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8 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Walkergreen2 sentences2015See State v. Walker, 345 Md. 293, 296 , 691 A.2d 1341 (1997) (explaining that a court must consider six conditions before admitting evidence under the residual exception). 2015See State v. Walker, 345 Md. 293, 296 , 691 A.2d 1341 (1997) (explaining that a court must consider six conditions before admitting evidence under the residual exception). | 4 | 5 |
Johnson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2020Id. at 2561 (citations omitted). 2020Because “the elements necessary to determine the imaginary ideal are uncertain both in nature and degree of effect,” this abstract inquiry offers significantly less predictability than one “[t]hat deals with the actual, not with an imaginary condition other than the facts.” Id. (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See also Walker v. State, 107 Md.App. 502, 517 , 668 A.2d 990 (1995), aff'd, 345 Md. 293 , 691 A.2d 1341 (1997) (“We ... hold that in reviewing a trial court’s admission of hearsay under a residual exception [i.e. 2012See also Walker v. State, 107 Md.App. 502, 517 , 668 A.2d 990 (1995), aff'd, 345 Md. 293 , 691 A.2d 1341 (1997) (“We ... hold that in reviewing a trial court’s admission of hearsay under a residual exception [i.e. | 1 | 1 |
Idaho v. Wrightgreen2 sentences1997Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), held that the Confrontation Clause does not preclude hearsay from being admitted under the residual exception against a defendant in a criminal trial. 1997Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), held that the Confrontation Clause does not preclude hearsay from being admitted under the residual exception against a defendant in a criminal trial. | 1 | 1 |
Eda Mae Page v. Barko Hydraulicsgreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., U.S. v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 909 (D.C.Cir.1990) (“We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that an appellate court should be ‘particularly hesitant to overturn a trial court’s admissibility ruling under the residual hearsay exception absent a “definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” ’ Balogh’s of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 798 F.2d 1356 , 1358 (11th Cir.1986) (en banc) (quoting Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir.1982))”); S.E.C. v. First City Financial Corp., 1997See, e.g., U.S. v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 909 (D.C.Cir.1990) (“We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that an appellate court should be ‘particularly hesitant to overturn a trial court’s admissibility ruling under the residual hearsay exception absent a “definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” ’ Balogh’s of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 798 F.2d 1356 , 1358 (11th Cir.1986) (en banc) (quoting Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir.1982))”); S.E.C. v. First City Financial Corp., | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Barry Kendall Hogan, and Mark Bradford Hogangreen2 sentences1997See United States v. Nixon, 779 F.2d 126, 134 (2d Cir.1985); U.S. v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 202-03 (3d Cir.1992) (and cases cited therein), reh’g denied, July 27, 1992, appeal after remand, 14 F.3d 881 (1994), and reh’g en banc denied, Mar. 22, 1994; United States v. Guevara, 598 F.2d 1094, 1100 (7th Cir.1979); U.S. v. Hogan, 763 F.2d 697, 703 (5th Cir.1985). 1997See United States v. Nixon, 779 F.2d 126, 134 (2d Cir.1985); U.S. v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 202-03 (3d Cir.1992) (and cases cited therein), reh'g denied, July 27, 1992, appeal after remand, 14 F.3d 881 (1994), and reh'g en banc denied, Mar. 22, 1994; United States *1355 v. Guevara, 598 F.2d 1094, 1100 (7th Cir.1979); U.S. v. Hogan, 763 F.2d 697, 703 (5th Cir.1985). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Michael Nixongreen2 sentences1997See United States v. Nixon, 779 F.2d 126, 134 (2d Cir.1985); U.S. v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 202-03 (3d Cir.1992) (and cases cited therein), reh’g denied, July 27, 1992, appeal after remand, 14 F.3d 881 (1994), and reh’g en banc denied, Mar. 22, 1994; United States v. Guevara, 598 F.2d 1094, 1100 (7th Cir.1979); U.S. v. Hogan, 763 F.2d 697, 703 (5th Cir.1985). 1997See United States v. Nixon, 779 F.2d 126, 134 (2d Cir.1985); U.S. v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 202-03 (3d Cir.1992) (and cases cited therein), reh'g denied, July 27, 1992, appeal after remand, 14 F.3d 881 (1994), and reh'g en banc denied, Mar. 22, 1994; United States *1355 v. Guevara, 598 F.2d 1094, 1100 (7th Cir.1979); U.S. v. Hogan, 763 F.2d 697, 703 (5th Cir.1985). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Michael Popenasgreen1 sentence1997See, for example, United States v. Popenas, supra, 780 F.2d at 548 ; State v. Dammons, 121 N.C.App. 61 , 464 S.E.2d 486 , stay denied, writ denied, 342 N.C. 660 , 465 S.E.2d 547 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Balogh's Of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getzgreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., U.S. v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 909 (D.C.Cir.1990) (“We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that an appellate court should be ‘particularly hesitant to overturn a trial court’s admissibility ruling under the residual hearsay exception absent a “definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” ’ Balogh’s of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 798 F.2d 1356 , 1358 (11th Cir.1986) (en banc) (quoting Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir.1982))”); S.E.C. v. First City Financial Corp., 1997See, e.g., U.S. v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 909 (D.C.Cir.1990) ("We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that an appellate court should be `particularly hesitant to overturn a trial court's admissibility ruling under the residual hearsay exception absent a "definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors."` Balogh's of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 798 F.2d 1356 , 1358 (11th Cir.1986) ( en banc ) (quoting Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir.1982))"); S.E.C. v. First City Financial Corp., | 1 | 1 |
Securities and Exchange Commission v. First City Financial Corporation, Ltd.green2 sentences1997See, e.g., U.S. v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 909 (D.C.Cir.1990) (“We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that an appellate court should be ‘particularly hesitant to overturn a trial court’s admissibility ruling under the residual hearsay exception absent a “definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” ’ Balogh’s of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 798 F.2d 1356 , 1358 (11th Cir.1986) (en banc) (quoting Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir.1982))”); S.E.C. v. First City Financial Corp., 1997See, e.g., U.S. v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 909 (D.C.Cir.1990) ("We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that an appellate court should be `particularly hesitant to overturn a trial court's admissibility ruling under the residual hearsay exception absent a "definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors."` Balogh's of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 798 F.2d 1356 , 1358 (11th Cir.1986) ( en banc ) (quoting Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir.1982))"); S.E.C. v. First City Financial Corp., | 1 | 1 |
James B. Geitz v. John Lindsey, Dennis Bevirt and Michael Boynegreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., U.S. v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 909 (D.C.Cir.1990) (“We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that an appellate court should be ‘particularly hesitant to overturn a trial court’s admissibility ruling under the residual hearsay exception absent a “definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” ’ Balogh’s of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 798 F.2d 1356 , 1358 (11th Cir.1986) (en banc) (quoting Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir.1982))”); S.E.C. v. First City Financial Corp., 1997See, e.g., U.S. v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 909 (D.C.Cir.1990) ("We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that an appellate court should be `particularly hesitant to overturn a trial court's admissibility ruling under the residual hearsay exception absent a "definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors."` Balogh's of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 798 F.2d 1356 , 1358 (11th Cir.1986) ( en banc ) (quoting Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir.1982))"); S.E.C. v. First City Financial Corp., | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Oliver L. Northgreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., U.S. v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 909 (D.C.Cir.1990) (“We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that an appellate court should be ‘particularly hesitant to overturn a trial court’s admissibility ruling under the residual hearsay exception absent a “definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” ’ Balogh’s of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 798 F.2d 1356 , 1358 (11th Cir.1986) (en banc) (quoting Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir.1982))”); S.E.C. v. First City Financial Corp., 1997See, e.g., U.S. v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 909 (D.C.Cir.1990) ("We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that an appellate court should be `particularly hesitant to overturn a trial court's admissibility ruling under the residual hearsay exception absent a "definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors."` Balogh's of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 798 F.2d 1356 , 1358 (11th Cir.1986) ( en banc ) (quoting Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir.1982))"); S.E.C. v. First City Financial Corp., | 1 | 1 |
Susanne Littlefield v. Malcolm McGuffey Susanne Littlefield v. Wally MacK Santa Maria Realty and Malcolm McGuffeygreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., U.S. v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 909 (D.C.Cir.1990) (“We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that an appellate court should be ‘particularly hesitant to overturn a trial court’s admissibility ruling under the residual hearsay exception absent a “definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” ’ Balogh’s of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 798 F.2d 1356 , 1358 (11th Cir.1986) (en banc) (quoting Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir.1982))”); S.E.C. v. First City Financial Corp., 1997See, e.g., U.S. v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 909 (D.C.Cir.1990) ("We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that an appellate court should be `particularly hesitant to overturn a trial court's admissibility ruling under the residual hearsay exception absent a "definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors."` Balogh's of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 798 F.2d 1356 , 1358 (11th Cir.1986) ( en banc ) (quoting Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir.1982))"); S.E.C. v. First City Financial Corp., | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Leonard A. Pelullogreen2 sentences1997See United States v. Nixon, 779 F.2d 126, 134 (2d Cir.1985); U.S. v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 202-03 (3d Cir.1992) (and cases cited therein), reh’g denied, July 27, 1992, appeal after remand, 14 F.3d 881 (1994), and reh’g en banc denied, Mar. 22, 1994; United States v. Guevara, 598 F.2d 1094, 1100 (7th Cir.1979); U.S. v. Hogan, 763 F.2d 697, 703 (5th Cir.1985). 1997See United States v. Nixon, 779 F.2d 126, 134 (2d Cir.1985); U.S. v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 202-03 (3d Cir.1992) (and cases cited therein), reh'g denied, July 27, 1992, appeal after remand, 14 F.3d 881 (1994), and reh'g en banc denied, Mar. 22, 1994; United States *1355 v. Guevara, 598 F.2d 1094, 1100 (7th Cir.1979); U.S. v. Hogan, 763 F.2d 697, 703 (5th Cir.1985). | 1 | 1 |
John Doe, Cross-Appellants v. United States of America, Cross-Appelleegreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., U.S. v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 909 (D.C.Cir.1990) (“We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that an appellate court should be ‘particularly hesitant to overturn a trial court’s admissibility ruling under the residual hearsay exception absent a “definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” ’ Balogh’s of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 798 F.2d 1356 , 1358 (11th Cir.1986) (en banc) (quoting Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir.1982))”); S.E.C. v. First City Financial Corp., 1997See, e.g., U.S. v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 909 (D.C.Cir.1990) ("We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that an appellate court should be `particularly hesitant to overturn a trial court's admissibility ruling under the residual hearsay exception absent a "definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors."` Balogh's of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 798 F.2d 1356 , 1358 (11th Cir.1986) ( en banc ) (quoting Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir.1982))"); S.E.C. v. First City Financial Corp., | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Peter Guevaragreen2 sentences1997See United States v. Nixon, 779 F.2d 126, 134 (2d Cir.1985); U.S. v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 202-03 (3d Cir.1992) (and cases cited therein), reh’g denied, July 27, 1992, appeal after remand, 14 F.3d 881 (1994), and reh’g en banc denied, Mar. 22, 1994; United States v. Guevara, 598 F.2d 1094, 1100 (7th Cir.1979); U.S. v. Hogan, 763 F.2d 697, 703 (5th Cir.1985). 1997See United States v. Nixon, 779 F.2d 126, 134 (2d Cir.1985); U.S. v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 202-03 (3d Cir.1992) (and cases cited therein), reh'g denied, July 27, 1992, appeal after remand, 14 F.3d 881 (1994), and reh'g en banc denied, Mar. 22, 1994; United States *1355 v. Guevara, 598 F.2d 1094, 1100 (7th Cir.1979); U.S. v. Hogan, 763 F.2d 697, 703 (5th Cir.1985). | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Stategreen2 sentences1996See Wilson v. State, 334 Md. 313, 334-35 , 639 A.2d 125, 135-36 (1994)(recognizing that a hearsay statement by one accomplice incriminating another is presumptively unreliable). 1996See Wilson v. State, 334 Md. 313, 334-35 , 639 A.2d 125, 135-36 (1994)(recognizing that a hearsay statement by one accomplice incriminating another is presumptively unreliable). | 1 | 1 |
Brandon v. Molesworthgreen2 sentences1995See Brandon v. Molesworth, 104 Md.App. 167 , 198 n. 29, 655 A.2d 1292 , cert. granted, 339 Md. 739 , 664 A.2d 935 (1995) (noting that Title 5 of the Maryland Rulos “reflects the pre-existing common law rales regarding hearsay evidence.”). 1995See Brandon v. Molesworth, 104 Md.App. 167 , 198 n. 29, 655 A.2d 1292 , cert. granted, 339 Md. 739 , 664 A.2d 935 (1995) (noting that Title 5 of the Maryland Rulos “reflects the pre-existing common law rales regarding hearsay evidence.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Helen L. Huff, Administratrix of the Estate of Jessee Huff, Deceased, Cross-Appellant v. White Motor Corporation, Cross-Appelleegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dorsey v. State
green
2 sentences2012Id. at 318-19, 691 A.2d 1341 (footnotes omitted). (b) Harmless Error In Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 , 350 A.2d 665 (1976), the Court of Appeals discussed harmless error, stating: [W]hen [a defendant], in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict, such error cannot be deemed “harmless” and a reversal is mandated. 2012Id. at 318-19, 691 A.2d 1341 (footnotes omitted). (b) Harmless Error In Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 , 350 A.2d 665 (1976), the Court of Appeals discussed harmless error, stating: [W]hen [a defendant], in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict, such error cannot be deemed “harmless” and a reversal is mandated. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Van Nixon v. State
green
2 sentences2012In a case decided prior to the amendment, this Court stated that Maryland Rule 5-803 (b)(24) and Rule 5-804(b)(5) “are the same but for one difference[—]Rule 5-803(b)(24) does not require that the witness be unavailable.” Nixon v. State, 140 Md.App. 170 , 183 n. 1, 780 A.2d 344 (2001). 2012In a case decided prior to the amendment, this Court stated that Maryland Rule 5-803 (b)(24) and Rule 5-804(b)(5) “are the same but for one difference[—]Rule 5-803(b)(24) does not require that the witness be unavailable.” Nixon v. State, 140 Md.App. 170 , 183 n. 1, 780 A.2d 344 (2001). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Foster v. State
green
2 sentences2012Appellant mistakenly relies upon Foster v. State, 297 Md. 191, 193 , 464 A.2d 986 (1983), a case decided before the Maryland Rules contained the residual exception for hearsay, in which the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in refusing to admit “exculpatory hearsay testimony critical to [the defendant’s] defense.” The defendant was sentenced to death for murdering the manager of a motel in which the defendant and her husband resided. 2012Appellant mistakenly relies upon Foster v. State, 297 Md. 191, 193 , 464 A.2d 986 (1983), a case decided before the Maryland Rules contained the residual exception for hearsay, in which the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in refusing to admit “exculpatory hearsay testimony critical to [the defendant’s] defense.” The defendant was sentenced to death for murdering the manager of a motel in which the defendant and her husband resided. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
United States v. Leonard A. Pelullo
green
2 sentences1997See United States v. Nixon, 779 F.2d 126, 134 (2d Cir.1985); U.S. v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 202-03 (3d Cir.1992) (and cases cited therein), reh’g denied, July 27, 1992, appeal after remand, 14 F.3d 881 (1994), and reh’g en banc denied, Mar. 22, 1994; United States v. Guevara, 598 F.2d 1094, 1100 (7th Cir.1979); U.S. v. Hogan, 763 F.2d 697, 703 (5th Cir.1985). 1997See United States v. Nixon, 779 F.2d 126, 134 (2d Cir.1985); U.S. v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 202-03 (3d Cir.1992) (and cases cited therein), reh'g denied, July 27, 1992, appeal after remand, 14 F.3d 881 (1994), and reh'g en banc denied, Mar. 22, 1994; United States *1355 v. Guevara, 598 F.2d 1094, 1100 (7th Cir.1979); U.S. v. Hogan, 763 F.2d 697, 703 (5th Cir.1985). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Consolidation Coal Co. v. National Labor Relations Board
green
2 sentences1997See, e.g., U.S. v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 909 (D.C.Cir.1990) (“We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that an appellate court should be ‘particularly hesitant to overturn a trial court’s admissibility ruling under the residual hearsay exception absent a “definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” ’ Balogh’s of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 798 F.2d 1356 , 1358 (11th Cir.1986) (en banc) (quoting Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir.1982))”); S.E.C. v. First City Financial Corp., 1997See, e.g., U.S. v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 909 (D.C.Cir.1990) ("We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that an appellate court should be `particularly hesitant to overturn a trial court's admissibility ruling under the residual hearsay exception absent a "definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors."` Balogh's of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 798 F.2d 1356 , 1358 (11th Cir.1986) ( en banc ) (quoting Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir.1982))"); S.E.C. v. First City Financial Corp., | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Justice v. Suits
green
2 sentences1997See, e.g., U.S. v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 909 (D.C.Cir.1990) (“We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that an appellate court should be ‘particularly hesitant to overturn a trial court’s admissibility ruling under the residual hearsay exception absent a “definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” ’ Balogh’s of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 798 F.2d 1356 , 1358 (11th Cir.1986) (en banc) (quoting Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir.1982))”); S.E.C. v. First City Financial Corp., 1997See, e.g., U.S. v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 909 (D.C.Cir.1990) ("We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that an appellate court should be `particularly hesitant to overturn a trial court's admissibility ruling under the residual hearsay exception absent a "definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors."` Balogh's of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 798 F.2d 1356 , 1358 (11th Cir.1986) ( en banc ) (quoting Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir.1982))"); S.E.C. v. First City Financial Corp., | 1 | 1997–1997 |
United States v. Frederick Robert Hinkson A/K/A \Crazy Fred
green
2 sentences1997As the Committee Note to Rule 5-803(b)(24) makes clear, the residual exceptions “do not contemplate an unfettered exercise of judicial discretion” and do not “establish a broad license for trial judges to admit hearsay statements that do not fall within one of the other exceptions contained in Rules 5-803 and 5-804(b).” The intent was that they would be used “very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.” Id. 1997As the Committee Note to Rule 5-803(b)(24) makes clear, the residual exceptions "do not contemplate an unfettered exercise of judicial discretion" and do not "establish a broad license for trial judges to admit hearsay statements that do not fall within one of the other exceptions contained in Rules 5-803 and 5-804(b)." The intent was that they would be used "very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances." Id. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Tyler v. State
green
2 sentences1997With minimal analysis, it adds that the statement would have been admissible under Maryland common law as well, citing Tyler v. State, 342 Md. 766 , 679 A.2d 1127 (1996) for that proposition. 1997With minimal analysis, it adds that the statement would have been admissible under Maryland common law as well, citing Tyler v. State, 342 Md. 766 , 679 A.2d 1127 (1996) for that proposition. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Company, Ltd.
green
2 sentences1997Citing Dallas County, supra, as an example, the Senate Judiciary Committee expressed the belief that “there are certain exceptional circumstances where evidence which is found by a court to have guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to or exceeding the guarantees reflected by the presently listed exceptions, and to have a high degree of probativeness and necessity could properly be admissible.” Id. 1997Citing Dallas County, supra, as an example, the Senate Judiciary Committee expressed the belief that “there are certain exceptional circumstances where evidence which is found by a court to have guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to or exceeding the guarantees reflected by the presently listed exceptions, and to have a high degree of probativeness and necessity could properly be admissible.” Id. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Dammons
neutral
2 sentences1997See, for example, United States v. Popenas, supra, 780 F.2d at 548 ; State v. Dammons, 121 N.C.App. 61 , 464 S.E.2d 486 , stay denied, writ denied, 342 N.C. 660 , 465 S.E.2d 547 (1995). 1997See, for example, United States v. Popenas, supra, 780 F.2d at 548 ; State v. Dammons, 121 N.C.App. 61 , 464 S.E.2d 486 , stay denied, writ denied, 342 N.C. 660 , 465 S.E.2d 547 (1995). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Hamilton
neutral
1 sentence1997See, for example, United States v. Popenas, supra, 780 F.2d at 548 ; State v. Dammons, 121 N.C.App. 61 , 464 S.E.2d 486 , stay denied, writ denied, 342 N.C. 660 , 465 S.E.2d 547 (1995). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Welch
neutral
1 sentence1997See, for example, United States v. Popenas, supra, 780 F.2d at 548 ; State v. Dammons, 121 N.C.App. 61 , 464 S.E.2d 486 , stay denied, writ denied, 342 N.C. 660 , 465 S.E.2d 547 (1995). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.