Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
10 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1882–1995 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Quinn v. Grossgreen2 sentences1924This is substantially the construction of the statute indicated in Quinn v. Gross, 24 Or. 147, 151 ( 33 Pac. 535 ), and Harding v. Grim, 25 Or. 506 ( 36 Pac. 634 ), although in neither of these cases was the direct question presented. * * ” And, in Re Estate of Banzer, 106 Or. 654, 657 ( 213 Pac. 406, 408 ), Mr. Justice Burnett, speaking for the court and commenting upon the two opinions above cited, used this language: "The clear import of these precedents is that the claimant in such cases must make out a prima facie case, sufficient to sustain a verdict in his behalf, independent of his own 1924This is substantially the construction of the statute indicated in Quinn v. Gross, 24 Or. 147, 151 ( 33 Pac. 535 ), and Harding v. Grim, 25 Or. 506 ( 36 Pac. 634 ), although in neither of these cases was the direct question presented. * * ” And, in Re Estate of Banzer, 106 Or. 654, 657 ( 213 Pac. 406, 408 ), Mr. Justice Burnett, speaking for the court and commenting upon the two opinions above cited, used this language: "The clear import of these precedents is that the claimant in such cases must make out a prima facie case, sufficient to sustain a verdict in his behalf, independent of his own | 2 | 2 |
Re Estate of Banzergreen2 sentences1977Looking at it from this standpoint, and keeping in full recognition its purpose, which is to avoid the injustice which might follow from the allowance of a claim against the estate of a deceased person on the testimony of the claimant alone, the reasonable interpretation seems to be that the testimony of the claimant is not sufficient, but there must be other material and pertinent testimony supporting or corroborating that given by him, sufficient to go to the jury and upon which it might find a verdict, so that the decision may rest upon some evidence other than that of the claimant. * * *” 1977Looking at it from this standpoint, and keeping in full recognition its purpose, which is to avoid the injustice which might follow from the allowance of a claim against the estate of a deceased person on the testimony of the claimant alone, the reasonable interpretation seems to be that the testimony of the claimant is not sufficient, but there must be other material and pertinent testimony supporting or corroborating that given by him, sufficient to go to the jury and upon which it might find a verdict, so that the decision may rest upon some evidence other than that of the claimant. * * *” | 1 | 2 |
Brewer v. Erwinyellow1 sentence1995See Brewer v. Erwin, 287 Or 435, 442 , 600 P2d 403 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
McDonald v. Holmesgreen2 sentences1943We quote from McCredie v. McCredie, 134 Or. 517 , 294 P. 361 , in which Mr. Justice Kelly said: “In McDonald v. Holmes, 22 Or. 212, 218 ( 29 P. 735 ), Mr. Justice Lord says: ‘One partner may sue another at law, where the cause of action * * * has been separated from it by explicit acts,’ etc. We find that the explicit acts of delivering the coupons from the bonds in question to Walter H. 1943We quote from McCredie v. McCredie, 134 Or. 517 , 294 P. 361 , in which Mr. Justice Kelly said: “In McDonald v. Holmes, 22 Or. 212, 218 ( 29 P. 735 ), Mr. Justice Lord says: ‘One partner may sue another at law, where the cause of action * * * has been separated from it by explicit acts,’ etc. We find that the explicit acts of delivering the coupons from the bonds in question to Walter H. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Rubelgreen2 sentences1937In the examination of the facts challenged by the exceptions to the allowance of the claim against the estate of the decedent, the court is limited to the specifications set forth in the objections interposed: §11-705, Oregon Code 1930; Roach’s Estate, 50 Or. 179, 190 ( 92 P. 118 ); Irvine v. Beck, supra. Taking up the question of whether there was a contract, express or implied, for repayment of the amount paid by the bank to Joseph Anderson, deceased, we are confronted with the proposition that the law implies a promise to refund whenever one person receives money of another which, in equity 1937In the examination of the facts challenged by the exceptions to the allowance of the claim against the estate of the decedent, the court is limited to the specifications set forth in the objections interposed: §11-705, Oregon Code 1930; Roach’s Estate, 50 Or. 179, 190 ( 92 P. 118 ); Irvine v. Beck, supra. Taking up the question of whether there was a contract, express or implied, for repayment of the amount paid by the bank to Joseph Anderson, deceased, we are confronted with the proposition that the law implies a promise to refund whenever one person receives money of another which, in equity | 1 | 1 |
Roach's Estategreen2 sentences1937In the examination of the facts challenged by the exceptions to the allowance of the claim against the estate of the decedent, the court is limited to the specifications set forth in the objections interposed: §11-705, Oregon Code 1930; Roach’s Estate, 50 Or. 179, 190 ( 92 P. 118 ); Irvine v. Beck, supra. Taking up the question of whether there was a contract, express or implied, for repayment of the amount paid by the bank to Joseph Anderson, deceased, we are confronted with the proposition that the law implies a promise to refund whenever one person receives money of another which, in equity 1937In the examination of the facts challenged by the exceptions to the allowance of the claim against the estate of the decedent, the court is limited to the specifications set forth in the objections interposed: §11-705, Oregon Code 1930; Roach’s Estate, 50 Or. 179, 190 ( 92 P. 118 ); Irvine v. Beck, supra. Taking up the question of whether there was a contract, express or implied, for repayment of the amount paid by the bank to Joseph Anderson, deceased, we are confronted with the proposition that the law implies a promise to refund whenever one person receives money of another which, in equity | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Harding v. Grim
green
2 sentences1924This is substantially the construction of the statute indicated in Quinn v. Gross, 24 Or. 147, 151 ( 33 Pac. 535 ), and Harding v. Grim, 25 Or. 506 ( 36 Pac. 634 ), although in neither of these cases was the direct question presented. * * ” And, in Re Estate of Banzer, 106 Or. 654, 657 ( 213 Pac. 406, 408 ), Mr. Justice Burnett, speaking for the court and commenting upon the two opinions above cited, used this language: "The clear import of these precedents is that the claimant in such cases must make out a prima facie case, sufficient to sustain a verdict in his behalf, independent of his own 1924This is substantially the construction of the statute indicated in Quinn v. Gross, 24 Or. 147, 151 ( 33 Pac. 535 ), and Harding v. Grim, 25 Or. 506 ( 36 Pac. 634 ), although in neither of these cases was the direct question presented. * * ” And, in Re Estate of Banzer, 106 Or. 654, 657 ( 213 Pac. 406, 408 ), Mr. Justice Burnett, speaking for the court and commenting upon the two opinions above cited, used this language: "The clear import of these precedents is that the claimant in such cases must make out a prima facie case, sufficient to sustain a verdict in his behalf, independent of his own | 2 | 1904–1924 |
Walsh v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc.
green
2 sentences1995The allowance of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty for the same purposes would be duplicative of that statutory scheme, see Walsh v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 278 Or 347 , 563 P2d 1205 (1977), and inconsistent with the choices made by the legislature. 1995The allowance of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty for the same purposes would be duplicative of that statutory scheme, see Walsh v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 278 Or 347 , 563 P2d 1205 (1977), and inconsistent with the choices made by the legislature. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Field v. Rodgers
green
2 sentences1977Unless that situation is made to appear independent of his own *190 declarations as a witness as an essential of his contention, he cannot fortify it by his own testimony for it is not present to be fortified.” To the same effect, see also Field v. Rogers, 128 Or 661, 665-66 , 275 P 598 (1929), and see In re Estate of T. 1977Unless that situation is made to appear independent of his own *190 declarations as a witness as an essential of his contention, he cannot fortify it by his own testimony for it is not present to be fortified.” To the same effect, see also Field v. Rogers, 128 Or 661, 665-66 , 275 P 598 (1929), and see In re Estate of T. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
State Ex Rel. Overhulse v. Appling
green
1 sentence1963State ex rel Overhulse et al v. Appling, supra, 226 Or at 598 . | 1 | 1963–1963 |
McCredie v. McCredie
green
2 sentences1943We quote from McCredie v. McCredie, 134 Or. 517 , 294 P. 361 , in which Mr. Justice Kelly said: “In McDonald v. Holmes, 22 Or. 212, 218 ( 29 P. 735 ), Mr. Justice Lord says: ‘One partner may sue another at law, where the cause of action * * * has been separated from it by explicit acts,’ etc. We find that the explicit acts of delivering the coupons from the bonds in question to Walter H. 1943We quote from McCredie v. McCredie, 134 Or. 517 , 294 P. 361 , in which Mr. Justice Kelly said: “In McDonald v. Holmes, 22 Or. 212, 218 ( 29 P. 735 ), Mr. Justice Lord says: ‘One partner may sue another at law, where the cause of action * * * has been separated from it by explicit acts,’ etc. We find that the explicit acts of delivering the coupons from the bonds in question to Walter H. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Chambers v. Chambers
green
2 sentences1901Laws (Laws 1895, p. 89), requiring the executor or administrator of an estate to render an account in April and October of each year, so that if noticé to interested parties can be implied from the allowance of an item of expense incurred in the management or settlement of an estate, from the filing of the account at the times prescribed, such notice cannot be invoked in this case, and hence the allowance of the claim by the administrator does not make out a prima facie case in favor of its validity, if objected to on final accounting, but the claimant must substantiate the reasonableness of t 1901Laws (Laws 1895, p. 89), requiring the executor or administrator of an estate to render an account in April and October of each year, so that if noticé to interested parties can be implied from the allowance of an item of expense incurred in the management or settlement of an estate, from the filing of the account at the times prescribed, such notice cannot be invoked in this case, and hence the allowance of the claim by the administrator does not make out a prima facie case in favor of its validity, if objected to on final accounting, but the claimant must substantiate the reasonableness of t | 1 | 1901–1901 |
Hollis v. Caughman
neutral
1 sentence1901It may be, however, that the order of the county court establishing the validity of Knight’s claim is binding upon all parties in interest; but to have this effect the record must show that notice of the time appointed for the hearing thereof was given, or that said parties were present at the settlement: Hollis v. Caughman, 22 Ala. 478 . | 1 | 1901–1901 |
Kearney v. Snodgrass
green
1 sentence1890The party objecting would have the full benefit of his objection in matters of law, if well founded, either by a ruling in his favor or by an allowance of the exception, and the rights of both parties be secure.” This court, in the case of Kearney v. Snodgrass, 12 Or. 311 , has announced substantially the same rule. | 1 | 1890–1890 |
Grant County v. Sels
neutral
1 sentence1882In the case last cited, the supreme court of Kansas held that it was error in the lower court to instruct the jury that the allowance of the claim in controversy by the board of county commissioners, “is an adjudication as binding on the parties as the judgment of a court.” The same doctrine is maintained in the decision of this court, in Grant County v. Sels, 5 Or., 243 . | 1 | 1882–1882 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.