residual exception in Utah

2025Mullins does not, however, engage in the appropriate analysis for such a request. 67 As such, we decline to overturn Houston. ¶49 Additionally, Mullins argues that the federal legal landscape has changed since we decided Houston; he specifically contends that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson v. United States abrogates our holding in Houston. 68 In Johnson, the Court found unconstitutionally vague a mandatory sentencing scheme for offenders with prior convictions for violent crimes.69 The statutory scheme’s residual clause imposed a sentencing enhancement if the prior convic

2025Mullins does not, however, engage in the appropriate analysis for such a request. 67 As such, we decline to overturn Houston. ¶49 Additionally, Mullins argues that the federal legal landscape has changed since we decided Houston; he specifically contends that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson v. United States abrogates our holding in Houston. 68 In Johnson, the Court found unconstitutionally vague a mandatory sentencing scheme for offenders with prior convictions for violent crimes.69 The statutory scheme’s residual clause imposed a sentencing enhancement if the prior convic

2020“Furthermore, several federal circuit courts have said that [the residual exception] is to be ‘used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’” State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238 , ¶ 26, 32 P.3d 976 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Trujillo, 136 F.3d 1388, 1395 (10th Cir. 1998)). ¶34 We interpret our rules of evidence “like statutes, . . . according to their plain language.” Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, ¶ 19 , 133 P.3d 370 .

2008In State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238 , 32 P.3d 976 , we identified several factors that should be considered when evaluating a statement's admissibility under the residual exception, including: (1) the probable motivation of the declar-ant in making the statement; (2) the circumstances under which it was made; and (3) the knowledge and qualifications of the declarant. ... [Aldditional factors that may be considered ... include:; (1) the character of the declarant for truthfulness and honesty and the availability of evidence on the issue; (2) whether the [statement] was given voluntarily, under

2025Mullins does not, however, engage in the appropriate analysis for such a request. 67 As such, we decline to overturn Houston. ¶49 Additionally, Mullins argues that the federal legal landscape has changed since we decided Houston; he specifically contends that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson v. United States abrogates our holding in Houston. 68 In Johnson, the Court found unconstitutionally vague a mandatory sentencing scheme for offenders with prior convictions for violent crimes.69 The statutory scheme’s residual clause imposed a sentencing enhancement if the prior convic

2025Mullins does not, however, engage in the appropriate analysis for such a request. 67 As such, we decline to overturn Houston. ¶49 Additionally, Mullins argues that the federal legal landscape has changed since we decided Houston; he specifically contends that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson v. United States abrogates our holding in Houston. 68 In Johnson, the Court found unconstitutionally vague a mandatory sentencing scheme for offenders with prior convictions for violent crimes.69 The statutory scheme’s residual clause imposed a sentencing enhancement if the prior convic

2025Mullins does not, however, engage in the appropriate analysis for such a request. 67 As such, we decline to overturn Houston. ¶49 Additionally, Mullins argues that the federal legal landscape has changed since we decided Houston; he specifically contends that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson v. United States abrogates our holding in Houston. 68 In Johnson, the Court found unconstitutionally vague a mandatory sentencing scheme for offenders with prior convictions for violent crimes.69 The statutory scheme’s residual clause imposed a sentencing enhancement if the prior convic

2025Mullins does not, however, engage in the appropriate analysis for such a request. 67 As such, we decline to overturn Houston. ¶49 Additionally, Mullins argues that the federal legal landscape has changed since we decided Houston; he specifically contends that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson v. United States abrogates our holding in Houston. 68 In Johnson, the Court found unconstitutionally vague a mandatory sentencing scheme for offenders with prior convictions for violent crimes.69 The statutory scheme’s residual clause imposed a sentencing enhancement if the prior convic

2022This court in Gibson cited the definitions from other jurisdictions in the context of noting that “[o]ther courts have defined ‘entice’ similarly.” 908 P.2d at 356 n.3. 20121040-CA 23 2022 UT App 95 State v. Ray when determining “whether the residual clause covers this or that crime.” Id. at 601. ¶48 Unlike with the provision at issue in Johnson, although adjustments and clarifications have been made to Utah’s enticement inquiry over time, the standard has never been overturned and replaced.

2022This court in Gibson cited the definitions from other jurisdictions in the context of noting that “[o]ther courts have defined ‘entice’ similarly.” 908 P.2d at 356 n.3. 20121040-CA 23 2022 UT App 95 State v. Ray when determining “whether the residual clause covers this or that crime.” Id. at 601. ¶48 Unlike with the provision at issue in Johnson, although adjustments and clarifications have been made to Utah’s enticement inquiry over time, the standard has never been overturned and replaced.

2021Evid. 803(6), or the residual exception, see id.

2020The State also asserts that even though the court ruled that the Frontier records were not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, “the majority of the records were properly certified and should have been ruled admissible under that exception.” The State claims that the bank records received from Frontier in response to the first subpoena “were produced in two distributions, each with its own custodial certification,” and that the records received as a result of the second subpoena “were produced via a secure email . . . with[out] a custodial certificate,” resultin

2020The State also asserts that even though the court ruled that the Frontier records were not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, “the majority of the records were properly certified and should have been ruled admissible under that exception.” The State claims that the bank records received from Frontier in response to the first subpoena “were produced in two distributions, each with its own custodial certification,” and that the records received as a result of the second subpoena “were produced via a secure email . . . with[out] a custodial certificate,” resultin

2020Therefore, because the summaries were created from the underlying bank records, if the bank records were inadmissible hearsay, then the summaries are on no stronger footing and would likewise constitute inadmissible hearsay. 20170436-CA 17 2020 UT App 87 State v. Buttars ¶33 “The residual exception is a catchall provision that may be applied when a hearsay statement ‘is not specifically covered by a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804.’” State v. Clopten, 2015 UT 82, ¶ 23 , 362 P.3d 1216 (quoting Utah R.

2020Parties are therefore required to comply with this rule if they wish to seek admission of such records because the residual exception was only intended to be used when the records “do[] not fit into a recognized exception.” 20170436-CA 18 2020 UT App 87 State v. Buttars Nelson, 777 P.2d at 482 .

2020“Furthermore, several federal circuit courts have said that [the residual exception] is to be ‘used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’” State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238 , ¶ 26, 32 P.3d 976 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Trujillo, 136 F.3d 1388, 1395 (10th Cir. 1998)). ¶34 We interpret our rules of evidence “like statutes, . . . according to their plain language.” Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, ¶ 19 , 133 P.3d 370 .

2020“Furthermore, several federal circuit courts have said that [the residual exception] is to be ‘used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.’” State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238 , ¶ 26, 32 P.3d 976 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Trujillo, 136 F.3d 1388, 1395 (10th Cir. 1998)). ¶34 We interpret our rules of evidence “like statutes, . . . according to their plain language.” Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, ¶ 19 , 133 P.3d 370 .

2020The State also asserts that even though the court ruled that the Frontier records were not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, “the majority of the records were properly certified and should have been ruled admissible under that exception.” The State claims that the bank records received from Frontier in response to the first subpoena “were produced in two distributions, each with its own custodial certification,” and that the records received as a result of the second subpoena “were produced via a secure email . . . with[out] a custodial certificate,” resultin

2020The State also asserts that even though the court ruled that the Frontier records were not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, “the majority of the records were properly certified and should have been ruled admissible under that exception.” The State claims that the bank records received from Frontier in response to the first subpoena “were produced in two distributions, each with its own custodial certification,” and that the records received as a result of the second subpoena “were produced via a secure email . . . with[out] a custodial certificate,” resultin

2018Under the categorical approach, “courts identify ‘the minimum criminal conduct necessary for conviction under a particular statute’” and “look only to the statutory definitions—i.e., the elements of [the] . . . offense[], and not to the particular [underlying] facts.” 18 Cite as: 2018 UT 35 Opinion of the Court United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 2018) (alterations in original) (omission in original) (citations omitted). 11 ¶60 The ACCA’s residual clause requires a sentencing court “to look only to the fact that [a] defendant had been convicted of crimes falling within certain cate

2018Under the categorical approach, “courts identify ‘the minimum criminal conduct necessary for conviction under a particular statute’” and “look only to the statutory definitions—i.e., the elements of [the] . . . offense[], and not to the particular [underlying] facts.” 18 Cite as: 2018 UT 35 Opinion of the Court United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 2018) (alterations in original) (omission in original) (citations omitted). 11 ¶60 The ACCA’s residual clause requires a sentencing court “to look only to the fact that [a] defendant had been convicted of crimes falling within certain cate

2018Under the categorical approach, “courts identify ‘the minimum criminal conduct necessary for conviction under a particular statute’” and “look only to the statutory definitions—i.e., the elements of [the] . . . offense[], and not to the particular [underlying] facts.” 18 Cite as: 2018 UT 35 Opinion of the Court United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 2018) (alterations in original) (omission in original) (citations omitted). 11 ¶60 The ACCA’s residual clause requires a sentencing court “to look only to the fact that [a] defendant had been convicted of crimes falling within certain cate

2018Under the categorical approach, "courts identify 'the minimum criminal conduct necessary for conviction under a particular statute' " and "look only to the statutory definitions- i.e. , the elements of [the] ... offense[ ], and not to the particular [underlying] facts." United States v. Hill , 890 F.3d 51 , 55 (2d Cir. 2018) (alterations in original) (omission in original) (citations omitted). 11 ¶60 The ACCA's residual clause requires a sentencing court "to look only to the fact that [a] defendant had been convicted of crimes falling within certain categories, and not to the facts underlying

2008Evid. 803(1); the residual exception, see id.

2008R. 807; and the excited utterance exception, see id.

2004Ellis & Sons Iron Works, Inc., 609 F.2d 820 (5th Cir.1980), the Fifth Circuit recognized that, in addition to admission under the learned treatise exception, safety codes may also be admitted under the residual exception to hearsay — rule 803(24) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

2001See Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 92 (1st Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 , 100 S.Ct. 710 , 62 L.Ed.2d 672 (1980); United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 348 (3rd Cir.1978); United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285, 291 (5th Cir.1976); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1355 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 , 97 S.Ct. 2174 , 53 L.Ed.2d 224 (1977).

2001See Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 92 (1st Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 , 100 S.Ct. 710 , 62 L.Ed.2d 672 (1980); United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 348 (3rd Cir.1978); United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285, 291 (5th Cir.1976); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1355 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 , 97 S.Ct. 2174 , 53 L.Ed.2d 224 (1977).

2001See Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 92 (1st Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 , 100 S.Ct. 710 , 62 L.Ed.2d 672 (1980); United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 348 (3rd Cir.1978); United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285, 291 (5th Cir.1976); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1355 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 , 97 S.Ct. 2174 , 53 L.Ed.2d 224 (1977).

2001Unless given the required notice that a proponent intends to *983 rely on the residual exception as a basis for admitting hearsay, an opposing party need not anticipate the residual exception and be prepared to contest the statement's trustworthiness generally, but rather need only be prepared to contest whether the statement fits under one of the other specific, narrow exceptions. 122 We conclude that the notice provision of Rule 804(b)(5) requires notice of the proponent's intent to rely on that exception, and we find support for our conclusion in the case law of several federal jurisdiction

2001Unless given the required notice that a proponent intends to *983 rely on the residual exception as a basis for admitting hearsay, an opposing party need not anticipate the residual exception and be prepared to contest the statement's trustworthiness generally, but rather need only be prepared to contest whether the statement fits under one of the other specific, narrow exceptions. 122 We conclude that the notice provision of Rule 804(b)(5) requires notice of the proponent's intent to rely on that exception, and we find support for our conclusion in the case law of several federal jurisdiction