8 South Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1994–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co.green2 sentences1996In Bar-ger, we cited with approval the language of Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co., 188 Wis. 376 , 206 N.W. 198, 200 (1925), where it was stated: The parent is by law required to support and care for his child. 1996In Bar-ger, we cited with approval the language of Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co., 188 Wis. 376 , 206 N.W. 198, 200 (1925), where it was stated: The parent is by law required to support and care for his child. | 3 | 3 |
Miller v. Hernandezgreen1 sentence2000Compare Miller, 520 N.W.2d at 271 (noting that the court and parties agreed to use a special interrogatory to determine how to calculate prejudgment interest, but failed to do so). [¶ 44.] Although special interrogatories would have been helpful to appellate review in this case, the jury instructions and the general verdict form were correct, even though general, and the real problem appears to be lack of proof rather than lack of specificity. | 1 | 1 |
Page v. Hibbardgreen2 sentences1998Page v. Hibbard, 119 Ill.2d 41 , 115 Ill.Dec. 544, 547 , 518 N.E.2d 69, 72 (1987). 3 [¶ 13.] Zoss cites Dionne v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 621 A.2d 414, 417-18 (Me.1993), for the same proposition but also argues that the burden was on Insurer to ferret out evidence of like damages; however, two years after Dionne , the Maine Supreme Court ruled that the burden is on the employee or spouse to either obtain an express allocation in the settlement or a judicial determination of the loss of consortium claim. 1998Page v. Hibbard, 119 Ill.2d 41 , 115 Ill.Dec. 544, 547 , 518 N.E.2d 69, 72 (1987). 3 [¶ 13.] Zoss cites Dionne v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 621 A.2d 414, 417-18 (Me.1993), for the same proposition but also argues that the burden was on Insurer to ferret out evidence of like damages; however, two years after Dionne , the Maine Supreme Court ruled that the burden is on the employee or spouse to either obtain an express allocation in the settlement or a judicial determination of the loss of consortium claim. | 1 | 1 |
Nichols v. Cantara & Sonsgreen1 sentence1998See Nichols v. Cantara & Sons, 659 A.2d 258, 259-61 (Me.1995). | 1 | 1 |
Dionne v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co.green1 sentence1998Page v. Hibbard, 119 Ill.2d 41 , 115 Ill.Dec. 544, 547 , 518 N.E.2d 69, 72 (1987). 3 [¶ 13.] Zoss cites Dionne v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 621 A.2d 414, 417-18 (Me.1993), for the same proposition but also argues that the burden was on Insurer to ferret out evidence of like damages; however, two years after Dionne , the Maine Supreme Court ruled that the burden is on the employee or spouse to either obtain an express allocation in the settlement or a judicial determination of the loss of consortium claim. | 1 | 1 |
Freer v. Hysan Corporationgreen2 sentences1998During this time, Insurer will cease the monthly payments. (7) After the number of months of payments provided for in (6) have elapsed, Insurer will continue to pay Zoss her monthly benefit amount, not subject to any lien. 7 *264 Accord Denius v. Robertson, 98 Ill.App.3d 83 , 53 Ill.Dec. 701, 704-05 , 424 N.E.2d 336, 339-40 (1981); see also Freer v. Hysan Corp., 108 Ill.2d 421 , 92 Ill.Dec. 221, 225 , 484 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 (1985) (“[T]he suspension of payments is the most expedient and accurate method for protecting the employer’s rights.”). [¶ 18.] The order granting summary judgment to Zoss 1998During this time, Insurer will cease the monthly payments. (7) After the number of months of payments provided for in (6) have elapsed, Insurer will continue to pay Zoss her monthly benefit amount, not subject to any lien. 7 *264 Accord Denius v. Robertson, 98 Ill.App.3d 83 , 53 Ill.Dec. 701, 704-05 , 424 N.E.2d 336, 339-40 (1981); see also Freer v. Hysan Corp., 108 Ill.2d 421 , 92 Ill.Dec. 221, 225 , 484 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 (1985) (“[T]he suspension of payments is the most expedient and accurate method for protecting the employer’s rights.”). [¶ 18.] The order granting summary judgment to Zoss | 1 | 1 |
Denius v. Robertsongreen2 sentences1998During this time, Insurer will cease the monthly payments. (7) After the number of months of payments provided for in (6) have elapsed, Insurer will continue to pay Zoss her monthly benefit amount, not subject to any lien. 7 *264 Accord Denius v. Robertson, 98 Ill.App.3d 83 , 53 Ill.Dec. 701, 704-05 , 424 N.E.2d 336, 339-40 (1981); see also Freer v. Hysan Corp., 108 Ill.2d 421 , 92 Ill.Dec. 221, 225 , 484 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 (1985) (“[T]he suspension of payments is the most expedient and accurate method for protecting the employer’s rights.”). [¶ 18.] The order granting summary judgment to Zoss 1998During this time, Insurer will cease the monthly payments. (7) After the number of months of payments provided for in (6) have elapsed, Insurer will continue to pay Zoss her monthly benefit amount, not subject to any lien. 7 *264 Accord Denius v. Robertson, 98 Ill.App.3d 83 , 53 Ill.Dec. 701, 704-05 , 424 N.E.2d 336, 339-40 (1981); see also Freer v. Hysan Corp., 108 Ill.2d 421 , 92 Ill.Dec. 221, 225 , 484 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 (1985) (“[T]he suspension of payments is the most expedient and accurate method for protecting the employer’s rights.”). [¶ 18.] The order granting summary judgment to Zoss | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Shiels v. Audette
green
1 sentence2007Id. (analogizing with Titze v. Miller, 337 N.W.2d 176 (S.D.1983) (holding that a husband’s cause of action for loss of consortium failed when the injured spouse was unable to recover damages for her own personal injuries, because although separate and distinct from the injured spouse’s claim for personal injuries, the loss of consortium claim was in any case derivative in nature)). [¶ 17.] This was precisely the basis upon which we answered question four in Knowles . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Titze v. Miller
green
1 sentence2007Id. (analogizing with Titze v. Miller, 337 N.W.2d 176 (S.D.1983) (holding that a husband’s cause of action for loss of consortium failed when the injured spouse was unable to recover damages for her own personal injuries, because although separate and distinct from the injured spouse’s claim for personal injuries, the loss of consortium claim was in any case derivative in nature)). [¶ 17.] This was precisely the basis upon which we answered question four in Knowles . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Zoss v. Dakota Truck Underwriters
green
2 sentences1999Zoss-1, 1998 SD 23, ¶ 17 , 575 N.W.2d at 263 . [¶ 11.] On remand, the trial court determined that Zoss had no viable loss of consortium claim. 1999Zoss-1, 1998 SD 23, ¶ 17 , 575 N.W.2d at 263 . [¶ 11.] On remand, the trial court determined that Zoss had no viable loss of consortium claim. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Lepic Ex Rel. Lepic v. Iowa Mutual Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences1994The insurer argued that the phrase, “for all damages for bodily injury sustained by any one person in any one accident” was not ambiguous, thus limiting liability under the policy to “one person” coverage and not allowing recovery of a loss of consortium claim. 402 N.W.2d at 761-63 . 1994The insurer argued that the phrase, "for all damages for bodily injury sustained by any one person in any one accident" was not ambiguous, thus limiting liability under the policy to "one person" coverage and not allowing recovery of a loss of consortium claim. 402 N.W.2d at 761-63 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.