Bruton rule in Illinois

1985In People v. Rosochacki (1969), 41 Ill. 2d 483 , 244 N.E.2d 136 , however, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the Bruton rule is not violated when the defendant claiming the benefits of the rule has made a similar inculpatory statement which is admitted into evidence.

1985In People v. Rosochacki (1969), 41 Ill. 2d 483 , 244 N.E.2d 136 , however, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the Bruton rule is not violated when the defendant claiming the benefits of the rule has made a similar inculpatory statement which is admitted into evidence.

1993Some years later, an exception to the Bruton rule was set forth by a divided Supreme Court in the plurality decision authored by Justice Rehnquist, Parker v. Randolph (1979), 442 U.S. 62 , 60 L.

1993Some years later, an exception to the Bruton rule was set forth by a divided Supreme Court in the plurality decision authored by Justice Rehnquist, Parker v. Randolph (1979), 442 U.S. 62 , 60 L.

1985Even before Parker, Illinois courts recognized that there is no Bruton violation where the complaining defendant himself has made “similar inculpatory admissions.” (People v. Bassett (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 285, 295 , 307 N.E.2d 359, 365 .) This has remained true after Parker as well.

1985Even before Parker, Illinois courts recognized that there is no Bruton violation where the complaining defendant himself has made “similar inculpatory admissions.” (People v. Bassett (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 285, 295 , 307 N.E.2d 359, 365 .) This has remained true after Parker as well.

2012In the appeal of the codefendant, Parker, we stated that the erroneous admission of the evidence “necessarily affects substantial rights and satisfies the second prong of the plain-error analysis” (id. at 319), but we also cited Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), for the proposition that a Bruton error can be harmless.1 Fillyaw, 409 Ill.

2011Cf. People v. Lucas, 48 Ill. 2d 158, 163 (1971) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)) (applying a harmless-error analysis and finding, in light of the totality of the evidence, that a Bruton violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

1988Ed. 2d at 186 , 107 S. Ct. at 1707 .) The Richardson majority felt that, even though inferences may be created by extrinsic evidence that links the defendant with the confession, “[w]here the necessity of such linkage is involved, it is a less valid generalization that the jury will not likely obey the instruction” and, “while it may not always be simple for the members of a jury to obey the instruction that they disregard an incriminating inference, there does not exist the overwhelming probability of their inability to do so that is the foundation of Bruton’s exception to the general rule.”

1988Ed. 2d at 186 , 107 S. Ct. at 1707 .) The Richardson majority felt that, even though inferences may be created by extrinsic evidence that links the defendant with the confession, “[w]here the necessity of such linkage is involved, it is a less valid generalization that the jury will not likely obey the instruction” and, “while it may not always be simple for the members of a jury to obey the instruction that they disregard an incriminating inference, there does not exist the overwhelming probability of their inability to do so that is the foundation of Bruton’s exception to the general rule.”

1983App. 3d 855, 857-58 . 9 Columbo advised the court that she was arguing that the defendants’ individual defenses were antagonistic only as to the murder charge and not as to the solicitation and conspiracy charges. 10 See section II of this opinion for a more detailed discussion of Hubert Green’s testimony. 11 See section II of this opinion for a more detailed discussion of Childs’ testimony. 12 We further note that in a later decision, People v. Davis (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 554 , 264 N.E.2d 140 , the Illinois Supreme Court held that the Bruton rule does not apply to statements of codefendants whic

1983App. 3d 855, 857-58 . 9 Columbo advised the court that she was arguing that the defendants’ individual defenses were antagonistic only as to the murder charge and not as to the solicitation and conspiracy charges. 10 See section II of this opinion for a more detailed discussion of Hubert Green’s testimony. 11 See section II of this opinion for a more detailed discussion of Childs’ testimony. 12 We further note that in a later decision, People v. Davis (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 554 , 264 N.E.2d 140 , the Illinois Supreme Court held that the Bruton rule does not apply to statements of codefendants whic

1977Ed. 2d 1100 , 88 S. Ct. 1921 (1968)), Illinois law holds that no violation of the Bruton rule occurs when the defendant claiming the benefit of the rule has himself made a similar inculpatory admission which is admitted into evidence.

1977Ed. 2d 1100 , 88 S. Ct. 1921 (1968)), Illinois law holds that no violation of the Bruton rule occurs when the defendant claiming the benefit of the rule has himself made a similar inculpatory admission which is admitted into evidence.

2004Although the specific question of whether a tattoo that contains a “statement” can trigger a Bruton violation has not beén addressed by this court, this court’s holding in People v. Davenport, 301 Ill.

2004Although the specific question of whether a tattoo that contains a “statement” can trigger a Bruton violation has not beén addressed by this court, this court’s holding in People v. Davenport, 301 Ill.

2000The court held that no Bruton violation occurred because no part of the codefendant’s statement was revealed. 224 Ill.

2000The court held that no Bruton violation occurred because no part of the codefendant's statement was revealed. 224 Ill.

1993In Hudson, an informant who hád participated in the crime testified that, after he had turned State’s evidence, the codefendant tried jointly with the defendant had called him a “stool pigeon.” (Hudson, 46 Ill. 2d at 196 .) The informant also testified that a jailor holding the defendant and the codefendant had told him that “the boys they got back there are mad at you.” (Hudson, 46 Ill. 2d at 196 .) The supreme court held that the testimony did not violate the Bruton rule because it did not “readily lead to the conclusion” that the defendant was guilty.

1993In Hudson, an informant who hád participated in the crime testified that, after he had turned State’s evidence, the codefendant tried jointly with the defendant had called him a “stool pigeon.” (Hudson, 46 Ill. 2d at 196 .) The informant also testified that a jailor holding the defendant and the codefendant had told him that “the boys they got back there are mad at you.” (Hudson, 46 Ill. 2d at 196 .) The supreme court held that the testimony did not violate the Bruton rule because it did not “readily lead to the conclusion” that the defendant was guilty.

1989The Supreme Court has since rejected Parker, however, in Cruz v. New York (1987), 481 U.S. 186 , 95 L.

1989Subsequently, in Cruz v. New York (1987), 481 U.S. 186 , 95 L.

1989The Supreme Court has since rejected Parker, however, in Cruz v. New York (1987), 481 U.S. 186 , 95 L.

1989Subsequently, in Cruz v. New York (1987), 481 U.S. 186 , 95 L.

1988App. 3d 132, 136-37 , 371 N.E.2d 926 , argues that a violation of rights under the Bruton rule was not designed for and has not ever been applied to a bench trial as was the proceeding in the present matter.

1988App. 3d 132, 136-37 , 371 N.E.2d 926 , argues that a violation of rights under the Bruton rule was not designed for and has not ever been applied to a bench trial as was the proceeding in the present matter.

1988Brown v. United States (1973), 411 U.S. 223 , 36 L.

1988Brown v. United States (1973), 411 U.S. 223 , 36 L.

1981(People v. Rosochacki (1969), 41 Ill. 2d 483 , 244 N.E.2d 136 ; People v. Marine (1977), 48 Ill.

1981(People v. Rosochacki (1969), 41 Ill. 2d 483 , 244 N.E.2d 136 ; People v. Marine (1977), 48 Ill.

2012In the appeal of the codefendant, Parker, we stated that the erroneous admission of the evidence “necessarily affects substantial rights and satisfies the second prong of the plain-error analysis” (id. at 319), but we also cited Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), for the proposition that a Bruton error can be harmless.1 Fillyaw, 409 Ill.

1993Further, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Schmitt, rejected the appellate court’s application of the Bruton analysis to bench trials: “Unlike the court in Bruton, we are not concerned here with the efficacy of jury instructions in eliminating the prejudice to a defendant that arises from the use at a joint trial of a non-testifying codefendant’s inculpatory statement ***.” (Schmitt, 131 Ill. 2d at 138 .) Clearly, defendant’s reliance on Bruton as being applicable to bench trials is misguided since it is clear that in Illinois, the Bruton analysis is inapplicable where the trier of fact is a judg

1993Further, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Schmitt, rejected the appellate court’s application of the Bruton analysis to bench trials: “Unlike the court in Bruton, we are not concerned here with the efficacy of jury instructions in eliminating the prejudice to a defendant that arises from the use at a joint trial of a non-testifying codefendant’s inculpatory statement ***.” (Schmitt, 131 Ill. 2d at 138 .) Clearly, defendant’s reliance on Bruton as being applicable to bench trials is misguided since it is clear that in Illinois, the Bruton analysis is inapplicable where the trier of fact is a judg

1993Defendant’s reliance on Lee v. Illinois (1986), 476 U.S. 530 , 90 L.

1993Defendant’s reliance on Lee v. Illinois (1986), 476 U.S. 530 , 90 L.