residual exception in Indiana

2019She summarized: In sum, § 16(b) has the same “[t]wo features” that “conspire[d] to make [the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (‘ACCA’)] unconstitutionally vague.” [Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557 ].

2016The emphasized portion of this definition is referred to as the “residual clause,” and deciding whether a particular crime fell within the residual clause “requires a court to picture the kind of conduct that the crime involves in ‘the ordinary case,’ and to judge whether that abstraction presents a serious potential risk of physical injury.” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557 . [22] The Court in Johnson held that this “ordinary case” analysis rendered the residual clause unconstitutionally vague for two reasons.

2019James, supra, at 208, 127 S. Ct. 1586 .

2019The Court further held that “the residual clause leaves grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime,” “ties the judicial assessment of risk to a judicially imagined ‘ordinary case’ of a crime, not to real-world facts or statutory elements,” and “leaves uncertainty about how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony.” Id. at 2557-2558. [24] In Sessions v. Dimaya, the Court addressed whether a similarly-worded clause in a statute’s definition of “crime of violence” suffers from the same constitutional Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PC-984 | De

2018VanPatten v. State , 986 N.E.2d 255 , 269 (Ind. 2013) (Massa, J., concurring in result).

2018See Ind. Const. Art. 4, sec. 23 ("... in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general, and of uniform operation throughout the State") (emphasis added); Lake Superior Court , 820 N.E.2d at 1245 .

2016Id.

2005This residual exception "allows hearsay not specifically admissible under one of the listed exceptions found in Rules 803 and 804 if it has 'equivalent cireum-stantial guarantees of trustworthiness' and (A) 'is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) 'is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) 'the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence" Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 448 (quoting Fed.

2005This residual exception "allows hearsay not specifically admissible under *1008 one of the listed exceptions found in Rules 803 and 804 if it has `equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness' and (A) `is offered as evidence of a material fact;' (B) `is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts;' and (C) `the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.'" Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 448 (quoting Fed.