71 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1979–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mahoney v. Lensinkgreen2 sentences1995"No appellate court case has yet addressed squarely the issue of whether, under any circumstances, a cause of action for the loss of filial consortium lies." Mahoney v. Lensink , 17 Conn. App. 130 , 141 (footnote) (1988). 1994See Mahoney v. Lensink , 17 Conn. App. 130 , 141 , 550 A.2d 1088 (1988), rev'd on other grounds , 213 Conn. 548 , 569 A.2d 518 (1990); Hopson v. St. | 2 | 4 |
Mahoney v. Lensinkgreen2 sentences1994See Mahoney v. Lensink , 17 Conn. App. 130 , 141 , 550 A.2d 1088 (1988), rev'd on other grounds , 213 Conn. 548 , 569 A.2d 518 (1990); Hopson v. St. 1994See Mahoney v. Lensink , 17 Conn. App. 130 , 141 , 550 A.2d 1088 (1988), rev'd on other grounds , 213 Conn. 548 , 569 A.2d 518 (1990); Hopson v. St. | 2 | 3 |
Bifolck v. Philip Morris, Inc.green2 sentences2021See footnote 2 of this opinion. 6 The plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly relied on § 20 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts because the ‘‘[a]doption of [the Restatement (Third) of Torts] for product liability claims has been rejected in Connecti- cut.’’ The plaintiff relies on Bifolck v. Philip Morris, Inc., 324 Conn. 402 , 408, 152 A.3d 1183 (2016), in which this court declined to adopt the Restatement (Third) or to make any substantive changes to our product liability tests, instead favoring ‘‘modest refinements’’ to the approach under the Restatement (Second). 2021See footnote 2 of this opinion. 6 The plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly relied on § 20 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts because the ‘‘[a]doption of [the Restatement (Third) of Torts] for product liability claims has been rejected in Connecti- cut.’’ The plaintiff relies on Bifolck v. Philip Morris, Inc., 324 Conn. 402 , 408, 152 A.3d 1183 (2016), in which this court declined to adopt the Restatement (Third) or to make any substantive changes to our product liability tests, instead favoring ‘‘modest refinements’’ to the approach under the Restatement (Second). | 2 | 2 |
Voris v. Molinarogreen2 sentences2019See also Voris v. Molinaro , supra, 302 Conn. at 797 -801 , 31 A.3d 363 (affirming judgment rendered upon trial court's granting of defendant's motion to strike loss of consortium claim on ground that predicate negligence claim brought by plaintiff's spouse had been settled). 2019See also Voris v. Molinaro , supra, 302 Conn. at 797 -801 , 31 A.3d 363 (affirming judgment rendered upon trial court's granting of defendant's motion to strike loss of consortium claim on ground that predicate negligence claim brought by plaintiff's spouse had been settled). | 2 | 2 |
Izzo v. Colonial Penn Insurancegreen2 sentences2017The court in Izzo identified the critical question as whether the loss of consortium claim arose "out of bodily injury sustained by 'one person' so as to make the 'per person' limit applicable, or is [a loss of consortium claim] a claim for bodily injury to a second person such as to invoke the 'per occurrence' limit." (Emphasis added.) Id., at 309 , 524 A.2d 641 . 2017The court in Izzo identified the critical question as whether the loss of consortium claim arose "out of bodily injury sustained by 'one person' so as to make the 'per person' limit applicable, or is [a loss of consortium claim] a claim for bodily injury to a second person such as to invoke the 'per occurrence' limit." (Emphasis added.) Id., at 309 , 524 A.2d 641 . | 1 | 8 |
Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.green2 sentences2000A loss of consortium claim is "dependant for its assertion. on the legal viability of the cause of action in the injured party." Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 212 Conn. 509 , 564 , 562 A.2d 1100 (1989). 2000A loss of consortium claim is "dependant for its assertion. on the legal viability of the cause of action in the injured party." Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 212 Conn. 509 , 564 , 562 A.2d 1100 (1989). | 1 | 7 |
Lynn v. Haybuster Manufacturing, Inc.green2 sentences1999The Supreme Court examined whether a loss of consortium claim could be maintained in the context of a products liability case in Lynn v. Haybuster Manufacturing, Inc. , 226 Conn. 282 , 289 , 627 A.2d 1288 (1993). 1999The Supreme Court examined whether a loss of consortium claim could be maintained in the context of a products liability case in Lynn v. Haybuster Manufacturing, Inc. , 226 Conn. 282 , 289 , 627 A.2d 1288 (1993). | 1 | 4 |
Keough, Admx. v. Keoughgreen2 sentences1994This court agrees with the reasoning of Judge Wagner in Toscano , supra, and holds that Connecticut does not allow a loss of consortium claim by a child based on injuries to a parent. 1993This court agrees with the reasoning of Judge Wagner in Toscano, supra, and holds that Connecticut does not allow a loss of consortium claim by a child based on injuries to a parent. | 1 | 4 |
Gurliacci v. Mayergreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Mueller v. Tepler, 312 Conn. 631 , 647, 655, 95 A.3d 1011 (2014) (in limiting rule in Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531 , 590 A.2d 914 [1991], Chief Justice Rogers reasoned "that allowing a plaintiff to maintain a loss of consortium claim under ... circumstances [in which she was not married to the injured person because such marriage was prohibited by law would] not impair preexisting expectations or reliance interests in any serious way"); State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418 , 479 n. 2, 953 A.2d 45 (2008) ( Palmer, J., concurring) (reasoning that lack of "any material reliance" on pre 2016See, e.g., Mueller v. Tepler, 312 Conn. 631 , 647, 655, 95 A.3d 1011 (2014) (in limiting rule in Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531 , 590 A.2d 914 [1991], Chief Justice Rogers reasoned "that allowing a plaintiff to maintain a loss of consortium claim under ... circumstances [in which she was not married to the injured person because such marriage was prohibited by law would] not impair preexisting expectations or reliance interests in any serious way"); State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418 , 479 n. 2, 953 A.2d 45 (2008) ( Palmer, J., concurring) (reasoning that lack of "any material reliance" on pre | 1 | 3 |
Musorofiti v. Vlcekgreen2 sentences2001The recent case of Musorofiti v. Vlcek, 65 Conn. App. 365 , ___ A.2d ___ (2001), discusses a loss of consortium claim at some length and defines such a claim as one that involves "the loss of services, financial support, and the variety of intangible relations that exist between spouses living together in marriage." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 372 . 2001The recent case of Musorofiti v. Vlcek, 65 Conn. App. 365 , ___ A.2d ___ (2001), discusses a loss of consortium claim at some length and defines such a claim as one that involves "the loss of services, financial support, and the variety of intangible relations that exist between spouses living together in marriage." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 372 . | 1 | 2 |
Parker v. Shaker Real Estate, Inc.green2 sentences1999Due to the derivative nature of this cause of action, the Appellate Court has upheld trial court decisions directing a verdict on a loss of consortium claim following dismissal of the injured spouse's claims; Parker v. Shaker Real Estate, Inc. , 47 Conn. App. 489 , 496 , 705 A.2d 210 (1998); and striking a loss of consortium claim where the injured spouse's claims were stricken; Greene v. Metals Selling Corp. , 3 Conn. App. 40 , 47 , 484 A.2d 478 (1984). 1999Due to the derivative nature of this cause of action, the Appellate Court has upheld trial court decisions directing a verdict on a loss of consortium claim following dismissal of the injured spouse's claims; Parker v. Shaker Real Estate, Inc. , 47 Conn. App. 489 , 496 , 705 A.2d 210 (1998); and striking a loss of consortium claim where the injured spouse's claims were stricken; Greene v. Metals Selling Corp. , 3 Conn. App. 40 , 47 , 484 A.2d 478 (1984). | 1 | 2 |
Allen v. Endrukaitisgreen2 sentences1996In Allen v. Endrukaitis, 35 Conn. Sup. 286 (1979), Judge Satter rejected the California rule and concluded that the statute of limitations for loss of consortium purposes should related back to the date of the spouse's injury claim and not the date of that injury. 1993See, e.g., Allen v. Endrukaitis, 35 Conn. Sup. 286 , 408 A.2d 673 (Super.Ct. 1979) (original plaintiff's claim for loss of consortium added to his complaint after the statute of limitations had passed, survived a motion to strike); Micherino v. Shanley, 2 CSCR 729 (June 16, 1987, Spear, J.) (wife's motion to intervene in husband's malpractice action so as to include her claim for loss of consortium, filed after expiration of statute of limitations, was denied). | 1 | 2 |
Golub v. Chrysler Corporation, No. Cv 91 0501082 (Oct. 22, 1992)green2 sentences1993I believe the sounder decision in this regard is found in Golub v. Chrysler Corp., 7 CSCR 1295 (October 22, 1992, Hennessey, J.), where it was held that a product liability statute does not permit a loss of consortium claim by the spouse of the one injured by the product. 1993See also Golub v. Chrysler Corporation, 7 CSCR 1295 , 1296 (1992) (Hennessey, J.) holding that the Products Liability Act, section 52-572m et seq., does not allow a derivative loss of consortium claim by the spouse of a person injured by a defective product. | 1 | 2 |
Gilman v. Shamesgreen2 sentences2025See Gilman v. Shames, 189 Conn. App. 736 , 747–48, 208 A.3d 1279 (2019) (‘‘Like a loss of consortium claim, a claim for bystander emotional distress is a derivat[ive] claim. . . . 2025See Gilman v. Shames, 189 Conn. App. 736 , 747–48, 208 A.3d 1279 (2019) (‘‘Like a loss of consortium claim, a claim for bystander emotional distress is a derivat[ive] claim. . . . | 1 | 1 |
| Lawrence v. Texasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moore v. McNamaragreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hooten v. Pennsylvania College of Optometrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Elliottgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rosander v. Copco Steel & Engineering Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Burke v. L & J Food & Liquor, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Desjarlais v. USAA Insurance Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Steele v. Botticellogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Zuniga v. Dwyergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Swartz v. United States Steel Corporationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Marshall v. Hartford Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| New Haven Savings Bank v. LaPlacegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Clarke v. Comissioner of Correctiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Borkowski v. Sachetigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associatesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Borkowski v. Sachetigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bhinder v. Sun Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jacoby v. Brinckerhoff
green
2 sentences2019Our Supreme Court's decision in Jacoby v. Brinckerhoff , supra, 250 Conn. 86 , 735 A.2d 347 , which analyzed the viability of a plaintiff's loss of consortium claim in the absence of a predicate action commenced by the plaintiff's former spouse, is instructive, however. 2019Our Supreme Court's decision in Jacoby v. Brinckerhoff , supra, 250 Conn. 86 , 735 A.2d 347 , which analyzed the viability of a plaintiff's loss of consortium claim in the absence of a predicate action commenced by the plaintiff's former spouse, is instructive, however. | 5 | 2000–2019 |
Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners
green
2 sentences1993However, the Supreme Court has disallowed a loss of consortium claim related to CT Page 8134 a nuisance or negligence highway defect claim in Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, 219 Conn. 179 (1991). 1992The plaintiffs have agreed to withdraw the fourth count, presumably because Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, 219 Conn. 179 , 199 , holds that a loss of consortium claim is not available where the underlying cause of action is for violation of the highway defects statute, section 13a-149 , which allows recovery only by the injured traveler. | 5 | 1992–1999 |
Ladd v. Douglas Trucking Co.
green
2 sentences2011In support of its conclusion that the settlement of the underlying claim extinguishes a loss of consortium claim, the majority contends that, because our statement to that effect in Hopson was reaffirmed in Ladd v. Douglas Trucking Co., 203 Conn. 187 , 523 A.2d 1301 (1987), and Jacoby v. Brinckerhoff, 250 Conn. 86 , 735 A.2d 347 (1999), disavowing that statement in Hopson would upset the well settled expectations that these cases created. 2011In support of its conclusion that the settlement of the underlying claim extinguishes a loss of consortium claim, the majority contends that, because our statement to that effect in Hopson was reaffirmed in Ladd v. Douglas Trucking Co., 203 Conn. 187 , 523 A.2d 1301 (1987), and Jacoby v. Brinckerhoff, 250 Conn. 86 , 735 A.2d 347 (1999), disavowing that statement in Hopson would upset the well settled expectations that these cases created. | 3 | 1993–2011 |
Wesson v. City of Milford
green
2 sentences2011Finally, the Appellate Court in Wesson , after observing that the Workers' Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31-275 et seq., provides the exclusive remedy for injuries incurred by employees in the workplace; Wesson v. Milford, supra, 5 Conn.App. at 372 , 498 A.2d 505 ; held that "[t]here is no logical reason why the legislature in 1913 could not have intended to abolish prospective common law derivative causes of action, such as actions for loss of consortium, not then recognized in Connecticut." Id., at 375-76 , 498 A.2d 505 . 2011Finally, the Appellate Court in Wesson , after observing that the Workers' Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31-275 et seq., provides the exclusive remedy for injuries incurred by employees in the workplace; Wesson v. Milford, supra, 5 Conn.App. at 372 , 498 A.2d 505 ; held that "[t]here is no logical reason why the legislature in 1913 could not have intended to abolish prospective common law derivative causes of action, such as actions for loss of consortium, not then recognized in Connecticut." Id., at 375-76 , 498 A.2d 505 . | 3 | 1993–2011 |
Hopson v. St. Mary's Hospital
green
2 sentences2011Mary's Hospital, 176 Conn. 485, 494 , 408 A.2d 260 (1979), to conclude that the plaintiff's loss of consortium claim was barred by the settlement of Voris' negligence claim. [4] The trial court rendered judgment for the defendant and this appeal followed. 2011Mary's Hospital, 176 Conn. 485, 494 , 408 A.2d 260 (1979), to conclude that the plaintiff's loss of consortium claim was barred by the settlement of Voris' negligence claim. [4] The trial court rendered judgment for the defendant and this appeal followed. | 3 | 1997–2011 |
Greene v. Metals Selling Corp.
green
2 sentences1999Due to the derivative nature of this cause of action, the Appellate Court has upheld trial court decisions directing a verdict on a loss of consortium claim following dismissal of the injured spouse's claims; Parker v. Shaker Real Estate, Inc. , 47 Conn. App. 489 , 496 , 705 A.2d 210 (1998); and striking a loss of consortium claim where the injured spouse's claims were stricken; Greene v. Metals Selling Corp. , 3 Conn. App. 40 , 47 , 484 A.2d 478 (1984). 1999Due to the derivative nature of this cause of action, the Appellate Court has upheld trial court decisions directing a verdict on a loss of consortium claim following dismissal of the injured spouse's claims; Parker v. Shaker Real Estate, Inc. , 47 Conn. App. 489 , 496 , 705 A.2d 210 (1998); and striking a loss of consortium claim where the injured spouse's claims were stricken; Greene v. Metals Selling Corp. , 3 Conn. App. 40 , 47 , 484 A.2d 478 (1984). | 3 | 1991–1999 |
Ratick Combustion v. Heating Pip. Cool. Bd., No. 353763 (Jan. 12, 1993)
neutral
2 sentences1993In Lindsey v. Lindberg Furnace, 8 CSCR 169 (January 12, 1993, Thompson, J.), the court also addressed the issue of whether a loss of consortium claim can be maintained in a PLA action. 1993(Citations omitted.) In Lindsey v. Lindberg Furnace, 8 CSCR 169 (January 12, 1993, Thompson, J.), the court also addressed the issues of whether a loss of consortium claim can be maintained in a product liability action. | 3 | 1993–1993 |
Mendillo v. Board of Education
red
2 sentences2014We further conclude that allowing plaintiffs in Sta- cey’s position to maintain a loss of consortium claim would not undermine any of the public policies that this court identified in Mendillo v. Board of Education, supra, 246 Conn. 456 , when it considered whether it should recognize loss of parental consortium claims. 1999CT Page 3850 The defendant further asks the court to find that a claim for filial consortium cannot stand as a matter of law in light of Mendillo v. Board of Education, 246 Conn. 456 (1998). | 2 | 1999–2014 |
Schiano v. Bliss Exterminating Co.
green
2 sentences2001The loss of consortium claim asserted by Reine Pelletier in the fifth count is merely derivative of her husband's claim, Schiano v. Bliss Exterminating Co ., 57 Conn. App. 406 , 414 n. 7, (2000). 2000Because the loss of consortium claim asserted by Reine Pelletier in the CT Page 15314 third count is merely derivative of her husband's claims, Schiano v. Bliss Exterminating Co. , 57 Conn. App. 406 , 414 n. 7, ___ A.2d ___ (2000), judgment also enters for Sordoni on the third count of the amended complaint. | 2 | 2000–2001 |
Marri v. Stamford Street Railroad Co.
green
2 sentences1993Co., 84 Conn. 9, 14-17 , 78 A. 582 (1911); the right of a wife to bring a loss of consortium claim was not recognized until well into the twentieth century. 1993Co., 84 Conn. 9, 14-17 , 78 A. 582 (1911); the right of a wife to bring a loss of consortium claim was not recognized until well into the twentieth century. | 2 | 1992–1993 |
Park Regional Corporation v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission
green
2 sentences1993Park Regional Corporation v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 144 Conn. 677, 682 , 136 A.2d 785 (1957). 1993Park Regional Corporation v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 144 Conn. 677, 682 , 136 A.2d 785 (1957). | 2 | 1993–1993 |
O'Connor v. O'Connor
green
2 sentences2016See, e.g., Mueller v. Tepler, 312 Conn. 631 , 647, 655, 95 A.3d 1011 (2014) (in limiting rule in Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531 , 590 A.2d 914 [1991], Chief Justice Rogers reasoned "that allowing a plaintiff to maintain a loss of consortium claim under ... circumstances [in which she was not married to the injured person because such marriage was prohibited by law would] not impair preexisting expectations or reliance interests in any serious way"); State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418 , 479 n. 2, 953 A.2d 45 (2008) ( Palmer, J., concurring) (reasoning that lack of "any material reliance" on pre 2016See, e.g., Mueller v. Tepler, 312 Conn. 631 , 647, 655, 95 A.3d 1011 (2014) (in limiting rule in Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531 , 590 A.2d 914 [1991], Chief Justice Rogers reasoned "that allowing a plaintiff to maintain a loss of consortium claim under ... circumstances [in which she was not married to the injured person because such marriage was prohibited by law would] not impair preexisting expectations or reliance interests in any serious way"); State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418 , 479 n. 2, 953 A.2d 45 (2008) ( Palmer, J., concurring) (reasoning that lack of "any material reliance" on pre | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Ozyck v. D'Atri green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Lisee v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Craig v. Driscoll
green
2 sentences2016See, e.g., Mueller v. Tepler, 312 Conn. 631 , 647, 655, 95 A.3d 1011 (2014) (in limiting rule in Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531 , 590 A.2d 914 [1991], Chief Justice Rogers reasoned "that allowing a plaintiff to maintain a loss of consortium claim under ... circumstances [in which she was not married to the injured person because such marriage was prohibited by law would] not impair preexisting expectations or reliance interests in any serious way"); State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418 , 479 n. 2, 953 A.2d 45 (2008) ( Palmer, J., concurring) (reasoning that lack of "any material reliance" on pre 2016See, e.g., Mueller v. Tepler, 312 Conn. 631 , 647, 655, 95 A.3d 1011 (2014) (in limiting rule in Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531 , 590 A.2d 914 [1991], Chief Justice Rogers reasoned "that allowing a plaintiff to maintain a loss of consortium claim under ... circumstances [in which she was not married to the injured person because such marriage was prohibited by law would] not impair preexisting expectations or reliance interests in any serious way"); State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418 , 479 n. 2, 953 A.2d 45 (2008) ( Palmer, J., concurring) (reasoning that lack of "any material reliance" on pre | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Morel v. Commissioner of Public Health
green
2 sentences2016See, e.g., Mueller v. Tepler, 312 Conn. 631 , 647, 655, 95 A.3d 1011 (2014) (in limiting rule in Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531 , 590 A.2d 914 [1991], Chief Justice Rogers reasoned "that allowing a plaintiff to maintain a loss of consortium claim under ... circumstances [in which she was not married to the injured person because such marriage was prohibited by law would] not impair preexisting expectations or reliance interests in any serious way"); State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418 , 479 n. 2, 953 A.2d 45 (2008) ( Palmer, J., concurring) (reasoning that lack of "any material reliance" on pre 2016See, e.g., Mueller v. Tepler, 312 Conn. 631 , 647, 655, 95 A.3d 1011 (2014) (in limiting rule in Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531 , 590 A.2d 914 [1991], Chief Justice Rogers reasoned "that allowing a plaintiff to maintain a loss of consortium claim under ... circumstances [in which she was not married to the injured person because such marriage was prohibited by law would] not impair preexisting expectations or reliance interests in any serious way"); State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418 , 479 n. 2, 953 A.2d 45 (2008) ( Palmer, J., concurring) (reasoning that lack of "any material reliance" on pre | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Board of Education
green
2 sentences2016See, e.g., Mueller v. Tepler, 312 Conn. 631 , 647, 655, 95 A.3d 1011 (2014) (in limiting rule in Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531 , 590 A.2d 914 [1991], Chief Justice Rogers reasoned "that allowing a plaintiff to maintain a loss of consortium claim under ... circumstances [in which she was not married to the injured person because such marriage was prohibited by law would] not impair preexisting expectations or reliance interests in any serious way"); State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418 , 479 n. 2, 953 A.2d 45 (2008) ( Palmer, J., concurring) (reasoning that lack of "any material reliance" on pre 2016See, e.g., Mueller v. Tepler, 312 Conn. 631 , 647, 655, 95 A.3d 1011 (2014) (in limiting rule in Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531 , 590 A.2d 914 [1991], Chief Justice Rogers reasoned "that allowing a plaintiff to maintain a loss of consortium claim under ... circumstances [in which she was not married to the injured person because such marriage was prohibited by law would] not impair preexisting expectations or reliance interests in any serious way"); State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418 , 479 n. 2, 953 A.2d 45 (2008) ( Palmer, J., concurring) (reasoning that lack of "any material reliance" on pre | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. DeJesus
green
2 sentences2016See, e.g., Mueller v. Tepler, 312 Conn. 631 , 647, 655, 95 A.3d 1011 (2014) (in limiting rule in Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531 , 590 A.2d 914 [1991], Chief Justice Rogers reasoned "that allowing a plaintiff to maintain a loss of consortium claim under ... circumstances [in which she was not married to the injured person because such marriage was prohibited by law would] not impair preexisting expectations or reliance interests in any serious way"); State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418 , 479 n. 2, 953 A.2d 45 (2008) ( Palmer, J., concurring) (reasoning that lack of "any material reliance" on pre 2016See, e.g., Mueller v. Tepler, 312 Conn. 631 , 647, 655, 95 A.3d 1011 (2014) (in limiting rule in Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531 , 590 A.2d 914 [1991], Chief Justice Rogers reasoned "that allowing a plaintiff to maintain a loss of consortium claim under ... circumstances [in which she was not married to the injured person because such marriage was prohibited by law would] not impair preexisting expectations or reliance interests in any serious way"); State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418 , 479 n. 2, 953 A.2d 45 (2008) ( Palmer, J., concurring) (reasoning that lack of "any material reliance" on pre | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Charron v. Amaral green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Cruz v. Montanez green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| LITTLE v. Jarvis green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of America green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Norris v. Atlanta & West Point Railroad green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Deems v. Western Maryland Railway Co. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Manzitti v. Amsler green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Oldani v. Lieberman green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Yates v. State green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Kibble v. Weeks Dredging & Construction Co. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Conradt v. Four Star Promotions, Inc. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. St. Onge neutral | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Pugh v. Super Fresh Food Markets, Inc. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Stone Mountain Memorial Ass'n v. Herrington green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Norris v. Atlanta & West Point Railroad green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Hall v. Gardens Services, Inc. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Guttman Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Ass'n green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Casey v. Pohlman green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Wei Ping Wu v. Town of Fairfield green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.