Evans factors in Texas

2022Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12 (referred to as the Evans factors).

2022Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12 (referred to as the Evans factors).

2020In Tate v. State, the court clarified that although the Evans factors are helpful in guiding a court’s analysis, “the ultimate inquiry remains that set forth in Jackson: Based on the combined and cumulative force of the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?” 500 S.W.3d 410, 414 (Tex. Crim.

2020In Tate v. State, the court clarified that although the Evans factors are helpful in guiding a court’s analysis, “the ultimate inquiry remains that set forth in Jackson: Based on the combined and cumulative force of the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?” 500 S.W.3d 410, 414 (Tex. Crim.

2016See State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Tex. Crim.

2016See State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Tex. Crim.

2010See Evans , 202 S.W.3d at 162 ; Robinson v. State , 174 S.W.3d 320, 326 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd).

2010See Evans , 202 S.W.3d at 162 ; Robinson v. State , 174 S.W.3d 320, 326 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd).

1999See State v. Mayorga, 876 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex.App.—Dallas *111 1994).

1999See State v. Mayorga, 876 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex.App.—Dallas *111 1994).

2015Ferguson v. State, 313 S.W.3d 419, 426 ; see also Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 .

2010See Evans , 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12; [2] Ferguson v. State , 313 S.W.3d 419 , 423–24 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).

2026See Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d at 837 .

2024See id. (citing Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 414 ).

2024See id. (citing Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 414 ).

2023Citing Reyes, 849 S.W.2d at 816 , Evans argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying him a hearing because he raised a matter not determinable from the record which could entitle him to relief—namely, that his “plea was the result of the ineffective assistance of counsel[,]” that he was misadvised he “would receive a sentence of probation if he entered a plea,” and that absent such misadvice, he “would not have pled guilty to the charges.” The State argues that even if Evans’ motion sufficiently raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the trial court could have reasonably

2023See Reyes, 849 S.W.2d at 816 ; Colone v. State, 573 S.W.3d 249, 260 (Tex. Crim.

2023Hobbs v. State, 298 S.W.3d 193, 200 (Tex. 5 See TEX.

2023See Reyes, 849 S.W.2d at 816 ; Colone v. State, 573 S.W.3d 249, 260 (Tex. Crim.

2021See id. art. 64.01(a-1).

2021See id. art. 64.03(a)(1)(A)(ii).

2021See 18 A hedging term such as “contention” or “according to my belief” would not nullify an otherwise valid declaration that is sworn “under penalty of perjury.” Bahm, 219 S.W.3d at 393–95. 19 Although the majority of Evans’s declaration used the term “contention,” a single sentence used a stronger term: Evans “aver[red]” that there was “more than a mere probability” that the jury would not have found him guilty if the evidence had been “competently processed.” However, the “ultimate question of whether a reasonable probability exists that exculpatory DNA tests would change the result on guilt

2021Id.; see Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 855–56; Fain, 2012 WL 752652 , at *20.

2018See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 ; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899 ; see also Tex. Code Crim.

2015“Contested jury argument must be extreme or manifestly improper to constitute reversible error.” Bryant v. State, 340 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d).

2015Even were we to assume that any of the foregoing arguments may be a valid basis for reversing a grant of a default judgment, we do not reach the merits of these issues because we conclude that Evans failed to preserve error. 4 Cf. Massey, 35 S.W.3d at 699 (affirming default judgment on direct appeal where appellants did not argue the Craddock factors in appellate brief or any post-judgment motions). 5 Although not framed by Evans in the context of the Craddock factors, a lack of notice of a trial setting is sufficient to satisfy the first Craddock factor.

2015See Smalley v. Smalley, 436 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (noting a trial court loses its subject matter jurisdiction after expiration of its plenary power); see also City of Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam) (stating a court that acts without subject matter jurisdiction commits fundamental error that an appellate court may review for the first time on appeal).

2015See French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim.

2015(CR: 49); see, e.g., Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484-85 (holding that both direct and indirect products of unlawful 18 searches generally must be excluded); Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780, 787-91 (Tex. Crim.

2015Finally, as the Fifth Court of Appeals held in its 1992 opinion in Denbow v. State, “a strong suspicion or mere probability” that a defendant exercised care, control, or management over a controlled substance is insufficient to support a conviction.24 Accordingly, even assuming—without conceding—that it is proper to add “the presence of personal property on the premises” to the Evans factors, the existence of diapers for a present infant and month-old court documents do not even raise a “strong” suspicion about whether Appellant had a “right to possess” the apartment on the day of his arrest,

2015Finally, as the Fifth Court of Appeals held in its 1992 opinion in Denbow v. State, “a strong suspicion or mere probability” that a defendant exercised care, control, or management over a controlled substance is insufficient to support a conviction.24 Accordingly, even assuming—without conceding—that it is proper to add “the presence of personal property on the premises” to the Evans factors, the existence of diapers for a present infant and month-old court documents do not even raise a “strong” suspicion about whether Appellant had a “right to possess” the apartment on the day of his arrest,

2015(CR: 49); see, e.g., Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484-85 (holding that both direct and indirect products of unlawful 18 searches generally must be excluded); Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780, 787-91 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Smalley v. Smalley, 436 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (noting a trial court loses its subject matter jurisdiction after expiration of its plenary power); see also City of Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam) (stating a court that acts without subject matter jurisdiction commits fundamental error that an appellate court may review for the first time on appeal).