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13 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Mourygreen2 sentences2015“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010). 2015“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010). | 2 | 2 |
Edwards v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parolegreen1 sentence2024See Edwards, 751 A.2d at 719 ; see also Turner letter at 6. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Wrecksgreen1 sentence2022See Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating that once an appellate court determines that counsel’s application and brief satisfy Anders, the court must then conduct its own review of the appeal to determine if it is wholly frivolous). -3- J-S16015-22 In his Anders brief, counsel maintains Evans’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to an excessive sentence without duly considering mitigating factors is frivolous. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Diggsgreen1 sentence2021The record supports Judge Evans’ analysis, and had Appellant not waived this issue, we would adopt the court’s reasoning as our own. -8- J-S10012-21 of a motion for a new trial based on a weight of the evidence claim is the least assailable of its rulings.” Commonwealth v. Diggs, 949 A.2d 873, 879-80 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Alabamagreen1 sentence2020Notably, Evans’ brief cites to Commonwealth v. Lee, 206 A.3d 1, 11 (en banc) (Pa. Super. 2019), appeal denied, 218 A.3d 851 (Pa. 2019) (holding that trial court properly concluded petition was untimely and declining to extend Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 483 (2012) to non- juvenile offenders) without acknowledging that it expressly rejected his argument. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Leegreen1 sentence2020Notably, Evans’ brief cites to Commonwealth v. Lee, 206 A.3d 1, 11 (en banc) (Pa. Super. 2019), appeal denied, 218 A.3d 851 (Pa. 2019) (holding that trial court properly concluded petition was untimely and declining to extend Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 483 (2012) to non- juvenile offenders) without acknowledging that it expressly rejected his argument. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Seagravesgreen1 sentence2020See Seagraves, 103 A.3d at 842 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Persingergreen1 sentence2018See Commonwealth v. Hart, 174 A.3d 660 , 667 (Pa.Super. 2017) (“[T]o be valid, a plea must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”) (citing Commonwealth v. Persinger, 615 A.2d 1305, 1307 (Pa. 1992)). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Dodgegreen2 sentences2018“A defendant presents a substantial question when he sets forth a plausible argument that the sentence violates a provision of the Sentencing Code or is contrary to the fundamental norms of the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2013). 2018“A defendant presents a substantial question when he sets forth a plausible argument that the sentence violates a provision of the Sentencing Code or is contrary to the fundamental norms of the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2013). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Antidormigreen2 sentences2015See Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 759 (Pa. Super. 2014). -5- J-S70028-15 The fourth factor of the Evans test as set forth above requires that we consider whether the issue presented by Counsel raises a substantial question requiring us to review the discretionary aspects of the sentence. 2015See Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 759 (Pa. Super. 2014). -5- J-S70028-15 The fourth factor of the Evans test as set forth above requires that we consider whether the issue presented by Counsel raises a substantial question requiring us to review the discretionary aspects of the sentence. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Guthriegreen1 sentence2005See Commonwealth v. Smith, 572 Pa. 572 , 818 A.2d 494, 498 (2003) (“[T]he rules of criminal procedure require the appointment of counsel in PCRA proceedings.”); Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31 , 720 A.2d 693 , 699 (1999) (“The denial of PCRA relief cannot stand unless the petitioner was afforded the assistance of counsel.”); Kutnyak, 781 A.2d at 1262 (holding that appellant is entitled to representation of counsel on first PCRA petition “despite any apparent untimeliness of the petition or the apparent non-cognizability of the claims presented”); Guthrie, 749 A.2d at 504 (remanding for ap | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Kutnyakgreen1 sentence2005See Commonwealth v. Smith, 572 Pa. 572 , 818 A.2d 494, 498 (2003) (“[T]he rules of criminal procedure require the appointment of counsel in PCRA proceedings.”); Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31 , 720 A.2d 693 , 699 (1999) (“The denial of PCRA relief cannot stand unless the petitioner was afforded the assistance of counsel.”); Kutnyak, 781 A.2d at 1262 (holding that appellant is entitled to representation of counsel on first PCRA petition “despite any apparent untimeliness of the petition or the apparent non-cognizability of the claims presented”); Guthrie, 749 A.2d at 504 (remanding for ap | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Albrechtgreen2 sentences2005See Commonwealth v. Smith, 572 Pa. 572 , 818 A.2d 494, 498 (2003) (“[T]he rules of criminal procedure require the appointment of counsel in PCRA proceedings.”); Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31 , 720 A.2d 693 , 699 (1999) (“The denial of PCRA relief cannot stand unless the petitioner was afforded the assistance of counsel.”); Kutnyak, 781 A.2d at 1262 (holding that appellant is entitled to representation of counsel on first PCRA petition “despite any apparent untimeliness of the petition or the apparent non-cognizability of the claims presented”); Guthrie, 749 A.2d at 504 (remanding for ap 2005See Commonwealth v. Smith, 572 Pa. 572 , 818 A.2d 494, 498 (2003) (“[T]he rules of criminal procedure require the appointment of counsel in PCRA proceedings.”); Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31 , 720 A.2d 693 , 699 (1999) (“The denial of PCRA relief cannot stand unless the petitioner was afforded the assistance of counsel.”); Kutnyak, 781 A.2d at 1262 (holding that appellant is entitled to representation of counsel on first PCRA petition “despite any apparent untimeliness of the petition or the apparent non-cognizability of the claims presented”); Guthrie, 749 A.2d at 504 (remanding for ap | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Fergusongreen1 sentence2005See Commonwealth v. Smith, 572 Pa. 572 , 818 A.2d 494, 498 (2003) (“[T]he rules of criminal procedure require the appointment of counsel in PCRA proceedings.”); Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31 , 720 A.2d 693 , 699 (1999) (“The denial of PCRA relief cannot stand unless the petitioner was afforded the assistance of counsel.”); Kutnyak, 781 A.2d at 1262 (holding that appellant is entitled to representation of counsel on first PCRA petition “despite any apparent untimeliness of the petition or the apparent non-cognizability of the claims presented”); Guthrie, 749 A.2d at 504 (remanding for ap | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Smithgreen2 sentences2005See Commonwealth v. Smith, 572 Pa. 572 , 818 A.2d 494, 498 (2003) (“[T]he rules of criminal procedure require the appointment of counsel in PCRA proceedings.”); Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31 , 720 A.2d 693 , 699 (1999) (“The denial of PCRA relief cannot stand unless the petitioner was afforded the assistance of counsel.”); Kutnyak, 781 A.2d at 1262 (holding that appellant is entitled to representation of counsel on first PCRA petition “despite any apparent untimeliness of the petition or the apparent non-cognizability of the claims presented”); Guthrie, 749 A.2d at 504 (remanding for ap 2005See Commonwealth v. Smith, 572 Pa. 572 , 818 A.2d 494, 498 (2003) (“[T]he rules of criminal procedure require the appointment of counsel in PCRA proceedings.”); Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31 , 720 A.2d 693 , 699 (1999) (“The denial of PCRA relief cannot stand unless the petitioner was afforded the assistance of counsel.”); Kutnyak, 781 A.2d at 1262 (holding that appellant is entitled to representation of counsel on first PCRA petition “despite any apparent untimeliness of the petition or the apparent non-cognizability of the claims presented”); Guthrie, 749 A.2d at 504 (remanding for ap | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Quailgreen2 sentences2005See Commonwealth v. Smith, 572 Pa. 572 , 818 A.2d 494, 498 (2003) (“[T]he rules of criminal procedure require the appointment of counsel in PCRA proceedings.”); Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31 , 720 A.2d 693 , 699 (1999) (“The denial of PCRA relief cannot stand unless the petitioner was afforded the assistance of counsel.”); Kutnyak, 781 A.2d at 1262 (holding that appellant is entitled to representation of counsel on first PCRA petition “despite any apparent untimeliness of the petition or the apparent non-cognizability of the claims presented”); Guthrie, 749 A.2d at 504 (remanding for ap 2005See Quail, 729 A.2d at 573 n. 1 (leaving it to the PCRA court to determine whether appointment of counsel was “necessary or even advisable”). ¶ 12 For all the foregoing reasons, we have no choice but to vacate the trial court’s order denying Evans’s motion seeking collateral review. | 1 | 1 |
Garner v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2003See Haller v. Department of Revenue, 556 Pa. 289 , 728 A.2d 351 (1999). [7] In Garner, 529 U.S. at 253 , 120 S.Ct. 1362 , the U.S. Supreme Court made the following statement about a parole board's discretion: [W]here parole is concerned[,] discretion, by its very definition, is subject to changes in the manner in which it is informed and then exercised. 2003See Haller v. Department of Revenue, 556 Pa. 289 , 728 A.2d 351 (1999). [7] In Garner, 529 U.S. at 253 , 120 S.Ct. 1362 , the U.S. Supreme Court made the following statement about a parole board's discretion: [W]here parole is concerned[,] discretion, by its very definition, is subject to changes in the manner in which it is informed and then exercised. | 1 | 1 |
Haller v. COM., DEPT. OF REVENUEgreen2 sentences2003See Haller v. Department of Revenue, 556 Pa. 289 , 728 A.2d 351 (1999). [7] In Garner, 529 U.S. at 253 , 120 S.Ct. 1362 , the U.S. Supreme Court made the following statement about a parole board's discretion: [W]here parole is concerned[,] discretion, by its very definition, is subject to changes in the manner in which it is informed and then exercised. 2003See Haller v. Department of Revenue, 556 Pa. 289 , 728 A.2d 351 (1999). [7] In Garner, 529 U.S. at 253 , 120 S.Ct. 1362 , the U.S. Supreme Court made the following statement about a parole board's discretion: [W]here parole is concerned[,] discretion, by its very definition, is subject to changes in the manner in which it is informed and then exercised. | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. City of Philadelphiagreen1 sentence1991Evans v. Philadelphia Transportation Company, 418 Pa. 567, 574 , 212 A.2d 440, 443 (1965); see also Williams v. *160 City of Philadelphia, 131 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 71, 569 A.2d 419 (1990) (relying on Evans standard in addressing question of willful misconduct under section 8550). | 1 | 1 |
Evans v. Philadelphia Transportation Co.green2 sentences1991Evans v. Philadelphia Transportation Company, 418 Pa. 567, 574 , 212 A.2d 440, 443 (1965); see also Williams v. *160 City of Philadelphia, 131 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 71, 569 A.2d 419 (1990) (relying on Evans standard in addressing question of willful misconduct under section 8550). 1991Evans v. Philadelphia Transportation Company, 418 Pa. 567, 574 , 212 A.2d 440, 443 (1965); see also Williams v. *160 City of Philadelphia, 131 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 71, 569 A.2d 419 (1990) (relying on Evans standard in addressing question of willful misconduct under section 8550). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Alleyne v. United States
green
1 sentence2018Evans claims that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge his illegal mandatory minimum sentence under Alleyne.8 Evans’ claim is meritless; the trial court did not impose a mandatory minimum ____________________________________________ 8 Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (holding facts that increase mandatory minimum sentence are elements of crime and are required to be found beyond reasonable doubt by fact finder). -4- J-S74011-18 sentence. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Evans
green
2 sentences2018Evans, supra. -4- J-S54023-18 As to the fourth prong of the Evans test, we note that an appeal will only be granted when there is a substantial question that the sentence imposed was not appropriate under the Sentencing Code. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781. 2018Evans, supra. -4- J-S54023-18 As to the fourth prong of the Evans test, we note that an appeal will only be granted when there is a substantial question that the sentence imposed was not appropriate under the Sentencing Code. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Vealey
green
1 sentence2017Wells asserts that the PCRA court incorrectly relied on Commonwealth v. Vealey, 581 A.2d 217 (Pa. Super. 1990), in reaching its determination that Wells suffered no prejudice relative to his Evans claim. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.