residual clause in Illinois

2023We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo (People v. Belk, 203 Ill. 2d 187, 192 (2003)) and, when reviewing penal statutes, we review in favor of the accused (In re Jaime P., 223 Ill. 2d 526, 539 (2006)). ¶ 35 An offense may qualify as a forcible felony under the residual clause in one of two ways.

2019“Interpretation of the forcible felony statute is an issue of law, which we review de novo.” People v. Sanderson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141381, ¶ 5 (citing People v. Belk, 203 Ill. 2d 187, 192 (2003)). ¶ 20 “An unenumerated felony falls within the residual clause if the defendant ‘contemplated that the use of force or violence against an individual might be involved and [was] willing to use such force or violence.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Belk, 203 Ill. 2d 187, 196 (2003).

2023Id. (rejecting State’s argument “that every attempt to commit an enumerated forcible felony falls within the residual clause”).

2019“Interpretation of the forcible felony statute is an issue of law, which we review de novo.” People v. Sanderson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141381, ¶ 5 (citing People v. Belk, 203 Ill. 2d 187, 192 (2003)). ¶ 20 “An unenumerated felony falls within the residual clause if the defendant ‘contemplated that the use of force or violence against an individual might be involved and [was] willing to use such force or violence.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Belk, 203 Ill. 2d 187, 196 (2003).

2026People v. Samier, 129 Ill.

2020See, e.g., People v. Mares, 2018 IL App (2d) 150565 , ¶ 11 (“As the statute’s residual clause indicates, a knife with a blade that is not at least three inches long can still be a deadly weapon.”); People v. Samier, 129 Ill.

2014See Polk, 2014 IL App (1st) 122017 , ¶ 56.

2014See Polk, 2014 IL App (1st) 122017 , ¶ 56.

2019First, where one of a crime’s elements is ‘a specific intent’ to carry out a violent act, every instance of that crime ‘necessarily qualifies’ as a forcible felony.” Id. ¶ 6 (quoting People v. Thomas, 407 Ill.

2016Accordingly, we hold that every attempted murder qualifies as a forcible felony for purposes of the armed habitual criminal statute ***.” Id. at 140 . -3- No. 1-14-1381 As an initial matter, we reject the State’s position that Thomas stands for the proposition that every attempt to commit an enumerated forcible felony falls within the residual clause.

2026Rather, “[a]s the statute’s residual clause indicates, a knife with a blade that is not at least three inches long can still be a deadly weapon.” Mares, 2018 IL App (2d) 150565 , ¶ 11.

2026The emphasized text, the statute’s residual clause, has long been understood to mean that, while a knife with a three-inch blade is per se a dangerous weapon, a shorter knife or blade-type weapon can also be a “deadly or dangerous” weapon because it is “of like character.” See, e.g., People v. McCoy, 2026 IL App (1st) 231052, ¶¶ 32-49 (sharp knife of unspecified length); People v. Mares, 2018 IL App (2d) 150565, ¶ 11 (box cutter of unspecified length); People v. Westerfer, 169 Ill.

2026The emphasized text, the statute’s residual clause, has long been understood to mean that, while a knife with a three-inch blade is per se a dangerous weapon, a shorter knife or blade-type weapon can also be a “deadly or dangerous” weapon because it is “of like character.” See, e.g., People v. McCoy, 2026 IL App (1st) 231052, ¶¶ 32-49 (sharp knife of unspecified length); People v. Mares, 2018 IL App (2d) 150565, ¶ 11 (box cutter of unspecified length); People v. Westerfer, 169 Ill.

2020App. 3d 966, 968-69 (1985) (knife with blade of less than 3 inches was “dangerous weapon,” as it was used to threaten life of victim and could have taken her life as - 11 - 1-17-0950 threatened); People v. Westefer, 169 Ill.

2026People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 139 (2002).

2020Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, where a statutory clause specifies several classes of things as well as “other” things, “other” means “other such like.” People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 138 (2002).

2024See Jones, 226 Ill.

2016The State acknowledges the split among the appellate courts of this State as to whether aggravated battery is a forcible felony under the residual clause of section 2-8 of the Code (720 ILCS 5/2-8 (West 2012)). ¶9 In People v. Jones, 226 Ill.

2017See Cement Masons Pension Fund, Local 803 v. William A. Randolph, Inc., 358 Ill.

2017See Cement Masons Pension Fund, Local 803 v. William A. Randolph, Inc., 358 Ill.

2014People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995).

2012People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995).

2024We think that context matters. ¶ 23 People v. Rodriguez, 2023 IL App (3d) 230450 , supports our conclusion that the specific facts and details of the charged offense matter when determining whether a defendant’s conduct implicates the residual clause of section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code.

2024We concluded “that the specific facts and details of the charged offense matter when determining whether a defendant’s conduct implicates the residual clause of section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code.” Id. ¶ 23; see People v. Rodriguez, 2023 IL App (3d) 230450, ¶ 10 (relying on the facts of the case to show that the charged felony offense involved the threat of great bodily harm for purposes of section 110-6.1(a)(1.5)). ¶ 19 In this case, although neither defining statute for the charged felony offenses explicitly required the “threat of *** great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurem

2026The appellate cases have uniformly held that it can. ¶ 38 We have held for decades that section 33A-1 “does not preclude all knives with blades shorter than three inches from being characterized a dangerous weapon.” People v. Hall, 117 Ill.

2026With citations tracing back to common-law precedents, these cases have thus held that a shorter knife qualifies as a dangerous weapon under the residual clause if the knife is used in a dangerous manner in the commission of the offense. ¶ 64 As one typical case summed up the point: “[W]hile a knife with a three-inch blade is per se a dangerous weapon pursuant to section 33A-1, similar instruments fall within the purview of the statute if it is established that they became a dangerous weapon when used in a manner dangerous to the physical well-being of the individual threatened.” Hall, 117 Ill.

2026Rather, as we alluded to in T.G., 285 Ill.

2026App. 3d at 802-03 ; see T.G., 285 Ill.

2026See People v. Reed, 2025 IL 130595, ¶ 25 (“When interpreting a statute, *** no part of the statute should be rendered superfluous or meaningless.”). ¶ 41 But defendant also goes too far in arguing that the only way to give meaning to the three- inch blade requirement is to categorically exclude smaller knives from the scope of the residual clause.

2026The emphasized text, the statute’s residual clause, has long been understood to mean that, while a knife with a three-inch blade is per se a dangerous weapon, a shorter knife or blade-type weapon can also be a “deadly or dangerous” weapon because it is “of like character.” See, e.g., People v. McCoy, 2026 IL App (1st) 231052, ¶¶ 32-49 (sharp knife of unspecified length); People v. Mares, 2018 IL App (2d) 150565, ¶ 11 (box cutter of unspecified length); People v. Westerfer, 169 Ill.

2025See Wiggins v. Rogers, 2019 IL App (1st) 190161, ¶ 22 .

2024See People v. Grandberry, 2024 IL App (3d) 230546, ¶¶ 3, 11-12 (holding that where the defendant was charged with aggravated battery for biting a nurse’s finger without -8- causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or disfigurement, the offense was not detainable under the residual clause of section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code).

2024People v. Gorss, 2022 IL 126464, ¶ 10 (“[W]here the language used is plain and unambiguous, we may not ‘depart from its terms’ or read into the rule exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the drafters’ intent.” (quoting Acme Markets, Inc. v. Callanan, 236 Ill. 2d 29, 38 (2009))). ¶ 20 Defendant argues that a similar argument was recently rejected in People v. Minssen, 2024 IL App (4th) 231198 , which held that the legislature intended the residual clause in section 110- 6.1(a)(1.5) to encompass fewer offenses than the residual clause in section 2-8 and that the 8 possibility