allowance claim in Michigan

1936When the commissioners shall allow any claim in whole or in part, and the sum allowed, being objected to, shall amount to twenty dollars, in either of which cases the aggrieved party may appeal. ’ ’ In Winter v. Winter, 90 Mich. 197 , involving the identical statute and in answer to the contention that appeal would not lie because no objection to the allowance of the claim had been made before the commissioners, the court said: “We see no force in these objections.

1936When the commissioners shall allow any claim in whole or in part, and the sum allowed, being objected to, shall amount to twenty dollars, in either of which cases the aggrieved party may appeal." In Winter v. Winter , 90 Mich. 197 , involving the identical statute and in answer to the contention that appeal would not lie because no objection to the allowance of the claim had been made before the commissioners, the court said: "We see no force in these objections.

2014If the allowance of the claim to exercise this secondary right would result in defeating the main purpose to be attained, it must be refused,” Id. at 275 , quoting Ex parte Small, 69 SC 43; 48 SE 40 (1904).

2014If the allowance of the claim to exercise this secondary right would result in defeating the main purpose to be attained, it must be refused,” Id. at 275 , quoting Ex parte Small, 69 SC 43; 48 SE 40 (1904).

1999Accordingly, as petitioner correctly *338 asserts, by the clear and unambiguous language of subsection 717(1), Frankenmuth Mut, supra, respondent’s failure to comply with the time limits for mailing of a notice of action resulted in petitioner’s claim’s being deemed allowed by operation of law.

1970Atkinson v. Birmingham (1922), 44 RI 123 (116 A 205, 36 ALR 366 ); Motley v. Dugan (Mo App, 1945), 191 SW2d 979 ; Vesey v. Connally (1960), 112 Ohio App 225 ( 175 NE2d 876 ); Wendelboe v. Jacobson (1960), 10 Utah 2d 344 ( 353 P2d 178 ).

1970Atkinson v. Birmingham (1922), 44 RI 123 (116 A 205, 36 ALR 366 ); Motley v. Dugan (Mo App, 1945), 191 SW2d 979 ; Vesey v. Connally (1960), 112 Ohio App 225 ( 175 NE2d 876 ); Wendelboe v. Jacobson (1960), 10 Utah 2d 344 ( 353 P2d 178 ).

1970Atkinson v. Birmingham (1922), 44 RI 123 (116 A 205, 36 ALR 366 ); Motley v. Dugan (Mo App, 1945), 191 SW2d 979 ; Vesey v. Connally (1960), 112 Ohio App 225 ( 175 NE2d 876 ); Wendelboe v. Jacobson (1960), 10 Utah 2d 344 ( 353 P2d 178 ).

1970Atkinson v. Birmingham (1922), 44 RI 123 (116 A 205, 36 ALR 366 ); Motley v. Dugan (Mo App, 1945), 191 SW2d 979 ; Vesey v. Connally (1960), 112 Ohio App 225 ( 175 NE2d 876 ); Wendelboe v. Jacobson (1960), 10 Utah 2d 344 ( 353 P2d 178 ).

1959Under the authority of In re Linstead Estate, supra, we do not think that the stipulated facts on behalf of Wayne county disclose a sufficient ability to pay prior to July 9, 1957.

1955In re LaFreniere’s Estate, 316 Mich 285 .

1939In re Estate of Leland, 277 Mich. 19 .

1935Laws 1929, § 8424, which reads as follows: “If death results from the injury the employer shall pay, or cause to be paid as hereinafter provided, in addition to the indemnity paid to dependents, the reasonable expense of his last sickness and burying, which shall not exceed two hundred dollars, in addition .to any sum the employer may be required to pay under the provisions of section four of part two of this act. ’ ’ In Johns v. Wisconsin Land & Lumber Co., 268 Mich. 675 , the plaintiff, who conducted a funeral home, petitioned the department of labor and industry under this section for the a

1931In Re Shailer Estate, 172 Mich. 600, 611 , wherein a similar question was considered, this court said: “In any event, the allowance of a claim to compensation by a trustee is a discretionary matter, and we have no disposition to disagree with the finding of the learned circuit judge upon this point.” The trial court was familiar with the facts as disclosed in the record.

1912Henderson v. Sherman, 47 Mich. 267 ( 11 N. W. 153 ).

1912Henderson v. Sherman, 47 Mich. 267 ( 11 N. W. 153 ).

1909The answer to this contention is that the claim, which is fully set forth in the record attached to the bill of complaint and the plea, was not for the most part barred by the statute of limitations, but only certain items thereof, and it does not follow that these items might not have been shown by testimony to the satisfaction of the probate court to have come within some of the exceptions preventing the running of the statute; but, conceding that some of the items were unlawful claims, still these did not oust the court of jurisdiction, since other items were proper subjects for allowance,

1892Stat. § 5913, provides that— “ The final discision and judgment, in cases so appealed, shall be certified by the circuit court or Supreme Court, as the case may be, to the probate court; and the same proceedings shall be had thereon as if such decision had been reported by the commissioners. ” It was held in La Roe v. Freeland, 8 Mich. 531 , that the correct form of the judgment in the circuit court on appeal would be an adjudication of the allowance of the claim at a certain sum, or a disallowance, and not a judgment against the administrator in a common-law form.

1889Mr. Culver after-wards brought a new suit on the claim itself, and prevailed, as will be seen hereafter. i In the same volume (Durfee v. Abbott, 50 Mich. 479 , 15 N. W.

1889Mr. Culver after-wards brought a new suit on the claim itself, and prevailed, as will be seen hereafter. i In the same volume (Durfee v. Abbott, 50 Mich. 479 , 15 N. W.