admissibility standard in California

2018III Prejudice Even though the court erred by disregarding Sargon , we must consider whether that error was prejudicial, i.e., whether there is a reasonable probability the result would have been more favorable to Apple absent the error. "[A] 'probability' in this context does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance , more than an abstract possibility ." ( College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704 , 715, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 898 , 882 P.2d 894 .) For reasons we will explain, we conclude there is a reasonable chance the court would have denied plaintiffs' motio

2018III Prejudice Even though the court erred by disregarding Sargon , we must consider whether that error was prejudicial, i.e., whether there is a reasonable probability the result would have been more favorable to Apple absent the error. "[A] 'probability' in this context does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance , more than an abstract possibility ." ( College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704 , 715, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 898 , 882 P.2d 894 .) For reasons we will explain, we conclude there is a reasonable chance the court would have denied plaintiffs' motio

1994The Malinda S. court found social study reports prepared by Department personnel to be more reliable than the report considered in Daniels because the official social study reports “are prepared by disinterested parties in the regular course of their professional duties [imparting] elements of objectivity and expertise [which] lend them a degree of reliability and trustworthiness not present in Daniels.” (Malinda S., supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 377 .) Pointing to omissions in the social study report and to such factors as its recitation of thirdhand hearsay, appellant argues the report should there

1994The Malinda S. court found social study reports prepared by Department personnel to be *915 more reliable than the report considered in Daniels because the official social study reports "are prepared by disinterested parties in the regular course of their professional duties [imparting] elements of objectivity and expertise [which] lend them a degree of reliability and trustworthiness not present in Daniels . " ( Malinda S., supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 377 .) Pointing to omissions in the social study report and to such factors as its recitation of thirdhand hearsay, appellant argues the report shou

1990Contrary to the view expressed in In re Donald R., supra, 195 Cal.App.3d 703 , this general limitation does not render evidence incompetent simply because it is exempted from the hearsay rule by the Welfare and Institutions Code, rather than some other civil statute.

1990Contrary to the view expressed in In re Donald R., supra, 195 Cal. App.3d 703 , this general limitation does not render evidence incompetent simply because it is exempted from the hearsay rule by the Welfare and Institutions Code, rather than some other civil statute.

2023Rather than flesh out the record in order to provide suitable Evidence Code section 352 guardrails for the scope of cross-examination—and for any other 14 See People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50 , 93–94 (defense counsel should be able to cross-examine a prosecution witness, who had received immunity for his role in the crime, as to the sentence the witness believed he was facing, even if that belief was inaccurate; there was no need to explore the “basis” for that belief); Simons, California Evidence Manual, supra, section 3:43. 33 testimony Castaneda-Prado or the People might have wished

2023Rather than flesh out the record in order to provide suitable Evidence Code section 352 guardrails for the scope of cross-examination—and for any other 14 See People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50 , 93–94 (defense counsel should be able to cross-examine a prosecution witness, who had received immunity for his role in the crime, as to the sentence the witness believed he was facing, even if that belief was inaccurate; there was no need to explore the “basis” for that belief); Simons, California Evidence Manual, supra, section 3:43. 33 testimony Castaneda-Prado or the People might have wished

2022(People v. Patino (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1745 ; see also People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 956 .) 11 outside this admissibility framework.11 And where a case presents no danger of jury confusion, “there is simply no need for the expert testimony.” (Bowker, at p. 394; see Clotfelter, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at pp. 64−65 [CSAAS-related testimony inadmissible as to prior sex crimes for which victims did not delay reporting or recant, and defendant did not question victim credibility].) The California Supreme Court approved our approach in People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289 (McAl

2021Moving to exclude any evidence regarding Carroll, the prosecutor described him as “a long time drug user, low-level dealer, and occasional boyfriend” of Jones, adding that Dworak’s “[m]arginal evidence” linking Carroll to the crime was insufficient to satisfy the admissibility standard set in People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826 (Hall).

2021(Oracle Corp. v. Superior Court (Jan. 31, 2013, H038880), petn. den.) 19 The trial court issued a written order after the evidentiary hearing finding that the expert testimony of Orszag, and of Oracle’s proposed expert, Ramsey Shehadeh, met the admissibility standard under Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th 747 .10 5.

2021(Oracle Corp. v. Superior Court (Jan. 31, 2013, H038880), petn. den.) 19 The trial court issued a written order after the evidentiary hearing finding that the expert testimony of Orszag, and of Oracle’s proposed expert, Ramsey Shehadeh, met the admissibility standard under Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th 747 .10 5.

2021(People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 725 .) If evidence was erroneously admitted, we review for harmless error under the standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .

2021(People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 725 .) If evidence was erroneously admitted, we review for harmless error under the standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .

2016After the admissibility hearing, Youssef testified the adjacent table was within two feet of appellant, and Peters and the other man were sitting right next to appellant in a 1 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ]. 3 somewhat triangular configuration with Peters closer to the wall of a building.2 The other man had a cylindrical glass pipe in one hand and a metal rod in the other.

2016After the admissibility hearing, Youssef testified the adjacent table was within two feet of appellant, and Peters and the other man were sitting right next to appellant in a 1 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ]. 3 somewhat triangular configuration with Peters closer to the wall of a building.2 The other man had a cylindrical glass pipe in one hand and a metal rod in the other.

2016The statement is not hearsay, since it is the hearer's reaction to the statement that is the relevant fact sought to be proved, not the truth of the matter asserted in the statement." ' " (People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1162 .) As long as the nonhearsay purpose is relevant to an issue in dispute, the proffered statement is admissible.

2015(James, supra, 56 Cal.App.3d at p. 890 .) Evidence that defendant had cut his wrists while barricading himself in the bathroom as the police entered his home supports an inference that he was trying to evade prosecution for the molestation of A.C.

2012(Id. at p. 760.) California law, by contrast, allows evidence of mental disease to be presented at the guilt phase, as demonstrated by the defense presented in this case. (§ 28, subd. (a); People v. Hernandez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 520 .) The Court of Appeal below, however, was convinced that Clark’s rationale for upholding Arizona’s more restrictive rule supported the jury instruction on the conclusive presumption of sanity.

2007As indicated above, these matters were appropriately presented to the trier of fact to consider in weighing the accuracy of Johnson’s conclusions, but none of them affected the admissibility of the test results themselves. ( Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 812-813; Farmer, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 913 .) Defendant next focuses on Johnson’s procedures in calculating the test results’ statistical significance.

1992The Supreme Court held that general scientific acceptance had already been established by precedent, but also made specific reference to the “third prong” of Kelly-Frye, which the court described as “the application of correct scientific procedures in the case under review. [Citations.]” (Fierro, supra, at pp. 214-215 .) The court held the defendant had waived any objection as to the third prong by stipulating that appropriate scientific procedures had been used, but, “[i]n any event, defendant has not demonstrated any deficiency in the testing procedures, or any act or omission which might ha

1992The Supreme Court held that general scientific acceptance had already been established by precedent, but also made specific reference to the “third prong” of Kelly-Frye, which the court described as “the application of correct scientific procedures in the case under review. [Citations.]” (Fierro, supra, at pp. 214-215 .) The court held the defendant had waived any objection as to the third prong by stipulating that appropriate scientific procedures had been used, but, “[i]n any event, defendant has not demonstrated any deficiency in the testing procedures, or any act or omission which might ha

1992(Id., at p. 688.) Further, any question created by Farmer and Cooper , and any doubt as to the correctness of Axell’s conclusion, is dispelled by two post-Axell decisions in which the Supreme Court reiterated the third prong of Kelly-Frye as an element of the admissibility inquiry. *824 In People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426 , 821 P.2d 1302 ] (petn. for cert. pending), the defendant challenged the admission of electrophoretic analysis of dried bloodstains.

1992(Id., at p. 688.) Further, any question created by Farmer and Cooper , and any doubt as to the correctness of Axell’s conclusion, is dispelled by two post-Axell decisions in which the Supreme Court reiterated the third prong of Kelly-Frye as an element of the admissibility inquiry. *824 In People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426 , 821 P.2d 1302 ] (petn. for cert. pending), the defendant challenged the admission of electrophoretic analysis of dried bloodstains.

1991This situation is in contrast with that presented by the facts in People v. Adams, supra, 59 Cal.App.3d 559, 567 , where evidence of noncompliance with the regulations went only to the weight of the evidence because the foundational prerequisites of admissibility were independently established.

1968(Willson v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.2d 291 *565 [ 294 P.2d 36 ]; People v. Amos, 181 Cal.App.2d 506 [ 5 Cal. Rptr. 451 ].) (Cf. People v. Lewis, 240 Cal.App.2d 546 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 579 ], People v. Cove, 228 Cal.App.2d 466 [ 39 Cal. Rptr. 535 ], and People v. Kilvington, 104 Cal. 86 [ 37 P. 799 , 43 Am.St.Rep. 73 ], where other facts of the commission of a felony having been committed warranted reliance upon the informant’s declaration.) Given the factual pattern known to Officer Reid, in the instant case it would have been reasonable for the officer to have made further investigation leading to

1968(Willson v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.2d 291 *565 [ 294 P.2d 36 ]; People v. Amos, 181 Cal.App.2d 506 [ 5 Cal. Rptr. 451 ].) (Cf. People v. Lewis, 240 Cal.App.2d 546 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 579 ], People v. Cove, 228 Cal.App.2d 466 [ 39 Cal. Rptr. 535 ], and People v. Kilvington, 104 Cal. 86 [ 37 P. 799 , 43 Am.St.Rep. 73 ], where other facts of the commission of a felony having been committed warranted reliance upon the informant’s declaration.) Given the factual pattern known to Officer Reid, in the instant case it would have been reasonable for the officer to have made further investigation leading to

1968(Willson v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.2d 291 *565 [ 294 P.2d 36 ]; People v. Amos, 181 Cal.App.2d 506 [ 5 Cal. Rptr. 451 ].) (Cf. People v. Lewis, 240 Cal.App.2d 546 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 579 ], People v. Cove, 228 Cal.App.2d 466 [ 39 Cal. Rptr. 535 ], and People v. Kilvington, 104 Cal. 86 [ 37 P. 799 , 43 Am.St.Rep. 73 ], where other facts of the commission of a felony having been committed warranted reliance upon the informant’s declaration.) Given the factual pattern known to Officer Reid, in the instant case it would have been reasonable for the officer to have made further investigation leading to

1968(Willson v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.2d 291 *565 [ 294 P.2d 36 ]; People v. Amos, 181 Cal.App.2d 506 [ 5 Cal. Rptr. 451 ].) (Cf. People v. Lewis, 240 Cal.App.2d 546 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 579 ], People v. Cove, 228 Cal.App.2d 466 [ 39 Cal. Rptr. 535 ], and People v. Kilvington, 104 Cal. 86 [ 37 P. 799 , 43 Am.St.Rep. 73 ], where other facts of the commission of a felony having been committed warranted reliance upon the informant’s declaration.) Given the factual pattern known to Officer Reid, in the instant case it would have been reasonable for the officer to have made further investigation leading to

1968(Willson v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.2d 291 *565 [ 294 P.2d 36 ]; People v. Amos, 181 Cal.App.2d 506 [ 5 Cal. Rptr. 451 ].) (Cf. People v. Lewis, 240 Cal.App.2d 546 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 579 ], People v. Cove, 228 Cal.App.2d 466 [ 39 Cal. Rptr. 535 ], and People v. Kilvington, 104 Cal. 86 [ 37 P. 799 , 43 Am.St.Rep. 73 ], where other facts of the commission of a felony having been committed warranted reliance upon the informant’s declaration.) Given the factual pattern known to Officer Reid, in the instant case it would have been reasonable for the officer to have made further investigation leading to