Bruton rule in California

2023First, the Aranda/Bruton rule is not applicable here as it addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant. “ ‘Aranda and Bruton stand 39. for the proposition that a “nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant's right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is given.” [Citation].’ [Citation.] Th

2023First, the Aranda/Bruton rule is not applicable here as it addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant. “ ‘Aranda and Bruton stand 39. for the proposition that a “nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant's right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is given.” [Citation].’ [Citation.] Th

2025Madrigal objected to the admission of this evidence below on the same ground. 54 “Broadly stated, the Aranda/Bruton rule declares that a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses when a facially incriminating statement of a nontestifying co-defendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider the statement only against the declarant.” (Gallardo, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 68 ; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 ; Bruton v. U.S. (1968) 391 U.S. 123 .)13 The rule does not extend to a codefendant’s statement that does n

2024(See People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 ; Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 ; see also 18 People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 868-869 [“‘“Aranda and Bruton stand for the proposition that a ‘nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant’s right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is given.’”’”] However, in Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200 (Richardson), the United States Supreme Court limited the

2026B Legal Standards “The Aranda/Bruton rule addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant. ‘ “Aranda and Bruton stand for the proposition that a ‘nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant’s right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is given.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th

2024(See People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 ; Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 ; see also 18 People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 868-869 [“‘“Aranda and Bruton stand for the proposition that a ‘nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant’s right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is given.’”’”] However, in Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200 (Richardson), the United States Supreme Court limited the

2026(See People v. Song (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 973, 982 .) “Broadly stated, the Aranda/Bruton rule declares that a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses when a facially incriminating statement of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider the statement only against the declarant.” (People v. Gallardo (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 51, 68 .) However, following Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 , the Aranda/Bruton doctrine only applies to testimonial statements.

2026(See People v. Song (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 973, 982 .) “Broadly stated, the Aranda/Bruton rule declares that a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses when a facially incriminating statement of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider the statement only against the declarant.” (People v. Gallardo (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 51, 68 .) However, following Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 , the Aranda/Bruton doctrine only applies to testimonial statements.

2025Madrigal objected to the admission of this evidence below on the same ground. 54 “Broadly stated, the Aranda/Bruton rule declares that a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses when a facially incriminating statement of a nontestifying co-defendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider the statement only against the declarant.” (Gallardo, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 68 ; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 ; Bruton v. U.S. (1968) 391 U.S. 123 .)13 The rule does not extend to a codefendant’s statement that does n

2024(See People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 ; Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 ; see also 18 People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 868-869 [“‘“Aranda and Bruton stand for the proposition that a ‘nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant’s right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is given.’”’”] However, in Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200 (Richardson), the United States Supreme Court limited the

2026“Broadly stated, the Aranda/Bruton rule declares that a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses when a facially incriminating statement of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider the statement only against the declarant. [Citation.]” (People v. Gallardo (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 51, 68 .) “[T]he problem addressed in Bruton and Aranda may be solved by the use of separate juries for codefendants, with each jury to be excused at appropriate times to avoid exposure to inadmissible evidence.” (Peo

2025In Washington, supra, we rejected a similar argument that due process provided an alternative ground for challenging admission of nontestimonial statements by a codefendant, declining to “breathe life back into the Aranda/Bruton doctrine when the 23 codefendant’s confession is nontestimonial.” ( 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 30 .) Among other reasons for so concluding, we found no basis for construing the broader guarantees of due process to prohibit what the more specific constitutional guarantee of confrontation permits.

2013The Aranda/Bruton rule “declares that a nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant’s right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is given.” (People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1120 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306 ].) As defendant acknowledged in his motion, as an alternative to severance, Ricardo’s statement to police would be admissible against Ricardo if it was redacted to omit any portion that incriminated d

2013The Aranda/Bruton rule “declares that a nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant’s right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is given.” (People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1120 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306 ].) As defendant acknowledged in his motion, as an alternative to severance, Ricardo’s statement to police would be admissible against Ricardo if it was redacted to omit any portion that incriminated d

2024(See People v. Sweeney (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 210, 221 ; see also People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 850 .) “‘“‘Confrontation clause violations are subject to federal harmless-error analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [Chapman].’ [Citation.] We ask whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have reached the same verdict absent the error.’”’” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 395 ; see People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 421, 438 [“[W]e evaluate federal constitutional error for harmlessness under the Chapman beyo

2016Bruton error is reviewed under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 .

2026(See People v. Song (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 973, 982 .) “Broadly stated, the Aranda/Bruton rule declares that a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses when a facially incriminating statement of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider the statement only against the declarant.” (People v. Gallardo (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 51, 68 .) However, following Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 , the Aranda/Bruton doctrine only applies to testimonial statements.

2026(See People v. Song (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 973, 982 .) “Broadly stated, the Aranda/Bruton rule declares that a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses when a facially incriminating statement of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider the statement only against the declarant.” (People v. Gallardo (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 51, 68 .) However, following Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 , the Aranda/Bruton doctrine only applies to testimonial statements.

2018(Bruton, supra, 391 U.S. at p. 137 .) However, because it is premised on the confrontation clause, “ ‘the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to non-testimonial statements.’ ” (People v. Arceo, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 571 , quoting U.S. v. Johnson (6th Cir. 2009) 581 F.3d 320, 326 .) Bruton is “ ‘simply irrelevant in the context of nontestimonial statements’ made ‘to a cellmate in an informal setting.’ ” (U.S. v. Vasquez (5th Cir. 2014) 766 F.3d 373, 378 , quoting U.S. v. Dargan (4th Cir. 2013) 738 F.3d 643, 650-651 .) “Bruton is no longer applicable to a non

2018(Bruton, supra, 391 U.S. at p. 137 .) However, because it is premised on the confrontation clause, “ ‘the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to non-testimonial statements.’ ” (People v. Arceo, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 571 , quoting U.S. v. Johnson (6th Cir. 2009) 581 F.3d 320, 326 .) Bruton is “ ‘simply irrelevant in the context of nontestimonial statements’ made ‘to a cellmate in an informal setting.’ ” (U.S. v. Vasquez (5th Cir. 2014) 766 F.3d 373, 378 , quoting U.S. v. Dargan (4th Cir. 2013) 738 F.3d 643, 650-651 .) “Bruton is no longer applicable to a non

2022“The Aranda/Bruton rule addresses the situation in which ‘an out-of- court confession of one defendant . . . incriminates not only that defendant but another defendant jointly charged.’ ” (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 537 (Brown), quoting People v. Fletcher, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 455 .) “ ‘The United States Supreme Court has held that, because jurors cannot be expected to ignore one defendant’s confession that is “powerfully incriminating” as to a second defendant when determining the latter’s guilt[, even when instructed to do so], admission of such a confession at a joint trial g

2021(See People v. Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 537 , italics omitted [“The Aranda/Bruton rule addresses the situation in which ‘an out-of court confession of one defendant … incriminates not only that defendant but another defendant jointly charged [and tried].’”].) As we interpret Morfin’s appellate argument, he mentions these issues to show they were raised below and, therefore, his Sixth Amendment claim should not be deemed forfeited.

2007Clark's redacted statement contained no evidence against defendant. ( Crawford, supra, 541 U. S. at pp. 39-40, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354 .) Thus, it cannot implicate the confrontation clause. ( Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200, 211 , 107 S.Ct. 1702 , 95 L.Ed.2d 176 ; People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1046-1047 , 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 230 , 824 P.2d 1277 .) The same redaction that "prevents Bruton error also serves to prevent Crawford error." ( United States v. Chen (2d Cir.2004) 393 F.3d 139, 150 .) Defendant further asserts that because Clark's redacted statement was admitted, Clark testified

2007Clark's redacted statement contained no evidence against defendant. ( Crawford, supra, 541 U. S. at pp. 39-40, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354 .) Thus, it cannot implicate the confrontation clause. ( Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200, 211 , 107 S.Ct. 1702 , 95 L.Ed.2d 176 ; People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1046-1047 , 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 230 , 824 P.2d 1277 .) The same redaction that "prevents Bruton error also serves to prevent Crawford error." ( United States v. Chen (2d Cir.2004) 393 F.3d 139, 150 .) Defendant further asserts that because Clark's redacted statement was admitted, Clark testified

2025(Crawford, at p. 68; see also Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813, 824 [ 126 S.Ct. 2266 ]; Whorton v. Bockting (2007) 549 U.S. 406, 420 [ 127 S.Ct. 1173 ].) A statement is “testimonial” under this standard if it was “ ‘made with some degree of formality or solemnity,’ ” and “the primary purpose of the statement must ‘pertain[] in some fashion to a criminal prosecution.’ ” (People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 603 .) Crawford and subsequent United States Supreme Court authority thereby limited the right of confrontation described by the Aranda/Bruton doctrine to cover only “testimonial” st

2025(Crawford, at p. 68; see also Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813, 824 [ 126 S.Ct. 2266 ]; Whorton v. Bockting (2007) 549 U.S. 406, 420 [ 127 S.Ct. 1173 ].) A statement is “testimonial” under this standard if it was “ ‘made with some degree of formality or solemnity,’ ” and “the primary purpose of the statement must ‘pertain[] in some fashion to a criminal prosecution.’ ” (People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 603 .) Crawford and subsequent United States Supreme Court authority thereby limited the right of confrontation described by the Aranda/Bruton doctrine to cover only “testimonial” st

2022(People v. Almeda (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 346, 362 (Almeda); People v. Washington (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 19, 29 (Washington); People v. Arceo (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 556, 575 .) In order to be testimonial, a statement “must have been given and taken primarily for the purpose ascribed to testimony—to establish or prove some past fact for possible use in a criminal trial.” (People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 984 .) The Aranda/Bruton doctrine does not apply to Grace’s comments implicating Washington and Hughes.

2018(Bruton, supra, 391 U.S. at p. 137 .) However, because it is premised on the confrontation clause, “ ‘the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to non-testimonial statements.’ ” (People v. Arceo, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 571 , quoting U.S. v. Johnson (6th Cir. 2009) 581 F.3d 320, 326 .) Bruton is “ ‘simply irrelevant in the context of nontestimonial statements’ made ‘to a cellmate in an informal setting.’ ” (U.S. v. Vasquez (5th Cir. 2014) 766 F.3d 373, 378 , quoting U.S. v. Dargan (4th Cir. 2013) 738 F.3d 643, 650-651 .) “Bruton is no longer applicable to a non

2016(See e.g., United States v. Johnson (6th Cir. 2009) 581 F.3d 320, 326 [“Because it is premised on the Confrontation Clause, the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to nontestimonial statements”]; United States v. Figueroa-Cartagena (1st Cir. 2010) 612 F.3d 69, 85 [because Bruton’s analysis is premised on the presumption that the defendant who is implicated by his codefendant’s out-of-court statement has a Sixth Amendment right to confront an adverse witness, Bruton does not apply if the codefendant’s statement is nontestimonial].) We agree that the Aranda/Bruton r

2016(See e.g., United States v. Johnson (6th Cir. 2009) 581 F.3d 320, 326 [“Because it is premised on the Confrontation Clause, the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to nontestimonial statements”]; United States v. Figueroa-Cartagena (1st Cir. 2010) 612 F.3d 69, 85 [because Bruton’s analysis is premised on the presumption that the defendant who is implicated by his codefendant’s out-of-court statement has a Sixth Amendment right to confront an adverse witness, Bruton does not apply if the codefendant’s statement is nontestimonial].) We agree that the Aranda/Bruton r

2026As explained above, when, despite redaction, a codefendant’s statement obviously refers directly to the defendant and implicates him or her in the charged crimes, the Bruton rule applies and introduction of the statement at a joint trial violates the defendant’s rights under the confrontation clause.” ( Burney, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 231-232.) We hold that Valeria’s confession did not violate Gerson’s and Luis’s right of confrontation.

2026As explained above, when, despite redaction, a codefendant’s statement obviously refers directly to the defendant and implicates him or her in the charged crimes, the Bruton rule applies and introduction of the statement at a joint trial violates the defendant’s rights under the confrontation clause.” ( Burney, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 231-232.) We hold that Valeria’s confession did not violate Gerson’s and Luis’s right of confrontation.

2024(See People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 ; Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 ; see also 18 People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 868-869 [“‘“Aranda and Bruton stand for the proposition that a ‘nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant’s right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is given.’”’”] However, in Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200 (Richardson), the United States Supreme Court limited the

2024(See People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 ; Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 ; see also 18 People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 868-869 [“‘“Aranda and Bruton stand for the proposition that a ‘nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant’s right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is given.’”’”] However, in Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200 (Richardson), the United States Supreme Court limited the

2024(Almeda, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 362 .) “Broadly stated, the Aranda/Bruton rule declares that a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses when a facially incriminating statement of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury 33 is instructed to consider the statement only against the declarant.” (Gallardo, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 68 .) Our state Supreme court has recognized that, “because the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay statements, the Aranda/Bruton doctrine’s Sixth Amendment protect

2024(Almeda, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 362 .) “Broadly stated, the Aranda/Bruton rule declares that a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses when a facially incriminating statement of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury 33 is instructed to consider the statement only against the declarant.” (Gallardo, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 68 .) Our state Supreme court has recognized that, “because the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay statements, the Aranda/Bruton doctrine’s Sixth Amendment protect

2017Drawing such a distinction, defendant reasons, is "illogical." *29 This argument is not without persuasive force, but ultimately lacks merit because the Aranda / Bruton doctrine is grounded exclusively in the confrontation clause and can extend no farther than the metes and bounds of the clause defined by the United States Supreme Court. ( U.S. v. Berrios (3d Cir. 2012) 676 F.3d 118 , 128 [" Bruton is no more than a by-product of the Confrontation Clause"]; U.S. v. Johnson (6th Cir. 2009) 581 F.3d 320 , 326 [noting that "the Bruton rule" "is premised on the Confrontation Clause"].) This is the

2017Drawing such a distinction, defendant reasons, is "illogical." *29 This argument is not without persuasive force, but ultimately lacks merit because the Aranda / Bruton doctrine is grounded exclusively in the confrontation clause and can extend no farther than the metes and bounds of the clause defined by the United States Supreme Court. ( U.S. v. Berrios (3d Cir. 2012) 676 F.3d 118 , 128 [" Bruton is no more than a by-product of the Confrontation Clause"]; U.S. v. Johnson (6th Cir. 2009) 581 F.3d 320 , 326 [noting that "the Bruton rule" "is premised on the Confrontation Clause"].) This is the

2020The Attorney General suggests we have held otherwise in People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182 and Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th 415 , where we reasoned that “[t]he same redaction that ‘prevents Bruton error also serves to prevent Crawford error.’ ” (Stevens, at p. 199; accord, Lewis, at p. 506.) But as with Bruton and Richardson, Stevens and Lewis have no application here: Both concerned the admission of a codefendant’s statement at a joint trial before a single jury.

2016(People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 452 .) However, the trial court may “order separate trials if, among other reasons, there is an incriminating confession by one defendant that implicates a codefendant, or if the defendants will present conflicting defenses. [Citations.] Additionally, severance may be called for when ‘there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) The exception respecting incriminating statements of a codefenda

2024(Almeda, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 362 .) “Broadly stated, the Aranda/Bruton rule declares that a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses when a facially incriminating statement of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury 33 is instructed to consider the statement only against the declarant.” (Gallardo, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 68 .) Our state Supreme court has recognized that, “because the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay statements, the Aranda/Bruton doctrine’s Sixth Amendment protect

2024(Almeda, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 362 .) “Broadly stated, the Aranda/Bruton rule declares that a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses when a facially incriminating statement of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury 33 is instructed to consider the statement only against the declarant.” (Gallardo, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 68 .) Our state Supreme court has recognized that, “because the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay statements, the Aranda/Bruton doctrine’s Sixth Amendment protect

2025(Ibid.) “[C]ertain obviously redacted confessions might be ‘directly accusatory,’ and thus fall within Bruton’s rule, even if they did not specifically use a defendant’s name” (Samia, at p. 647), for example, “the ‘red- haired, bearded, one-eyed man-with-a-limp.’ ” (Gray v. Maryland (1998) 523 U.S. 185, 195 .) Immediately before the prosecutor played the recordings of Garcia’s interview with detectives, the trial court gave the following limiting instruction to the jury: “Lastly, the jury is instructed that Mr. Garcia’s statement made to the police are [sic] admissible only against Mr. Garcia

2020(Gray v. Maryland (1998) 523 U.S. 185, 192, 197 .) Gray held when, despite redaction, the statement “involve[s] inferences that a jury ordinarily could make immediately, even were the confession the very first item introduced at trial,” the Bruton rule has not been satisfied.

2015(Arceo, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 571 [Bruton rule, like Confrontation Clause, does not apply to nontestimonial statements]; Cervantes, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 176–177 [same]; Greenberger, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 332 [same].) B.

2015(Arceo, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 571 [Bruton rule, like Confrontation Clause, does not apply to nontestimonial statements]; Cervantes, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 176–177 [same]; Greenberger, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 332 [same].) B.

2022“Bruton and Aranda . . . predate Crawford, which narrowed the scope of the right to confrontation to testimonial statements.” (Gallardo, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 68 .) “[B]ecause it is premised on the confrontation clause, ‘ “the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to non-testimonial statements.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Almeda (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 346, 362 .) Here, with respect to the jail call, “[t]here was nothing formalized about [Avendano] and [Lizeth]’s meandering and profane conversation.” (People v. Jefferson (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 830, 843 .) Further

2022“Bruton and Aranda . . . predate Crawford, which narrowed the scope of the right to confrontation to testimonial statements.” (Gallardo, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 68 .) “[B]ecause it is premised on the confrontation clause, ‘ “the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to non-testimonial statements.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Almeda (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 346, 362 .) Here, with respect to the jail call, “[t]here was nothing formalized about [Avendano] and [Lizeth]’s meandering and profane conversation.” (People v. Jefferson (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 830, 843 .) Further

2024As we have observed, ‘“Aranda and Bruton stand for the proposition that a ‘nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial self- incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant’s right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is given.’”’” (People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830 , 869 overruled on other grounds in People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104 .) However, as Redman is forced to concede, the Aranda/Bruton rule provides only “‘a narrow exception to the general rule tha

2023First, the Aranda/Bruton rule is not applicable here as it addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant. “ ‘Aranda and Bruton stand 39. for the proposition that a “nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant's right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is given.” [Citation].’ [Citation.] Th

2026B Legal Standards “The Aranda/Bruton rule addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontestifying defendant that incriminates a codefendant. ‘ “Aranda and Bruton stand for the proposition that a ‘nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant’s right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is given.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th

2022“Bruton and Aranda . . . predate Crawford, which narrowed the scope of the right to confrontation to testimonial statements.” (Gallardo, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 68 .) “[B]ecause it is premised on the confrontation clause, ‘ “the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to non-testimonial statements.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Almeda (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 346, 362 .) Here, with respect to the jail call, “[t]here was nothing formalized about [Avendano] and [Lizeth]’s meandering and profane conversation.” (People v. Jefferson (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 830, 843 .) Further

2016Delamora’s Confrontation Rights Under Aranda/Bruton “The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’ The right of confrontation includes the right of cross- examination.” (People v. Fletcher, supra, 13 Cal.4th 451, 455 .) “The Aranda/Bruton rule addresses a specific issue that arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a n

2015(Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 ; People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 652 .) “[B]ut Bruton recognized only a ‘narrow exception’ to the general rule that juries are presumed to follow limiting instructions [citation], and defendant[s] offer[] no rationale for extending the Bruton exception to this case.” (Ervine, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 776 .) Ultimately, “Out-of-court statements that are not offered for their truth are not hearsay under California law (Evid.

2020The Attorney General suggests we have held otherwise in People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182 and Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th 415 , where we reasoned that “[t]he same redaction that ‘prevents Bruton error also serves to prevent Crawford error.’ ” (Stevens, at p. 199; accord, Lewis, at p. 506.) But as with Bruton and Richardson, Stevens and Lewis have no application here: Both concerned the admission of a codefendant’s statement at a joint trial before a single jury.

2017We need not decide this question, however, since “Crawford addressed the introduction of testimonial hearsay statements against a defendant. [Gran’s] redacted statement contained no evidence against defendant. [Citation.] Thus, it cannot implicate the confrontation clause. [Citations.] The same redaction that ‘prevents Bruton error also serves to prevent Crawford error.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 199 ; see U.S. v. Lung Fong Chen, supra, 393 F.3d at p. 150 .) Defendant disputes this conclusion.

2018(Bruton, supra, 391 U.S. at p. 137 .) However, because it is premised on the confrontation clause, “ ‘the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to non-testimonial statements.’ ” (People v. Arceo, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 571 , quoting U.S. v. Johnson (6th Cir. 2009) 581 F.3d 320, 326 .) Bruton is “ ‘simply irrelevant in the context of nontestimonial statements’ made ‘to a cellmate in an informal setting.’ ” (U.S. v. Vasquez (5th Cir. 2014) 766 F.3d 373, 378 , quoting U.S. v. Dargan (4th Cir. 2013) 738 F.3d 643, 650-651 .) “Bruton is no longer applicable to a non

2018(Bruton, supra, 391 U.S. at p. 137 .) However, because it is premised on the confrontation clause, “ ‘the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to non-testimonial statements.’ ” (People v. Arceo, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 571 , quoting U.S. v. Johnson (6th Cir. 2009) 581 F.3d 320, 326 .) Bruton is “ ‘simply irrelevant in the context of nontestimonial statements’ made ‘to a cellmate in an informal setting.’ ” (U.S. v. Vasquez (5th Cir. 2014) 766 F.3d 373, 378 , quoting U.S. v. Dargan (4th Cir. 2013) 738 F.3d 643, 650-651 .) “Bruton is no longer applicable to a non