Bruton violation in Tennessee

2019In State v. Elliott, the supreme court stated: “where[] the confession of one non-testifying codefendant contradicts, repudiates, or adds to material statements in the confession of the other non-testifying codefendant, so as to expose the latter to an increased risk of conviction or to an increase in the degree of the offense with correspondingly greater punishment, the latter codefendant is entitled to test the veracity of the statements in the confession of his codefendant.” 524 S.W.2d 473, 478 (Tenn. 1975). 18 In Bruton’s progeny, the United States Supreme Court distinguished cases where “

2017Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-37 (1968). “[T]he Bruton rule proscribes, generally, the use of one co-defendant’s confession to implicate the other as being violative of the nonconfessing co-defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.” State v. Elliot, 524 S.W.2d 473, 477 (Tenn. 1975).

2025See State v. Ogle, 666 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Tenn. 1984) (holding that a Bruton violation may be harmless when “ample evidence was available to demonstrate petitioner’s guilt without reliance upon his co- defendant’s confession”); Flynn, 2017 WL 1861784 , at *18 (analyzing harmless error from the absence of a limiting instruction, in part, by evaluating the strength of proof offered independent of the co-defendant’s confession); State v. Freeman, No. M2006-02751-CCA- R3-CD, 2008 WL 833936 , at *23 (Tenn. Crim.

2025See State v. Ogle, 666 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Tenn. 1984) (holding that a Bruton violation may be harmless when “ample evidence was available to demonstrate petitioner’s guilt without reliance upon his co- defendant’s confession”); Flynn, 2017 WL 1861784 , at *18 (analyzing harmless error from the absence of a limiting instruction, in part, by evaluating the strength of proof offered independent of the co-defendant’s confession); State v. Freeman, No. M2006-02751-CCA- R3-CD, 2008 WL 833936 , at *23 (Tenn. Crim.

2025Furthermore, “the mere finding of a Bruton error in the course of [a] trial ‘does not automatically require reversal of the ensuing criminal conviction.’” King v. State, 989 S.W.2d 319, 329 (Tenn. 1999) (quoting Schnedble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430 (1972)).

2025Furthermore, “the mere finding of a Bruton error in the course of [a] trial ‘does not automatically require reversal of the ensuing criminal conviction.’” King v. State, 989 S.W.2d 319, 329 (Tenn. 1999) (quoting Schnedble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430 (1972)).

2022This court ultimately determined that there was no error because the trial court provided a limiting instruction at the close of the trial, the prosecution did not argue that the evidence applied to the Petitioner, and finally, that because the threats made no mention of the Petitioner, there was no violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1968) (concluding there was no Bruton violation because co-defendant’s jailhouse statement asserting that he told his brother to destroy the murder weapon did not inculpate defendant).

2022This court ultimately determined that there was no error because the trial court provided a limiting instruction at the close of the trial, the prosecution did not argue that the evidence applied to the Petitioner, and finally, that because the threats made no mention of the Petitioner, there was no violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1968) (concluding there was no Bruton violation because co-defendant’s jailhouse statement asserting that he told his brother to destroy the murder weapon did not inculpate defendant).

2025Furthermore, “the mere finding of a Bruton error in the course of [a] trial ‘does not automatically require reversal of the ensuing criminal conviction.’” King v. State, 989 S.W.2d 319, 329 (Tenn. 1999) (quoting Schnedble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430 (1972)).

2025Furthermore, “the mere finding of a Bruton error in the course of [a] trial ‘does not automatically require reversal of the ensuing criminal conviction.’” King v. State, 989 S.W.2d 319, 329 (Tenn. 1999) (quoting Schnedble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430 (1972)).

2025See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211 ; Dorsey, 568 S.W.2d at 642 ; see also Tenn. R.

2025See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211 ; Dorsey, 568 S.W.2d at 642 ; see also Tenn. R.

2011The Bruton rule was subsequently limited by Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 , 107 S. Ct. 1702 (1987).

2011The Bruton rule was subsequently limited by Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 , 107 S. Ct. 1702 (1987).

1998Porterfied, 746 S.W.2d at 446 .

1997See State v. Porterfield, 746 S.W.2d at 446 ; State v. Cameron, 909 S.W.2d at 853 ; Tenn. R.

2018See United States v. Jimenez, 509 F.3d 682, 691 (5th Cir. 2007) (defense counsel opened the door to codefendant’s statements implicating the defendant by repeatedly asking the Drug Enforcement Administration agent to explain the basis for his suspicions about the defendant); United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1290 (11th Cir.2003) (defendant invited Bruton error by stipulating to the admission of tape containing co-defendant’s implicating statements); United States v. Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184, 1187 (9th Cir.1992) (“[A] defendant who elicits a statement that may be violative of Bruto

2013See United States v. Jimenez, 509 F.3d 682, 691 (5th Cir. 2007) (defense counsel opened the door to co- defendant’s statements implicating the defendant by repeatedly asking the Drug Enforcement Administration agent to explain the basis for his suspicions about the defendant); United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003) (defendant invited Bruton error by stipulating to the admission of tape containing co-defendant’s implicating statements); United States v. Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184, 1187 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[A] defendant who elicits a statement that may be violative of B

2018See United States v. Jimenez, 509 F.3d 682, 691 (5th Cir. 2007) (defense counsel opened the door to codefendant’s statements implicating the defendant by repeatedly asking the Drug Enforcement Administration agent to explain the basis for his suspicions about the defendant); United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1290 (11th Cir.2003) (defendant invited Bruton error by stipulating to the admission of tape containing co-defendant’s implicating statements); United States v. Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184, 1187 (9th Cir.1992) (“[A] defendant who elicits a statement that may be violative of Bruto

2013See United States v. Jimenez, 509 F.3d 682, 691 (5th Cir. 2007) (defense counsel opened the door to co- defendant’s statements implicating the defendant by repeatedly asking the Drug Enforcement Administration agent to explain the basis for his suspicions about the defendant); United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003) (defendant invited Bruton error by stipulating to the admission of tape containing co-defendant’s implicating statements); United States v. Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184, 1187 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[A] defendant who elicits a statement that may be violative of B

2018See United States v. Jimenez, 509 F.3d 682, 691 (5th Cir. 2007) (defense counsel opened the door to codefendant’s statements implicating the defendant by repeatedly asking the Drug Enforcement Administration agent to explain the basis for his suspicions about the defendant); United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1290 (11th Cir.2003) (defendant invited Bruton error by stipulating to the admission of tape containing co-defendant’s implicating statements); United States v. Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184, 1187 (9th Cir.1992) (“[A] defendant who elicits a statement that may be violative of Bruto

2013See United States v. Jimenez, 509 F.3d 682, 691 (5th Cir. 2007) (defense counsel opened the door to co- defendant’s statements implicating the defendant by repeatedly asking the Drug Enforcement Administration agent to explain the basis for his suspicions about the defendant); United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003) (defendant invited Bruton error by stipulating to the admission of tape containing co-defendant’s implicating statements); United States v. Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184, 1187 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[A] defendant who elicits a statement that may be violative of B

2018See United States v. Jimenez, 509 F.3d 682, 691 (5th Cir. 2007) (defense counsel opened the door to codefendant’s statements implicating the defendant by repeatedly asking the Drug Enforcement Administration agent to explain the basis for his suspicions about the defendant); United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1290 (11th Cir.2003) (defendant invited Bruton error by stipulating to the admission of tape containing co-defendant’s implicating statements); United States v. Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184, 1187 (9th Cir.1992) (“[A] defendant who elicits a statement that may be violative of Bruto

2013See United States v. Jimenez, 509 F.3d 682, 691 (5th Cir. 2007) (defense counsel opened the door to co- defendant’s statements implicating the defendant by repeatedly asking the Drug Enforcement Administration agent to explain the basis for his suspicions about the defendant); United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003) (defendant invited Bruton error by stipulating to the admission of tape containing co-defendant’s implicating statements); United States v. Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184, 1187 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[A] defendant who elicits a statement that may be violative of B

2000The Court of Criminal Appeals has developed five factors to consider when deciding whether an error constitutes “plain error” in the absence of an objection at trial: “(a) the record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court; (b) a clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached; (c) a substantial right of the accused must have been adversely affected; (d) the accused did not waive the issue for tactical reasons; and (e) consideration of the error is ‘necessary to do substantial justice.’ ” State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 641-42 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994); see also Ogle, 6

2000The Court of Criminal Appeals has developed five factors to consider when deciding whether an error constitutes “plain error” in the absence of an objection at trial: “(a) the record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court; (b) a clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached; (c) a substantial right of the accused must have been adversely affected; (d) the accused did not waive the issue for tactical reasons; and (e) consideration of the error is ‘necessary to do substantial justice.’ ” State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 641-42 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994); see also Ogle, 6

2013See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 , 398 n.11 (1986)(stating that nonhearsay does not violate the defendant’s right to confront witnesses); Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 220 (1974) (“[S]ince the prosecution was not contending that anything [the non-testifying defendants] said at the election contest was true, the other defendants had no interest in cross-examining them so as to put their credibility in issue.”); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Because this testimony was not used for the truth of the matter asserted by the out-of-court declarant, it was not

2013See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 , 398 n.11 (1986)(stating that nonhearsay does not violate the defendant’s right to confront witnesses); Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 220 (1974) (“[S]ince the prosecution was not contending that anything [the non-testifying defendants] said at the election contest was true, the other defendants had no interest in cross-examining them so as to put their credibility in issue.”); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Because this testimony was not used for the truth of the matter asserted by the out-of-court declarant, it was not

2013See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 , 398 n.11 (1986)(stating that nonhearsay does not violate the defendant’s right to confront witnesses); Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 220 (1974) (“[S]ince the prosecution was not contending that anything [the non-testifying defendants] said at the election contest was true, the other defendants had no interest in cross-examining them so as to put their credibility in issue.”); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Because this testimony was not used for the truth of the matter asserted by the out-of-court declarant, it was not

2013See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 , 398 n.11 (1986)(stating that nonhearsay does not violate the defendant’s right to confront witnesses); Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 220 (1974) (“[S]ince the prosecution was not contending that anything [the non-testifying defendants] said at the election contest was true, the other defendants had no interest in cross-examining them so as to put their credibility in issue.”); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Because this testimony was not used for the truth of the matter asserted by the out-of-court declarant, it was not

2013See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 , 398 n.11 (1986)(stating that nonhearsay does not violate the defendant’s right to confront witnesses); Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 220 (1974) (“[S]ince the prosecution was not contending that anything [the non-testifying defendants] said at the election contest was true, the other defendants had no interest in cross-examining them so as to put their credibility in issue.”); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Because this testimony was not used for the truth of the matter asserted by the out-of-court declarant, it was not

2013See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 , 398 n.11 (1986)(stating that nonhearsay does not violate the defendant’s right to confront witnesses); Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 220 (1974) (“[S]ince the prosecution was not contending that anything [the non-testifying defendants] said at the election contest was true, the other defendants had no interest in cross-examining them so as to put their credibility in issue.”); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Because this testimony was not used for the truth of the matter asserted by the out-of-court declarant, it was not

2013See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 , 398 n.11 (1986)(stating that nonhearsay does not violate the defendant’s right to confront witnesses); Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 220 (1974) (“[S]ince the prosecution was not contending that anything [the non-testifying defendants] said at the election contest was true, the other defendants had no interest in cross-examining them so as to put their credibility in issue.”); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Because this testimony was not used for the truth of the matter asserted by the out-of-court declarant, it was not

2013See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 , 398 n.11 (1986)(stating that nonhearsay does not violate the defendant’s right to confront witnesses); Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 220 (1974) (“[S]ince the prosecution was not contending that anything [the non-testifying defendants] said at the election contest was true, the other defendants had no interest in cross-examining them so as to put their credibility in issue.”); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Because this testimony was not used for the truth of the matter asserted by the out-of-court declarant, it was not

2014State v. Elliot, 524 S.W.2d 473, 478 (Tenn. 1975) (citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969)); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430 (1972).

2014State v. Elliot, 524 S.W.2d 473, 478 (Tenn. 1975) (citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969)); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430 (1972).

1981There is no doubt that Elliott diluted somewhat our opinion in Gwin v. State, 523 S.W.2d 636 , (Tenn.Cr.App.1975), in which we held that in the total context of that case redacted statements, similar to those in this case, were admissible.

1977Thus this case must be distinguished from Gwin v. State, 523 S.W.2d 636 (Tenn.Cr.App. 1975), in which this Court held that there was no Bruton violation because, among other factors, the confessing co-defendant’s statement had been redacted to read “blank” in each place where a non-confessing co-defendant’s name appeared.

2016The Court further refined the Bruton rule in Gray v. Maryland, where the court confirmed that “Richardson placed outside the scope of Bruton’s rule those statements that incriminate inferentially” but cautioned, however, that “Richardson must depend in significant part upon the kind of, not the simple fact of, inference.” Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 195-96 (1998).

2016The Court further refined the Bruton rule in Gray v. Maryland, where the court confirmed that “Richardson placed outside the scope of Bruton’s rule those statements that incriminate inferentially” but cautioned, however, that “Richardson must depend in significant part upon the kind of, not the simple fact of, inference.” Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 195-96 (1998).

2016Importantly, the Defendant makes no real argument at all other than stating the general principles of the Bruton case, even providing the principle that the Defendant cannot take advantage of an alleged Bruton violation “which he himself committed, or invited, induced the trial court to commit, or which were the natural consequence of his own neglect or misconduct.” See State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 493 (Tenn. 2004) (quoting Norris v. Richards, 246 S.W.2d 81, 85 (Tenn. 1952)) (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Jack Price and Larry Thomas Cochran, No. E2011-01050-CCA-R3- CD, 2013

2016Importantly, the Defendant makes no real argument at all other than stating the general principles of the Bruton case, even providing the principle that the Defendant cannot take advantage of an alleged Bruton violation “which he himself committed, or invited, induced the trial court to commit, or which were the natural consequence of his own neglect or misconduct.” See State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 493 (Tenn. 2004) (quoting Norris v. Richards, 246 S.W.2d 81, 85 (Tenn. 1952)) (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Jack Price and Larry Thomas Cochran, No. E2011-01050-CCA-R3- CD, 2013

2004See State v. Cameron, 909 S.W.2d 836, 853 (Tenn. Crim.

2004See State v. Cameron, 909 S.W.2d 836, 853 (Tenn. Crim.

1997In the direct appeal of this matter, our Supreme Court ruled on this issue and found “no Bruton violation in the admission in evidence of the confessions.” King, 718 S.W.2d at 247 .

1995While we note that our Supreme Court has held that no Bruton violation exists where confessions of jointly tried co-defendants are similar in material aspects, State v. King, 718 S.W.2d 241, 247 (Tenn. 1986), the rationale of Cruz undercuts that decision.

1997However, since our Supreme Court’s opinion, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987).

1990See Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 194 , 107 S.Ct. 1714, 1719-20 , 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987).

2025See, e.g., United States v. Benson, 957 F.3d 218, 230 (4th Cir. 2020) (“As an initial matter, Bruton does not apply here because the Confrontation Clause is only implicated in the context of testimonial statements.”); United States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d 320, 326 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Because it is premised on the Confrontation Clause, the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to nontestimonial statements.”).

2025See, e.g., United States v. Benson, 957 F.3d 218, 230 (4th Cir. 2020) (“As an initial matter, Bruton does not apply here because the Confrontation Clause is only implicated in the context of testimonial statements.”); United States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d 320, 326 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Because it is premised on the Confrontation Clause, the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to nontestimonial statements.”).

2025See, e.g., United States v. Benson, 957 F.3d 218, 230 (4th Cir. 2020) (“As an initial matter, Bruton does not apply here because the Confrontation Clause is only implicated in the context of testimonial statements.”); United States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d 320, 326 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Because it is premised on the Confrontation Clause, the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to nontestimonial statements.”).

2025See, e.g., United States v. Benson, 957 F.3d 218, 230 (4th Cir. 2020) (“As an initial matter, Bruton does not apply here because the Confrontation Clause is only implicated in the context of testimonial statements.”); United States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d 320, 326 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Because it is premised on the Confrontation Clause, the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to nontestimonial statements.”).

2021See United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Bruton is directed toward preserving a defendant’s right to cross- examination, and thus has nothing to do with arguments of counsel based on their interpretation of the evidence.”).

2021See United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Bruton is directed toward preserving a defendant’s right to cross- examination, and thus has nothing to do with arguments of counsel based on their interpretation of the evidence.”).