14 Virginia opinions name it 4 courts 1980–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bristol v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2010See Bristol v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 568 , 636 S.E.2d 460 (2006). 2010See Bristol v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 568 , 636 S.E.2d 460 (2006). | 2 | 2 |
Taylor v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2024Further, Rustioni did not opine, either directly or indirectly, on a specific witness’s veracity or credibility.6 Whereas in Davison, the child therapist was found to be “offering an opinion about why the child’s testimony should be believed and why a prior inconsistent statement should be disbelieved,” “[n]o such testimony was elicited in this case.” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 557, 565 (1996) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Bottoms v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2023See Bottoms v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 378, 383-84 (1996) (noting that a judge has a duty to alter a pretrial ruling on a motion in limine if required by “the case as it actually develops” at trial). - 28 - perpetrator,” not affirmative proof of one. | 1 | 1 |
Venable v. Stocknergreen1 sentence2019Corp. of Va. v. Saxon Shoes, Inc., 271 Va. 206, 213 (2006); see also Venable v. Stockner, 200 Va. 900 , 904-05 10 We see no reason to question the expert’s qualifications to testify regarding the standard of care in this case. | 1 | 1 |
BLUE RIDGE SERVICE OF VA v. Saxon Shoesgreen1 sentence2019Corp. of Va. v. Saxon Shoes, Inc., 271 Va. 206, 213 (2006); see also Venable v. Stockner, 200 Va. 900 , 904-05 10 We see no reason to question the expert’s qualifications to testify regarding the standard of care in this case. | 1 | 1 |
Rabeiro v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2002"On factual issues relating to the admissibility of evidence, the burden of persuasion is proof by a preponderance of the evidence." Rabeiro v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 61, 64-65 , 389 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1990). 2002"On factual issues relating to the admissibility of evidence, the burden of persuasion is proof by a preponderance of the evidence." Rabeiro v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 61, 64-65 , 389 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
Hackney v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2000See Hackney v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 288, 292-96 , 504 S.E.2d 385, 388-90 (1998) (en banc) (acknowledging general principle but holding policy requires that knowingly erroneous decision not to sever remains harmful and, therefore, reversible error if the only thing that renders the other conviction admissible is defendant’s subsequent decision to testify); cf. Foster, 6 Va.App. at 323 , 369 S.E.2d at 694 (holding that misjoinder of offenses in indictment would not constitute a “substantive” error requiring reversal if evidence of each count would be admissible in separate trial of other cou 2000See Hackney v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 288, 292-96 , 504 S.E.2d 385, 388-90 (1998) (en banc) (acknowledging general principle but holding policy requires that knowingly erroneous decision not to sever remains harmful and, therefore, reversible error if the only thing that renders the other conviction admissible is defendant’s subsequent decision to testify); cf. Foster, 6 Va.App. at 323 , 369 S.E.2d at 694 (holding that misjoinder of offenses in indictment would not constitute a “substantive” error requiring reversal if evidence of each count would be admissible in separate trial of other cou | 1 | 1 |
Foster v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2000See Hackney v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 288, 292-96 , 504 S.E.2d 385, 388-90 (1998) (en banc) (acknowledging general principle but holding policy requires that knowingly erroneous decision not to sever remains harmful and, therefore, reversible error if the only thing that renders the other conviction admissible is defendant’s subsequent decision to testify); cf. Foster, 6 Va.App. at 323 , 369 S.E.2d at 694 (holding that misjoinder of offenses in indictment would not constitute a “substantive” error requiring reversal if evidence of each count would be admissible in separate trial of other cou 2000See Hackney v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 288, 292-96 , 504 S.E.2d 385, 388-90 (1998) (en banc) (acknowledging general principle but holding policy requires that knowingly erroneous decision not to sever remains harmful and, therefore, reversible error if the only thing that renders the other conviction admissible is defendant’s subsequent decision to testify); cf. Foster, 6 Va.App. at 323 , 369 S.E.2d at 694 (holding that misjoinder of offenses in indictment would not constitute a “substantive” error requiring reversal if evidence of each count would be admissible in separate trial of other cou | 1 | 1 |
Godwin v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2000See Hackney v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 288, 292-96 , 504 S.E.2d 385, 388-90 (1998) (en banc) (acknowledging general principle but holding policy requires that knowingly erroneous decision not to sever remains harmful and, therefore, reversible error if the only thing that renders the other conviction admissible is defendant’s subsequent decision to testify); cf. Foster, 6 Va.App. at 323 , 369 S.E.2d at 694 (holding that misjoinder of offenses in indictment would not constitute a “substantive” error requiring reversal if evidence of each count would be admissible in separate trial of other cou 2000See Hackney v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 288, 292-96 , 504 S.E.2d 385, 388-90 (1998) (en banc) (acknowledging general principle but holding policy requires that knowingly erroneous decision not to sever remains harmful and, therefore, reversible error if the only thing that renders the other conviction admissible is defendant’s subsequent decision to testify); cf. Foster, 6 Va.App. at 323 , 369 S.E.2d at 694 (holding that misjoinder of offenses in indictment would not constitute a “substantive” error requiring reversal if evidence of each count would be admissible in separate trial of other cou | 1 | 1 |
Ramsey v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence1996See Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 245, 249 , 105 1 Although the defendant did not allege specific grounds at trial for the objection to Welford's testimony, the trial court stated that the testimony is "only admitted because it's [Welford's] state of mind. | 1 | 1 |
Lebel v. Swincickigreen2 sentences1980See Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427 , 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958). 1980See Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427 , 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Highway Express Lines, Inc. v. Fleming
green
1 sentence2025There, the Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing “the plaintiff to cross-examine an expert [witness] who had been hired by the defendant’s insurance company on payments he had received from the company for testifying in previous cases.” Id. at 362. 9 Fleming provides a good example of such substantial relationship where the witness in question was a paid employee of the insurance company and was “introduced by the defendant in an attempt to discredit or impeach the testimony of numerous witnesses introduced by plaintiff.” 185 Va. at 672-73 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Ferguson v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2024Bailey, 259 Va. at 738 (quoting Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 745, 746 , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 861 (1972)); see also Pittman v. Commonwealth, No. 0681-22-1, slip op. at 18 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2023) (“Virginia case law . . . allows a witness to authenticate the contents of a -5- video . . . simply based on the fact that he recognizes certain key components of a video, thus establishing the requisite indicia of reliability to satisfy the requirements of Rule 2:901.”). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Ray v. Brierley
green
1 sentence2024Bailey, 259 Va. at 738 (quoting Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 745, 746 , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 861 (1972)); see also Pittman v. Commonwealth, No. 0681-22-1, slip op. at 18 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2023) (“Virginia case law . . . allows a witness to authenticate the contents of a -5- video . . . simply based on the fact that he recognizes certain key components of a video, thus establishing the requisite indicia of reliability to satisfy the requirements of Rule 2:901.”). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Bailey v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2024Bailey, 259 Va. at 738 (quoting Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 745, 746 , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 861 (1972)); see also Pittman v. Commonwealth, No. 0681-22-1, slip op. at 18 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2023) (“Virginia case law . . . allows a witness to authenticate the contents of a -5- video . . . simply based on the fact that he recognizes certain key components of a video, thus establishing the requisite indicia of reliability to satisfy the requirements of Rule 2:901.”). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Snead v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2016Challenged Evidence Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion in limine asking the court to exclude evidence of the phone calls between Deputy Leonard and an “individual purporting to be Mr. Grady.” Relying on Snead v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 493 , 358 S.E.2d 750 (1987), counsel argued that the conversations did not meet the admissibility standard required to prove the caller’s identity as the appellant. 2016Challenged Evidence Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion in limine asking the court to exclude evidence of the phone calls between Deputy Leonard and an “individual purporting to be Mr. Grady.” Relying on Snead v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 493 , 358 S.E.2d 750 (1987), counsel argued that the conversations did not meet the admissibility standard required to prove the caller’s identity as the appellant. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
United States v. Thomas York
green
1 sentence1997In United States v. Battiste, 834 F.Supp. 995 (N.D.Illinois, E.D.1993), the court disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 916 , 112 S.Ct. 321 , 116 L.Ed.2d 262 (1991), that a declaration against penal interest is a "firmly rooted” exception to the hearsay rule. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
United States v. Battiste
green
1 sentence1997In United States v. Battiste, 834 F.Supp. 995 (N.D.Illinois, E.D.1993), the court disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 916 , 112 S.Ct. 321 , 116 L.Ed.2d 262 (1991), that a declaration against penal interest is a "firmly rooted” exception to the hearsay rule. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Rashty v. Michigan
green
1 sentence1997In United States v. Battiste, 834 F.Supp. 995 (N.D.Illinois, E.D.1993), the court disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 916 , 112 S.Ct. 321 , 116 L.Ed.2d 262 (1991), that a declaration against penal interest is a "firmly rooted” exception to the hearsay rule. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
York v. United States
green
1 sentence1997In United States v. Battiste, 834 F.Supp. 995 (N.D.Illinois, E.D.1993), the court disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 916 , 112 S.Ct. 321 , 116 L.Ed.2d 262 (1991), that a declaration against penal interest is a "firmly rooted” exception to the hearsay rule. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
United States v. John W. Downing
green
1 sentence1994A second inquiry in the admissibility analysis is whether the proffered testimony “shows that particular features of the eyewitness identifications involved may have impaired the accuracy of those identifications.” Id. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.