCA uses that term in the residual clause); Chambers v. United States , 555 U.S. 122 , 129 S.Ct. 687 , 172 L.Ed.2d 484 (2009) (holding that a conviction under Illinois' failure to report for penal confinement statute is not a ''violent felony'' under the residual clause of the ACCA); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 , 128 S.Ct. 1581 , 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008) (holding that a conviction under New Mexico's driving und 2015See Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 , 131 S. Ct. 2267 , 180 L.Ed.2d 60 (2011) (holding that a conviction under Indiana's vehicle flight statute is a ''violent felony'' as the ACCA uses that term in the residual clause); Chambers v. United States , 555 U.S. 122 , 129 S.Ct. 687 , 172 L.Ed.2d 484 (2009) (holding that a conviction under Illinois' failure to report for penal confinement statute is not a ''violent felony'' under the residual clause of the ACCA); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 , 128 S.Ct. 1581 , 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008) (holding that a conviction under New Mexico's driving und | 1 | 1 |
State of Minnesota v. David Lee Haywoodgreen1 sentence2015See, e.g., State v. Haywood, 869 N.W.2d 902 , 910 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015). ¶ 64 Other courts have applied Johnson only to address whether language similar to the ACCA's residual clause appearing in other federal or state provisions is vague. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Donald Turnergreen1 sentence2014However, this exception is "to be used only rarely, and in exceptional cireum-stances and applies only when certain exceptional guarantees of trustworthiness exist and when high degrees of probativeness and necessity are present." United States v. Turner, 718 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir.2013) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) 3 A trial court "must make adequate findings on the record before admitting hearsay statements under the residual exception." Vasquez v. People, 173 P.3d 1099, 1106 (Colo.2007). | 1 | 1 |
John Furtado v. Harold Bishop, John Furtado v. Harold Bishopgreen1 sentence1990Co., 852 F.2d 626, 631 (1st Cir.1988) (analyzing requirements of Fed.R.Evid. 803(24) on hypothesis that hearsay letter was admitted by trial court under that section); Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 90-91 (1st Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 , 100 S.Ct. 710 , 62 L.Ed.2d 672 (1980). 6 In Oldsen v. People, 732 P.2d at 1136-37 , we upheld under the residual exception the district court’s ruling admitting hearsay statements. | 1 | 1 |
Glenn Polansky v. Cna Insurance Companygreen1 sentence1990Co., 852 F.2d 626, 631 (1st Cir.1988) (analyzing requirements of Fed.R.Evid. 803(24) on hypothesis that hearsay letter was admitted by trial court under that section); Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 90-91 (1st Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 , 100 S.Ct. 710 , 62 L.Ed.2d 672 (1980). 6 In Oldsen v. People, 732 P.2d at 1136-37 , we upheld under the residual exception the district court’s ruling admitting hearsay statements. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Welch v. United States
green
2 sentences2023In doing so, it observed that "[b]efore Johnson , the [ACCA] applied to any person who possessed a firearm after three violent felony convictions, even if one or more of those convictions fell under only the residual clause." Welch , 578 U.S. at 129 , 136 S.Ct. 1257 . 2023In doing so, it observed that "[b]efore Johnson , the [ACCA] applied to any person who possessed a firearm after three violent felony convictions, even if one or more of those convictions fell under only the residual clause." Welch , 578 U.S. at 129 , 136 S.Ct. 1257 . | 2 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Thompson
green
1 sentence2025Id. ¶ 48 Under the residual exception to the hearsay rule, the proponent must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement is supported by “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.” CRE 807; see Vasquez v. People, 173 P.3d 1099, 1106 (Colo. 2007). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016Johnson appears to have backed away from the position in Flipside, 455 U.S. at 497 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , that .a statute may be declared facially void for vagueness only if it is "impermissibly vague in all its applications." 135 S.Ct. at 2560-61 ("[Allithough statements in some of our opinions could be read to suggest otherwise, our holdings squarely contradict the theory that a vague provision is constitutional merely because there is some conduct that clearly falls within the provision's grasp."); see also Shell, 148 P.3d at 172 (observing that, to succeed on a claim that a law is facially voi 2016Johnson appears to have backed away from the position in Flipside, 455 U.S. at 497 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , that .a statute may be declared facially void for vagueness only if it is "impermissibly vague in all its applications." 135 S.Ct. at 2560-61 ("[Allithough statements in some of our opinions could be read to suggest otherwise, our holdings squarely contradict the theory that a vague provision is constitutional merely because there is some conduct that clearly falls within the provision's grasp."); see also Shell, 148 P.3d at 172 (observing that, to succeed on a claim that a law is facially voi | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Begay v. United States
red
2 sentences2015See Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 , 131 S. Ct. 2267 , 180 L.Ed.2d 60 (2011) (holding that a conviction under Indiana's vehicle flight statute is a ''violent felony'' as the ACCA uses that term in the residual clause); Chambers v. United States , 555 U.S. 122 , 129 S.Ct. 687 , 172 L.Ed.2d 484 (2009) (holding that a conviction under Illinois' failure to report for penal confinement statute is not a ''violent felony'' under the residual clause of the ACCA); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 , 128 S.Ct. 1581 , 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008) (holding that a conviction under New Mexico's driving und 2015See Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 , 131 S. Ct. 2267 , 180 L.Ed.2d 60 (2011) (holding that a conviction under Indiana's vehicle flight statute is a ''violent felony'' as the ACCA uses that term in the residual clause); Chambers v. United States , 555 U.S. 122 , 129 S.Ct. 687 , 172 L.Ed.2d 484 (2009) (holding that a conviction under Illinois' failure to report for penal confinement statute is not a ''violent felony'' under the residual clause of the ACCA); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 , 128 S.Ct. 1581 , 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008) (holding that a conviction under New Mexico's driving und | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Chambers v. United States
green
2 sentences2015See Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 , 131 S. Ct. 2267 , 180 L.Ed.2d 60 (2011) (holding that a conviction under Indiana's vehicle flight statute is a ''violent felony'' as the ACCA uses that term in the residual clause); Chambers v. United States , 555 U.S. 122 , 129 S.Ct. 687 , 172 L.Ed.2d 484 (2009) (holding that a conviction under Illinois' failure to report for penal confinement statute is not a ''violent felony'' under the residual clause of the ACCA); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 , 128 S.Ct. 1581 , 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008) (holding that a conviction under New Mexico's driving und 2015See Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 , 131 S. Ct. 2267 , 180 L.Ed.2d 60 (2011) (holding that a conviction under Indiana's vehicle flight statute is a ''violent felony'' as the ACCA uses that term in the residual clause); Chambers v. United States , 555 U.S. 122 , 129 S.Ct. 687 , 172 L.Ed.2d 484 (2009) (holding that a conviction under Illinois' failure to report for penal confinement statute is not a ''violent felony'' under the residual clause of the ACCA); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 , 128 S.Ct. 1581 , 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008) (holding that a conviction under New Mexico's driving und | 1 | 2015–2015 |
James v. United States
red
2 sentences2015See Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 , 131 S. Ct. 2267 , 180 L.Ed.2d 60 (2011) (holding that a conviction under Indiana's vehicle flight statute is a ''violent felony'' as the ACCA uses that term in the residual clause); Chambers v. United States , 555 U.S. 122 , 129 S.Ct. 687 , 172 L.Ed.2d 484 (2009) (holding that a conviction under Illinois' failure to report for penal confinement statute is not a ''violent felony'' under the residual clause of the ACCA); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 , 128 S.Ct. 1581 , 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008) (holding that a conviction under New Mexico's driving und 2015See Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 , 131 S. Ct. 2267 , 180 L.Ed.2d 60 (2011) (holding that a conviction under Indiana's vehicle flight statute is a ''violent felony'' as the ACCA uses that term in the residual clause); Chambers v. United States , 555 U.S. 122 , 129 S.Ct. 687 , 172 L.Ed.2d 484 (2009) (holding that a conviction under Illinois' failure to report for penal confinement statute is not a ''violent felony'' under the residual clause of the ACCA); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 , 128 S.Ct. 1581 , 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008) (holding that a conviction under New Mexico's driving und | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State ex rel. Mark A. Richardson, Relator v. The Honorable Daniel R. Green
green
1 sentence2015Richardson v. Green, 465 S.W.3d 60 , 66-67 (Mo. 2015). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Oldsen v. People
green
2 sentences1990Co., 852 F.2d 626, 631 (1st Cir.1988) (analyzing requirements of Fed.R.Evid. 803(24) on hypothesis that hearsay letter was admitted by trial court under that section); Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 90-91 (1st Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 , 100 S.Ct. 710 , 62 L.Ed.2d 672 (1980). 6 In Oldsen v. People, 732 P.2d at 1136-37 , we upheld under the residual exception the district court’s ruling admitting hearsay statements. 1990In Oldsen , the trial court admitted the hearsay statements of a child victim of sexual assault under the “medical exception” to the hearsay rule contained in CRE 803(4). 732 P.2d at 1132 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
United States Steel Corporation v. United States Environmental Protection Agency
green
1 sentence1990Co., 852 F.2d 626, 631 (1st Cir.1988) (analyzing requirements of Fed.R.Evid. 803(24) on hypothesis that hearsay letter was admitted by trial court under that section); Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 90-91 (1st Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 , 100 S.Ct. 710 , 62 L.Ed.2d 672 (1980). 6 In Oldsen v. People, 732 P.2d at 1136-37 , we upheld under the residual exception the district court’s ruling admitting hearsay statements. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Bishop v. Furtado
green
2 sentences1990Co., 852 F.2d 626, 631 (1st Cir.1988) (analyzing requirements of Fed.R.Evid. 803(24) on hypothesis that hearsay letter was admitted by trial court under that section); Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 90-91 (1st Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 , 100 S.Ct. 710 , 62 L.Ed.2d 672 (1980). 6 In Oldsen v. People, 732 P.2d at 1136-37 , we upheld under the residual exception the district court’s ruling admitting hearsay statements. 1990Co., 852 F.2d 626, 631 (1st Cir.1988) (analyzing requirements of Fed.R.Evid. 803(24) on hypothesis that hearsay letter was admitted by trial court under that section); Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 90-91 (1st Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 , 100 S.Ct. 710 , 62 L.Ed.2d 672 (1980). 6 In Oldsen v. People, 732 P.2d at 1136-37 , we upheld under the residual exception the district court’s ruling admitting hearsay statements. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
W.C.L. v. People
green
2 sentences1986W.C.L. v. People, 685 P.2d 176 (Colo.1984). 1986W.C.L. v. People, 685 P.2d 176 (Colo.1984). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.