award defense in Oregon

2016After the Court of Appeals issued its decision, Weyer- haeuser moved for reconsideration, arguing that, in revers- ing the trial court’s judgment in favor of Stayton on its Cite as 359 Or 610 (2016) 621 indemnity claim, the Court of Appeals should have reversed the award for defense costs as well.

2012In the prior case on which the court relied, Bailey v. Morrison-Knudsen, 5 Or App 592, 598 , 485 P2d 1254 (1971), the court had quoted the statute and stated: “Here, the employer initiated the request for review by the board from an award of the hearing officer of permanent total disability.

2012In the prior case on which the court relied, Bailey v. Morrison-Knudsen, 5 Or App 592, 598 , 485 P2d 1254 (1971), the court had quoted the statute and stated: “Here, the employer initiated the request for review by the board from an award of the hearing officer of permanent total disability.

2008If there was error, it was not “apparent” and did not “appear on the face of the record,” which are two of the requisites for plain error under Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 381 , 823 P2d 956 (1991).

2008If there was error, it was not “apparent” and did not “appear on the face of the record,” which are two of the requisites for plain error under Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 381 , 823 P2d 956 (1991).

2008Similarly, defendant’s lack of opposition to the award of defense costs and his failure to object to the court’s finding on ability to pay inhibits the advancement of his second assignment of error to this court. 4 Affirmed. 1 The trial court file does not include a copy of the application for court-appointed counsel. 2 Defendant confirmed in oral argument that he did not seek a jury trial on the consecutive sentencing factors under State v. Ice, 343 Or 248 , 170 P3d 1049 (2007), cert granted,_US_, 128 S Ct 1657 (2008). 3 ORAP 5.45(1) provides, in part, that “[n]o matter claimed as error will

2008Similarly, defendant’s lack of opposition to the award of defense costs and his failure to object to the court’s finding on ability to pay inhibits the advancement of his second assignment of error to this court. 4 Affirmed. 1 The trial court file does not include a copy of the application for court-appointed counsel. 2 Defendant confirmed in oral argument that he did not seek a jury trial on the consecutive sentencing factors under State v. Ice, 343 Or 248 , 170 P3d 1049 (2007), cert granted,_US_, 128 S Ct 1657 (2008). 3 ORAP 5.45(1) provides, in part, that “[n]o matter claimed as error will

2008Similarly, defendant’s lack of opposition to the award of defense costs and his failure to object to the court’s finding on ability to pay inhibits the advancement of his second assignment of error to this court. 4 Affirmed. 1 The trial court file does not include a copy of the application for court-appointed counsel. 2 Defendant confirmed in oral argument that he did not seek a jury trial on the consecutive sentencing factors under State v. Ice, 343 Or 248 , 170 P3d 1049 (2007), cert granted,_US_, 128 S Ct 1657 (2008). 3 ORAP 5.45(1) provides, in part, that “[n]o matter claimed as error will

1992Largent v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (A69831), 116 Or App 661 , 842 P2d 447 (1992). 2 None of the cases that the parties cite is controlling, and none is as persuasive as the language of the policy. 3 The award on that claim was $1,000.

1992Largent v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (A69831), 116 Or App 661 , 842 P2d 447 (1992). 2 None of the cases that the parties cite is controlling, and none is as persuasive as the language of the policy. 3 The award on that claim was $1,000.

1987As noted in our opinion, 84 Or App at 131 , the claim was classified as nondisabling.

1983Finally, TSPC argues that, at least for petitioner, the attorney fees incurred here are a “cost of doing business” and, as such, normally not subject to an award under the doctrine of Polizos v. OLCC, 40 Or App 135 , 594 P2d 1248 (1979).

1983Finally, TSPC argues that, at least for petitioner, the attorney fees incurred here are a “cost of doing business” and, as such, normally not subject to an award under the doctrine of Polizos v. OLCC, 40 Or App 135 , 594 P2d 1248 (1979).

1982SAIF relies on Bentley v. SAIF, 38 Or App 473 , 590 P2d 746 (1979), for the proposition that the circuit court may modify the Board’s attorney fee award only if the Board “abused its discretion.” In Bentley , we discussed our own scope of review of an attorney fee award made by the Board and decided that we would modify the Board’s award only in the case of a “manifest abuse of discretion.” 38 Or App at 481 .

1982SAIF relies on Bentley v. SAIF, 38 Or App 473 , 590 P2d 746 (1979), for the proposition that the circuit court may modify the Board’s attorney fee award only if the Board “abused its discretion.” In Bentley , we discussed our own scope of review of an attorney fee award made by the Board and decided that we would modify the Board’s award only in the case of a “manifest abuse of discretion.” 38 Or App at 481 .

1979However, we conclude that under Pritchett v. Fry, 286 Or 189 , 593 P2d 1133 (1979), the original award was in error.

1979However, we conclude that under Pritchett v. Fry, 286 Or 189 , 593 P2d 1133 (1979), the original award was in error.