admissibility test in Maryland

2004In a survey of other states, the Court of Appeals stated: Several states have made similar interpretations of their other crimes evidence statutes. [Colorado v.] Flowers, 644 P.2d [916,] 919 [1982](“The test for admissibility of similar offense evidence introduced by the defendant ... must (be) decide(d) ... on a case-by-case basis.”); People v. Bueno, 626 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Colo.Ct.App.1981) (“When offered by the defendant, evidence of similar transactions is admissible as long as it is relevant to the guilt or innocence of the *603 accused.”); Commonwealth v. Jewett, 392 Mass. 558, 563 , 467 N

2004In a survey of other states, the Court of Appeals stated: Several states have made similar interpretations of their other crimes evidence statutes. [Colorado v.] Flowers, 644 P.2d [916,] 919 [1982](“The test for admissibility of similar offense evidence introduced by the defendant ... must (be) decide(d) ... on a case-by-case basis.”); People v. Bueno, 626 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Colo.Ct.App.1981) (“When offered by the defendant, evidence of similar transactions is admissible as long as it is relevant to the guilt or innocence of the *603 accused.”); Commonwealth v. Jewett, 392 Mass. 558, 563 , 467 N

2004In a survey of other states, the Court of Appeals stated: Several states have made similar interpretations of their other crimes evidence statutes. [Colorado v.] Flowers, 644 P.2d [916,] 919 [1982](“The test for admissibility of similar offense evidence introduced by the defendant ... must (be) decide(d) ... on a case-by-case basis.”); People v. Bueno, 626 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Colo.Ct.App.1981) (“When offered by the defendant, evidence of similar transactions is admissible as long as it is relevant to the guilt or innocence of the *603 accused.”); Commonwealth v. Jewett, 392 Mass. 558, 563 , 467 N

2004In a survey of other states, the Court of Appeals stated: Several states have made similar interpretations of their other crimes evidence statutes. [Colorado v.] Flowers, 644 P.2d [916,] 919 [1982](“The test for admissibility of similar offense evidence introduced by the defendant ... must (be) decide(d) ... on a case-by-case basis.”); People v. Bueno, 626 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Colo.Ct.App.1981) (“When offered by the defendant, evidence of similar transactions is admissible as long as it is relevant to the guilt or innocence of the *603 accused.”); Commonwealth v. Jewett, 392 Mass. 558, 563 , 467 N

2004In a survey of other states, the Court of Appeals stated: Several states have made similar interpretations of their other crimes evidence statutes. [Colorado v.] Flowers, 644 P.2d [916,] 919 [1982](“The test for admissibility of similar offense evidence introduced by the defendant ... must (be) decide(d) ... on a case-by-case basis.”); People v. Bueno, 626 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Colo.Ct.App.1981) (“When offered by the defendant, evidence of similar transactions is admissible as long as it is relevant to the guilt or innocence of the *603 accused.”); Commonwealth v. Jewett, 392 Mass. 558, 563 , 467 N

2002In its survey of how other states have handled the issue, the Court of Appeals said: Several states have made similar interpretations of their other crimes evidence statutes. [Colorado v.] Flowers, 644 P.2d [916,] 919 [ (1982) ] (“The test for admissibility of similar offense evidence introduced by the defendant ... must be decided ... on a case-by-case basis.”); People v. Bueno, 626 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Colo.CtApp.1981) (“When offered by the defendant, evidence of similar transactions is admissible as long as it is relevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused.”); Commonwealth v. Jewett, 392

2024See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347, 1352 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Williamson required the district court to examine each portion of [the] statement to determine whether it tended to subject [the declarant] to criminal liability.”); United States v. Castelan, 219 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that under “Williamson, the district court must consider whether each statement, not just the confession as a whole, was truly self-inculpatory” (emphasis added)); United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that “when ruling upon a narrative’s admissibility under thi

2024See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347, 1352 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Williamson required the district court to examine each portion of [the] statement to determine whether it tended to subject [the declarant] to criminal liability.”); United States v. Castelan, 219 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that under “Williamson, the district court must consider whether each statement, not just the confession as a whole, was truly self-inculpatory” (emphasis added)); United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that “when ruling upon a narrative’s admissibility under thi

2024See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347, 1352 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Williamson required the district court to examine each portion of [the] statement to determine whether it tended to subject [the declarant] to criminal liability.”); United States v. Castelan, 219 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that under “Williamson, the district court must consider whether each statement, not just the confession as a whole, was truly self-inculpatory” (emphasis added)); United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that “when ruling upon a narrative’s admissibility under thi

2024See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347, 1352 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Williamson required the district court to examine each portion of [the] statement to determine whether it tended to subject [the declarant] to criminal liability.”); United States v. Castelan, 219 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that under “Williamson, the district court must consider whether each statement, not just the confession as a whole, was truly self-inculpatory” (emphasis added)); United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that “when ruling upon a narrative’s admissibility under thi

2024See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347, 1352 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Williamson required the district court to examine each portion of [the] statement to determine whether it tended to subject [the declarant] to criminal liability.”); United States v. Castelan, 219 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that under “Williamson, the district court must consider whether each statement, not just the confession as a whole, was truly self-inculpatory” (emphasis added)); United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that “when ruling upon a narrative’s admissibility under thi

2024See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347, 1352 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Williamson required the district court to examine each portion of [the] statement to determine whether it tended to subject [the declarant] to criminal liability.”); United States v. Castelan, 219 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that under “Williamson, the district court must consider whether each statement, not just the confession as a whole, was truly self-inculpatory” (emphasis added)); United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that “when ruling upon a narrative’s admissibility under thi

2024See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347, 1352 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Williamson required the district court to examine each portion of [the] statement to determine whether it tended to subject [the declarant] to criminal liability.”); United States v. Castelan, 219 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that under “Williamson, the district court must consider whether each statement, not just the confession as a whole, was truly self-inculpatory” (emphasis added)); United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that “when ruling upon a narrative’s admissibility under thi

2024See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347, 1352 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Williamson required the district court to examine each portion of [the] statement to determine whether it tended to subject [the declarant] to criminal liability.”); United States v. Castelan, 219 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that under “Williamson, the district court must consider whether each statement, not just the confession as a whole, was truly self-inculpatory” (emphasis added)); United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that “when ruling upon a narrative’s admissibility under thi

2024See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347, 1352 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Williamson required the district court to examine each portion of [the] statement to determine whether it tended to subject [the declarant] to criminal liability.”); United States v. Castelan, 219 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that under “Williamson, the district court must consider whether each statement, not just the confession as a whole, was truly self-inculpatory” (emphasis added)); United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that “when ruling upon a narrative’s admissibility under thi

2024See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347, 1352 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Williamson required the district court to examine each portion of [the] statement to determine whether it tended to subject [the declarant] to criminal liability.”); United States v. Castelan, 219 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that under “Williamson, the district court must consider whether each statement, not just the confession as a whole, was truly self-inculpatory” (emphasis added)); United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that “when ruling upon a narrative’s admissibility under thi

2002In its survey of how other states have handled the issue, the Court of Appeals said: Several states have made similar interpretations of their other crimes evidence statutes. [Colorado v.] Flowers, 644 P.2d [916,] 919 [ (1982) ] (“The test for admissibility of similar offense evidence introduced by the defendant ... must be decided ... on a case-by-case basis.”); People v. Bueno, 626 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Colo.CtApp.1981) (“When offered by the defendant, evidence of similar transactions is admissible as long as it is relevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused.”); Commonwealth v. Jewett, 392

2000Flowers, 644 P.2d at 919 (“[T]he test for admissibility of similar offense evidence introduced by the defendant ... must [be] decide[d] ... on a case-by-case basis.”); People v. Bueno, 626 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Colo.Ct.App.1981) (“[W]hen offered by the defendant, evidence of similar transactions is admissible as long as it is relevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused.”); Commonwealth v. Jewett, 392 Mass. 558, 563 , 467 N.E.2d 155, 158 (1984) (“When a defendant offers exculpatory evidence ... prejudice ceases to be a factor, and relevance should function as the admissibility standard.”); Gar

2020For this reason, we tend to agree with the Supreme Court of Connecticut: “an admissibility test for scientific evidence premised solely on its ‘general acceptance’ is conceptually flawed and therefore must be rejected.” State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 750 (Conn. 1997) (emphasis in original).

2000Flowers, 644 P.2d at 919 (“[T]he test for admissibility of similar offense evidence introduced by the defendant ... must [be] decide[d] ... on a case-by-case basis.”); People v. Bueno, 626 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Colo.Ct.App.1981) (“[W]hen offered by the defendant, evidence of similar transactions is admissible as long as it is relevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused.”); Commonwealth v. Jewett, 392 Mass. 558, 563 , 467 N.E.2d 155, 158 (1984) (“When a defendant offers exculpatory evidence ... prejudice ceases to be a factor, and relevance should function as the admissibility standard.”); Gar

2000Flowers, 644 P.2d at 919 ("[T]he test for admissibility of similar offense evidence introduced by the defendant ... must [be] decide[d] ... on a case-by-case basis."); People v. Bueno, 626 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Colo.Ct.App.1981) ("[W]hen offered by the defendant, evidence of similar transactions is admissible as long as it is relevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused."); Commonwealth v. Jewett, 392 Mass. 558, 563 , 467 N.E.2d 155, 158 (1984) ("When a defendant offers exculpatory evidence... prejudice ceases to be a factor, and relevance should function as the admissibility standard."); Garf

2000See Bryant, 129 Md.App. at 699 , 743 A.2d at 819 . *423 We granted certiorari to clarify the requirements of Rule 5-902(a)(ll) allowing hospital records to be admitted as certified records of regularly conducted business activity without the in-court testimony of the hospital records custodian and to reiterate that § 10-306 is not applicable to hospital records like those in this case. 1 At approximately 1:30 a.m. on August 12,1994, Respondent, William Dunlock Bryant, was driving northbound on Interstate 95 near White Marsh, along with one passenger, Gertrude O’Boyle.

2000See Bryant, 129 Md.App. at 699 , 743 A.2d at 819 . *423 We granted certiorari to clarify the requirements of Rule 5-902(a)(ll) allowing hospital records to be admitted as certified records of regularly conducted business activity without the in-court testimony of the hospital records custodian and to reiterate that § 10-306 is not applicable to hospital records like those in this case. 1 At approximately 1:30 a.m. on August 12,1994, Respondent, William Dunlock Bryant, was driving northbound on Interstate 95 near White Marsh, along with one passenger, Gertrude O’Boyle.

2000Flowers, 644 P.2d at 919 (“[T]he test for admissibility of similar offense evidence introduced by the defendant ... must [be] decide[d] ... on a case-by-case basis.”); People v. Bueno, 626 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Colo.Ct.App.1981) (“[W]hen offered by the defendant, evidence of similar transactions is admissible as long as it is relevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused.”); Commonwealth v. Jewett, 392 Mass. 558, 563 , 467 N.E.2d 155, 158 (1984) (“When a defendant offers exculpatory evidence ... prejudice ceases to be a factor, and relevance should function as the admissibility standard.”); Gar

2000Flowers, 644 P.2d at 919 (“[T]he test for admissibility of similar offense evidence introduced by the defendant ... must [be] decide[d] ... on a case-by-case basis.”); People v. Bueno, 626 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Colo.Ct.App.1981) (“[W]hen offered by the defendant, evidence of similar transactions is admissible as long as it is relevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused.”); Commonwealth v. Jewett, 392 Mass. 558, 563 , 467 N.E.2d 155, 158 (1984) (“When a defendant offers exculpatory evidence ... prejudice ceases to be a factor, and relevance should function as the admissibility standard.”); Gar

1999Despite the United States Supreme Court’s enunciation of a more liberal admissibility test in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), Maryland courts consistently have utilized the Frye/Reed rule of general acceptance within the field. 11 See Schultz v. State, 106 Md.App. 145 , 664 A.2d 60 *498 (1995).

1999Despite the United States Supreme Court’s enunciation of a more liberal admissibility test in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), Maryland courts consistently have utilized the Frye/Reed rule of general acceptance within the field. 11 See Schultz v. State, 106 Md.App. 145 , 664 A.2d 60 *498 (1995).

1999Underlying this prong of the test is the concern that other crimes or bad acts evidence “ ‘is generally more prejudicial than probative.’ ” Taylor, 347 Md. at 369 , 701 A.2d at 392 (quoting McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 611 , 375 A.2d 551, 555 (1977)).

1999Underlying this prong of the test is the concern that other crimes or bad acts evidence “ ‘is generally more prejudicial than probative.’ ” Taylor, 347 Md. at 369 , 701 A.2d at 392 (quoting McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 611 , 375 A.2d 551, 555 (1977)).

1999The third prong of the admissibility test involves the trial court’s assessment of the need for and probative value of the “other crimes” evidence, which must “be carefully weighed against any undue prejudice likely to result from its admission.” Faulkner, 314 Md. at 635 , 552 A.2d at 898 ; see also Cross, 282 Md. at 474 , 386 A.2d at 761 .

1999The third prong of the admissibility test involves the trial court’s assessment of the need for and probative value of the “other crimes” evidence, which must “be carefully weighed against any undue prejudice likely to result from its admission.” Faulkner, 314 Md. at 635 , 552 A.2d at 898 ; see also Cross, 282 Md. at 474 , 386 A.2d at 761 .

1999See, e.g., Ayers, 335 Md. at 632-34 , 645 A.2d at 37 ; Terry, 332 Md. at 335 , 631 A.2d at 427 ; Faulkner, 314 Md. at 634-35 , 552 A.2d at 898 .

1999See, e.g., Ayers, 335 Md. at 632-34 , 645 A.2d at 37 ; Terry, 332 Md. at 335 , 631 A.2d at 427 ; Faulkner, 314 Md. at 634-35 , 552 A.2d at 898 .

1983See, e.g., Baynes, 88 Ill.2d at 239-40 , 430 N.E.2d at 1079 . [10] See Lusby, 217 Md. at 195 , 141 A.2d at 895 ; see also, e.g., Carter, 48 Cal.2d at 751-52 , 312 P.2d at 674, 678 ; Kaminski, 63 So.2d at 341 ; Green, 154 Iowa at 1383-86, 121 N.W.2d at 91-92 ; Stafford, 213 Kan. at 162-63 , 515 P.2d at 778 ; Davis, 351 So.2d at 774 ; Edwards, 412 A.2d at 984-87 ; People v. Welke, 342 Mich. 164, 169 , 68 N.W.2d 759, 761 (1955); Kolander, 236 Minn. at 222 , 52 N.W.2d at 465-66 ; Mattox, 240 Miss. at 561 , 128 So.2d at 373 ; Driver, 38 N.J. at 260-61 , 183 A.2d at 659 ; Ball, 254 Pa.Super. at 150

1983See, e.g., Baynes, 88 Ill.2d at 239-40 , 430 N.E.2d at 1079 . [10] See Lusby, 217 Md. at 195 , 141 A.2d at 895 ; see also, e.g., Carter, 48 Cal.2d at 751-52 , 312 P.2d at 674, 678 ; Kaminski, 63 So.2d at 341 ; Green, 154 Iowa at 1383-86, 121 N.W.2d at 91-92 ; Stafford, 213 Kan. at 162-63 , 515 P.2d at 778 ; Davis, 351 So.2d at 774 ; Edwards, 412 A.2d at 984-87 ; People v. Welke, 342 Mich. 164, 169 , 68 N.W.2d 759, 761 (1955); Kolander, 236 Minn. at 222 , 52 N.W.2d at 465-66 ; Mattox, 240 Miss. at 561 , 128 So.2d at 373 ; Driver, 38 N.J. at 260-61 , 183 A.2d at 659 ; Ball, 254 Pa.Super. at 150

1983See, e.g., Baynes, 88 Ill.2d at 239-40 , 430 N.E.2d at 1079 . .

1983See, e.g., Baynes, 88 Ill.2d at 239-40 , 430 N.E.2d at 1079 . .