9 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1985–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Newman v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., Brisbon v. United States, 894 A.2d 1121, 1130 (D.C.2006) (reversing conviction where defense witness was excluded based on judge’s determination that witness was biased, noting that is “essentially a credibility determination that should have been left to the jury”); Brown v. United States, 740 A.2d 533, 537 (D.C.1999) (“Conditioning bias cross-examination on the court’s ability to assess the credibility of the source of [an] alleged motive [to fabricate] runs too close to usurping the jury’s function.”); Newman v. United States, 705 A.2d 246, 259 (D.C. 1997) (noting that in evaluat 2014See, e.g., Brisbon v. United States, 894 A.2d 1121, 1130 (D.C. 2006) (reversing conviction where defense witness was excluded based on judge‟s determination that witness was biased, noting that is “essentially a credibility determination that should have been left to the jury”); Brown v. United States, 740 A.2d 533, 537 (D.C. 1999) (“Conditioning bias cross-examination on the court's ability to assess the credibility of the source of [an] alleged motive [to fabricate] runs too close to usurping the jury's function.”); Newman v. United States, 705 A.2d 246, 259 (D.C. 1997) (noting that in evalu | 1 | 1 |
Brisbon v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., Brisbon v. United States, 894 A.2d 1121, 1130 (D.C.2006) (reversing conviction where defense witness was excluded based on judge’s determination that witness was biased, noting that is “essentially a credibility determination that should have been left to the jury”); Brown v. United States, 740 A.2d 533, 537 (D.C.1999) (“Conditioning bias cross-examination on the court’s ability to assess the credibility of the source of [an] alleged motive [to fabricate] runs too close to usurping the jury’s function.”); Newman v. United States, 705 A.2d 246, 259 (D.C. 1997) (noting that in evaluat 2014See, e.g., Brisbon v. United States, 894 A.2d 1121, 1130 (D.C. 2006) (reversing conviction where defense witness was excluded based on judge‟s determination that witness was biased, noting that is “essentially a credibility determination that should have been left to the jury”); Brown v. United States, 740 A.2d 533, 537 (D.C. 1999) (“Conditioning bias cross-examination on the court's ability to assess the credibility of the source of [an] alleged motive [to fabricate] runs too close to usurping the jury's function.”); Newman v. United States, 705 A.2d 246, 259 (D.C. 1997) (noting that in evalu | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., Brisbon v. United States, 894 A.2d 1121, 1130 (D.C.2006) (reversing conviction where defense witness was excluded based on judge’s determination that witness was biased, noting that is “essentially a credibility determination that should have been left to the jury”); Brown v. United States, 740 A.2d 533, 537 (D.C.1999) (“Conditioning bias cross-examination on the court’s ability to assess the credibility of the source of [an] alleged motive [to fabricate] runs too close to usurping the jury’s function.”); Newman v. United States, 705 A.2d 246, 259 (D.C. 1997) (noting that in evaluat 2014See, e.g., Brisbon v. United States, 894 A.2d 1121, 1130 (D.C. 2006) (reversing conviction where defense witness was excluded based on judge‟s determination that witness was biased, noting that is “essentially a credibility determination that should have been left to the jury”); Brown v. United States, 740 A.2d 533, 537 (D.C. 1999) (“Conditioning bias cross-examination on the court's ability to assess the credibility of the source of [an] alleged motive [to fabricate] runs too close to usurping the jury's function.”); Newman v. United States, 705 A.2d 246, 259 (D.C. 1997) (noting that in evalu | 1 | 1 |
United States v. William Darrell Halbert, (Two Cases)green1 sentence1992Subsection (b) stresses that “[t]he presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.” And subsection (c), focusing specifically on delay in presentment, restricts the power of the court by providing that a confession “shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing [a defendant] before a magistrate ... if such confession is found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily and ... such confession was made or given by such person within six hours immedi | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Howard T. Poolegreen2 sentences1992D.C. 289, 294, 495 F.2d 115, 120 (1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1048 , 95 S.Ct. 2667 , 45 L.Ed.2d 701 (1975); id. at 298, 495 F.2d at 124 (Leventhal, J., concurring). 1992D.C. 289, 294, 495 F.2d 115, 120 (1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1048 , 95 S.Ct. 2667 , 45 L.Ed.2d 701 (1975); id. at 298, 495 F.2d at 124 (Leventhal, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
Ruffin v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1989See, e.g., Hill v. United States, 512 A.2d 269, 278 (D.C.1986); see also United States v. Jackson, 450 A.2d 419, 424 (D.C.1982); Wheeler v. United States, 300 A.2d 713, 716 (D.C.1973); Ruffin v. United States, 293 A.2d 477, 479 (D.C.1972). | 1 | 1 |
Wheeler v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1989See, e.g., Hill v. United States, 512 A.2d 269, 278 (D.C.1986); see also United States v. Jackson, 450 A.2d 419, 424 (D.C.1982); Wheeler v. United States, 300 A.2d 713, 716 (D.C.1973); Ruffin v. United States, 293 A.2d 477, 479 (D.C.1972). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jacksongreen1 sentence1989See, e.g., Hill v. United States, 512 A.2d 269, 278 (D.C.1986); see also United States v. Jackson, 450 A.2d 419, 424 (D.C.1982); Wheeler v. United States, 300 A.2d 713, 716 (D.C.1973); Ruffin v. United States, 293 A.2d 477, 479 (D.C.1972). | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1989See, e.g., Hill v. United States, 512 A.2d 269, 278 (D.C.1986); see also United States v. Jackson, 450 A.2d 419, 424 (D.C.1982); Wheeler v. United States, 300 A.2d 713, 716 (D.C.1973); Ruffin v. United States, 293 A.2d 477, 479 (D.C.1972). | 1 | 1 |
Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc. v. Eula A. Tawneygreen2 sentences1988Our reliance on New York Life has caused us to state the admissibility test to be whether the diagnosis or opinion is one “upon which competent physicians would not disagree.” Rotan v. Egan, supra, 537 A.2d at 566 (citing Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Tawney, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 151 , 152, 233 F.2d 353, 354 (1956). 1988C. 151, 152, 233 F.2d 353, 354 (1956). | 1 | 1 |
William J. Gass v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1985Super.Ct.Civ.R. 43-1 provides for the admission into evidence of “[a]ny writing or record ... made as a memorandum or record of any act ... if made in regular course of any business, and if it was the regular course of such business to make such memorandum or record at the time of such act ....” Cf. Gass v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 11, 14-16 , 416 F.2d 767, 770-72 (1969) (slides made and analyzed in the regular course of hospital operations admissible under Federal Business Records Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1732 , since deleted from Title 28 and replaced by Fed.R.Evid. 803(6). 7 . 1985Super.Ct.Civ.R. 43-1 provides for the admission into evidence of “[a]ny writing or record ... made as a memorandum or record of any act ... if made in regular course of any business, and if it was the regular course of such business to make such memorandum or record at the time of such act ....” Cf. Gass v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 11, 14-16 , 416 F.2d 767, 770-72 (1969) (slides made and analyzed in the regular course of hospital operations admissible under Federal Business Records Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1732 , since deleted from Title 28 and replaced by Fed.R.Evid. 803(6). 7 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
MOTOROLA INC. v. MICHAEL PATRICK MURRAY
green
1 sentence2024But Motorola states that Rule 702 “expressly requires” the trial court to determine whether an expert reliably applied principles and methods to the case at hand, id. at 757 , and we discern no application of Rule 702 or Motorola in the trial court’s ruling. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
United States v. Daryl E. Singleterry
green
1 sentence2011But this admissibility analysis by the trial court necessarily involves consideration of whether the confession has been sufficiently corroborated, and “courts often characterize corroboration requirements as governing the sufficiency of the evidence.” Singleterry, 29 F.3d at 738 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Hawes v. Chua
green
2 sentences2006In ruling that it was excluding Dr. Brownlee’s causation testimony “for the same reason” as it excluded his standard of care testimony, the court appears to have mistakenly applied the rule set forth in Hawes v. Chua, 769 A.2d at 797 , governing the admissibility of standard of care testimony. 2006Id. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
In Re Melton
green
1 sentence2001The admissibility of a defense expert’s opinion obviously differs in that, as we have seen, such determinations are committed to the broad discretion of the trial judge, see In re Melton, supra. We therefore review the admission of a defense expert’s medical opinion deferentially, whereas a decision that the expert testimony presented by the plaintiff was (or was not) sufficient to meet her burden of proof is a question ultimately of law that we decide de novo. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Klein v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
green
1 sentence1992D.C. 289, 294, 495 F.2d 115, 120 (1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1048 , 95 S.Ct. 2667 , 45 L.Ed.2d 701 (1975); id. at 298, 495 F.2d at 124 (Leventhal, J., concurring). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Edwards Underground Water District v. Hills
green
1 sentence1992D.C. 289, 294, 495 F.2d 115, 120 (1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1048 , 95 S.Ct. 2667 , 45 L.Ed.2d 701 (1975); id. at 298, 495 F.2d at 124 (Leventhal, J., concurring). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Clinton Community Hospital Corp. v. Southern Maryland Medical Center
green
1 sentence1992D.C. 289, 294, 495 F.2d 115, 120 (1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1048 , 95 S.Ct. 2667 , 45 L.Ed.2d 701 (1975); id. at 298, 495 F.2d at 124 (Leventhal, J., concurring). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Rotan v. Egan
green
2 sentences1988Our reliance on New York Life has caused us to state the admissibility test to be whether the diagnosis or opinion is one “upon which competent physicians would not disagree.” Rotan v. Egan, supra, 537 A.2d at 566 (citing Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Tawney, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 151 , 152, 233 F.2d 353, 354 (1956). 1988Our reliance on New York Life has caused us to state the admissibility test to be whether the diagnosis or opinion is one "upon which competent physicians would not disagree." Rotan v. Egan, supra, 537 A.2d at 566 (citing Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Tawney, 98 U.S.App.D. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.