Bruton rule in Louisiana

1993Subsequently, however, in Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 , 99 S.Ct. 2132 , 60 L.Ed.2d 713 (1979), the high court found the Bruton rule inapplicable when the defendant has confessed and his confession interlocks with and corroborates the confession of his co-defendant.

1993Subsequently, however, in Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 , 99 S.Ct. 2132 , 60 L.Ed.2d 713 (1979), the high court found the Bruton rule inapplicable when the defendant has confessed and his confession interlocks with and corroborates the confession of his co-defendant.

2012And although Crawford did not fully define the term “testimonial,” Crawford and its progeny has provided accepted examples of testimonial statements, such as ex parte in-court testimony (e.g., affidavits, custodial examinations, pri- or testimony, pretrial statements), and has generally defined the term as including statements “made under circumstances which would lead an |41 objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52, 124 S.Ct. 1354 .

2007A judge, unlike a jury, by virtue of the judge's training and knowledge of the law is fully capable of disregarding any impropriety." Compare State v. Myers, 584 So.2d 242, 253 (La.App. 5 Cir.1991), writ denied, 588 So.2d 105 (La.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 912 , 112 S.Ct. 1945 , 118 L.Ed.2d 550 (1992), in which this court found that the Bruton rule "does not apply in a bench trial because it is presumed that the judge is capable of applying the rule of limited admissibility and will consider the proffered statement with respect to the confessor's guilt alone." Based on this jurisprudence, a

2007A judge, unlike a jury, by virtue of the judge's training and knowledge of the law is fully capable of disregarding any impropriety." Compare State v. Myers, 584 So.2d 242, 253 (La.App. 5 Cir.1991), writ denied, 588 So.2d 105 (La.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 912 , 112 S.Ct. 1945 , 118 L.Ed.2d 550 (1992), in which this court found that the Bruton rule "does not apply in a bench trial because it is presumed that the judge is capable of applying the rule of limited admissibility and will consider the proffered statement with respect to the confessor's guilt alone." Based on this jurisprudence, a

2007A judge, unlike a jury, by virtue of the judge's training and knowledge of the law is fully capable of disregarding any impropriety." Compare State v. Myers, 584 So.2d 242, 253 (La.App. 5 Cir.1991), writ denied, 588 So.2d 105 (La.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 912 , 112 S.Ct. 1945 , 118 L.Ed.2d 550 (1992), in which this court found that the Bruton rule "does not apply in a bench trial because it is presumed that the judge is capable of applying the rule of limited admissibility and will consider the proffered statement with respect to the confessor's guilt alone." Based on this jurisprudence, a

2007A judge, unlike a jury, by virtue of the judge's training and knowledge of the law is fully capable of disregarding any impropriety." Compare State v. Myers, 584 So.2d 242, 253 (La.App. 5 Cir.1991), writ denied, 588 So.2d 105 (La.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 912 , 112 S.Ct. 1945 , 118 L.Ed.2d 550 (1992), in which this court found that the Bruton rule "does not apply in a bench trial because it is presumed that the judge is capable of applying the rule of limited admissibility and will consider the proffered statement with respect to the confessor's guilt alone." Based on this jurisprudence, a

2007A judge, unlike a jury, by virtue of the judge's training and knowledge of the law is fully capable of disregarding any impropriety." Compare State v. Myers, 584 So.2d 242, 253 (La.App. 5 Cir.1991), writ denied, 588 So.2d 105 (La.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 912 , 112 S.Ct. 1945 , 118 L.Ed.2d 550 (1992), in which this court found that the Bruton rule "does not apply in a bench trial because it is presumed that the judge is capable of applying the rule of limited admissibility and will consider the proffered statement with respect to the confessor's guilt alone." Based on this jurisprudence, a

2007A judge, unlike a jury, by virtue of the judge's training and knowledge of the law is fully capable of disregarding any impropriety." Compare State v. Myers, 584 So.2d 242, 253 (La.App. 5 Cir.1991), writ denied, 588 So.2d 105 (La.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 912 , 112 S.Ct. 1945 , 118 L.Ed.2d 550 (1992), in which this court found that the Bruton rule "does not apply in a bench trial because it is presumed that the judge is capable of applying the rule of limited admissibility and will consider the proffered statement with respect to the confessor's guilt alone." Based on this jurisprudence, a

1996State v. Fleming. 574 So.2d 486 (La.App. 4 Cir.1991), writ denied, 592 So.2d 1313 (La. 1992). [10] Furthermore, the Bruton rule is inapplicable when, as is the case here, the defendant has confessed and her confession interlocks with and corroborates the confession of her co-defendant.

1996State v. Fleming. 574 So.2d 486 (La.App. 4 Cir.1991), writ denied, 592 So.2d 1313 (La. 1992). [10] Furthermore, the Bruton rule is inapplicable when, as is the case here, the defendant has confessed and her confession interlocks with and corroborates the confession of her co-defendant.

1996State v. Fleming. 574 So.2d 486 (La.App. 4 Cir.1991), writ denied, 592 So.2d 1313 (La. 1992). [10] Furthermore, the Bruton rule is inapplicable when, as is the case here, the defendant has confessed and her confession interlocks with and corroborates the confession of her co-defendant.

1996State v. Fleming. 574 So.2d 486 (La.App. 4 Cir.1991), writ denied, 592 So.2d 1313 (La. 1992). [10] Furthermore, the Bruton rule is inapplicable when, as is the case here, the defendant has confessed and her confession interlocks with and corroborates the confession of her co-defendant.

1994App. 2nd Cir.1984), writ denied, 464 So.2d 313 (La.1985), the state further claims that defendant's Bruton claim is not supported because that complaint "is grounded in an improper effort to equate the hearsay testimony of Ms. Gaines regarding [Tyrone] Gaines' [sic] admission ... to the admission of an out-of-court confession by a non-testifying defendant being jointly tried." The state also contends the statement at issue was not the product of police interrogation, and as a statement against Gaines's penal interest, is a clear exception to the hearsay exclusion rule.

1994However, as noted in Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 542-44 , 106 S.Ct. 2056, 2063 , 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986), "spill-over" prejudice is not the only concern raised by the admission of statements by a non-testifying codefendant.

1994However, as noted in Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 542-44 , 106 S.Ct. 2056, 2063 , 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986), "spill-over" prejudice is not the only concern raised by the admission of statements by a non-testifying codefendant.

1991State v. Ruiz, 437 So.2d 330 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1983) writ denied 440 So.2d 763 (La.1983).

1991State v. Ruiz, 437 So.2d 330 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1983) writ denied 440 So.2d 763 (La.1983).

1991State v. Ruiz, 437 So.2d 330 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1983) writ denied 440 So.2d 763 (La.1983).

1991State v. Ruiz, 437 So.2d 330 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1983) writ denied 440 So.2d 763 (La.1983).

1983United States ex rel Faulisi v. Pinkney, 611 F.2d 176 (7th Cir.1979); Cockrell, supra .

1983United States ex rel Faulisi v. Pinkney, 611 F.2d 176 (7th Cir.1979); Cockrell, supra .

1983United States ex rel Faulisi v. Pinkney, 611 F.2d 176 (7th Cir.1979); Cockrell, supra .

1983United States ex rel Faulisi v. Pinkney, 611 F.2d 176 (7th Cir.1979); Cockrell, supra .

1976"The Court said in Bruton at page 135, 88 S.Ct. at page 1627 , "`We agree that there are many circumstances in which this reliance (that the jury will follow instructions) is justified.

1976Menendez v. United States, 393 F.2d 312 (5 Cir. 1968); Barton v. United States, 263 F.2d 894 (5 Cir. 1959); Calloway v. United States, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 273 , 399 F.2d 1006 (1968); Oliver v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 302 , 335 F.2d 724 (1964); Kramer v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 50 , 317 F.2d 114 (1963). "* * * "Failing to bring themselves within the ambit of the Bruton decision, the appellants' Constitutional rights were not infringed by either the admission of Barnette's confession or their joint trial." 416 F.2d at 551 .

1976Menendez v. United States, 393 F.2d 312 (5 Cir. 1968); Barton v. United States, 263 F.2d 894 (5 Cir. 1959); Calloway v. United States, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 273 , 399 F.2d 1006 (1968); Oliver v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 302 , 335 F.2d 724 (1964); Kramer v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 50 , 317 F.2d 114 (1963). "* * * "Failing to bring themselves within the ambit of the Bruton decision, the appellants' Constitutional rights were not infringed by either the admission of Barnette's confession or their joint trial." 416 F.2d at 551 .

1976Menendez v. United States, 393 F.2d 312 (5 Cir. 1968); Barton v. United States, 263 F.2d 894 (5 Cir. 1959); Calloway v. United States, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 273 , 399 F.2d 1006 (1968); Oliver v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 302 , 335 F.2d 724 (1964); Kramer v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 50 , 317 F.2d 114 (1963). "* * * "Failing to bring themselves within the ambit of the Bruton decision, the appellants' Constitutional rights were not infringed by either the admission of Barnette's confession or their joint trial." 416 F.2d at 551 .

1976Menendez v. United States, 393 F.2d 312 (5 Cir. 1968); Barton v. United States, 263 F.2d 894 (5 Cir. 1959); Calloway v. United States, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 273 , 399 F.2d 1006 (1968); Oliver v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 302 , 335 F.2d 724 (1964); Kramer v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 50 , 317 F.2d 114 (1963). "* * * "Failing to bring themselves within the ambit of the Bruton decision, the appellants' Constitutional rights were not infringed by either the admission of Barnette's confession or their joint trial." 416 F.2d at 551 .

1976Menendez v. United States, 393 F.2d 312 (5 Cir. 1968); Barton v. United States, 263 F.2d 894 (5 Cir. 1959); Calloway v. United States, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 273 , 399 F.2d 1006 (1968); Oliver v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 302 , 335 F.2d 724 (1964); Kramer v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 50 , 317 F.2d 114 (1963). "* * * "Failing to bring themselves within the ambit of the Bruton decision, the appellants' Constitutional rights were not infringed by either the admission of Barnette's confession or their joint trial." 416 F.2d at 551 .

1976Menendez v. United States, 393 F.2d 312 (5 Cir. 1968); Barton v. United States, 263 F.2d 894 (5 Cir. 1959); Calloway v. United States, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 273 , 399 F.2d 1006 (1968); Oliver v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 302 , 335 F.2d 724 (1964); Kramer v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 50 , 317 F.2d 114 (1963). "* * * "Failing to bring themselves within the ambit of the Bruton decision, the appellants' Constitutional rights were not infringed by either the admission of Barnette's confession or their joint trial." 416 F.2d at 551 .

1976Menendez v. United States, 393 F.2d 312 (5 Cir. 1968); Barton v. United States, 263 F.2d 894 (5 Cir. 1959); Calloway v. United States, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 273 , 399 F.2d 1006 (1968); Oliver v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 302 , 335 F.2d 724 (1964); Kramer v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 50 , 317 F.2d 114 (1963). "* * * "Failing to bring themselves within the ambit of the Bruton decision, the appellants' Constitutional rights were not infringed by either the admission of Barnette's confession or their joint trial." 416 F.2d at 551 .

1976Menendez v. United States, 393 F.2d 312 (5 Cir. 1968); Barton v. United States, 263 F.2d 894 (5 Cir. 1959); Calloway v. United States, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 273 , 399 F.2d 1006 (1968); Oliver v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 302 , 335 F.2d 724 (1964); Kramer v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 50 , 317 F.2d 114 (1963). "* * * "Failing to bring themselves within the ambit of the Bruton decision, the appellants' Constitutional rights were not infringed by either the admission of Barnette's confession or their joint trial." 416 F.2d at 551 .

1976Menendez v. United States, 393 F.2d 312 (5 Cir. 1968); Barton v. United States, 263 F.2d 894 (5 Cir. 1959); Calloway v. United States, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 273 , 399 F.2d 1006 (1968); Oliver v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 302 , 335 F.2d 724 (1964); Kramer v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 50 , 317 F.2d 114 (1963). "* * * "Failing to bring themselves within the ambit of the Bruton decision, the appellants' Constitutional rights were not infringed by either the admission of Barnette's confession or their joint trial." 416 F.2d at 551 .

1976Menendez v. United States, 393 F.2d 312 (5 Cir. 1968); Barton v. United States, 263 F.2d 894 (5 Cir. 1959); Calloway v. United States, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 273 , 399 F.2d 1006 (1968); Oliver v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 302 , 335 F.2d 724 (1964); Kramer v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 50 , 317 F.2d 114 (1963). "* * * "Failing to bring themselves within the ambit of the Bruton decision, the appellants' Constitutional rights were not infringed by either the admission of Barnette's confession or their joint trial." 416 F.2d at 551 .

1976The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Posey v. United States, 416 F.2d 545 (5th Cir., 1969), in considering whether admission of a co-defendant's redacted confession violated appellant's rights of confrontation under the Bruton rule, held, "This court, as well as others, has held that there is no error in the admission of a co-defendant's confession, if all references to the other defendants are deleted and there is no `substantial threat' to the right of confrontation and cross-examination.

1976The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Posey v. United States, 416 F.2d 545 (5th Cir., 1969), in considering whether admission of a co-defendant's redacted confession violated appellant's rights of confrontation under the Bruton rule, held, "This court, as well as others, has held that there is no error in the admission of a co-defendant's confession, if all references to the other defendants are deleted and there is no `substantial threat' to the right of confrontation and cross-examination.

1976Menendez v. United States, 393 F.2d 312 (5 Cir. 1968); Barton v. United States, 263 F.2d 894 (5 Cir. 1959); Calloway v. United States, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 273 , 399 F.2d 1006 (1968); Oliver v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 302 , 335 F.2d 724 (1964); Kramer v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 50 , 317 F.2d 114 (1963). "* * * "Failing to bring themselves within the ambit of the Bruton decision, the appellants' Constitutional rights were not infringed by either the admission of Barnette's confession or their joint trial." 416 F.2d at 551 .

1976Menendez v. United States, 393 F.2d 312 (5 Cir. 1968); Barton v. United States, 263 F.2d 894 (5 Cir. 1959); Calloway v. United States, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 273 , 399 F.2d 1006 (1968); Oliver v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 302 , 335 F.2d 724 (1964); Kramer v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 50 , 317 F.2d 114 (1963). "* * * "Failing to bring themselves within the ambit of the Bruton decision, the appellants' Constitutional rights were not infringed by either the admission of Barnette's confession or their joint trial." 416 F.2d at 551 .

1974The State urges in brief that the harmless error rule regarding a Bruton error, stated in Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 , 89 S.Ct. 1726 , 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969), is applicable to this case.

1974The State urges in brief that the harmless error rule regarding a Bruton error, stated in Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 , 89 S.Ct. 1726 , 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969), is applicable to this case.

1974The State relies on the case of Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 , 92 S.Ct. 1056 , 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972).

1974The State relies on the case of Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 , 92 S.Ct. 1056 , 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972).

1971Docket No. 5139, Supreme Court of the United States, 403 U.S. 949 , 91 S.Ct. 2288 , 29 L.Ed.2d 861 .

1971Docket No. 5139, Supreme Court of the United States, 403 U.S. 949 , 91 S.Ct. 2288 , 29 L.Ed.2d 861 .

1971Docket No. 5139, Supreme Court of the United States, 403 U.S. 949 , 91 S.Ct. 2288 , 29 L.Ed.2d 861 .

1971Docket No. 5139, Supreme Court of the United States, 403 U.S. 949 , 91 S.Ct. 2288 , 29 L.Ed.2d 861 .

1969In the former case in reversing Bruton’s conviction for armed postal robbery, having been jointly tried with one Evans, 1 whose confession implicating Bruton was admitted into evidence over Bruton’s objection and who did not take the stand, the Supreme Court reversed Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 , 77 S.Ct. 294 , 1 L.Ed.2d 278 , and held that despite instructions to the jury to disregard the implicating statements in determining the guilt or innocence of Bruton, admission at the joint trial of co-defendant’s extrajudicial confession implicating him violated Bruton’s right of cross

1969In the former case in reversing Bruton’s conviction for armed postal robbery, having been jointly tried with one Evans, 1 whose confession implicating Bruton was admitted into evidence over Bruton’s objection and who did not take the stand, the Supreme Court reversed Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 , 77 S.Ct. 294 , 1 L.Ed.2d 278 , and held that despite instructions to the jury to disregard the implicating statements in determining the guilt or innocence of Bruton, admission at the joint trial of co-defendant’s extrajudicial confession implicating him violated Bruton’s right of cross