Evans motion in Maryland

1999Evans v. State, 113 Md.App. 347 , 688 A.2d 28 (1997).

1999Evans v. State, 113 Md.App. 347 , 688 A.2d 28 (1997).

2013If, as occurred during the pendency of the appeal in the present case, the Supreme Court announces a new rule of criminal procedure, then that new rule applies “to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final.” Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 , 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987).

2013If, as occurred during the pendency of the appeal in the present case, the Supreme Court announces a new rule of criminal procedure, then that new rule applies “to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final.” Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 , 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987).

2008Bitronics, 610 F.Supp. at 556 .

2008Bitronics, 610 F.Supp. at 556 .

2006It found, first, that "anticipating the shifting burdens eventually adopted by the Supreme Court in Batson, " this Court, in Evans's appeal, "applied a reasonable and correct legal standard," and that, in the first post conviction proceeding, Judge Eschenburg "measured Evans's claim against Batson, which had by then been published." Id.

2006It found, first, that “anticipating the shifting burdens eventually adopted by the Supreme Court in Batson,” this Court, in Evans’s appeal, “applied a reasonable and correct legal standard,” and that, in the first post conviction proceeding, Judge Eschenburg “measured Evans’s claim against Batson, which had by then been published.” Id.

2006Ayers v. Belmontes, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 469 , 166 L.Ed.2d 334 (2006), which Evans has failed even to mention, much less attempt to distinguish.

2006Ayers v. Belmontes, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 469 , 166 L.Ed.2d 334 (2006), which Evans has failed even to mention, much less attempt to distinguish.

2006The majority acknowledges that this standard should be applied to Evans' motion to reopen the 1995 post-conviction proceeding. 396 Md. at 277-79 , 914 A.2d at 37-38 .

2006The majority acknowledges that this standard should be applied to Evans' motion to reopen the 1995 post-conviction proceeding. 396 Md. at 277-79 , 914 A.2d at 37-38 .

2006Evans's motion for reconsideration, in which he presented six issues, was denied, Foster, Evans and Huffington v. State, 305 Md. 306 , 503 A.2d 1326 (1986) (CA-3), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.

2006Evans's motion for reconsideration, in which he presented six issues, was denied, Foster, Evans and Huffington v. State, 305 Md. 306 , 503 A.2d 1326 (1986) (CA-3), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.

2006A case more on point, and more pointedly dooming Evans's claim, is Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir.2005), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.

2006A case more on point, and more pointedly dooming Evans’s claim, is Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir.2005), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.

2006Evans v. Maryland, 478 U.S. 1010 , 106 S.Ct. 3310 , 92 L.Ed.2d 722 (1986).

2006Evans v. Maryland, 478 U.S. 1010 , 106 S.Ct. 3310 , 92 L.Ed.2d 722 (1986).

2006Evans v. Maryland, 478 U.S. 1010 , 106 S.Ct. 3310 , 92 L.Ed.2d 722 (1986).

2006Evans v. Maryland, 478 U.S. 1010 , 106 S.Ct. 3310 , 92 L.Ed.2d 722 (1986).

2004The majority adopts the reasoning of the court set out in Stubbs v. Colandrea, 154 Md.App. 673 , 841 A.2d 361 (2004) in dismissing Evans’ claim.

2004The majority adopts the reasoning of the court set out in Stubbs v. Colandrea, 154 Md.App. 673 , 841 A.2d 361 (2004) in dismissing Evans’ claim.

2004(Appellant’s brief at 9). 10 Evans’s counsel’s argument is as follows (id. at 13, 174 A.2d 167 ): *261 “The Newly Discovered 302 Reports, in Combination with the Testimony of the Three Other Witnesses Never Before Heard by Any Jury, Create a Substantial and Significant Possibility that a New Jury Would Find that Evans Was Not the Shooter and Therefore Is Ineligible for the Death Penalty.” The State responds by arguing that the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Evans’s motion for a new trial and that the evidence proffered by Evans at the April and December 2002 hearings did

1986Part IV C of the opinion in Foster, 304 Md. at 476-480 , 499 A.2d 1236 , flatly rejected this contention, stating that “we need not decide whether a statute imposing such a ‘burden’ on a capital defendant would be constitutional, for the Maryland statute, as interpreted in Tichnell I [Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 730 , 415 A.2d 830 (1980) ] and later cases, places no such burden on the defendant.” We went on to point out in Foster that subsection (h) of § 413, while employing the “preponderance of the evidence” test, “does not specify which side has the burden of proof or of persuasion.” 1

1986Part IV C of the opinion in Foster, 304 Md. at 476-480 , 499 A.2d 1236 , flatly rejected this contention, stating that “we need not decide whether a statute imposing such a ‘burden’ on a capital defendant would be constitutional, for the Maryland statute, as interpreted in Tichnell I [Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 730 , 415 A.2d 830 (1980) ] and later cases, places no such burden on the defendant.” We went on to point out in Foster that subsection (h) of § 413, while employing the “preponderance of the evidence” test, “does not specify which side has the burden of proof or of persuasion.” 1

1986Part IV C of the opinion in Foster, 304 Md. at 476-480 , 499 A.2d 1236 , flatly rejected this contention, stating that “we need not decide whether a statute imposing such a ‘burden’ on a capital defendant would be constitutional, for the Maryland statute, as interpreted in Tichnell I [Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 730 , 415 A.2d 830 (1980) ] and later cases, places no such burden on the defendant.” We went on to point out in Foster that subsection (h) of § 413, while employing the “preponderance of the evidence” test, “does not specify which side has the burden of proof or of persuasion.” 1

1986Part IV C of the opinion in Foster, 304 Md. at 476-480 , 499 A.2d 1236 , flatly rejected this contention, stating that “we need not decide whether a statute imposing such a ‘burden’ on a capital defendant would be constitutional, for the Maryland statute, as interpreted in Tichnell I [Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 730 , 415 A.2d 830 (1980) ] and later cases, places no such burden on the defendant.” We went on to point out in Foster that subsection (h) of § 413, while employing the “preponderance of the evidence” test, “does not specify which side has the burden of proof or of persuasion.” 1

1986APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW SENTENCING BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT REFUSED TO ADMIT EVIDENCE AS TO WHEN APPELLANT WOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR PAROLE.” We fully answered in the Evans opinion the question presented, reaffirming a well-established principle of Maryland law that evidence concerning parole eligibility under statutes and administrative procedures is inadmissible at a criminal trial or sentencing proceeding before a jury, as it may suggest to the jury that it might shift its statutory responsibilities to another body. 304 Md. at 530, 499 A.2d 1261 .

1986APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW SENTENCING BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT REFUSED TO ADMIT EVIDENCE AS TO WHEN APPELLANT WOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR PAROLE." We fully answered in the Evans opinion the question presented, reaffirming a well-established principle of Maryland law that evidence concerning parole eligibility under statutes and administrative procedures is inadmissible at a criminal trial or sentencing proceeding before a jury, as it may suggest to the jury that it might shift its statutory responsibilities to another body. 304 Md. at 530, 499 A.2d 1261 .