14 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Oaks v. Connorsgreen2 sentences2013See also Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24 , 660 A.2d 423 (1995), confirming Murphy and holding that the individual cap applicable in a non-death personal injury action included damages awarded on a loss of consortium claim; there was not a separate cap for that claim. 2013See also Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24 , 660 A.2d 423 (1995), confirming Murphy and holding that the individual cap applicable in a non-death personal injury action included damages awarded on a loss of consortium claim; there was not a separate cap for that claim. | 3 | 8 |
Phipps v. General Motors Corp.green2 sentences2005The Court noted that, notwithstanding that Owens-Illinois was cognizant of its holding in Scribner , as well as its effect in rendering the cap applicable to the Respondent’s personal injury, it nevertheless urged a different result with respect to its loss of consortium claim, arguing that the proposed result was “required by the nature of the action and by [our] cases.” Petitioner, continued the Court, citing Oaks v. Connors, 839 Md. 24 , 660 A.2d 423 (1995), insisted that because such a claim “arises from the loss of society, affection, assistance, and conjugal fellowship suffered by the ma 2005The Court noted that, notwithstanding that Owens-Illinois was cognizant of its holding in Scribner , as well as its effect in rendering the cap applicable to the Respondent’s personal injury, it nevertheless urged a different result with respect to its loss of consortium claim, arguing that the proposed result was “required by the nature of the action and by [our] cases.” Petitioner, continued the Court, citing Oaks v. Connors, 839 Md. 24 , 660 A.2d 423 (1995), insisted that because such a claim “arises from the loss of society, affection, assistance, and conjugal fellowship suffered by the ma | 2 | 2 |
John Crane, Inc. v. Scribnergreen2 sentences2005Vol.) § 11-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (hereinafter “Statutory Cap”), 2 applied to bar the respondents’ *472 claim for mesothelioma and loss of consortium; when, in a latent disease case, a loss of consortium case arises for purposes of the “cap” statute; whether, in light of our decisions in John Crane, Inc. v. Scribner, 369 Md. 369, 372 , 800 A.2d 727, 728 (2002) and Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Pransky, 369 Md. 360, 363 , 800 A.2d 722, 723 (2002), the respondents’ loss of consortium claim, based on an injury incurred before they married, is barred as a matter of law and w 2005Vol.) § 11-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (hereinafter “Statutory Cap”), 2 applied to bar the respondents’ *472 claim for mesothelioma and loss of consortium; when, in a latent disease case, a loss of consortium case arises for purposes of the “cap” statute; whether, in light of our decisions in John Crane, Inc. v. Scribner, 369 Md. 369, 372 , 800 A.2d 727, 728 (2002) and Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Pransky, 369 Md. 360, 363 , 800 A.2d 722, 723 (2002), the respondents’ loss of consortium claim, based on an injury incurred before they married, is barred as a matter of law and w | 1 | 2 |
Linton v. Lintongreen1 sentence2006See also Linton v. Linton, 46 Md. | 1 | 1 |
Connors v. Oaksgreen2 sentences2005Although aware that Grimshaw considered when a loss of consortium claim arose in the context of the cap statute and a *486 latent disease, holding that it arose at the same time as the predicate personal injury claim, the petitioner maintains that it is neither persuasive nor dispositive: “[bjecause this Court in Scribner overruled Grimshaw on the issue of when a personal injury claim arises, it is not clear whether Grimshaw’s holding as to when the underlying personal injury arises — is still good law.” (Petitioner’s Brief at 23) Moreover, the petitioner points out that Grimshaw cited Oaks fo 2005Although aware that Grimshaw considered when a loss of consortium claim arose in the context of the cap statute and a *486 latent disease, holding that it arose at the same time as the predicate personal injury claim, the petitioner maintains that it is neither persuasive nor dispositive: “[bjecause this Court in Scribner overruled Grimshaw on the issue of when a personal injury claim arises, it is not clear whether Grimshaw’s holding as to when the underlying personal injury arises — is still good law.” (Petitioner’s Brief at 23) Moreover, the petitioner points out that Grimshaw cited Oaks fo | 1 | 1 |
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Cornelsengreen2 sentences2005Co. v. Cornelsen, 272 Md. 48, 51 , 321 A.2d 149, 150 (1974); and Exxon Corp. v. Schoene, 67 Md.App. 412, 423 , 508 A.2d 142, 148 (1986). 2005Co. v. Cornelsen, 272 Md. 48, 51 , 321 A.2d 149, 150 (1974); and Exxon Corp. v. Schoene, 67 Md.App. 412, 423 , 508 A.2d 142, 148 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
Exxon Corp., USA v. Schoenegreen2 sentences2005Co. v. Cornelsen, 272 Md. 48, 51 , 321 A.2d 149, 150 (1974); and Exxon Corp. v. Schoene, 67 Md.App. 412, 423 , 508 A.2d 142, 148 (1986). 2005Co. v. Cornelsen, 272 Md. 48, 51 , 321 A.2d 149, 150 (1974); and Exxon Corp. v. Schoene, 67 Md.App. 412, 423 , 508 A.2d 142, 148 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Pranskygreen2 sentences2005Vol.) § 11-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (hereinafter “Statutory Cap”), 2 applied to bar the respondents’ *472 claim for mesothelioma and loss of consortium; when, in a latent disease case, a loss of consortium case arises for purposes of the “cap” statute; whether, in light of our decisions in John Crane, Inc. v. Scribner, 369 Md. 369, 372 , 800 A.2d 727, 728 (2002) and Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Pransky, 369 Md. 360, 363 , 800 A.2d 722, 723 (2002), the respondents’ loss of consortium claim, based on an injury incurred before they married, is barred as a matter of law and w 2005Vol.) § 11-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (hereinafter “Statutory Cap”), 2 applied to bar the respondents’ *472 claim for mesothelioma and loss of consortium; when, in a latent disease case, a loss of consortium case arises for purposes of the “cap” statute; whether, in light of our decisions in John Crane, Inc. v. Scribner, 369 Md. 369, 372 , 800 A.2d 727, 728 (2002) and Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Pransky, 369 Md. 360, 363 , 800 A.2d 722, 723 (2002), the respondents’ loss of consortium claim, based on an injury incurred before they married, is barred as a matter of law and w | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Eli Lilly & Co.green1 sentence2005The reasoning in Anderson is illustrative: “Consortium represents the marital partners’ interest in the continuance of the marital relationship as it existed at its inception ..., not upon some guarantee that the marital partners are free of any preexisting latent injuries.” 588 N.E.2d at 67-68 (citations and footnote omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Sutherland v. Auch Inter-Borough Transit Companygreen1 sentence1984The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held, in Sutherland v. Auch Inter-Borough Transit Co., 366 F.Supp. 127, 134 (E.D.Pa.1973), that Pennsylvania law would permit a loss of consortium action “where, at the time of the accident, plaintiffs were engaged to be married and the wedding date was less than a month away.” The District Court engaged in little analysis in reaching this conclusion and, in fact, “[n]o rationale is offered to support the departure from the traditional elements of a loss of consortium claim.” Childers v. Shannon, 183 N.J.Super. 591, 593 | 1 | 1 |
Childers v. Shannongreen2 sentences1984The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held, in Sutherland v. Auch Inter-Borough Transit Co., 366 F.Supp. 127, 134 (E.D.Pa.1973), that Pennsylvania law would permit a loss of consortium action “where, at the time of the accident, plaintiffs were engaged to be married and the wedding date was less than a month away.” The District Court engaged in little analysis in reaching this conclusion and, in fact, “[n]o rationale is offered to support the departure from the traditional elements of a loss of consortium claim.” Childers v. Shannon, 183 N.J.Super. 591, 593 1984The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held, in Sutherland v. Auch Inter-Borough Transit Co., 366 F.Supp. 127, 134 (E.D.Pa.1973), that Pennsylvania law would permit a loss of consortium action “where, at the time of the accident, plaintiffs were engaged to be married and the wedding date was less than a month away.” The District Court engaged in little analysis in reaching this conclusion and, in fact, “[n]o rationale is offered to support the departure from the traditional elements of a loss of consortium claim.” Childers v. Shannon, 183 N.J.Super. 591, 593 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Cook
green
2 sentences2006Although aware that Grimshaw considered when a loss of consortium claim arose in the context of the cap statute and a latent disease, holding that it arose at the same time as the predicate personal injury claim, the petitioner maintains that it is neither persuasive nor dispositive. 386 Md. at 484-86 , 872 A.2d 969 (emphasis supplied). 2006Although aware that Grimshaw considered when a loss of consortium claim arose in the context of the cap statute and a latent disease, holding that it arose at the same time as the predicate personal injury claim, the petitioner maintains that it is neither persuasive nor dispositive. 386 Md. at 484-86 , 872 A.2d 969 (emphasis supplied). | 2 | 2005–2006 |
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Gianotti
green
2 sentences2005In concluding that “[a] loss of consortium claim is derivative of the injured spouse’s claim for personal injury,” id. at 38 , 660 A.2d 423 ; Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 176 , 757 A.2d 118 (2000); Klein v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 92 Md.App. 477, 493 , 608 A.2d 1276 (1992), the Court explained: “When a physical injury results to a married person as a result of someone else’s tortious conduct, two injuries may arise: (1) the physical injury to the spouse who was directly injured by the tortious conduct and (2) the derivative loss of society, affection, assistance, and conjugal fellowship to his 2005Owens-Illinois characterizes this result as “an outrageous legal fiction,” but this result has been sanctioned by both Grimshaw and Gianotti, both of which were reviewed and affirmed as to when the loss of consortium claim arose in Cook, supra. Prior to Cook, we had modified the rule that couples have no loss of consortium claim for injuries that predated their marriages in Owens-Illinois v. Gianotti, 148 Md. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Deems v. Western Maryland Railway Co.
green
2 sentences1984Our Court of Appeals has held that a loss of consortium claim “can only be asserted in a joint action for injury to the marital relationship.” Deems, 247 Md. at 115 , 231 A.2d 514 . 1984Our Court of Appeals has held that a loss of consortium claim “can only be asserted in a joint action for injury to the marital relationship.” Deems, 247 Md. at 115 , 231 A.2d 514 . | 2 | 1984–1989 |
Proctor v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
green
2 sentences2014Area Transit Auth., 412 Md. 691, 727-28 , 990 A.2d 1048 (2010)), it survives to the extent that the other claims survive. 20 . 2014Area Transit Auth., 412 Md. 691, 727-28 , 990 A.2d 1048 (2010)), it survives to the extent that the other claims survive. 20 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
United States v. Streidel
green
2 sentences2013A year later, in United States v. Streidel, 329 Md. 533 , 620 A.2d 905 (1993), we rejected the views of the U.S. District Court in Franklin and the Court of Special Appeals in Potomac Electric and held that the General Assembly did not intend for the cap to apply to awards in wrongful death actions. 2013A year later, in United States v. Streidel, 329 Md. 533 , 620 A.2d 905 (1993), we rejected the views of the U.S. District Court in Franklin and the Court of Special Appeals in Potomac Electric and held that the General Assembly did not intend for the cap to apply to awards in wrongful death actions. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Hunter
green
2 sentences2006In Owens-Illinois v. Hunter, 162 Md.App. 385, 398-99 , 875 A.2d 157 (2005), the defendant argued for the imposition of the cap on the award for loss of consortium, just as Crane and Garlock argue for such an imposition here. 2006In Owens-Illinois v. Hunter, 162 Md.App. 385, 398-99 , 875 A.2d 157 (2005), the defendant argued for the imposition of the cap on the award for loss of consortium, just as Crane and Garlock argue for such an imposition here. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Gillespie-Linton v. Miles
green
2 sentences2005L.Rev. 685 (2000), addressing “whether the general rule (that no loss of consortium claim exists for an ante-nuptial tort) applies in cases where, at the time of the marriage, the injury to the spouse is latent and therefore has not been, and could not have been, reasonably discovered prior to the marriage,” Gianotti, supra, 148 Md.App. at 485 , 813 A.2d at 296 , it held: *480 “for purposes of applying the common law rule enunciated in [Gillespie-Linton v.] Miles, supra [ 58 Md.App. 484, 495 , 473 A.2d 947 (1984) ], a loss of consortium claim is barred only if, at the time the parties marry, t 2005L.Rev. 685 (2000), addressing “whether the general rule (that no loss of consortium claim exists for an ante-nuptial tort) applies in cases where, at the time of the marriage, the injury to the spouse is latent and therefore has not been, and could not have been, reasonably discovered prior to the marriage,” Gianotti, supra, 148 Md.App. at 485 , 813 A.2d at 296 , it held: *480 “for purposes of applying the common law rule enunciated in [Gillespie-Linton v.] Miles, supra [ 58 Md.App. 484, 495 , 473 A.2d 947 (1984) ], a loss of consortium claim is barred only if, at the time the parties marry, t | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Klein v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.
green
2 sentences2005In concluding that “[a] loss of consortium claim is derivative of the injured spouse’s claim for personal injury,” id. at 38 , 660 A.2d 423 ; Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 176 , 757 A.2d 118 (2000); Klein v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 92 Md.App. 477, 493 , 608 A.2d 1276 (1992), the Court explained: “When a physical injury results to a married person as a result of someone else’s tortious conduct, two injuries may arise: (1) the physical injury to the spouse who was directly injured by the tortious conduct and (2) the derivative loss of society, affection, assistance, and conjugal fellowship to his 2005In concluding that “[a] loss of consortium claim is derivative of the injured spouse’s claim for personal injury,” id. at 38 , 660 A.2d 423 ; Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 176 , 757 A.2d 118 (2000); Klein v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 92 Md.App. 477, 493 , 608 A.2d 1276 (1992), the Court explained: “When a physical injury results to a married person as a result of someone else’s tortious conduct, two injuries may arise: (1) the physical injury to the spouse who was directly injured by the tortious conduct and (2) the derivative loss of society, affection, assistance, and conjugal fellowship to his | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Okwa v. Harper
green
2 sentences2005In concluding that “[a] loss of consortium claim is derivative of the injured spouse’s claim for personal injury,” id. at 38 , 660 A.2d 423 ; Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 176 , 757 A.2d 118 (2000); Klein v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 92 Md.App. 477, 493 , 608 A.2d 1276 (1992), the Court explained: “When a physical injury results to a married person as a result of someone else’s tortious conduct, two injuries may arise: (1) the physical injury to the spouse who was directly injured by the tortious conduct and (2) the derivative loss of society, affection, assistance, and conjugal fellowship to his 2005In concluding that “[a] loss of consortium claim is derivative of the injured spouse’s claim for personal injury,” id. at 38 , 660 A.2d 423 ; Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 176 , 757 A.2d 118 (2000); Klein v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 92 Md.App. 477, 493 , 608 A.2d 1276 (1992), the Court explained: “When a physical injury results to a married person as a result of someone else’s tortious conduct, two injuries may arise: (1) the physical injury to the spouse who was directly injured by the tortious conduct and (2) the derivative loss of society, affection, assistance, and conjugal fellowship to his | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger
green
2 sentences2005Vol.) § 3-1401 et. seq. of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (“UCATA”), based on a default judgment entered against a third party defendant, (Babcock & Wilcox), in Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 350 Md. 452 , 713 A.2d 962 (1998), an asbestos case, who is also a third party defendant in the case sub judice and where there was, in the case sub *473 judice, no finding that the defaulting party was a joint tortfea- ' sor. 2005Vol.) § 3-1401 et. seq. of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (“UCATA”), based on a default judgment entered against a third party defendant, (Babcock & Wilcox), in Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 350 Md. 452 , 713 A.2d 962 (1998), an asbestos case, who is also a third party defendant in the case sub judice and where there was, in the case sub *473 judice, no finding that the defaulting party was a joint tortfea- ' sor. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw
green
2 sentences2002Grimshaw, 115 Md.App. at 166-67 , 692 A.2d 5 . 2002Grimshaw, 115 Md.App. at 166-67 , 692 A.2d 5 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Stager v. Schneider
green
1 sentence2002Id. at 1315 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Jane Doe John Doe v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., Cutter Laboratories Division
green
1 sentence1992Appellees moved to dismiss the loss of consortium claim under strict liability, relying on Doe v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., 675 F.Supp. 1466 (D.Md.1987), aff'd, 927 F.2d 187 (4th Cir.1991). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Doe v. Miles Laboratories, Cutter Laboratories Div.
green
2 sentences1992Appellees moved to dismiss the loss of consortium claim under strict liability, relying on Doe v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., 675 F.Supp. 1466 (D.Md.1987), aff'd, 927 F.2d 187 (4th Cir.1991). 1992The producer’s motion for summary judgment on the breach of warranties claim was granted, and on its motion for summary judgment on the loss of consortium claim, the Court granted the motion on the theory that “strict products liability focuses on the character of the product and not the conduct of the manufacturer” whereas recovery for loss of consortium focuses on the fact that “fault [has been] found on the part of the defendant, based either on negligent or intentional misconduct____” Doe, 675 F.Supp. at 1481 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Argonne Co. v. Hitaffer
green
2 sentences1989Cir.1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 , 71 S.Ct. 80 , 95 L.Ed. 624 (1950), when the court held that the wife also had a loss of consortium claim when her husband was negligently injured. 1989Cir.1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 , 71 S.Ct. 80 , 95 L.Ed. 624 (1950), when the court held that the wife also had a loss of consortium claim when her husband was negligently injured. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Carolin v. Commissioner
green
2 sentences1989Cir.1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 , 71 S.Ct. 80 , 95 L.Ed. 624 (1950), when the court held that the wife also had a loss of consortium claim when her husband was negligently injured. 1989The scope of consortium claims was broadened in Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 188 F.2d 811 (D.C.Cir.1950), cert. denied, 846 U.S. 852 , 71 S.Ct. 80 , 95 L.Ed. 624 (1950), when the court held that the wife also had a loss of consortium claim when her husband was negligently injured. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Abellon v. Hartford Insurance
green
2 sentences1988Co., 167 Cal.App.3d 21 , 212 Cal.Rptr. 852 (1985), the case upon which the Daleys rely as the principal support for their argument. 1988Co., 167 Cal.App.3d 21 , 212 Cal.Rptr. 852 (1985), the case upon which the Daleys rely as the principal support for their argument. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
United Services Automobile Assn. v. Warner
green
2 sentences1988After finding that the plaintiff’s loss of consortium claim arose out of his wife’s bodily injuries, the court stated: *557 [T]he principle consistently followed has been that where one person was injured or killed in the accident or occurrence, the single injury limit applied, regardless of the number of persons damaged as a result of that injury____ ... [T]he vast majority of jurisdictions follow the principle that all damage claims, direct or consequential, ... resulting from injury to one person, are subject to the “per person” limitation____ 64 Cal.App.3d at 963 , 135 Cal.Rptr. at 37 . 4 1988After finding that the plaintiff’s loss of consortium claim arose out of his wife’s bodily injuries, the court stated: *557 [T]he principle consistently followed has been that where one person was injured or killed in the accident or occurrence, the single injury limit applied, regardless of the number of persons damaged as a result of that injury____ ... [T]he vast majority of jurisdictions follow the principle that all damage claims, direct or consequential, ... resulting from injury to one person, are subject to the “per person” limitation____ 64 Cal.App.3d at 963 , 135 Cal.Rptr. at 37 . 4 | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.