allowance claim in New York

1965In accordance with section 211 of the Surrogate’s Court Act (derived from former section 210 with modifications), the allowance of a claim by an estate representative establishes its prima facie validity (Matter of Dole, 168 App. Div. 253 ; Matter of Warrin, 56 App. Div. 414 ).

1961If the surrogate shall sustain the objections in a case where the claim * * * has not been paid, the claim shall be deemed to be rejected by the accountant at the time of such determination, and the time between the presentation of the claim * * * and the time of such, determination, shall not he a part of the time limited in this act for commencing an action thereon.” The allowance of the claim by the administrator established prima facie its validity (Matter of Warrin, 56 App. Div. 414 ; Matter of Dole, 168 App. Div. 253 ). and its validity can only be challenged upon the ground that it did

1965In accordance with section 211 of the Surrogate’s Court Act (derived from former section 210 with modifications), the allowance of a claim by an estate representative establishes its prima facie validity (Matter of Dole, 168 App. Div. 253 ; Matter of Warrin, 56 App. Div. 414 ).

1961If the surrogate shall sustain the objections in a case where the claim * * * has not been paid, the claim shall be deemed to be rejected by the accountant at the time of such determination, and the time between the presentation of the claim * * * and the time of such, determination, shall not he a part of the time limited in this act for commencing an action thereon.” The allowance of the claim by the administrator established prima facie its validity (Matter of Warrin, 56 App. Div. 414 ; Matter of Dole, 168 App. Div. 253 ). and its validity can only be challenged upon the ground that it did

2014The statute provides: “(a) No claim shall be allowed and ordered to be paid by the corporation if the court finds upon the hearing for the allowance of the claim that it is founded upon a judgment which was entered by default or consent of the defendant. “(b) When the corporation receives notice of intention to enter judgment and intention to file a claim against the corporation and the time allowed for filing an answer has expired, the corporation shall be granted a reasonable time after the receipt of notice by it to answer and to defend the action. “(c) If upon a hearing for the allowance o

2014The statute provides: “(a) No claim shall be allowed and ordered to be paid by the corporation if the court finds upon the hearing for the allowance of the claim that it is founded upon a judgment which was entered by default or consent of the defendant. “(b) When the corporation receives notice of intention to enter judgment and intention to file a claim against the corporation and the time allowed for filing an answer has expired, the corporation shall be granted a reasonable time after the receipt of notice by it to answer and to defend the action. “(c) If upon a hearing for the allowance o

2014The statute provides: “(a) No claim shall be allowed and ordered to be paid by the corporation if the court finds upon the hearing for the allowance of the claim that it is founded upon a judgment which was entered by default or consent of the defendant. “(b) When the corporation receives notice of intention to enter judgment and intention to file a claim against the corporation and the time allowed for filing an answer has expired, the corporation shall be granted a reasonable time after the receipt of notice by it to answer and to defend the action. “(c) If upon a hearing for the allowance o

2014The statute provides: “(a) No claim shall be allowed and ordered to be paid by the corporation if the court finds upon the hearing for the allowance of the claim that it is founded upon a judgment which was entered by default or consent of the defendant. “(b) When the corporation receives notice of intention to enter judgment and intention to file a claim against the corporation and the time allowed for filing an answer has expired, the corporation shall be granted a reasonable time after the receipt of notice by it to answer and to defend the action. “(c) If upon a hearing for the allowance o

2019Co. , 145 AD3d 601 [1st Dept 2016]; Matter of Midland Ins.

1984The final impediment to an allowance of the claim is the satisfaction of the Department’s burden of proving that the decedent had “sufficient income and resources to provide medical assistance as determined by the regulations of the department” (Social Services Law § 366 [3] [a]) during the period MA was provided (Matter of Dabney, 104 AD2d 678 , supra).

1972Co., 109 U. S. 522, 526 .) In this case the hardship is so flagrant and plaintiff’s oppression so apparent, as to justify the allowance of the defense interposed, and if established at trial, deny foreclosure.

1970(Jordan v. National Shoe and Leather Bank, 74 N. Y. 467 ; Gilmartin v. Osborne Trust Co., 266 App. Div. 1022 , affid. 292 N. Y. 629 ; Gerseta Corp. v. Equitable Trust Co., 241 N. Y. 418 .) Objection IVB relates to the allowance of a claim of one P. C.

1970(Jordan v. National Shoe and Leather Bank, 74 N. Y. 467 ; Gilmartin v. Osborne Trust Co., 266 App. Div. 1022 , affid. 292 N. Y. 629 ; Gerseta Corp. v. Equitable Trust Co., 241 N. Y. 418 .) Objection IVB relates to the allowance of a claim of one P. C.

1970(Jordan v. National Shoe and Leather Bank, 74 N. Y. 467 ; Gilmartin v. Osborne Trust Co., 266 App. Div. 1022 , affid. 292 N. Y. 629 ; Gerseta Corp. v. Equitable Trust Co., 241 N. Y. 418 .) Objection IVB relates to the allowance of a claim of one P. C.

1970(Jordan v. National Shoe and Leather Bank, 74 N. Y. 467 ; Gilmartin v. Osborne Trust Co., 266 App. Div. 1022 , affid. 292 N. Y. 629 ; Gerseta Corp. v. Equitable Trust Co., 241 N. Y. 418 .) Objection IVB relates to the allowance of a claim of one P. C.

1962It appears quite clearly to this court that the assignment of the Standard Electric Equipment Corporation stock was a prerequisite to the payment of any alimony (see Matter of Rosenfield, 284 App. Div. 937, 939 , supra).

1961The court is therefore limited to a consideration of the question of merely whether the claim was allowed fraudulently or negligently (Matter of Fitzpatrick, 123 Misc. 779, 783 ; Matter of Dorland, 100 Misc. 236, 245 ) and the claimant is not required to participate in the trial of those objections.

1961Should the allowance of the claim be not sustained, the claimant will then be in the same position as she would have been had the claim been initially rejected by the administrator (Matter of Fitzpatrick, supra; Matter of Borland, supra; Matter of Soll, 53 N. Y.

1961The court is therefore limited to a consideration of the question of merely whether the claim was allowed fraudulently or negligently (Matter of Fitzpatrick, 123 Misc. 779, 783 ; Matter of Dorland, 100 Misc. 236, 245 ) and the claimant is not required to participate in the trial of those objections.

1961S. 2d 215; Michaels v. Flach, 197 App. Div. 478 ); that is, she may institute suit in another forum within three months thereafter (Surrogate’s Ct. Act, § 211), where she may demand and be entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right.

1958(Matter of Dole, 168 App. Div. 253 ; Matter of Rhinelander, 264 App. Div. 607 .) The court finds that the executrix was not negligent in allowing the claim.

1954The allowance of a hearing is discretionary with the commission, and the failure to grant one is not, without more, an abuse of discretion (Matter of Billingslea v. McGoldrick, 305 N. Y. 641 ; Matter of Mouakad v. Ross, 274 App. Div. 74 ).

1954The allowance of a hearing is discretionary with the commission, and the failure to grant one is not, without more, an abuse of discretion (Matter of Billingslea v. McGoldrick, 305 N. Y. 641 ; Matter of Mouakad v. Ross, 274 App. Div. 74 ).

1954The question as to whether an interested party has been deprived of “ a reasonable opportunity to be heard ” depends upon the facts in each case (Matter of Granville v. Ross, 274 App. Div. 491 ).

1949(Lyon v. Smith, 142 App. Div. 186 .) The real objection to the allowance of this claim is that it is now a well-known fact that a note may be scientifically examined and the approximate age of the ink may be determined within quite definite limits and the age of the paper may often be determined with absolute definiteness; the genuineness of the decedent’s signature may be determined by an examination by handwriting experts and there are many other tests that could be applied to such a note.

1945The Supreme Court has lately told us, concerning the selection of grand jurors, that “it is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community ” (Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 130 .) “ The fundamental purpose of the grand jury system is to obtain a group of men and women who represent a fair and impartial cross-section of the citizens of the county; each one with his or her own individual thoughts, experiences and reactions ” (In re Grand Jurors etc., 25 N. Y.

1945This did not amount to an allowance of the claim (Matter of Brown, 60 Misc. 35 ).

1944Respondent relies principally upon Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co. ( 235 N. Y. 1 ), where it was held that in an action where issue had been joined by answer and a trial had been had and the Appellate Division had reversed the determination of the trial court and had made new findings and a new decree in accordance with the power vested in it by statute, it had the power to grant an additional allowance under rule 200 of the Rules of Civil Practice.

1940My decisions in Matter of Grifenhagen ( 168 Misc. 568 ; 174 id. 559) and Matter of Burr (143 id. 877; affd., 239 App. Div. 774 ), which are cited by the petitioner here in favor of the allowance of the claim of the estate as a setoff, have no relevancy to the circumstances in the present proceeding.

1940My decisions in Matter of Grifenhagen ( 168 Misc. 568 ; 174 id. 559) and Matter of Burr (143 id. 877; affd., 239 App. Div. 774 ), which are cited by the petitioner here in favor of the allowance of the claim of the estate as a setoff, have no relevancy to the circumstances in the present proceeding.

1938(Miller v. State, 229 App. Div. 423 .) ” The above decision was that of Cross Island Realty Corp. v. State (Claim No. 21690) (unreported).