award defense in California

2019Governing Law By allowing recovery of defense costs, Code of Civil Procedure section 1038 aims to discourage "unmeritorious" and "frivolous" litigation. ( Kobzoff v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center (1998) 19 Cal.4th 851 , 857, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 803 , 968 P.2d 514 .) In both the initial filing of an action and its continued maintenance, section 1038 requires the plaintiff to meet two conditions: good faith and reasonable cause. ( Carroll v. State of California (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 134 , 141, 265 Cal.Rptr. 753 .) For a defendant to recover fees, it is sufficient if the trial court fi

2019Governing Law By allowing recovery of defense costs, Code of Civil Procedure section 1038 aims to discourage "unmeritorious" and "frivolous" litigation. ( Kobzoff v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center (1998) 19 Cal.4th 851 , 857, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 803 , 968 P.2d 514 .) In both the initial filing of an action and its continued maintenance, section 1038 requires the plaintiff to meet two conditions: good faith and reasonable cause. ( Carroll v. State of California (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 134 , 141, 265 Cal.Rptr. 753 .) For a defendant to recover fees, it is sufficient if the trial court fi

2017(See In re S.C., supra , 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 453 .).

2017(See In re S.C., supra , 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 453 .).

2019Proc., § 1038.) The award of defense costs is reviewed under two different standards. " 'Reasonable cause' " is determined objectively as a matter of law and is subject to de novo review. ( Hall v. Regents of University of California (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1580 , 1586, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 387 ). " 'Good faith' " is a factual inquiry into the plaintiff's subjective state of mind and is therefore reviewed under a sufficiency of the evidence standard. ( Ibid. ) B.

2019Proc., § 1038.) The award of defense costs is reviewed under two different standards. " 'Reasonable cause' " is determined objectively as a matter of law and is subject to de novo review. ( Hall v. Regents of University of California (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1580 , 1586, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 387 ). " 'Good faith' " is a factual inquiry into the plaintiff's subjective state of mind and is therefore reviewed under a sufficiency of the evidence standard. ( Ibid. ) B.

2014(Carroll, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 139 .) The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgments; however, the court did not specifically consider the argument of whether section 1038 authorizes an award of defense costs against counsel. ( 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 144 .) Instead, the court analyzed section 1038’s requirements of “good faith” and “reasonable cause.” (Carroll, at pp. 140-143.) “An opinion is not authority for a point not raised, considered, or resolved therein.” (Styne v. Stevens (2001) 26 Cal.4th 42, 57 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 14 , 26 P.3d 343 ].) The City also relies heavily on cases in which co

2014(Carroll, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 139 .) The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgments; however, the court did not specifically consider the argument of whether section 1038 authorizes an award of defense costs against counsel. ( 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 144 .) Instead, the court analyzed section 1038’s requirements of “good faith” and “reasonable cause.” (Carroll, at pp. 140-143.) “An opinion is not authority for a point not raised, considered, or resolved therein.” (Styne v. Stevens (2001) 26 Cal.4th 42, 57 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 14 , 26 P.3d 343 ].) The City also relies heavily on cases in which co

2024Vacation of an award under section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5), “must rest on more than a simple error in applying the rules of evidence” and is not a “‘back door . . . through which parties may routinely test the validity of legal theories of arbitrators.’” (Heimlich v. Shivji, supra, 7 Cal.5th 350, 368 .) As discussed, however, the parties stipulated to enhanced judicial review for legal errors, and we therefore review the award for error rather than the more deferential 26 Valencias filed a sufficient and timely petition to confirm the arbitration award, the Mendoza defendants bore the burde

2024Vacation of an award under section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5), “must rest on more than a simple error in applying the rules of evidence” and is not a “‘back door . . . through which parties may routinely test the validity of legal theories of arbitrators.’” (Heimlich v. Shivji, supra, 7 Cal.5th 350, 368 .) As discussed, however, the parties stipulated to enhanced judicial review for legal errors, and we therefore review the award for error rather than the more deferential 26 Valencias filed a sufficient and timely petition to confirm the arbitration award, the Mendoza defendants bore the burde

2001(See, e.g., Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 27-28, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183 , 832 P.2d 899 ; Alternative Systems, Inc. v. Carey (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1034, 1039 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 .) Here, the sole statutory basis for correcting the award is the claim that the arbitrators "exceeded their powers." (§ 1286.6, subd. (b).) [5] We consider that *693 claim, bearing in mind the substantial deference due the arbitrators' determination that they acted within the scope of their powers. [6] ( Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 372, 374, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 581

2001(See, e.g., Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 27-28, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183 , 832 P.2d 899 ; Alternative Systems, Inc. v. Carey (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1034, 1039 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 .) Here, the sole statutory basis for correcting the award is the claim that the arbitrators "exceeded their powers." (§ 1286.6, subd. (b).) [5] We consider that *693 claim, bearing in mind the substantial deference due the arbitrators' determination that they acted within the scope of their powers. [6] ( Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 372, 374, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 581

2001(See, e.g., Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 27-28, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183 , 832 P.2d 899 ; Alternative Systems, Inc. v. Carey (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1034, 1039 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 .) Here, the sole statutory basis for correcting the award is the claim that the arbitrators "exceeded their powers." (§ 1286.6, subd. (b).) [5] We consider that *693 claim, bearing in mind the substantial deference due the arbitrators' determination that they acted within the scope of their powers. [6] ( Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 372, 374, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 581

2001(See, e.g., Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 27-28, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183 , 832 P.2d 899 ; Alternative Systems, Inc. v. Carey (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1034, 1039 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 .) Here, the sole statutory basis for correcting the award is the claim that the arbitrators "exceeded their powers." (§ 1286.6, subd. (b).) [5] We consider that *693 claim, bearing in mind the substantial deference due the arbitrators' determination that they acted within the scope of their powers. [6] ( Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 372, 374, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 581

2025The court reasoned, “[a] contrary holding would permit the exception to swallow the rule of limited judicial review; a litigant could always contend the arbitrator erred and thus exceeded his powers.” (Ibid.) And as the trial court here recognized, the Supreme Court reiterated its Moncharsh holding in Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 362 , 366: “[A]rbitrators do not exceed their powers merely by erroneously deciding a contested issue of law or fact.” Then in Heimlich v. Shivji, supra, 7 Cal.5th 350 (Heimlich), the Supreme Court held that “vacation of an award for ‘r

2022(Johnson v. County of Fresno (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1087, 1096 [“Once a claim has been assigned, the assignee is the owner and has the right to sue on it. [Citations.] In fact, once the transfer has been made, the assignor lacks standing to sue on the claim”].) As a result, the final, partial awards against Trade on the ECL note actually belong to the Bank—ECL obtained those awards by suing on claims that ECL had already assigned to the Bank.

2015But his opening brief states “the attorney fee award should have been limited to the fees 11 Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 615 [“If an action asserts both contract and tort or other noncontract claims, [Civil Code] section 1717 applies only to attorney fees incurred to litigate the contract claims.”].) Defendants’ arguments on this point are unpersuasive.

2014When a defendant in an action for contribution or indemnity prevails on summary judgment or another dispositive motion listed in the statute, "[t]o avoid an award of defense costs and fees under . . . section 1038, the plaintiff must establish that the action was pursued both with reasonable cause and in good faith." (Bosetti, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 1226 .) However, once the trial court determines that the action was either not pursued in good faith or with reasonable cause, "[a]wards of costs and attorney fees under . . . section 1038 include costs and fees incurred defending the judgme

2014(Gray, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1190.) Our interpretation of section 1038 is consistent with well-established authority that “[flee awards against attorneys are ordinarily available only as sanctions and are generally not allowed under routine fee-shifting provisions . . . .” (Moore v. Kaufman, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 615 .) “[T]rial courts may not award attorney fees as a sanction for misconduct absent statutory authority (or an agreement of the parties).” (Clark v. Optical Coating Laboratory, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 150, 164 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 812 ].) Legislative silence on whethe

2014(Gray, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1190.) Our interpretation of section 1038 is consistent with well-established authority that “[flee awards against attorneys are ordinarily available only as sanctions and are generally not allowed under routine fee-shifting provisions . . . .” (Moore v. Kaufman, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 615 .) “[T]rial courts may not award attorney fees as a sanction for misconduct absent statutory authority (or an agreement of the parties).” (Clark v. Optical Coating Laboratory, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 150, 164 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 812 ].) Legislative silence on whethe

2014(Gray, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1190.) Our interpretation of section 1038 is consistent with well-established authority that “[flee awards against attorneys are ordinarily available only as sanctions and are generally not allowed under routine fee-shifting provisions . . . .” (Moore v. Kaufman, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 615 .) “[T]rial courts may not award attorney fees as a sanction for misconduct absent statutory authority (or an agreement of the parties).” (Clark v. Optical Coating Laboratory, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 150, 164 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 812 ].) Legislative silence on whethe

2014(Carroll, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 139 .) The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgments; however, the court did not specifically consider the argument of whether section 1038 authorizes an award of defense costs against counsel. ( 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 144 .) Instead, the court analyzed section 1038’s requirements of “good faith” and “reasonable cause.” (Carroll, at pp. 140-143.) “An opinion is not authority for a point not raised, considered, or resolved therein.” (Styne v. Stevens (2001) 26 Cal.4th 42, 57 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 14 , 26 P.3d 343 ].) The City also relies heavily on cases in which co

2014(Carroll, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 139 .) The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgments; however, the court did not specifically consider the argument of whether section 1038 authorizes an award of defense costs against counsel. ( 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 144 .) Instead, the court analyzed section 1038’s requirements of “good faith” and “reasonable cause.” (Carroll, at pp. 140-143.) “An opinion is not authority for a point not raised, considered, or resolved therein.” (Styne v. Stevens (2001) 26 Cal.4th 42, 57 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 14 , 26 P.3d 343 ].) The City also relies heavily on cases in which co

2014(See Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 690, fn. 13 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 386 , 881 P.2d 1083 ]; Carroll, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at pp. 141-142; Curtis, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1249-1250.) Thus, the City asserts section 1038 provides an option for public entities to recover defense costs incurred in defending against frivolous lawsuits.

2014(See Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 690, fn. 13 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 386 , 881 P.2d 1083 ]; Carroll, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at pp. 141-142; Curtis, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1249-1250.) Thus, the City asserts section 1038 provides an option for public entities to recover defense costs incurred in defending against frivolous lawsuits.

2008(Barella v. Exchange Bank, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 799 [“a section 998 offer must be strictly construed in favor of the party sought to be subjected to its operation”].) 6 Oftentimes legal writers use the terms “claim” and “cause of action” interchangeably with no harm to anyone, but this case illustrates the hazard of their use as synonyms in insurance litigation because “claim” has a particular meaning in the insurance industry. 7 Respondent’s brief states: “[Appellants’] argument, which turns upon the one word ‘all,’ is specious.” 8 Because we are reversing the cost award based on the s

2006Exchange, Inc. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 648, 661 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 378 ] (Louise Gardens), in which the appellate court held the conduct of the insured after the issuance of an appraisal award “constituted an adoption and ratification” of the award and barred a challenge to it.

2006Exchange, Inc. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 648, 661 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 378 ] (Louise Gardens), in which the appellate court held the conduct of the insured after the issuance of an appraisal award “constituted an adoption and ratification” of the award and barred a challenge to it.