Bruton rule in Massachusetts

2013As for Gonzalez’s testimony, the error with respect to Santos was that Gonzalez recounted statements allegedly made by the defendant that implicated Santos, in violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-136 (1968); because the statements at issue were allegedly made by the defendant himself, he is not in a position to claim a Bruton violation.

2013As for Gonzalez’s testimony, the error with respect to Santos was that Gonzalez recounted statements allegedly made by the defendant that implicated Santos, in violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-136 (1968); because the statements at issue were allegedly made by the defendant himself, he is not in a position to claim a Bruton violation.

2002See Commonwealth v. Adams, 416 Mass. 55, 58 (1993), quoting Commonwealth v. Sinnott, 399 Mass. 863, 872 (1987) (test whether Bruton error is harmless is whether any “ ‘spillover’ resulting from imperfect interlock [of the statements] was without effect on the jury and did not contribute to the verdict”).

1993The test whether a Bruton error is harmless “is stringent, requiring reversal unless any ‘spillover’ resulting from imperfect interlock [of the confessions] ‘was without effect on the jury and did not contribute to the verdict.’ ” Commonwealth v. Sinnott, 399 Mass. 863, 872 (1987), quoting Commonwealth v. Marini, 375 Mass. 510, 521 (1978).

2013See Richardson v. Marsh, supra at 203-204 n.l, 208 (when linked with respondent’s own testimony, redacted statement placed respondent in vehicle at time murder plan was being discussed); Commonwealth v. Vasquez, supra at 841-845 (no Bruton violation in admitting nontestifying codefendant’s statement that he opposed plan to murder but “other members [of the gang] threatened to kill him”); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 292, 294, 298 (1999) (admission of nontesti-fying codefendant’s bare statement that “[w]e stabbed” victim did not violate Bruton by suggesting involvement of one or mo

2012The defendant acknowledges that the United States Supreme Court has limited the application of the Bruton rule to only those cases where the codefendant’s statement “ ‘expressly implicate^]’ the defendant, leaving no doubt that it would prove to be ‘powerfully incriminating,’ ” Commonwealth v. James, 424 Mass. 770, 782 (1997), quoting from Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208 (1987), or where, despite any redaction of, or substitution for, a defendant’s name, a codefendant’s confession “point[s] directly” or “obviously refer[s] directly” to the defendant.

2013See Richardson v. Marsh, supra at 203-204 n.l, 208 (when linked with respondent’s own testimony, redacted statement placed respondent in vehicle at time murder plan was being discussed); Commonwealth v. Vasquez, supra at 841-845 (no Bruton violation in admitting nontestifying codefendant’s statement that he opposed plan to murder but “other members [of the gang] threatened to kill him”); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 292, 294, 298 (1999) (admission of nontesti-fying codefendant’s bare statement that “[w]e stabbed” victim did not violate Bruton by suggesting involvement of one or mo

2012See Commonwealth v. Blake, 428 Mass. 57, 60-61 (1998) (no Bruton violation where, at joint trial, statements of nontesti-fying codefendants did not expressly implicate any particular defendant); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 292, 294-295, 298 (1999) (no Bruton violation where victim was stabbed by several men and nontestifying codefendant’s statement declared, “We stabbed” victim).

2013Cf. Commonwealth v. James, supra at 781-784 (no Bruton violation where statement explicitly placed codefendants together on night of murder in what proved to be “demonstrably false alibi”).

2012The defendant acknowledges that the United States Supreme Court has limited the application of the Bruton rule to only those cases where the codefendant’s statement “ ‘expressly implicate^]’ the defendant, leaving no doubt that it would prove to be ‘powerfully incriminating,’ ” Commonwealth v. James, 424 Mass. 770, 782 (1997), quoting from Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208 (1987), or where, despite any redaction of, or substitution for, a defendant’s name, a codefendant’s confession “point[s] directly” or “obviously refer[s] directly” to the defendant.

2006The defendant and Lomberto were not tried jointly, see Commonwealth v. Adams, 416 Mass. 55, 57-58 (1993) (Bruton rule applies only at joint trial), and the defendant’s testimony about Lomberto’s admission did not explicitly implicate the defendant.

2002See Commonwealth v. Adams, 416 Mass. 55, 58 (1993), quoting Commonwealth v. Sinnott, 399 Mass. 863, 872 (1987) (test whether Bruton error is harmless is whether any “ ‘spillover’ resulting from imperfect interlock [of the statements] was without effect on the jury and did not contribute to the verdict”).

1997See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bongarzone, 390 Mass. 326, 345 (1983) (Bruton rule violated with admission of statement about two professional drug dealers who trafficked in major supplies of marihuana and threatened bodily harm to others, where it was clear that two dealers referred to defendants).

1991See also Commonwealth v. Bongarzone, 390 Mass. at 342 ; Commonwealth v. Keevan, 400 Mass. at 570 .

1993See Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 660 (1982). 6 Adams does not contest the judge’s denial of this motion. 7 As with the Bruton error, this conclusion has no bearing on Adams’ conviction of unlawfully carrying a firearm.

1993See Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 660 (1982). 6 Adams does not contest the judge’s denial of this motion. 7 As with the Bruton error, this conclusion has no bearing on Adams’ conviction of unlawfully carrying a firearm.

2010If, on the other hand, the 2002 date defined finality for the direct review process, Foxworth’s habeas petition should be granted because the Supreme Court’s decision in Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998), would then apply, and the Appeals Court’s decision on the claimed Bruton violation represented an unreasonable application of Gray.

2009The question whether the use of a symbol or neutral pronoun would violate the Bruton rule was resolved in Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998) (Gray).

2017See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 464 Mass. 56, 69-70 , cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2828 (2013), and cases cited; Commonwealth v. Pontes. 402 Mass. 311, 314-315 (1988).

2017See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 464 Mass. 56, 69-70 , cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2828 (2013), and cases cited; Commonwealth v. Pontes. 402 Mass. 311, 314-315 (1988).

2017See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 464 Mass. 56, 69 , cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2828 (2013) (“[o]ur considerations of the Bruton rule mirror the Federal standard”).

2017See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 464 Mass. 56, 69 , cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2828 (2013) (“[o]ur considerations of the Bruton rule mirror the Federal standard”).

2017See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 464 Mass. 56, 69 , cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2828 (2013) (“[o]ur considerations of the Bruton rule mirror the Federal standard”).

2017See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 464 Mass. 56, 69 , cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2828 (2013) (“[o]ur considerations of the Bruton rule mirror the Federal standard”).

2013See Commonwealth v. James, 424 Mass. 770, 782 (1997). “ ‘Where a nontestifying codefendant’s statement “expressly implicate[s]” the defendant, leaving no doubt that it would prove to be “powerfully incriminating,” the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment . . . has been offended,’ notwithstanding any limiting instruction by the judge that the jury may consider the statement only against the codefendant.” Commonwealth v. McAfee, 430 Mass. 483, 488 (1999), quoting Commonwealth v. Blake, 428 Mass. 57, 60 (1998).

2012See Commonwealth v. Blake, 428 Mass. 57, 60-61 (1998) (no Bruton violation where, at joint trial, statements of nontesti-fying codefendants did not expressly implicate any particular defendant); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 292, 294-295, 298 (1999) (no Bruton violation where victim was stabbed by several men and nontestifying codefendant’s statement declared, “We stabbed” victim).

2004See Commonwealth v. Hicks, 377 Mass. 1, 4-5 (1979). 2.

1985Commonwealth v. Hicks, 377 Mass. 1, 5 (1977), and cases cited.

1997See Commonwealth v. Corradino, 368 Mass. 411, 419 (1975).

1997See Commonwealth v. Corradino, 368 Mass. 411, 419 (1975).

1976In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80, 87 (1970), the Supreme Court affirmed that the Bruton rule did not preclude the admission of such statements as exceptions to the hearsay rule.

1976In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80, 87 (1970), the Supreme Court affirmed that the Bruton rule did not preclude the admission of such statements as exceptions to the hearsay rule.

2000See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126-128, 135-137 (1968); Commonwealth v. Keevan, 400 Mass. 557, 569 (1987) (claimed Bruton error addressed in context of separate trials of codefendants); Commonwealth v. Pope, supra at 280 n.7.

1991See also Commonwealth v. Bongarzone, 390 Mass. at 342 ; Commonwealth v. Keevan, 400 Mass. at 570 .

1993The test whether a Bruton error is harmless “is stringent, requiring reversal unless any ‘spillover’ resulting from imperfect interlock [of the confessions] ‘was without effect on the jury and did not contribute to the verdict.’ ” Commonwealth v. Sinnott, 399 Mass. 863, 872 (1987), quoting Commonwealth v. Marini, 375 Mass. 510, 521 (1978).

1987As we observed in Commonwealth v. Marini, supra, the Supreme Court has varied its approach regarding this issue.” Commonwealth v. Hanger, 377 Mass. 503, 510-511 (1979).

1983See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972); Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 364 Mass. 1, 10 (1973).

1983See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972); Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 364 Mass. 1, 10 (1973).

2013See Commonwealth v. James, 424 Mass. 770, 782 (1997). “ ‘Where a nontestifying codefendant’s statement “expressly implicate[s]” the defendant, leaving no doubt that it would prove to be “powerfully incriminating,” the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment . . . has been offended,’ notwithstanding any limiting instruction by the judge that the jury may consider the statement only against the codefendant.” Commonwealth v. McAfee, 430 Mass. 483, 488 (1999), quoting Commonwealth v. Blake, 428 Mass. 57, 60 (1998).

2013See Commonwealth v. James, 424 Mass. 770, 782 (1997). “ ‘Where a nontestifying codefendant’s statement “expressly implicate[s]” the defendant, leaving no doubt that it would prove to be “powerfully incriminating,” the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment . . . has been offended,’ notwithstanding any limiting instruction by the judge that the jury may consider the statement only against the codefendant.” Commonwealth v. McAfee, 430 Mass. 483, 488 (1999), quoting Commonwealth v. Blake, 428 Mass. 57, 60 (1998).

2012The SJC in Guzman identified Bruton-based reversals as ones which while “ ‘consistent’ with innocence [are] without any tendency to establish it.” Id. at 358 (emphasis in the original) and at 358 n.6.

2012The SJC in Guzman identified Bruton-based reversals as ones which while “ ‘consistent’ with innocence [are] without any tendency to establish it.” Id. at 358 (emphasis in the original) and at 358 n.6.

2010Foxworth, 570 F.3d at 423 .

2010Foxworth, 570 F.3d at 423 .

2009Other courts have similarly determined that there was a Bruton error in the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s accusation of a “friend.” See, e.g., United States v. Richards, supra at 340-341; United States v. Petit, 841 F.2d 1546 , 1556 n.15 (11th Cir. 1988); People v. Fletcher, 13 Cal. 4th 451, 458, 468-471 (1986); People v. Hernandez, 121 Ill. 2d 293, 309-318 (1988).

2009Other courts have similarly determined that there was a Bruton error in the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s accusation of a “friend.” See, e.g., United States v. Richards, supra at 340-341; United States v. Petit, 841 F.2d 1546 , 1556 n.15 (11th Cir. 1988); People v. Fletcher, 13 Cal. 4th 451, 458, 468-471 (1986); People v. Hernandez, 121 Ill. 2d 293, 309-318 (1988).

2009Other courts have similarly determined that there was a Bruton error in the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s accusation of a “friend.” See, e.g., United States v. Richards, supra at 340-341; United States v. Petit, 841 F.2d 1546 , 1556 n.15 (11th Cir. 1988); People v. Fletcher, 13 Cal. 4th 451, 458, 468-471 (1986); People v. Hernandez, 121 Ill. 2d 293, 309-318 (1988).

2009Other courts have similarly determined that there was a Bruton error in the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s accusation of a “friend.” See, e.g., United States v. Richards, supra at 340-341; United States v. Petit, 841 F.2d 1546 , 1556 n.15 (11th Cir. 1988); People v. Fletcher, 13 Cal. 4th 451, 458, 468-471 (1986); People v. Hernandez, 121 Ill. 2d 293, 309-318 (1988).

2009See Commonwealth v. Cook, 380 Mass. 314, 322 (1980).

2009See Commonwealth v. Cook, 380 Mass. 314, 322 (1980).

2007See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 443 Mass. 122, 135 (2004); Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 131 (2006).

2007See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 443 Mass. 122, 135 (2004); Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 131 (2006).

2007See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 443 Mass. 122, 135 (2004); Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 131 (2006).

2007See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 443 Mass. 122, 135 (2004); Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 131 (2006).