Evans motion in Mississippi

2022Evans, 109 So. 3d at 1048 . 10 ¶35.

2022Id. at 1047 .

2002This Court has considered the issue raised in point two of Evans's motion for directed verdict in James v. State, 731 So.2d 1135 (Miss.1999).

2000This Court has considered the issue raised in point two of Evans's motion for directed verdict in James v. State, 731 So.2d 1135 (Miss. 1999).

1997However, during a second hearing on Evans' Motion on Access to Law Library, the trial court, relying on Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 , 97 S.Ct. 1491 , 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), denied Evans' motion and ruled that "[t]he defendant's right of access to the courts have been fulfilled by the appointment of Mr. Tucker either as an advisory counsel or as standby counsel." ś 411.

1997However, during a second hearing on Evans' Motion on Access to Law Library, the trial court, relying on Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 , 97 S.Ct. 1491 , 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), denied Evans' motion and ruled that "[t]he defendant's right of access to the courts have been fulfilled by the appointment of Mr. Tucker either as an advisory counsel or as standby counsel." ś 411.

2023We render judgment in favor of Evans on her claim for confirmation of title to the property by adverse possession because she met all the elements required by the separate opinion in Quates, 239 So. 2d at 812 .

2023Evans claims that he did not know his trial counsel had never appealed his conviction until recently. 5 In March 2019, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the trial court’s order was an appealable ruling and allowed Evans’s motion to proceed as a motion for post-conviction collateral relief. 5 motion was excepted from the three-year statutory time bars under Rowland v. State, 42 So. 3d 503 (Miss. 2010), overruled by Howell v. State, 358 So. 3d 613 (Miss. 2023).

2020In Dickerson, the defendant argued “that, even if he was competent to stand trial, the evidence of his history of mental illness precludes imposition of the death penalty.” Id. at 15 .

2020Preliminarily, the State “disputes Evans’ claim that he actually has a serious mental illness.” In any case, the State responds that Evans “is essentially asking that this Court expand the definition of intellectual disability to include a serious mental illness” but that an “identical claim” was “flatly rejected” in Dickerson v. State, 175 So. 3d 8 (Miss. 2015). ¶61.

2012We recognize that as a general rule, “the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Henderson v. State, 878 So.2d 246, 247 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2004) (quoting Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)).

2012We recognize that as a general rule, “the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Henderson v. State, 878 So.2d 246, 247 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2004) (quoting Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)).

2002However, what Evans fails to consider is that it can only be considered as manslaughter when done in the "heat of passion." Turner v. State, 773 So.2d 952 (¶ 5) (Miss.Ct.App.2000).

2001Evans' instruction, D-4, is a peremptory instruction concerning the sufficiency of the evidence which states that "[t]he Court instructs the jury that under the evidence presented in this case, you must return a verdict of `Not Guilty' as to all counts of the indictment." This Court will reverse only when the evidence is such that "reasonable and fair-minded jurors could only find the accused not guilty." McClain v. State , 625 So.2d 774 , 778 (Miss. 1993).