Bruton violation in District of Columbia

2024In Rowe, the government waited until the third day of a joint trial to seek a ruling from the trial court regarding a Bruton issue, see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), which concerns whether the state can admit one co-defendant’s confession when it clearly implicates another co-defendant (raising a Confrontation Clause issue where the confessing co-defendant chooses not to testify and so cannot be confronted), Rowe, 480 A.2d at 780-81 .

1997Hagans nevertheless contends that these measures were inadequate to protect him against the confession of a codefendant whom he was unable to confront, see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), for the same reason we found such measures inadequate in Akins v. United States, supra. Specifically, for purposes of Bruton analysis, Hagans contends there is no conceptual difference between his alleged role as aider and abettor and the alleged coconspirator status of the defendants Barnes and Carrero in Akins , as to whom we found redaction and a limiting inst

2012Baxter’s taking the stand obviated a Bruton issue, but the confession was nonetheless inadmissible because “under the traditional rules of evidence, it constitutes inadmissible hearsay and has no legitimate probative force against the non-confessing codefendant.” Carpenter v. United States, 430 A.2d 496, 500 (D.C.1981) (en banc) (citing Sousa v. United States, 400 A.2d 1036, 1043 (1979)).

2011Even if a statement is not testimonial, and therefore outside the Bruton rule, the trial judge is still bound by Criminal Rule 14 to “take adequate steps to reduce or eliminate any prejudice arising from joinder.” Carpenter v. United States, 430 A.2d 496, 503 (D.C.1981).

2000This rule was further refined in Richardson, supra, 481 U.S. at 211 , 107 S.Ct. 1702 (1987), where the United States Supreme Court rejected the “contextual implication” doctrine used by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to determine whether a Bruton issue existed, id. at 209 , 107 S.Ct. 1702 , and held that where a defendant’s name and any reference to the defendant’s existence are eliminated from the co-defendant’s extrajudicial statement, the statement is properly admitted, with limiting instructions, regardless of any inference of the defendant’s guilt that arises when the statement is lin

2000This rule was further refined in Richardson, supra, 481 U.S. at 211 , 107 S.Ct. 1702 (1987), where the United States Supreme Court rejected the “contextual implication” doctrine used by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to determine whether a Bruton issue existed, id. at 209 , 107 S.Ct. 1702 , and held that where a defendant’s name and any reference to the defendant’s existence are eliminated from the co-defendant’s extrajudicial statement, the statement is properly admitted, with limiting instructions, regardless of any inference of the defendant’s guilt that arises when the statement is lin

2024As Martin put it in the supplemental brief he filed on the Geders issue, the infringement of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel “happened at a critical time,” just before “what turned out to be one of the most important days of trial.” In (Reginald A.) Jackson, the trial court order directed the defendant to “discuss nothing with anyone, not even [his] lawyer” during a luncheon recess after his lawyer had finished with his direct examination. 420 A.2d at 1202, 1203 .

2012Baxter’s taking the stand obviated a Bruton issue, but the confession was nonetheless inadmissible because “under the traditional rules of evidence, it constitutes inadmissible hearsay and has no legitimate probative force against the non-confessing codefendant.” Carpenter v. United States, 430 A.2d 496, 500 (D.C.1981) (en banc) (citing Sousa v. United States, 400 A.2d 1036, 1043 (1979)).

2009See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1275 (11th Cir.2007) (stating "we ... review issues concerning a district court's evidentiary rulings, such as the Bruton claim here, for abuse of discretion,” despite clear Bruton error); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 150 (2d Cir.2003) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to redact confessions rather than sever, and that because redactions were not obvious, "admission of the redacted statement did not violate the Bruton doctrine and was not an abuse of discretion”); United States v. Sotomayor-Vazquez, 249

2009See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1275 (11th Cir.2007) (stating "we ... review issues concerning a district court's evidentiary rulings, such as the Bruton claim here, for abuse of discretion,” despite clear Bruton error); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 150 (2d Cir.2003) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to redact confessions rather than sever, and that because redactions were not obvious, "admission of the redacted statement did not violate the Bruton doctrine and was not an abuse of discretion”); United States v. Sotomayor-Vazquez, 249

2009See, e.g., United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251 , 1261 n. 15 (11th Cir.2008); United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir.2005). .

2009See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1275 (11th Cir.2007) (stating "we ... review issues concerning a district court's evidentiary rulings, such as the Bruton claim here, for abuse of discretion,” despite clear Bruton error); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 150 (2d Cir.2003) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to redact confessions rather than sever, and that because redactions were not obvious, "admission of the redacted statement did not violate the Bruton doctrine and was not an abuse of discretion”); United States v. Sotomayor-Vazquez, 249

2009See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1275 (11th Cir.2007) (stating "we ... review issues concerning a district court's evidentiary rulings, such as the Bruton claim here, for abuse of discretion,” despite clear Bruton error); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 150 (2d Cir.2003) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to redact confessions rather than sever, and that because redactions were not obvious, "admission of the redacted statement did not violate the Bruton doctrine and was not an abuse of discretion”); United States v. Sotomayor-Vazquez, 249

2009See, e.g., United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251 , 1261 n. 15 (11th Cir.2008); United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir.2005). .

2009See, e.g., Comford, 947 A.2d at 1186 .

2009See, e.g., Comford, 947 A.2d at 1186 .

2009See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1275 (11th Cir.2007) (stating "we ... review issues concerning a district court's evidentiary rulings, such as the Bruton claim here, for abuse of discretion,” despite clear Bruton error); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 150 (2d Cir.2003) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to redact confessions rather than sever, and that because redactions were not obvious, "admission of the redacted statement did not violate the Bruton doctrine and was not an abuse of discretion”); United States v. Sotomayor-Vazquez, 249

2009See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1275 (11th Cir.2007) (stating "we ... review issues concerning a district court's evidentiary rulings, such as the Bruton claim here, for abuse of discretion,” despite clear Bruton error); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 150 (2d Cir.2003) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to redact confessions rather than sever, and that because redactions were not obvious, "admission of the redacted statement did not violate the Bruton doctrine and was not an abuse of discretion”); United States v. Sotomayor-Vazquez, 249

2009See also United States v. Williams, 429 F.3d 767, 773-74 (8th Cir.2005) (noting possibility of Bruton violation where the redaction was “not seamlessly woven into the narrative ..., and the neutral pronoun 'someone' may have lost its anonymity by sheer repetition”). .

2009It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.” 547 U.S. at 821 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 (citation omitted). .Accord Geter, 929 A.2d at 431 n. 5 ("If the defendant who made the out-of-court statement does not testify, introduction of the un-redacted statement into evidence would violate the co-defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation if the statement is testimonial in nature and it would not be admissible against the co-defendant in a separa

2009It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.” 547 U.S. at 821 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 (citation omitted). .Accord Geter, 929 A.2d at 431 n. 5 ("If the defendant who made the out-of-court statement does not testify, introduction of the un-redacted statement into evidence would violate the co-defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation if the statement is testimonial in nature and it would not be admissible against the co-defendant in a separa

2000See, e.g., United States v. Akinkoye, 174 F.3d 451, 457 (4th Cir.1999) (finding no Bruton violation where the use of neutral phrases "another person” and "another individual” did not facially implicate the defendant); United States v. Vejar-Urias, 165 F.3d 337, 340 (5th Cir.1999) (holding that “[w]here a defendant's name is replaced with a neutral pronoun, as long as identification of the defendant is clear or inculpatory only by reference to evidence other than the redacted confession, and a limiting instruction, is given to the jury, there is no Bruton violation”); United States v. Verduzco-

2000See, e.g., United States v. Akinkoye, 174 F.3d 451, 457 (4th Cir.1999) (finding no Bruton violation where the use of neutral phrases "another person” and "another individual” did not facially implicate the defendant); United States v. Vejar-Urias, 165 F.3d 337, 340 (5th Cir.1999) (holding that “[w]here a defendant's name is replaced with a neutral pronoun, as long as identification of the defendant is clear or inculpatory only by reference to evidence other than the redacted confession, and a limiting instruction, is given to the jury, there is no Bruton violation”); United States v. Verduzco-

2000See, e.g., United States v. Akinkoye, 174 F.3d 451, 457 (4th Cir.1999) (finding no Bruton violation where the use of neutral phrases "another person” and "another individual” did not facially implicate the defendant); United States v. Vejar-Urias, 165 F.3d 337, 340 (5th Cir.1999) (holding that “[w]here a defendant's name is replaced with a neutral pronoun, as long as identification of the defendant is clear or inculpatory only by reference to evidence other than the redacted confession, and a limiting instruction, is given to the jury, there is no Bruton violation”); United States v. Verduzco-

2000See, e.g., United States v. Akinkoye, 174 F.3d 451, 457 (4th Cir.1999) (finding no Bruton violation where the use of neutral phrases "another person” and "another individual” did not facially implicate the defendant); United States v. Vejar-Urias, 165 F.3d 337, 340 (5th Cir.1999) (holding that “[w]here a defendant's name is replaced with a neutral pronoun, as long as identification of the defendant is clear or inculpatory only by reference to evidence other than the redacted confession, and a limiting instruction, is given to the jury, there is no Bruton violation”); United States v. Verduzco-

1988Nelson v. Follette, 430 F.2d 1055, 1059 (2d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 917 , 91 S.Ct. 899 , 27 L.Ed. 2818 (1971))), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 200 , 107 S.Ct. 1702 , 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987); United States v. Cleveland, 590 F.2d 24, 29 (1st Cir.1978) (where independent evidence against defendants substantial, admission of confession which did not refer to defendants was not so prejudicial as to mandate a severance); United States v. Belle, supra, 593 F.2d at 501, 508 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) whether redacted codefendant's confession is particularly significant in prosecution's case

1988Nelson v. Follette, 430 F.2d 1055, 1059 (2d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 917 , 91 S.Ct. 899 , 27 L.Ed. 2818 (1971))), rev’d on other grounds, 481 U.S. 200 , 107 S.Ct. 1702 , 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987); United States v. Cleveland, 590 F.2d 24, 29 (1st Cir.1978) (where independent evidence against defendants substantial, admission of confession which did not refer to defendants was not so prejudicial as to mandate a severance); United States v. Belle, supra, 593 F.2d at 501, 508 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) whether redacted codefendant’s confession is particularly significant in prosecution’s case