7 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Edward Serzysko v. The Chase Manhattan Bankgreen2 sentences1998App. 2d at 657 (quoting Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 461 F.2d 699, 702 [2d Cir.], cert. denied 409 U.S. 883 , reh. denied 409 U.S. 1029 [1972]). “ 'Rule 60(b)(6) is not available if the asserted grounds for relief are within the coverage of another provision of Rule 60(b).’ ” Wilson, 16 Kan. 1992The federal courts are in accord that 60-260(b)(6) is not to be used to circumvent the time limitations which apply to the first three grounds of 60-260(b). “[I]t is settled that an appellant cannot circumvent the one year limitation by invoking the residual clause (6) of Rule 60(b).” Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 461 F.2d 699, 702 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 409 U.S. 883 (1972). | 2 | 2 |
Johnson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2020In Johnson, the Court found the residual clause "[any felony that] involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another" in the Armed Career Criminal Act unconstitutionally vague despite that fact that "there is some conduct that clearly falls within the provision's grasp." 135 S. Ct. at 2557, 2561 . 2020See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557 ("We are convinced that the indeterminacy of the wide- ranging inquiry required by the residual clause . . . invites arbitrary enforcement."). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Bollingergreen1 sentence2021Ed. 2d 569 (2015) (the residual clause "any felony that 'involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another'" in the Armed Career Criminal Act was challenged as vague); Harris, 311 Kan. at 824 (the statutory phrase "any other dangerous or deadly cutting instrument of like character" in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6304[c] was challenged as vague); State v. Jenkins, 311 Kan. 39 , 51-52, 455 P.3d 779 (2020) (the term "moving violations" used in the felony fleeing and eluding statute was challenged as vague); State v. Williams, 308 Kan. 1439 , 1459, 430 P.3d 448 (2018) | 1 | 1 |
State v. Murdockgreen1 sentence2020See State v. Murdock, 309 Kan. 585 , 591, 439 P.3d 307 (2019) ("[A] defendant will receive the benefit of any change in the law that occurs while the direct appeal is pending."). | 1 | 1 |
Idaho v. Wrightgreen1 sentence1998See Green, 399 U.S., at 155-156; Evans, 400 U.S., at 86-87 (plurality opinion); Inadi, 475 U.S., at 393, n.5; see also Evans, supra, at 94-95 (Harlan, J., concurring in result).” 497 U.S. at 817-18 . | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of Emergency Beacon Corporation, Debtor. Montco, Inc. v. Harvey S. Barrgreen1 sentence1992In Wallace v. McManus, 776 F.2d 915, 916 (10th Cir. 1985), we find: “Rule 60(b)(6) is not available if the asserted grounds for relief are within the coverage of another provision of Rule 60(b).” In Matter of Emergency Beacon Corp., 666 F.2d 754, 758 (2d Cir. 1981), the court said that relief from judgment under clause (6) providing for relief for “any other reason justifying relief’ is not available under rule (Fed. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Eskridge v. United States
green
2 sentences1998App. 2d at 657 (quoting Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 461 F.2d 699, 702 [2d Cir.], cert. denied 409 U.S. 883 , reh. denied 409 U.S. 1029 [1972]). “ 'Rule 60(b)(6) is not available if the asserted grounds for relief are within the coverage of another provision of Rule 60(b).’ ” Wilson, 16 Kan. 1992The federal courts are in accord that 60-260(b)(6) is not to be used to circumvent the time limitations which apply to the first three grounds of 60-260(b). “[I]t is settled that an appellant cannot circumvent the one year limitation by invoking the residual clause (6) of Rule 60(b).” Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 461 F.2d 699, 702 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 409 U.S. 883 (1972). | 2 | 1992–1998 |
State v. Gonzalez
green
2 sentences2021Ed. 2d 569 (2015) (the residual clause "any felony that 'involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another'" in the Armed Career Criminal Act was challenged as vague); Harris, 311 Kan. at 824 (the statutory phrase "any other dangerous or deadly cutting instrument of like character" in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6304[c] was challenged as vague); State v. Jenkins, 311 Kan. 39 , 51-52, 455 P.3d 779 (2020) (the term "moving violations" used in the felony fleeing and eluding statute was challenged as vague); State v. Williams, 308 Kan. 1439 , 1459, 430 P.3d 448 (2018) 2021Ed. 2d 569 (2015) (the residual clause "any felony that 'involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another'" in the Armed Career Criminal Act was challenged as vague); Harris, 311 Kan. at 824 (the statutory phrase "any other dangerous or deadly cutting instrument of like character" in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6304[c] was challenged as vague); State v. Jenkins, 311 Kan. 39 , 51-52, 455 P.3d 779 (2020) (the term "moving violations" used in the felony fleeing and eluding statute was challenged as vague); State v. Williams, 308 Kan. 1439 , 1459, 430 P.3d 448 (2018) | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Williams
green
1 sentence2021Ed. 2d 569 (2015) (the residual clause "any felony that 'involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another'" in the Armed Career Criminal Act was challenged as vague); Harris, 311 Kan. at 824 (the statutory phrase "any other dangerous or deadly cutting instrument of like character" in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6304[c] was challenged as vague); State v. Jenkins, 311 Kan. 39 , 51-52, 455 P.3d 779 (2020) (the term "moving violations" used in the felony fleeing and eluding statute was challenged as vague); State v. Williams, 308 Kan. 1439 , 1459, 430 P.3d 448 (2018) | 1 | 2021–2021 |
– State v. Jenkins –
green
1 sentence2021Ed. 2d 569 (2015) (the residual clause "any felony that 'involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another'" in the Armed Career Criminal Act was challenged as vague); Harris, 311 Kan. at 824 (the statutory phrase "any other dangerous or deadly cutting instrument of like character" in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6304[c] was challenged as vague); State v. Jenkins, 311 Kan. 39 , 51-52, 455 P.3d 779 (2020) (the term "moving violations" used in the felony fleeing and eluding statute was challenged as vague); State v. Williams, 308 Kan. 1439 , 1459, 430 P.3d 448 (2018) | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Sessions v. Dimaya
green
2 sentences2020The primary problem with a law that fails to "provide explicit standards" for enforcement (as required by the Court in Grayned) is that such laws "invite arbitrary power." Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. ___ , 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223 , 200 L. 2020The primary problem with a law that fails to "provide explicit standards" for enforcement (as required by the Court in Grayned) is that such laws "invite arbitrary power." Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. ___ , 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223 , 200 L. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
City of Lincoln Center v. Farmway Co-Op, Inc.
green
2 sentences2020Our Supreme Court explained that this portion of the 2 statute was facially unconstitutional because it fails to "'convey sufficient clarity to those who apply the ordinance standards to protect against arbitrary and discrimination enforcement.'" 311 Kan. at 824 (citing City of Lincoln Center v. Farmway Co-Op, Inc., 298 Kan. 540, 549 , 316 P.3d 707 [2013]). 2020Our Supreme Court explained that this portion of the 2 statute was facially unconstitutional because it fails to "'convey sufficient clarity to those who apply the ordinance standards to protect against arbitrary and discrimination enforcement.'" 311 Kan. at 824 (citing City of Lincoln Center v. Farmway Co-Op, Inc., 298 Kan. 540, 549 , 316 P.3d 707 [2013]). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Wilson v. Wilson
green
2 sentences1998Federal Rule 60(b) is identical to K.S.A. 60-260(b), and the federal courts are in accord that 60-260(b)(6) cannot be used to circumvent the time limitations applicable to the first three grounds of 60-260(b). “ '[I]t is settled that an appellant cannot circumvent the one year limitation by invoking the residual clause (6) of Rule 60(b).’ ” Wilson, 16 Kan. 1998App. 2d at 657 (quoting Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 461 F.2d 699, 702 [2d Cir.], cert. denied 409 U.S. 883 , reh. denied 409 U.S. 1029 [1972]). “ 'Rule 60(b)(6) is not available if the asserted grounds for relief are within the coverage of another provision of Rule 60(b).’ ” Wilson, 16 Kan. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Williams v. Hilliard
green
1 sentence1998App. 2d at 657 (quoting Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 461 F.2d 699, 702 [2d Cir.], cert. denied 409 U.S. 883 , reh. denied 409 U.S. 1029 [1972]). “ 'Rule 60(b)(6) is not available if the asserted grounds for relief are within the coverage of another provision of Rule 60(b).’ ” Wilson, 16 Kan. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Wallace v. Mcmanus
green
1 sentence1992In Wallace v. McManus, 776 F.2d 915, 916 (10th Cir. 1985), we find: “Rule 60(b)(6) is not available if the asserted grounds for relief are within the coverage of another provision of Rule 60(b).” In Matter of Emergency Beacon Corp., 666 F.2d 754, 758 (2d Cir. 1981), the court said that relief from judgment under clause (6) providing for relief for “any other reason justifying relief’ is not available under rule (Fed. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.