Bruton rule in Kentucky

2006The Commonwealth argued that the incriminating out-of-court hearsay statements in this case constituted an exception to the Bruton rule because these statements contained “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) and Gabow v. Commonwealth, 34 S.W.3d 63 (Ky.2000), the trial court agreed and accordingly, denied Appellants’ motions for separate trials.

2006The Commonwealth argued that the incriminating out-of-court hearsay statements in this case constituted an exception to the Bruton rule because these statements contained “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) and Gabow v. Commonwealth, 34 S.W.3d 63 (Ky.2000), the trial court agreed and accordingly, denied Appellants’ motions for separate trials.

2009Sparkman v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 667 (Ky.2008) (applying the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to a Confrontation Clause violation).

2009Sparkman v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 667 (Ky.2008) (applying the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to a Confrontation Clause violation).

2009We agree with the several courts that have held that this latter question continues to be controlled by the Bruton line of cases and that "[t]he same redaction that `prevents Bruton error also serves to prevent Crawford error.'" People v. Stevens, 41 Cal.4th 182 , 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 196 , 158 P.3d 763, 776 (2007) (quoting from United States v. Chen, 393 F.3d 139 (2nd Cir.2004)).

2009We agree with the several courts that have held that this latter question continues to be controlled by the Bruton line of cases and that “[t]he same redaction that ‘prevents Bruton error also serves to prevent Crawford error.’ ” People v. Stevens, 41 Cal.4th 182 , 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 196 , 158 P.3d 763, 776 (2007) (quoting from United States v. Chen, 393 F.3d 139 (2nd Cir.2004)).

2009We need not decide, however, whether the admission of these portions of Eddings's statement amounted to a Bruton error, for even if it did, Bruton errors are subject to harmless error analysis, Shepherd, supra , and any error here was clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2009We need not decide, however, whether the admission of these portions of Eddings's statement amounted to a Bruton error, for even if it did, Bruton errors are subject to harmless error analysis, Shepherd, supra , and any error here was clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2008In accordance with Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 195 , 118 S.Ct. 1151, 1156 , 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) and Stanford v. Parker, 266 F.3d 442, 457 (6th Cir.2001), this Court has extended slightly the protections of Bruton , holding that redacted confessions which merely delete the name of the other defendant or insert the phrase “other party” or “deleted” also constitute a Bruton violation because the statements still facially incriminate the co-defendant.

2008In accordance with Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 195 , 118 S.Ct. 1151, 1156 , 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) and Stanford v. Parker, 266 F.3d 442, 457 (6th Cir.2001), this Court has extended slightly the protections of Bruton , holding that redacted confessions which merely delete the name of the other defendant or insert the phrase “other party” or “deleted” also constitute a Bruton violation because the statements still facially incriminate the co-defendant.

2008In accordance with Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 195 , 118 S.Ct. 1151, 1156 , 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) and Stanford v. Parker, 266 F.3d 442, 457 (6th Cir.2001), this Court has extended slightly the protections of Bruton , holding that redacted confessions which merely delete the name of the other defendant or insert the phrase “other party” or “deleted” also constitute a Bruton violation because the statements still facially incriminate the co-defendant.

2008In accordance with Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 195 , 118 S.Ct. 1151, 1156 , 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) and Stanford v. Parker, 266 F.3d 442, 457 (6th Cir.2001), this Court has extended slightly the protections of Bruton , holding that redacted confessions which merely delete the name of the other defendant or insert the phrase “other party” or “deleted” also constitute a Bruton violation because the statements still facially incriminate the co-defendant.

2006Since the trial court’s ruling on the above matter, the United States Supreme Court has overruled those portions of Ohio v. Roberts, supra, and Gabow v. Commonwealth, supra, which hold that out-of-court hearsay statements made by witnesses which are testimonial in nature may be admitted against a defendant if they (1) fall under a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or (2) bear “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60-61 , 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1369-70 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004).

2006Since the trial court’s ruling on the above matter, the United States Supreme Court has overruled those portions of Ohio v. Roberts, supra, and Gabow v. Commonwealth, supra, which hold that out-of-court hearsay statements made by witnesses which are testimonial in nature may be admitted against a defendant if they (1) fall under a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or (2) bear “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60-61 , 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1369-70 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004).

2006The Commonwealth argued that the incriminating out-of-court hearsay statements in this case constituted an exception to the Bruton rule because these statements contained “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) and Gabow v. Commonwealth, 34 S.W.3d 63 (Ky.2000), the trial court agreed and accordingly, denied Appellants’ motions for separate trials.

2006The Commonwealth argued that the incriminating out-of-court hearsay statements in this case constituted an exception to the Bruton rule because these statements contained “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) and Gabow v. Commonwealth, 34 S.W.3d 63 (Ky.2000), the trial court agreed and accordingly, denied Appellants’ motions for separate trials.

2006Since the trial court’s ruling on the above matter, the United States Supreme Court has overruled those portions of Ohio v. Roberts, supra, and Gabow v. Commonwealth, supra, which hold that out-of-court hearsay statements made by witnesses which are testimonial in nature may be admitted against a defendant if they (1) fall under a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or (2) bear “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60-61 , 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1369-70 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004).

2006Since the trial court’s ruling on the above matter, the United States Supreme Court has overruled those portions of Ohio v. Roberts, supra, and Gabow v. Commonwealth, supra, which hold that out-of-court hearsay statements made by witnesses which are testimonial in nature may be admitted against a defendant if they (1) fall under a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or (2) bear “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60-61 , 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1369-70 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004).

2001Gill v. Commonwealth, Ky., 7 S.W.3d 365, 368 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 830 , 121 S.Ct. 83 , 148 L.Ed.2d 45 (2000).

2001Gill v. Commonwealth, Ky., 7 S.W.3d 365, 368 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 830 , 121 S.Ct. 83 , 148 L.Ed.2d 45 (2000).

2001Gill v. Commonwealth, Ky., 7 S.W.3d 365, 368 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 830 , 121 S.Ct. 83 , 148 L.Ed.2d 45 (2000).

2001Gill v. Commonwealth, Ky., 7 S.W.3d 365, 368 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 830 , 121 S.Ct. 83 , 148 L.Ed.2d 45 (2000).

2000Cf. State v. Bleyl, 435 A.2d 1349 (Me.1981).

2000Cf. State v. Bleyl, 435 A.2d 1349 (Me.1981).

1999Violation of the Bruton rule is subject to the harmless error analysis of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), which holds “that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the [reviewing] court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 , 89 S.Ct. 1726 , 23 L.Ed.2d 284, 288 (1969); see also Cosby v. Commonwealth, Ky., 776 S.W.2d 367, 370 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1063 , 110 S.Ct. 880 , 107 L.Ed.2d 963 (1990).

1999Violation of the Bruton rule is subject to the harmless error analysis of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), which holds “that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the [reviewing] court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 , 89 S.Ct. 1726 , 23 L.Ed.2d 284, 288 (1969); see also Cosby v. Commonwealth, Ky., 776 S.W.2d 367, 370 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1063 , 110 S.Ct. 880 , 107 L.Ed.2d 963 (1990).

1998Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court subsequently refined the Bruton rule by holding in Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 , 91 S.Ct. 1723 , 29 L.Ed.2d 222 (1971) that when the confessing co-defendant elects to testify and thus subjects himself or herself to cross-examination, "It would be unrealistic . . . to hold that the respondent was denied either the opportunity or the benefit of full and effective cross-examination . . . ." Id, 402 U.S. at 629 , 91 S.Ct. at 1727 .

1998Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court subsequently refined the Bruton rule by holding in Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 , 91 S.Ct. 1723 , 29 L.Ed.2d 222 (1971) that when the confessing co-defendant elects to testify and thus subjects himself or herself to cross-examination, "It would be unrealistic . . . to hold that the respondent was denied either the opportunity or the benefit of full and effective cross-examination . . . ." Id, 402 U.S. at 629 , 91 S.Ct. at 1727 .

1979Catanzaro v. Mancusi, 404 F.2d 296, 300 (2nd Cir.1968) (U.S. cert. denied 397 U.S. 942 , 90 S.Ct. 956 , 25 L.Ed.2d 123 ), becomes applicable: “Where the jury has heard not only a codefendant’s confession but the defendant’s own confession no such ‘devastating’ risk attends the lack of confrontation as was thought to be involved in Bruton.” Also see Meyer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 472 S.W.2d 479 (1971).

1979Catanzaro v. Mancusi, 404 F.2d 296, 300 (2nd Cir.1968) (U.S. cert. denied 397 U.S. 942 , 90 S.Ct. 956 , 25 L.Ed.2d 123 ), becomes applicable: “Where the jury has heard not only a codefendant’s confession but the defendant’s own confession no such ‘devastating’ risk attends the lack of confrontation as was thought to be involved in Bruton.” Also see Meyer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 472 S.W.2d 479 (1971).

1979Catanzaro v. Mancusi, 404 F.2d 296, 300 (2nd Cir.1968) (U.S. cert. denied 397 U.S. 942 , 90 S.Ct. 956 , 25 L.Ed.2d 123 ), becomes applicable: “Where the jury has heard not only a codefendant’s confession but the defendant’s own confession no such ‘devastating’ risk attends the lack of confrontation as was thought to be involved in Bruton.” Also see Meyer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 472 S.W.2d 479 (1971).

1979Catanzaro v. Mancusi, 404 F.2d 296, 300 (2nd Cir.1968) (U.S. cert. denied 397 U.S. 942 , 90 S.Ct. 956 , 25 L.Ed.2d 123 ), becomes applicable: “Where the jury has heard not only a codefendant’s confession but the defendant’s own confession no such ‘devastating’ risk attends the lack of confrontation as was thought to be involved in Bruton.” Also see Meyer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 472 S.W.2d 479 (1971).

1973Cf. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 , 92 S.Ct. 1056 , 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 , 89 S. Ct. 1726 , 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969).

1973Cf. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 , 92 S.Ct. 1056 , 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 , 89 S. Ct. 1726 , 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969).