award violation in Ohio

1981Humble, v. Mark Concepts, Inc. (1979), 60 Ohio St. 2d 77 , this court, at page 79, listed certain principles that govern the allowance of a writ of mandamus to compel the granting of an additional award for violation of a specific safety requirement, as follows: “The law in Ohio is well settled.

1981Humble, v. Mark Concepts Inc. (1979), 60 Ohio St. 2d 77 , this court applied the abuse of discretion standard to the Industrial Commission determination that the employer had not violated a specific safety requirement as set forth in the syllabus: “The Industrial Commission’s denial of an employee’s application for an additional award for violation of a specific safety requirement constitutes an abuse of discretion where the uncontested evidence shows that an employer has violated a specific safety requirement resulting in injury to an employee.

1959They compare their situation to that of the Industrial Commission of Ohio, which is demonstrated in the case of State v. Ohio Stove Co., 154 Ohio St. 27 , 93 N.E.2d 291 , wherein the court says: "By virtue of the provisions of Section 35, Article II of the state Constitution, the decision of the Industrial Commission in a claim for an additional award for violation of a specific requirement is final.

1959They compare their situation to that of the Industrial Commission of Ohio, which is demonstrated in the case of State v. Ohio Stove Co., 154 Ohio St., 27 , 93 N. E. (2d), 291, wherein the court says: ‘ ‘ By virtue of the provisions of Section 35, Article II of the state Constitution, the decision of the Industrial Commission in a claim for an additional award for violation of a specific requirement is final.

2025In doing so, he points to R.C. 3105.171(E)(2), which states, “The court may make a distributive award in lieu of a division of marital property in order to achieve equity between the spouses, if the court determines that a division of the marital property in kind or in money would be impractical or burdensome.” {¶53} Wife argues the trial court did not make a distributive award as it was undisputed that the points were marital property, so the award did not come from separate property, as is necessary for a distributive award. {¶54} A “distributive award” is defined as “any payment or payments

2018Id. at 159-160 .

2008Kaufman v. Byers , 159 Ohio App.3d 238 , 823 N.E. 2d 520 , 2004-Ohio-6346 , at ¶ 37 .

2008Kaufman v. Byers , 159 Ohio App.3d 238 , 823 N.E. 2d 520 , 2004-Ohio-6346 , at ¶ 37 .

1999Comm., 1999-Ohio-181 .] Workers’ compensation—Industrial Commission’s denial of application for an additional award for violation of a specific safety requirement vacated and cause returned to commission for further consideration and amended order, when.

1991Comm. (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 257 , 61 O.O.2d 488 , 291 N.E.2d 748 , paragraph one of the syllabus, that: “The term ‘specific requirement’ * * * does not comprehend a general course of conduct or general duties or obligations flowing from the relation of employer and employee, but embraces such lawful, specific and definite requirements or standards of conduct as are prescribed by statute or by orders of the Industrial Commission, and which are of a character plainly to apprise an employer of his legal obligation toward his employees.” In that an award for a violation of a specific safety requir

1991Comm. (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 257 , 61 O.O.2d 488 , 291 N.E.2d 748 , paragraph one of the syllabus, that: “The term ‘specific requirement’ * * * does not comprehend a general course of conduct or general duties or obligations flowing from the relation of employer and employee, but embraces such lawful, specific and definite requirements or standards of conduct as are prescribed by statute or by orders of the Industrial Commission, and which are of a character plainly to apprise an employer of his legal obligation toward his employees.” In that an award for a violation of a specific safety requir

1984Cf. Jenkins v. Keller (1966), 6 Ohio St. 2d 122 [ 35 O.O.2d 147 ].

1984Cf. Jenkins v. Keller (1966), 6 Ohio St. 2d 122 [ 35 O.O.2d 147 ].

1984Comm. (1977), 49 Ohio St. 2d 268 [ 3 O.O.3d 407 ], the Ohio Supreme Court held that the Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying an additional award for violation of a specific safety requirement where there was no evidence that the employer was in control of the area of a building where there was an opening that was not guarded as specifically required.

1984Comm. (1977), 49 Ohio St. 2d 268 [ 3 O.O.3d 407 ], the Ohio Supreme Court held that the Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying an additional award for violation of a specific safety requirement where there was no evidence that the employer was in control of the area of a building where there was an opening that was not guarded as specifically required.

1975“This does not apply where a shield or exhaust equipment provides adequate eye protection for employees otherwise exposed to the hazards covered in IC-5-10.04(B) (1), to IC-5-10.04(B) (14) inclusive.” It is appellant’s position that “the commission was in error if it concluded that the cited specific requirement IC-5-10 was not applicable,” and that “if the commission concluded that the cited safety requirement was applicable but not violated, then it did so without substantial evidence * * * to support its finding * * In Mees, supra ( 29 Ohio St. 2d 128 ), a writ of mandamus was sought in the