allowance claim in California

1921(Morton v. Adams, 124 Cal. 229 [ 71 Am.

1906Rep. 53 , 56 Pac. 1038 ]: “The allowance of a claim is not in any true sense a judgment.” In Estate of Glenn, 74 Cal. 567 , [ 16 Pac. 396 ], cases were cited to show “that for some purposes the allowance of a claim is a judgment.” The fact that the allowance and approval may be contested at subsequent stages of the proceedings in probate (Estate of Lohse, 62 Cal. 413 ) shows that the allowance is not a final judgment in the full sense of that term.

1989In In re Steinberg (1983) 148 Cal. App.3d 14, 20 [ 195 Cal. Rptr. 613 ], the court recognized that a moviemaker had a First Amendment right to disseminate his movie, but that this right was limited by his agreement to submit the final version of the movie to the juvenile court for editing. [9] In Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, Pa. (3d Cir.1988) 853 F.2d 1084, 1094-1101 , a cable television franchisee was held under federal law to have voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived its First Amendment rights by an agreement with the franchisor.

1989In In re Steinberg (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 14, 20 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 613 ], the court recognized that a moviemaker had a First Amendment right to disseminate his movie, but that this right was limited by his agreement to submit the final version of the movie to the juvenile court for editing. 9 In Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, Pa. (3d Cir. 1988) 853 F.2d 1084, 1094-1101 , a cable television franchisee was held under federal law to have voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived its First Amendment rights by an agreement with the franchisor.

1974Bank, 207 Cal. App.2d 199 , at page 203 [ 24 Cal. Rptr. 384 ]: "`"... that the allowance of a claim against a solvent estate is not equivalent to an ordinary judgment.

1974Bank, 201 Cal.App.2d 199, at page 203 [ 24 Cal.Rptr. 384 ]: “ ‘ . . that the allowance of a claim against a solvent estate is not equivalent to an ordinary judgment.

1963A comparable situation is discussed in Smith v. Miller, 5 Cal.App.2d 564 , where the court at page 569 [ 43 P.2d 347 ] said: “These remedies being inconsistent, the vendor may elect which he would pursue but he cannot have both, and an election exercised to pursue one forfeits his right to subsequently pursue the other [ Citations]. ’ ’ Thus, we come to the conclusion that the filing and approval of the creditor’s claim for the full contract price passed the title to the respondent and this had the same force as a judgment of the court (Potts v. Mehrmann, 50 Cal.App. 622, 625 [ 195 P. 941 ]);

1899That case refers to and cites “numerous decisions which hold that for some purposes the allowance of a claim is a judgment”; admits that “the allowance is not conclusive upon the heirs,” and cites Magraw v. McGlynn, 26 Cal. 420 , to the effect that '“claims so allowed and approved pass into judgments of a qualified character only.” In the next ease cited by appellant—Walkerley v. Bacon, 85 Cal. 140—a claim was allowed for only half of the amount for which-it was presented.

1952The basic case is Estate of Glenn, supra, and the following quotation from the opinion in that case clearly shows the basis of that decision ( 74 Cal. 567 -568) : “Section 1504 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which in this respect is substantially the same as section 140 of the old Practice Act (see Laws 1851, p. 465) provides: ‘A judgment rendered against an executor or • administrator, upon any claim for money against the estate of his testator or intestate, only establishes the claim in the same manner as if it had been allowed by the executor or administrator and a judged “This is an expre

1906Rep. 53 , 56 Pac. 1038 ]: “The allowance of a claim is not in any true sense a judgment.” In Estate of Glenn, 74 Cal. 567 , [ 16 Pac. 396 ], cases were cited to show “that for some purposes the allowance of a claim is a judgment.” The fact that the allowance and approval may be contested at subsequent stages of the proceedings in probate (Estate of Lohse, 62 Cal. 413 ) shows that the allowance is not a final judgment in the full sense of that term.

1946(Harlan v. Harlan, 154 Cal. 341 [ 98 P. 32 ] ; Saunders v. Simms, 183 Cal. 167 [ 190 P. 806 ] ; Crowley v. Superior Court, supra ; McNabb v. McNabb, 47 Cal.App.2d 623 [ 118 P.2d 869 ] ; Shields v. Shields, 55 Cal.App.2d 579 [ 130 P.2d 982 ].) The doctrine of laches can be invoked only where by reason of plaintiff’s acts the allowance of the claim would work an unwarranted injustice.

1946(Harlan v. Harlan, 154 Cal. 341 [ 98 P. 32 ] ; Saunders v. Simms, 183 Cal. 167 [ 190 P. 806 ] ; Crowley v. Superior Court, supra ; McNabb v. McNabb, 47 Cal.App.2d 623 [ 118 P.2d 869 ] ; Shields v. Shields, 55 Cal.App.2d 579 [ 130 P.2d 982 ].) The doctrine of laches can be invoked only where by reason of plaintiff’s acts the allowance of the claim would work an unwarranted injustice.

1942Bank (1936), 15 Cal. App. (2d) 293, 298 [ 59 Pac. (2d) 606 ]; Estate of Wilson (1929), 97 Cal. App. 529, 531 [ 275 Pac. 977 ]; and In Re Sullenberger (1887), 72 Cal. 549, 552 [ 14 Pac. 513 ], orders vacating the *76 allowance of claims by the judge were upheld under section 937 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which authorizes the vacation of "an order made out of court, without notice to the adverse party.” Other cases also have designated the judge’s allowance of a claim as an "order.” (Haub v. Leggett (1911), 160 Cal. 491, 495 [ 117 Pac. 556 ]; Estate of Spanier (1898), 120 Cal. 698, 699 [ 5

1940This construction of the code provision in question does not in any way deprive appellant of the opportunity to show that the claim should not have been allowed, for the court upon ex parte application might on sufficient showing have set aside the allowance of the claim (In re Sullenberger, 72 Cal. 549, 552 [ 14 Pac. 513 ]), or the claim could have been set aside upon the motion of appellant, had he introduced on the hearing of such motion evidence to show that the claim had been erroneously approved.

1921(Hall v. Cayot, 141 Cal. 13 [ 74 Pac. 299 ]; Estate of More, 121 Cal. 638 [ 54 Pac. 148 ].) And it is held thgt the allowance of a claim is not in any true sense *423 a judgment.

1920(Hall v. Cayot, 141 Cal. 13 , [ 74 Pac. 299 ]; Estate of More, 121 Cal. 638 , [ 54 Pac. 148 ].) And it is held that the allowance of a claim is not in any true sense a judgment.

1921(Hall v. Cayot, 141 Cal. 13 [ 74 Pac. 299 ]; Estate of More, 121 Cal. 638 [ 54 Pac. 148 ].) And it is held thgt the allowance of a claim is not in any true sense *423 a judgment.

1921(Hall v. Cayot, 141 Cal. 13 [ 74 Pac. 299 ]; Estate of More, 121 Cal. 638 [ 54 Pac. 148 ].) And it is held thgt the allowance of a claim is not in any true sense *423 a judgment.

1906Rep. 53 , 56 Pac. 1038 ]: “The allowance of a claim is not in any true sense a judgment.” In Estate of Glenn, 74 Cal. 567 , [ 16 Pac. 396 ], cases were cited to show “that for some purposes the allowance of a claim is a judgment.” The fact that the allowance and approval may be contested at subsequent stages of the proceedings in probate (Estate of Lohse, 62 Cal. 413 ) shows that the allowance is not a final judgment in the full sense of that term.

1885Proc. § 1636; Estate of Loshe, 62 Cal. 413 ; Estate of Hill, 62 Cal. 186 .) If the allowance of the claim sought to be contested by the present suit was improperly had, and objection is made at the proper time in the Probate Court having control of the administration, that court will doubtless vacate the allowance and compel the administrator to account for the money paid thereon out of the funds of the estate.

2020(Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 543, 572 [“An amicus curiae ordinarily must limit its argument to the issues raised by the parties on appeal, and a reviewing court need not address additional arguments raised by an amicus curiae”].) 18 Evidence Code section 1060, which provides that “the owner of a trade secret has a privilege to refuse to disclose the secret, and to prevent another from disclosing it, if the allowance of the privilege will not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice.” The exemptions in Government Code section 6254 “are permissive, not mand

2015Of the 10 cases cited by Hoffman to the trial court, only one mentioned a trade secret, Hofmann Corp. v. Superior Court (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 357 (Hofmann Corp.).

2007Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (b).) The court reasoned that "a grant of immunity with a proper protective order would not frustrate but would further the legislative purpose of suppressing deceptive advertising" ( Kaufman, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 428-429, 115 Cal.Rptr. 812 , 525 P.2d 716 , fn. omitted), "[n]or would it unduly hamper the prosecution of persons who, in the judgment of the authorities, should be subjected to criminal proceedings" ( id. at p. 429, 115 Cal.Rptr. 812 , 525 P.2d 716 ), and the Legislature remained "free to redefine the limits of authorization" if it believed the court's a

2007Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (b).) The court reasoned that "a grant of immunity with a proper protective order would not frustrate but would further the legislative purpose of suppressing deceptive advertising" ( Kaufman, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 428-429, 115 Cal.Rptr. 812 , 525 P.2d 716 , fn. omitted), "[n]or would it unduly hamper the prosecution of persons who, in the judgment of the authorities, should be subjected to criminal proceedings" ( id. at p. 429, 115 Cal.Rptr. 812 , 525 P.2d 716 ), and the Legislature remained "free to redefine the limits of authorization" if it believed the court's a

2007The court undertook its most painstaking consideration of judicially declared immunity in Daly, supra, 19 Cal.3d 132 , 137 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 560 P.2d 1193 , which was a civil action for damages by the survivors of a newspaper editor who had been killed by hired gunmen in the course of a labor dispute.

2007The court undertook its most painstaking consideration of judicially declared immunity in Daly, supra, 19 Cal.3d 132 , 137 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 560 P.2d 1193 , which was a civil action for damages by the survivors of a newspaper editor who had been killed by hired gunmen in the course of a labor dispute.

2005(See Upjohn Co. v. Hygieia Biological Laboratories (E.D.Cal. 1993) 151 F.R.D. 355 ; Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1391 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 ].) If the court feels it necessary to maintain the secrecy of the fax database, and there are no means by which it can be disclosed to plaintiff without violating its secrecy, 16 the court should consider whether to order defendant to provide notice by telephone facsimile to the persons whose numbers are in the fax database if that can be done without disclosure of the database to plaintiff, and would be relativel

2005(See Upjohn Co. v. Hygieia Biological Laboratories (E.D.Cal.1993) 151 F.R.D. 355 ; Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1391 , 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 .) If the court feels it necessary to maintain the secrecy of the fax database, and there are no means by which it can be disclosed to plaintiff without violating its secrecy, [16] the court should consider whether to order defendant to provide notice by telephone facsimile to the persons whose numbers are in the fax database if that can be done without disclosure of the database to plaintiff, and would be relativel

2002B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999) 229 B.R. 777, 780 ; In re Newton (Bankr.

2002Co. v. Low (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1169 , 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 574 which concluded that there are no exemptions from disclosure for information included in Article 10. [9] The request that this court take judicial notice of the "REASONS FOR APPROVAL/DISAPPROVAL OF REGULATORY ACTION" is granted.

2002Co. v. Low (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1169 , 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 574 which concluded that there are no exemptions from disclosure for information included in Article 10. [9] The request that this court take judicial notice of the "REASONS FOR APPROVAL/DISAPPROVAL OF REGULATORY ACTION" is granted.

2002Corp., supra, 143 F.3d at p. 529 .) The Heckers cite title 11 United States Code section 349 (b) to argue that the allowance of a claim is not final for purposes of res judicata where the case was dismissed prior to confirmation of a reorganization plan. 3 Title 11 United States Code section 349 governs the effect of a dismissal of a bankruptcy proceeding.

1989Assn., supra, 139 Cal. App.2d 241, 246 ; Block v. Sacramento Clinical Labs, Inc., supra, 131 Cal. App.3d 386, 390-391 .) (5b) On the other hand, trade secrets have been recognized as a constitutionally protected intangible property interest. ( Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. (1984) 467 U.S. 986, 1001-1004 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 815, 831-833 , 104 S.Ct. 2862 ].) Evidence Code section 1060 provides: "If he or his agent or employee *319 claims the privilege, the owner of a trade secret has a privilege to refuse to disclose the secret, and to prevent another from disclosing it, if the allowance of the privilege

1989Assn., supra, 139 Cal. App.2d 241, 246 ; Block v. Sacramento Clinical Labs, Inc., supra, 131 Cal. App.3d 386, 390-391 .) (5b) On the other hand, trade secrets have been recognized as a constitutionally protected intangible property interest. ( Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. (1984) 467 U.S. 986, 1001-1004 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 815, 831-833 , 104 S.Ct. 2862 ].) Evidence Code section 1060 provides: "If he or his agent or employee *319 claims the privilege, the owner of a trade secret has a privilege to refuse to disclose the secret, and to prevent another from disclosing it, if the allowance of the privilege

1976An allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, would be inhibitory not simply of falsehood but of other legitimate public comment. *429 In addition, the court struck down the presumption of “malice,” which flowed from the mere fact of publication, as unconstitutional in principle. “ ‘The power to create presumptions is not a means of escape from constitutional restrictions,’ [citation]: ‘the showing of malice required for the forfeiture of the privilege is not presumed but is a matter for proof by the plaintiff. . . .’ [citation].” ( 376 U.S. at p. 284 [

1967He claims prejudice and relies upon People v. Stewart (1857) 7 Cal. 140 , wherein the court said: “It is contended that the prisoner has not been injured by the allowance of the challenge, and that it is the duty of this Court to affirm the judgment, unless it clearly appears that error has intervened.