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14 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences2014“The decision to grant a mistrial is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a showing that a mistrial is essential to the preservation of the right to a fair trial.” (Citation omitted.) Jackson v. State, 292 Ga. 685, 689 (4) ( 740 SE2d 609 ) (2013); see also Norwood v. State, 252 Ga. 292, 294 (3) ( 313 SE2d 98 ) (1984) (denial of mistrial does not constitute grounds for reversal unless mistrial is mandated to ensure fair trial). 2014“The decision to grant a mistrial is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a showing that a mistrial is essential to the preservation of the right to a fair trial.” (Citation omitted.) Jackson v. State, 292 Ga. 685, 689 (4) ( 740 SE2d 609 ) (2013); see also Norwood v. State, 252 Ga. 292, 294 (3) ( 313 SE2d 98 ) (1984) (denial of mistrial does not constitute grounds for reversal unless mistrial is mandated to ensure fair trial). | 2 | 2 |
Norwood v. Stategreen2 sentences2014“The decision to grant a mistrial is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a showing that a mistrial is essential to the preservation of the right to a fair trial.” (Citation omitted.) Jackson v. State, 292 Ga. 685, 689 (4) ( 740 SE2d 609 ) (2013); see also Norwood v. State, 252 Ga. 292, 294 (3) ( 313 SE2d 98 ) (1984) (denial of mistrial does not constitute grounds for reversal unless mistrial is mandated to ensure fair trial). 2014“The decision to grant a mistrial is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a showing that a mistrial is essential to the preservation of the right to a fair trial.” (Citation omitted.) Jackson v. State, 292 Ga. 685, 689 (4) ( 740 SE2d 609 ) (2013); see also Norwood v. State, 252 Ga. 292, 294 (3) ( 313 SE2d 98 ) (1984) (denial of mistrial does not constitute grounds for reversal unless mistrial is mandated to ensure fair trial). | 2 | 2 |
Ward v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Ward v. State, 299 Ga. App. 826, 827 ( 683 SE2d 894 ) (2009). 2017Ward v. State, 299 Ga. App. 826, 827 ( 683 SE2d 894 ) (2009). | 1 | 1 |
Vaughan v. Wellstar Health System, Inc.green2 sentences2014Vaughan v. Wellstar Health System, 304 Ga. App. 596, 602 ( 696 SE2d 506 ) (2010); Bregman-Rodoski v. Rozas, 273 Ga. App. 835, 836-837 ( 616 SE2d 171 ) (2005); Bowling v. Foster, 254 Ga. App. 374, 376-377 ( 562 SE2d 776 ) (2002); Lau’s Corp., supra. Judgment reversed. 2014Vaughan v. Wellstar Health System, 304 Ga. App. 596, 602 ( 696 SE2d 506 ) (2010); Bregman-Rodoski v. Rozas, 273 Ga. App. 835, 836-837 ( 616 SE2d 171 ) (2005); Bowling v. Foster, 254 Ga. App. 374, 376-377 ( 562 SE2d 776 ) (2002); Lau’s Corp., supra. Judgment reversed. | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Although the Fulton County incident was eventually dead docketed, “[i]t is well settled that there need not he a criminal charge or conviction relating to a similar offense for it to be admissible.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hill v. State, 298 Ga. App. 677, 680 (2) ( 680 SE2d 702 ) (2009). 2014Although the Fulton County incident was eventually dead docketed, “[i]t is well settled that there need not he a criminal charge or conviction relating to a similar offense for it to be admissible.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hill v. State, 298 Ga. App. 677, 680 (2) ( 680 SE2d 702 ) (2009). | 1 | 1 |
Bowling v. Fostergreen2 sentences2014Vaughan v. Wellstar Health System, 304 Ga. App. 596, 602 ( 696 SE2d 506 ) (2010); Bregman-Rodoski v. Rozas, 273 Ga. App. 835, 836-837 ( 616 SE2d 171 ) (2005); Bowling v. Foster, 254 Ga. App. 374, 376-377 ( 562 SE2d 776 ) (2002); Lau’s Corp., supra. Judgment reversed. 2014Vaughan v. Wellstar Health System, 304 Ga. App. 596, 602 ( 696 SE2d 506 ) (2010); Bregman-Rodoski v. Rozas, 273 Ga. App. 835, 836-837 ( 616 SE2d 171 ) (2005); Bowling v. Foster, 254 Ga. App. 374, 376-377 ( 562 SE2d 776 ) (2002); Lau’s Corp., supra. Judgment reversed. | 1 | 1 |
Bregman-Rodoski v. Rozasgreen2 sentences2014Vaughan v. Wellstar Health System, 304 Ga. App. 596, 602 ( 696 SE2d 506 ) (2010); Bregman-Rodoski v. Rozas, 273 Ga. App. 835, 836-837 ( 616 SE2d 171 ) (2005); Bowling v. Foster, 254 Ga. App. 374, 376-377 ( 562 SE2d 776 ) (2002); Lau’s Corp., supra. Judgment reversed. 2014Vaughan v. Wellstar Health System, 304 Ga. App. 596, 602 ( 696 SE2d 506 ) (2010); Bregman-Rodoski v. Rozas, 273 Ga. App. 835, 836-837 ( 616 SE2d 171 ) (2005); Bowling v. Foster, 254 Ga. App. 374, 376-377 ( 562 SE2d 776 ) (2002); Lau’s Corp., supra. Judgment reversed. | 1 | 1 |
Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. DTI Logistics, Inc.green2 sentences2011See Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. DTI Logistics, Inc., 300 Ga. App. 715, 722 (4) ( 686 SE2d 333 ) (2009). 2011See Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. DTI Logistics, Inc., 300 Ga. App. 715, 722 (4) ( 686 SE2d 333 ) (2009). | 1 | 1 |
Schofield v. Palmergreen2 sentences2009See Schofield v. Palmer, 279 Ga. 848, 853 (2) ( 621 SE2d 726 ) (2005). 2009See Schofield v. Palmer, 279 Ga. 848, 853 (2) ( 621 SE2d 726 ) (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. Stategreen2 sentences1998On February 23, 1997, the court entered an order allowing an out-of-time appeal. 3 Robinson v. State, 208 Ga. App. 528, 529 (2) ( 430 SE2d 830 ) (1993); see Moore v. State, 215 Ga. App. 626 (1) ( 451 SE2d 534 ) (1994). 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Collins v. State, 205 Ga. App. 341, 342 (1) ( 422 SE2d 56 ) (1992). 5 “As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1, 11 (47 SC 250, 71 LE 505) (1927), ‘. . . possessing and selling are distinct offenses. 1998On February 23, 1997, the court entered an order allowing an out-of-time appeal. 3 Robinson v. State, 208 Ga. App. 528, 529 (2) ( 430 SE2d 830 ) (1993); see Moore v. State, 215 Ga. App. 626 (1) ( 451 SE2d 534 ) (1994). 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Collins v. State, 205 Ga. App. 341, 342 (1) ( 422 SE2d 56 ) (1992). 5 “As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1, 11 (47 SC 250, 71 LE 505) (1927), ‘. . . possessing and selling are distinct offenses. | 1 | 1 |
Albrecht v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1998On February 23, 1997, the court entered an order allowing an out-of-time appeal. 3 Robinson v. State, 208 Ga. App. 528, 529 (2) ( 430 SE2d 830 ) (1993); see Moore v. State, 215 Ga. App. 626 (1) ( 451 SE2d 534 ) (1994). 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Collins v. State, 205 Ga. App. 341, 342 (1) ( 422 SE2d 56 ) (1992). 5 “As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1, 11 (47 SC 250, 71 LE 505) (1927), ‘. . . possessing and selling are distinct offenses. | 1 | 1 |
Tam v. Stategreen2 sentences1998While introducing the certificate of inspection of the Intoxilyzer is one method of proving the foundation required, see, e.g., Tam v. State, 225 Ga. App. 101, 103 (3) ( 483 SE2d 142 ) (1997), it is not the only method. 1998While introducing the certificate of inspection of the Intoxilyzer is one method of proving the foundation required, see, e.g., Tam v. State, 225 Ga. App. 101, 103 (3) ( 483 SE2d 142 ) (1997), it is not the only method. | 1 | 1 |
Collins v. Stategreen2 sentences1998On February 23, 1997, the court entered an order allowing an out-of-time appeal. 3 Robinson v. State, 208 Ga. App. 528, 529 (2) ( 430 SE2d 830 ) (1993); see Moore v. State, 215 Ga. App. 626 (1) ( 451 SE2d 534 ) (1994). 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Collins v. State, 205 Ga. App. 341, 342 (1) ( 422 SE2d 56 ) (1992). 5 “As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1, 11 (47 SC 250, 71 LE 505) (1927), ‘. . . possessing and selling are distinct offenses. 1998On February 23, 1997, the court entered an order allowing an out-of-time appeal. 3 Robinson v. State, 208 Ga. App. 528, 529 (2) ( 430 SE2d 830 ) (1993); see Moore v. State, 215 Ga. App. 626 (1) ( 451 SE2d 534 ) (1994). 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Collins v. State, 205 Ga. App. 341, 342 (1) ( 422 SE2d 56 ) (1992). 5 “As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1, 11 (47 SC 250, 71 LE 505) (1927), ‘. . . possessing and selling are distinct offenses. | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Stategreen2 sentences1998On February 23, 1997, the court entered an order allowing an out-of-time appeal. 3 Robinson v. State, 208 Ga. App. 528, 529 (2) ( 430 SE2d 830 ) (1993); see Moore v. State, 215 Ga. App. 626 (1) ( 451 SE2d 534 ) (1994). 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Collins v. State, 205 Ga. App. 341, 342 (1) ( 422 SE2d 56 ) (1992). 5 “As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1, 11 (47 SC 250, 71 LE 505) (1927), ‘. . . possessing and selling are distinct offenses. 1998On February 23, 1997, the court entered an order allowing an out-of-time appeal. 3 Robinson v. State, 208 Ga. App. 528, 529 (2) ( 430 SE2d 830 ) (1993); see Moore v. State, 215 Ga. App. 626 (1) ( 451 SE2d 534 ) (1994). 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Collins v. State, 205 Ga. App. 341, 342 (1) ( 422 SE2d 56 ) (1992). 5 “As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1, 11 (47 SC 250, 71 LE 505) (1927), ‘. . . possessing and selling are distinct offenses. | 1 | 1 |
Whittle v. Nottinghamgreen2 sentences1996The superior court denied Evans’ motion. 1. “[A]n action to reform a written instrument can be brought at any time within seven years from the time the cause of action accrues, if not barred by laches.” Whittle v. Nottingham, 164 Ga. 155,161 (3) ( 138 SE 62 ) (1927). 1996The superior court denied Evans’ motion. 1. “[A]n action to reform a written instrument can be brought at any time within seven years from the time the cause of action accrues, if not barred by laches.” Whittle v. Nottingham, 164 Ga. 155,161 (3) ( 138 SE 62 ) (1927). | 1 | 1 |
Murphy v. Stategreen2 sentences1987See generally Murphy v. State, 246 Ga. 626 (2) ( 273 SE2d 2 ) (1980). 1987See generally Murphy v. State, 246 Ga. 626 (2) ( 273 SE2d 2 ) (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Foster v. Continental Casualty Co.green2 sentences1979Foster v. Continental Cas Co., 141 Ga. App. 415, 416 ( 233 SE2d 492 ) (1977). 1979Foster v. Continental Cas Co., 141 Ga. App. 415, 416 ( 233 SE2d 492 ) (1977). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Evans v. State
green
2 sentences2023Evans v. State, 275 Ga. 541 ( 570 SE2d 331 ) (2002). 2023Evans v. State, 275 Ga. 541 ( 570 SE2d 331 ) (2002). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Vincent v. State
green
2 sentences1998The card is affixed to the top of the machine.” (Emphasis supplied.) Pretermitting the issue of whether Evans’ objection on the lack of foundation was adequate, Vincent v. State, 228 Ga. App. 691 (2) ( 492 SE2d 604 ) (1997) (failure to state what the proper foundation should be is insufficient), we conclude that although marginal, the foundation proven was adequate for admission of the test results, State’s Exhibit 1. 1998The card is affixed to the top of the machine.” (Emphasis supplied.) Pretermitting the issue of whether Evans’ objection on the lack of foundation was adequate, Vincent v. State, 228 Ga. App. 691 (2) ( 492 SE2d 604 ) (1997) (failure to state what the proper foundation should be is insufficient), we conclude that although marginal, the foundation proven was adequate for admission of the test results, State’s Exhibit 1. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Evans v. State
green
1 sentence1995The Court of Appeals did not expressly state whether by "the record" it meant only the record of the plea hearing or the entire record of proceedings in Evans's case. *333 However, the Court of Appeals did specify that the opening statement could not be relied on to support a finding of compliance with USCR 33.9 because "the opening statement was not transcribed and there [was] no indication in the record as to what was stated in the prosecution's opening statement." Evans, 212 Ga. App. at 806 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins
green
2 sentences1994Evans’ motion was based in part on Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 ( 405 SE2d 474 ) (1991), where this court held that a movant for summary judgment who will not bear the burden of proof at trial need not affirmatively disprove the nonmoving party’s case; instead, the burden on the moving party may be discharged by pointing out by reference to the affidavits, depositions and other documents in the record that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. 1994Evans’ motion was based in part on Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 ( 405 SE2d 474 ) (1991), where this court held that a movant for summary judgment who will not bear the burden of proof at trial need not affirmatively disprove the nonmoving party’s case; instead, the burden on the moving party may be discharged by pointing out by reference to the affidavits, depositions and other documents in the record that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.